

Platos Parmenides

(*1st draft*)

Parallel Translations

Oxford Greek, Balboas, Loeb, Thomas Taylor, Morrow & Dillon, Jowett

beginning

126α

1st

137c

2nd

142b

3rd

155e

4th

157b

5th

159b

6th

160b

7th

163bc

8th

164b

9th

165e

Oxford Greek



PLATO

PARMENIDES
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

[Or Concerning Ideas : Dialectical]

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΙΔΕΩΝ : ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ]

THE CHARACTERS OF THE DIALOGUE
ΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ

CEPHALOS , ADEIMANTOS , ANTIPHON , GLAUKON , PYTHODOROS
ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ , ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ , ΑΝΤΙΦΩΝ , ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ , ΠΥΘΟΔΩΠΟΣ

SOCRATES , ZENO , PARMENIDES , ARISTOTELES
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ , ΖΗΗΩΝ , ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ , ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

Translated by Juan and Maria Balboa , following The Lead of Dr Pierre Grimes 11 26 16

Loeb's

Parmenides

Cephalus

Adeimantus

Antiphon

Glaucou

Pythodorus

Socrates

Zeno

Parmenides

Aristoteles

Thomas Taylor's

THE PARMENIDES

persons of the dialogue

Cephalus Pythodorus

Adimantus Socrates

Antiphon Zeno

Glaucou Parmenides

scene, the Ceramicus

Oxford Greek

Κέφαλος ἐπειδὴ Ἀθήναζε οἴκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἀφικόμεθα, κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐνετύχομεν
Ἀδεϊμάντῳ τε καὶ Γλαύκῳ· καί μου **λαβόμενος** τῆς χειρὸς ὁ Ἀδεϊμάντος, Χαῖρ', ἔφη, ὦ
Κέφαλε,

καὶ εἵ του δέῃ τῶν τῆδε ὧν ἡμεῖς δυνατοί, φράζε.

ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, πάρειμί γε ἐπ' **αὐτό** τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν.

λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, τὴν δέησιν.

Balboas

Cephalos: **1** Immediately after we arrived at Athens from Clazomenaea , the place of our abode ,
126A Επειδὴ ἀφικόμεθα Ἀθηναζε ἐκ Κλαζομενων οἰκοθεν

we happened to meet with Adeimantos and Glaucon at the place of assembly (the agora) ;

ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδεϊμάντῳ τε καὶ Γλαυκῳ , κατ' ἀγορὰν :

and Adeimantos , taking me by the hand said ...

καὶ ὁ Ἀδεϊμάντος λαβόμενος μου τῆς χειρὸς εἶπε

Adeimantos: Welcome , O Cephalos , and if there is anything you need , of those things that

χειρ , ὦ Κέφαλε , καὶ εἰ τοῦ δεεῖ τῶν
we have here , of which we are able to provide , please ask .

τῆδε , ὧν ἡμεῖς δυνατοί , φράζε .

Cephalos: Then on the one hand , I am certainly here indeed , for this very purpose ,

Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ παρειμί γε ἐπ' τοῦτο αὐτό
as being in need of your help .

δεησόμενος ὑμῶν .

Adeimantos: Please tell us , your need .

ἂν λέγοις , τὴν δέησιν .

126a λαβόμενος

129e λαμβανόμενοις

135e λάβοι

126a αὐτό

126b αὐτῷ

126c αὐτοῖς, αὐτόν

126a λέγοις

126c λέγεις

127a ἔλεγον, λέγειν

Loeb

Cephalus: When we came from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, we met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the market-place. Adeimantus took me by the hand and said,

“Welcome, Cephalus if there is anything we can do for you here, let us know.”

“Why,” said I, “that is just why I am here, to ask a favour of you.”

“Tell us,” said he, “what it is.”

Thomas Taylor

Cephalus: When we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, the place of our abode, we fortunately met with Adimantus and Glaucus in the forum: and Adimantus, taking me by the hand,

I am glad to see you (says he), Cephalus; and if you are in want of any thing here, in which we are able to assist you, I beg you would inform me.

Upon which I replied, I came for this very purpose, as being indigent of your assistance.

Tell me, then (says he), what you are in want of.

Morrow and Dillon

Cephalus: When we arrived in Athens from our home in Clazomenae, we encountered Adeimantus and Gloucon in the agora.

And taking me by the hand Adeimantus said, “Good cheer, Cephalus. If you wish anything of us here which we can do for you, tell us.”

“But that is exactly what I am here for,” I replied, “to make a request of you.”

“Tell me your request,” he said.

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· τῷ ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν **ὄνομα**; οὐ γὰρ μέμνημαι. παῖς δέ που ἦν, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησα δεῦρο ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν· **πολὺς** δὲ ἤδη **χρόνος** ἐξ ἐκείνου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρί, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης **ὄνομα**.

πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

αὐτῷ δέ γε;

Ἀντιφῶν. ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνη;

Balboas

Cephalos: What was your maternal brother's name ? For I do not remember .

126B τι ην υμων τω ομομητριω τω αδελφω ονομα ; γαρ ου μεμνημαι .

For at that time he was just a child when I came here before to the assembly from Clazomenaea ;

δε το ην που παις οτε δευρο προτερον επεδημησα εκ Κλαζομενων :

but since that time , a great length of time has already taken place .

δε εξ εκεινου , πολυς χρονος ηδη .

But , his father's name was , Pyrilampes , I believe .

γαρ μεν τω πατρι ονομα , Πυριλαμπης , δοκω .

Adeimantos: Quite so . (Πανυ γε .)

Cephalos: To be sure , but what was his name ?

γε δε Αυτω ;

Adeimantos: Antiphon . But what is it that you need most to enquire after ?

Αντιφων . αλλα τι μαλιστα πυνθανει ;

126b ὄνομα, ὄνομα

133d ὀνομάζεται

142a ὄνομα, ὀνομάζεται

126b πολὺς

126c πολλά, πολλά

127a πολὺ

126b χρόνος

136e χρόνου

140c χρόνου

126a αὐτό

126b αὐτῷ

126c αὐτοῦς, αὐτόν

127a αὐτῷ

Loeb

And I said, "What was your half-brother's name? I don't remember. He was only a boy when I came here from Clazomenae before and that is now a long time ago. His father's name, I believe, was Pylilampes."

"Yes," said he.

"And what is his own name?"

"Antiphon. Why do you ask?"

Thomas Taylor

And I replied, What was your brother's name? for I do not remember: as he was almost a child when I first came here from Clazomenia; and, since that circumstance took place, a great length of time has intervened. But his father's name was, I think, Pylilampes.

Entirely so (says he) and my brother's name was Antiphon. But what is it you principally inquire after?

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Morrow and Dillon

And I replied, "Your maternal brother, what was his name? For I don't remember. He was a child when I was here from Clazomenae before, and it has been a long time since then. The name of his father, I think, was Pylilampes."

"Quite Right," he said, "and his is Antiphon. But what is it you particularly want to know?"

οἶδε, εἶπον ἐγὼ, πολῖται τ' ἐμοί εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκόασί τε ὅτι οὗτος ὁ Ἀντιφῶν
Πυθοδώρῳ **τινὶ** Ζήνωνος ἑταίρῳ **πολλὰ** ἐντετύχηκε, καὶ τοὺς **λόγους**, οὓς **ποτε** Σωκράτης καὶ
Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθοδώρου ἀπονημονεύει.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, **λέγεις**.

τούτων τοίνυν, εἶπον, δεόμεθα διακούσαι.

ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν, ἔφη: μειράκιον γὰρ ὢν **αὐτούς** εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν, ἐπεὶ νῦν γε κατὰ τὸν
πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον πρὸς ἵπικῇ τὰ **πολλὰ διατρίβει**. ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ, ἴωμεν παρ' **αὐτόν**: ἄρτι
γὰρ ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται, οἴκει δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν Μελίτῃ.

Balboas

Cephalos: You are aware , that these fellow-citizens of mine , are quite philosophical ,
Οἶδ' , τ' πολῖται ἐμοί , εἰσι μάλα φιλοσοφοί ,
and have heard that this very Antiphon , was frequently present with one Pythodoros ,
τε ἀκηκοάσι ὅτι οὗτος ὁ Ἀντιφῶν **πολλὰ** ἐντετυχήκε **τινὶ** Πυθοδώρῳ
the companion of Zeno , and that he treasured in his memory **The Discourses/Logos** which
126C **εταίρῳ** Ζηνωνος , καὶ ἀπονημονεύει τοὺς λόγους οὓς
Socrates , Zeno , and Parmenides had with each other at that time , having been often heard
Σωκράτης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν **ποτε** , **πολλάκις** ἀκούσας
from Pythodoros .
του Πυθοδωρου .

Adeimantos: You speak the truth .(λέγεις Ἀληθῆ .)

Cephalos: Accordingly then , we are in need of hearing these discourses .
τοίνυν δεόμεθα διακούσαι , Τούτων .

Adeimantos: But this is no difficult matter to accomplish : for the young man has made **Them**
Ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν , γὰρ μειράκιον ὢν αὐτούς
the subject of quite focused attention ; and indeed after that , he now applies himself very
εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν , γε ἐπεὶ νῦν διατρίβει **πολλὰ**
closely to equestrian affairs with his grandfather who also has the same name . Then if we must ,
πρὸς τὰ ἵπικῇ κατὰ τὸν πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον . ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ ,
let us go to **him** ; for he just now went home from here ; for he lives very near , in Melita .
ἴωμεν παρ' αὐτόν : γὰρ ἄρτι οἴχεται οἴκαδε ἐνθένδε , δε οἴκει ἐγγὺς ἐν Μελίτῃ .

126b τινὶ

127a τινὰ
127c τινός

126b πολὺς

126c πολλὰ, πολλὰ

127a πολὺ
127c πολλοίς

126c λόγους

127a λόγους
127c λόγων

126c ποτε

127a ποτε
130d ποτέ, ποτε

126a λέγοις

126c λέγεις

127a ἔλεγον, λέγειν
127b λέγεσθαι

126a αὐτό

126b αὐτῷ

126c αὐτούς, αὐτόν

127a αὐτῷ
127b αὐτόν

126c

διατρίβει

Loeb

“These gentlemen,” I said, “are fellow-citizens of mine, who are very fond of philosophy. They have heard that this Antiphon had a good deal to do with a friend of Zeno's named Pythodorus, that Pythodorus often repeated to him the conversation which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides once had together, and that he remembers it.”

“That is true,” said he.

“Well,” I said, “we should like to hear it.”

“There is no difficulty about that,” said he “for when he was a youth he studied it with great care though now he devotes most of his time to horses, like his grandfather Antiphon. If that is what you want, let us go to him. He has just gone home from here, and he lives close by in Melite.”

Thomas Taylor

I replied, These my fellow-citizens are very philosophic, and have heard that this Antiphon was frequently present with one Pythodorus, the familiar of Zeno, and that he treasured in his memory the discourses which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other, and which had frequently been heard by Pythodorus.

You speak the truth (says he).

These discourses, therefore (says I), we are desirous to hear.

But this (says he) is no difficult matter to accomplish: for the young man has made them the subject of vehement meditation; and now with his grandfather, who bears the same name as himself, very much applies himself to equestrian affairs.

But if it is necessary, we will go to him: for he just now went from hence home; and dwells very near, in Melita.

Morrow and Dillon

“These men,” I said, “are fellow-citizens of mine and true philosophers. They have heard that this Antiphon has been much in the company with a certain Pythodorus, one of Zeno's associates, and has often heard him recount the conversation that took place between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides, and can retell it.”

“What you say is correct,” he said.

“Then it is this,” I said, “that we want to hear.”

“That will not be difficult,” he said. “When he was a youth he practiced the conversation very diligently; but now, like his grandfather for whom he is named, he devotes most of his attention to horses. If you wish, let us go to him. He has just left here to go to his home, and he lives nearby in Melite.”

ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν, καὶ κατελάβομεν τὸν Ἀντιφῶντα οἴκοι, χαλινόν **τινα** χαλκεῖ ἐκδιδόντα σκευάσαι: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἱ τε ἀδελφοὶ **ἔλεγον αὐτῷ** ὧν ἔνεκα παρῆμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέν τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καὶ με ἡσπάζετο, καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς **λόγους**, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὥκνει—**πολὺ** γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι— ἔπειτα μέντοι διηγείτο. ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν **λέγειν** τὸν Πυθόδωρον ὅτι ἀφίκοιντό **ποτε** εἰς Παναθήναια τὰ **μεγάλα**

Cephalos: After we had thus spoke , we proceeded to the house of Antiphon ; and we found him
 127A Ταῦτα εἰποντες εβαδιζομεν τον Αντιφωντα και κατελαβομεν
 at home , handing a bridle to a coppersmith to be prepared **in a certain way** ; but as soon as
 οἱκοι εκδιδοντα χαλινον χαλκει σκευασαι τινα : δε επειδη
 the smith was gone , and his brother had told **him** the reason for which we had arrived , he also
 εκεινου απηλλαγη τε οι αδελφοι ελεγον αυτω ενεκα ων παρειμεν , τε
 recognized me , in consequence of my former journey to this place , and he greeted us kindly ;
 ανεγνωρισε με , εκ της προτερας επιδημιας και ησπαζετο ,
 and upon our pleading with him to relate **The Discourses/Logos** , at first , he hesitated
 και ημων δεομενων διελθειν τους λογους , το μεν πρωτον ωκνει(οκνεω)
 –for he said it was a great deal of work– but afterwards , he most certainly set it out in detail .
 –γαρ εφη ειναι πολυ εργον– επειτα μεντοι διηγειτο .
 Therefore , Antiphon said indeed , that Pythodoros spoke to say ...
 δε ο Αντιφων εφη δη οτι τον Πυθοδωρον λεγειν ...

126b τινι

127a τινα

127c τινάς

128a τινά

126a λέγεις

126c λέγεις

127a ἔλεγον, λέγειν

127b λέγεσθαι

127c λέγεις, λέγεις, λεγόμενα, λέγεις

126b αὐτῷ

126c αὐτοῦς, αὐτόν

127a αὐτῷ

127b αὐτόν

127c αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖ, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτόν

126c λόγους

127a λόγους

127c λόγων

127d λόγου

126b πολὺς

126c πολλά, πολλά

127a πολὺ

127c πολλοὺς

127c πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

126c ποτε

127a ποτε

130d ποτέ, ποτε

134d ποτέ

127a μεγάλα

128c μέγα

130e μεγάλα

Loeb

Thereupon we started, and we found Antiphon at home, giving a smith an order to make a bridle. When he had got rid of the smith and his brother told him what we were there for, he remembered me from my former visit and greeted me cordially, and when we asked him to repeat the conversation, he was at first unwilling—for he said it was a good deal of trouble—but afterwards he did so. Antiphon, then, said that Pythodorus told him that

Thomas Taylor

After we had thus spoke, we proceeded to the house of Antiphon; and found him at home, giving a certain bridle to a coppersmith, to be furnished in a proper manner. But as soon as the smith was gone, and the brothers had told him the cause of our arrival, Antiphon knew me, in consequence of my former journey to this place, and very kindly saluted me: and upon our begging him to relate the discourses, at first he seemed unwilling to comply (for he said it was a very operose undertaking); but afterwards, however, he gratified our request. Antiphon, therefore, said that

Morrow and Dillon

“Having said this, we set out to walk there. We found Antiphon at home, giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted. And when he was free of him, his brothers told him why we had come. He recognized me from my former visit and bade me welcome. When we asked him to repeat the conversation, he at first was reluctant, saying that it was a very difficult task; but he then gave a full rehearsal of it. According to Antiphon, Pythodorus said that

Oxford Greek

Ζήνων τε καὶ Παρμενίδης. τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα ἤδη πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολιόν, **καλὸν** δὲ **κάγαθόν** τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα: Ζήνωνα δὲ ἑγγυὺς τῶν τετταράκοντα **τότε** εἶναι, εὐμήκη δὲ καὶ χαρίεντα ἰδεῖν, καὶ **λέγεσθαι αὐτόν** παιδικὰ τοῦ Παρμενίδου **γεγονέναι**.

Balboas

Antiphon: At that time , Zeno and Parmenides arrived to celebrate The Great Panathenaea .

127B ποτε Ζηνων τε και Παρμενιδης αφικοιντο εις τα μεγαλα Παναθηναια .
Thus , on the one hand , Parmenides was already quite well advanced in years , very gray-haired ,
συν μεν Παρμενιδην ειναι ηδη μαλα ευ πρεσβυτην , σφοδρα τον πολιον ,
but of a beautiful and good appearance , most nearly about sixty-five years of age ; but that on the
δε καλον καγαθον την οψιν , μαλιστα περι εξηκοντα και πεντε ετη : δε
other hand , at that time , Zeno was nearly forty years old , but very tall and graceful to see ;
τοτε Ζηνωνα ειναι εγγυς τετταρακοντα ετων , δε ευμηκη και χαριεντα ιδειν :
and **he** was said to have come to be the dear friend of Parmenides.
και αυτον λεγεσθαι γεγονεναι παιδικα του Παρμενιδου :

127b καλόν

128a καλώς, καλώς
130b καλοῦ

127b κάγαθόν

130b ἀγαθοῦ
134c ἀγαθόν

127b τότε

127c τότε, τότε
152c τότε, τότε, τότε

127b γεγονέναι

127d γενόμενον
129a γίγνεσθαι

126c αὐτοῖς, αὐτόν

127a αὐτῷ

127b αὐτόν

127c αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτόν

127d αὐτός, αὐτοῦ, αὐτός

126c λέγεις

127a ἔλεγον, λέγειν

127b λέγεσθαι

127c λέγεις, λέγεις, λεγόμενα, λέγεις

128a λέγων

Loeb

Zeno and Parmenides once came to the Great Panathenaea; that Parmenides was already quite elderly, about sixty-five years old, very white-haired, and of handsome and noble countenance; Zeno was at that time about forty years of age; he was tall and good-looking, and there was a story that Parmenides had been in love with him.

Thomas Taylor

related that Zeno and Parmenides once came to celebrate the great Panathenaea: that Parmenides was very much advanced in years, extremely hoary, but of a beautiful and venerable aspect, and about sixty-five years of age; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, was very tall and graceful to the view, and was reported to be the bosom friend of Parmenides.

Morrow and Dillon

on one occasion Zeno and Parmenides came to the Great Panathenaea. Parmenides was already quite an elderly man with very grey hair, but handsome and good to look upon. His age was probably about five and sixty. And Zeno was nearing forty at the time, tall and graceful in appearance; and it is said he had been the favorite of Parmenides.

καταλύειν δὲ **αὐτοὺς** ἔφη παρὰ τῷ Πυθοδώρῳ ἔκτος τείχους ἐν Κεραμεικῷ: οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι τόν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους **τινὰς** μετ' **αὐτοῦ πολλούς**, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος γραμμάτων—**τότε** γὰρ **αὐτὰ** πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνων κομισθῆναι—Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι **τότε** σφόδρα **νέον**. ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν **αὐτοῖς** τὸν Ζήνωνα **αὐτόν**, τὸν δὲ Παρμενίδην **τυχεῖν ἔξω** ὄντα:

Balboas

Then Pythodoros said that **they**

δε Πυθοδωρῳ εφη αυτους

lodged with him , in the Ceramicus , outside the walls ; where indeed Socrates also arrived ,
 127C καταλυειν παρα τω , εν Κεραμεικω εκτος τειχους : οι δη τον Σωκρατη και αφικεσθαι
 and many certain others with him , who had set their heart upon hearing the written discourses
 τε και πολλους τινας αλλους μετ' αυτου , επιθυμουντας ακουσαι των γραμματων
 of Zeno ; for at that time , **they** first began to pay attention to his writings ; since Socrates was
 του Ζηνωνος : γαρ τοτε αυτα πρωτον κομισθηναι υπ' εκεινων : δε Σωκρατη ειναι
 very young at that time . Therefore , Zeno himself read to **them selves** , while Parmenides
 σφοδρα νεον τοτε . ουν τον Ζηνωνα αυτον αναγιγνωσκειν αυτοις , δε τον Παρμενιδην
 happened to be outside ;
 τυχειν οντα εξω :

126b τι

127a τινα

127c τινὰς

128a τινά

130d τινα

127a αὐτῷ

127b αὐτόν

127c αὐτοὺς, αὐτοῦ, αὐτὰ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτόν

127d αὐτός, αὐτοῦ, αὐτός

127e αὐτά, αὐτοῦ

126c πολλά, πολλά

127a πολὺ

127c πολλούς

127c πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

128b πολλά, πολλά

127b τότε

127c τότε, τότε

152c τότε, τότε, τότε, τότε

152d τότε, τότε

127c νέον

128e νέου, νέου

130e νέος

127c τυχεῖν

133b τύχοι

138c τυγχάνει

127c ἔξω

138d ἔξω

138e ἔξω, ἔξω

Loeb

He said that they lodged with Pythodorus outside of the wall, in Cerameicus, and that Socrates and many others with him went there because they wanted to hear Zeno's writings, which had been brought to Athens for the first time by them. Socrates was then very young. So Zeno himself read aloud to them, and Parmenides was not in the house.

Thomas Taylor

He likewise said that he met with them, together with Pythodorus, in the Ceramicus, beyond the walls; where also Socrates came, and many others with him, desiring to hear the writings of Zeno, for then for the first time they became acquainted with his writings: but that Socrates at that time was very young. That, in consequence of this, Zeno himself read to them. And Pythodorus further related that it happened Parmenides was gone out;

Morrow and Dillon

He said they lodged with Pythodorus outside the city wall in the Cerameicus. Socrates and many others with him came there desiring to hear the work of Zeno, for these visitors had brought it to Athens for the first time. Socrates was quite young. Zeno himself read it to them (Parmenides happened to be out),

Oxford Greek

καὶ εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν **λόγων** ἀναγινωσκομένων, ἥνικα **αὐτός** τε ἐπεισελθεῖν ἔφη
 ὁ Πυθόδωρος ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετ' **αὐτοῦ** καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα
γενόμενον, καὶ σμικρ' ἄττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων: οὐ μὴν **αὐτός** γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον
 ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ Ζήνωνος.
 τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα **πάλιν** τε κελεῖναι τὴν πρώτην **ὑπόθεσιν** τοῦ πρώτου **λόγου**
 ἀναγνῶναι, καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης,

Balboas

so that only a small part of **the discourses** still remained to be read ,
 και ειναι πανυ βραχυ των λογων ετι λοιπον αναγινωσκομενων ,
 when Pythodoros **him self** , together with Parmenides came in from outside , and also
 127D ηνικα ο Πυθοδωρος αυτος τε μετ' τον Παρμενιδην επεισελθειν εξωθεν και
 Aristotle who he **him self** said became one of the thirty tyrants . So that they still had to hear
 Αριστοτελες αυτου εφη γενομενον τον των τριακοντα , και ετι επακουσαι
 some small part of the discourses ; not however Pythodoros **him self** , since he had indeed heard
 αττα σμικρ' των γραμματων : ου μην αυτος αλλα γε ακηκοεναι
 the discourses of Zeno before .
 του Ζηνωνος προτερον .

2 Therefore , Socrates having listened , he then urged him to read again the first hypothesis
 ουν Τον Σωκρατη ακουσαντα τε κελευσαι αναγνῶναι παλιν την πρωτον υποθεσιν
 of the first **Logos** , and having been read ; Socrates said ...
 του πρωτου λογου , και αναγνωσθεισης : φαναι

126c λόγους
 127a λόγους
127d λόγων
 127d λόγου
 127e λόγοι, λόγων, λόγους

127b αὐτόν
 127c αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτόν
127d αὐτός, αὐτοῦ, αὐτός
 127e αὐτά, αὐτοῦ
 128b αὐτός, αὐτόν

127b γεγονέναι
127d γενόμενον
 129a γίγνεσθαι
 129b γηγόμενα

127d πάλιν

136a πάλιν
 142b πάλιν

127d ὑπόθεσιν

128d ἐπὶ ὑπόθεσιν
 136a ὑποθέσεως, ἐπὶ ὑπόθεσιν

127a λόγους
 127c λόγων
127d λόγου
 127e λόγοι, λόγων, λόγους
 128c λόγῳ

Loeb

Pythodorus said the reading of the treatises was nearly finished when he came in himself with Parmenides and Aristoteles (the one who was afterwards one of the thirty), so they heard only a little that remained of the written works. He himself, however, had heard Zeno read them before. Socrates listened to the end, and then asked that the first thesis of the first treatise be read again. When this had been done, he said:

Thomas Taylor

and that but a small part of the discourse remained unfinished, when he himself entered, together with Parmenides and Aristotle, who was one of the thirty Athenians. That, in consequence of this, he heard but a little at that time; but that he had often before heard the whole discourse from Zeno. He further added, that Socrates, upon hearing the latter part of Zeno's discourse, entreated him to repeat the first hypothesis of his first discourse; and that, when he had repeated it, Socrates said -

Morrow and Dillon

and had almost completed the reading of the arguments when Pythodorus, as he said, came in and joined them, accompanied by Parmenides and Aristotle, the man who later was one of the Thirty; and they listened to the remaining part of the composition, though Pythodorus had himself heard Zeno read it before. When Socrates had heard it all he asked that the first hypothesis of the first argument be read again; and when it had been read, said,

Oxford Greek

πῶς, φάναι, ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστί τὰ ὄντα, ὥς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὅμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ διὰ ἀδύνατον: οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὔτε τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια οἶόν τε εἶναι; οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις;

οὕτω, φάναι τὸν Ζήωνα.

οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τὰ τε ἀνόμοια ὅμοια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον διὰ καὶ πολλά εἶναι; εἰ γὰρ πολλά εἴη, πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα.

Balboas

Socrates: In what way do you mean this , O Zeno ? If **The Beings** are Many , is it then

127Ε Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο , ὦ Ζηνων ; εἰ τὰ ὄντα ἐστί πολλά , ἀρα

necessary that **They** be both **Like** and **Unlike** ? But this is certainly impossible .

δεῖ ὡς αὐτὰ εἶναι τε ὁμοία καὶ ἀνομοία , δε τοῦτο διὰ ἀδύνατον :

For it is not possible for **The Unlike** to be **Like** nor for **The Like** to be **Unlike** ?

γὰρ οὔτε εἶναι οἶον τε τὰ ἀνομοία ὁμοία οὔτε τὰ ὁμοία ἀνομοία ;

You do not mean it in this way , do you ?

οὐχ λέγεις οὕτω ;

(For Socrates thinks that The Ideas are Separate

Zeno: Yes , in this way .

from Each Other and are not “Woven-together”)

Οὕτω .

Socrates: Is it not the case then , that if it is indeed impossible that both **The Unlike** be **Like**

Οὐκοῦν

εἰ

διὰ

ἀδύνατον

τε

τὰ ἀνομοία

εἶναι ὁμοία

and **The Like** be **Unlike** , it is certainly impossible that **many** should also exist . For if **many**

καὶ τὰ ὁμοία ἀνομοία , διὰ ἀδύνατον πολλά καὶ εἶναι : γὰρ εἰ πολλά

were to exist , then **they** would undergo impossibilities .

εἴη

,

ἂν

πάσχοι

τὰ ἀδύνατα .

127a ἔλεγον, λέγειν

127b λέγεσθαι

127e λέγεις, λέγεις, λεγόμενα, λέγεις

128a λέγων

128b λέγειν, λέγοντας, λεχθέντα

127a πολὺ

127c πολλοὺς

127e πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

128b πολλά, πολλά

128d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

127c αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτόν

127d αὐτός, αὐτοῦ, αὐτός

127e αὐτά, αὐτοῦ

128b αὐτός, αὐτόν

128d αὐτόν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτόν

127e ὅμοιά, ὅμοια, ὅμοια, ὅμοια, ὅμοια

129a ὅμοια, ὅμοιά

129b ὅμοιά, ὅμοια

127e ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

129a ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοια

129b ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

127e πάσχοι

128d πάσχειν, πάσχοι

129b πεπονθότα

Loeb

“Zeno, what do you mean by this? That if existences are many, they must be both like and unlike, which is impossible; for the unlike cannot be like, nor the like unlike? Is not that your meaning?”

“Yes,” said Zeno.

“Then if it is impossible for the unlike to be like and the like unlike, it is impossible for existences to be many; for if they were to be many, they would experience the impossible.

Thomas Taylor

How is it you assert, O Zeno, that if beings are many, it is requisite that the same things should be both similar and dissimilar? But that this is impossible. For neither can things dissimilar be similar, nor things similar be dissimilar. Is not this what you assert?

Zeno answered, It is.

If, therefore, it is impossible that dissimilars should be similar, and similars dissimilar, is it not impossible that many things should have a subsistence? For, if there were many, they would suffer impossibilities.

Morrow and Dillon

“Zeno, what do you mean by this? If beings are many, they must be both like and unlike; but this is clearly impossible; for it is impossible that unlike should be like or like unlike. Is this not what you say?”

“It is,” said Zeno.

“Therefore if it is impossible for unlike to be like and like things to be unlike, it is impossible that being is many; for if it is many it would have impossible characteristics.

Oxford Greek

ἄρα τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται σου οἱ **λόγοι**, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ **λεγόμενα** ὡς οὐ **πολλά** ἐστι; καὶ τούτου **αὐτοῦ** οἶει σοι τεκμήριον εἶναι ἕκαστον τῶν **λόγων**, ὥστε καὶ ἡγῆι τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι, ὅσουςπερ **λόγους** γέγραφας, ὡς οὐκ ἐστι **πολλά**; οὕτω **λέγεις**, ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω;

Balboas

Is this then , the intention of your
 ἐστιν τουτο αρα ο βουλονται σου
Discourses , and no other one , than to struggle through all arguments , to show that **many**
 οι λογοι , ουκ αλλο τι , η διαμαχεσθαι παρα παντα τα λεγομενα , ως πολλα
 do not exist ? And do you consider each of your **Discourses** to be a positive proof
 ου εστι ; και οiei εκαστων σοι των λογων ειναι τεκμηριον
 in support of your hypothesis ; so that you are also led to think that you have produced as many
 αυτου τουτου , ωστε και ηγει παρεχεσθαι τοσαυτα
 positive proofs , as you have composed **Discourses** , to show that **many** do not exist ?
 τεκμηρια οσουστερ γεγραφας λογους , ως πολλα ουκ εστι ;
 Do you mean it in this way , or do I not **understand** you correctly ?
 128A λεγεις ουτω , η εγω ουκ καταμανθανω ορθως ;

127c λόγων
 127d λόγου
127e λόγοι, λόγων, λόγους
 128c λόγῳ
 128d λόγῳ

127a ἔλεγον, λέγειν
 127b λέγεσθαι
127e λέγεις, λέγεις, λεγόμενα, λέγεις
 128a λέγων
 128b λέγειν, λέγοντας, λεχθέντα

127a πολὺ
 127c πολλοὺς
127e πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, **πολλά, πολλά**
 128b πολλά, πολλά
 128d πολλά, πολλά , πολλά

127c αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτόν
 127d αὐτός, αὐτοῦ, αὐτός
127e αὐτά, αὐτοῦ
 128b αὐτός, αὐτόν
 128d αὐτόν, αὐτῶν, αὐτόν

Loeb

Is that the purpose of your treatises, to maintain against all arguments that existences are not many? And you think each of your treatises is a proof of this very thing, and therefore you believe that the proofs you offer that existences are not many are as many as the treatises you have written? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood?”

Thomas Taylor

Is it not then the sole intention of your discourses to evince, by contesting through all things, that *the many* has no subsistence? And do you not consider each of your discourses as an argument in support of this opinion; and so think that you have produced as many arguments as you have composed discourses, to show that *the many* is not? Is not this what you say, or do I not rightly understand you?

Morrow and Dillon

Then is this the aim of your arguments, none other than to maintain valiantly, against everything that is said, that things are not many? And you think that each of your arguments is a proof of this, so that you consider you have as many proofs that things are not many as the number of the arguments in your book? Is this what you say, or have I misunderstood you?”

οὐκ, ἀλλά, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, **καλῶς** συνηκας **ὅλον** τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται.
 μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὅτι Ζήνων ὅδε οὐ **μόνον** τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ
 βούλεται ὥκειώσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι. **ταῦτόν** γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον **τινά** ὅπερ σύ,
 μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειράται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς **ἕτερόν** τι **λέγων**. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν
 φῆς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχει **καλῶς** τε καὶ εὖ:

Balboas

Zeno: No other way .You **have understood** quite well **the intent** of the whole work .
 Ουκ ἀλλὰ , συνηκας καλως ο βουλεται το ολον γραμμα .

Socrates: I understand , O Parmenides , that Zeno does not only wish to be situated
 Μανθανω , ω Παρμενιδες , οτι Ζηνων ου μονον βουλεται ωκειωσθαι
 in the other close bonds of friendship with you , but also **to agree** with you in the following
 τη ἀλλῃ φιλία σου , ἀλλὰ καὶ οδε
writings . For he has written in the very same direction as you , although , by changing
 τω συγγραμματι . γαρ γεγραφε οπερ ταυτον τροπον συ , δε μεταβαλλων
 certain particulars , he endeavors to **deceive** us that he asserts something other . For on the one
 τινα πειραται εξαπατον ημας ως λεγων τι ετερον . γαρ μεν
 hand , you assert in your poems that **The All** is **One** , and you produce sound proofs
 128B συ φης εν τοις ποιησαν το παν ειναι εν , και παρεχει τεκμηρια
 in a beautiful and good way in support of these hypotheses :
 καλως τε και ευ τουτων :

127b καλόν
128a καλῶς, καλῶς
 130b καλοῦ
 133c καλῶς
128a ὅλον
 131a ὅλου, ὅλον
 131b ὅλον, ὅλον
128a μόνον
 136a μόνον
 138c μόναι

128a ταῦτόν
 128b ταῦτά
 128d ταῦτά
 127a τινα
 127c τινάς
128a τινά
 130d τινα
 131e τίνα
128a ἕτερόν
 129c ἕτερα, ἕτερα, ἕτερα, ἕτερα
 132b ἕτερον

127b λέγεσθαι
 127c λέγεις, λέγεις, λεγόμενα, λέγεις
128a λέγων
 128b λέγειν, λέγοντας, λεχθέντα
 128c λέγεις

Loeb

“No,” said Zeno, “you have grasped perfectly the general intent of the work.”

“I see, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “that Zeno here wishes to be very close to you not only in his friendship, but also in his writing. For he has written much the same thing as you, but by reversing the process he tries to cheat us into the belief that he is saying something new. For you, in your poems, say that the all is one, and you furnish proofs of this in fine and excellent fashion;

Thomas Taylor

Upon which Zeno replied, You perceive excellently well the meaning of the whole book.

That Socrates then said, I perceive, O Parmenides, that this Zeno does not only wish to connect himself in the bands of friendship with you, but to agree with you likewise in sentiments concerning the doctrines of the present discourse. For Zeno, in a certain respect, has written the same as yourself; though, by changing certain particulars, he endeavours to deceive us into an opinion that his assertions are different from yours. For you in your poems assert that the universe is *one*; and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in support of this opinion:

Morrow and Dillon

“No,” said Zeno, “you have correctly understood the aim of the entire composition.”

“I see, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “that Zeno here aspires to be one with you not only in personal affection, but also in writing; for in a sense he has written the same thing as you, but he has changed it and is trying to deceive us into thinking he is saying something different. For you say in your poems that the All is One and for this you advance proofs in beautiful and goodly fashion;

ὁδε δὲ αὖ οὐ **πολλά** φησιν εἶναι, τεκμήρια δὲ καὶ **αὐτὸς** πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέχεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἔν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ **πολλά**, καὶ οὕτως ἐκάτερον **λέγειν** ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν **αὐτῶν** εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι **λέγοντας ταῦτά**, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρησθαι.

ναί, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, ὦ Σώκρατες. σὺ δ' οὖν τὴν **ἀλήθειαν** τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ **ἥσθησαι**. καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναι σκύλακες εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ **λεχθέντα**:

Balboas

but on the other hand , he says

δε φησιν
in turn , the following : that **many** is not , and then he produced very-many and very-mighty
αυ οδε πολλά ειναι ου , και δε αυτος παρεχεται παμπολλα και παμμεγεθη
positive proofs . Therefore , on the one hand , you affirm that **The All** is **One** , but on the other
τεκμηρια . ουν μεν φαναι το τον εν δε
hand , he denies that **The All** is **many** ; and in this way , almost saying the same thing , each one
μη τον πολλα , και ουτως σχεδον λεγοντας ταυτα τι , εκαστον
speaks , so as to appear not to have said the same things . Thus the latter **discourses** are revealed
λεγειν ωστε δοκειν μηδεν ειρηκεναι των αυτων , τους αλλους φαινεται
to us to be said in a way that is **above and beyond our way** of speaking/understanding .
υμιν ειρησθαι υπερ ημας τα ειρημενα .

Zeno: Yes , O Socrates . So it is , but you **have not** perfectly perceived **The Truth** of my words ;

Ναι , ω Σωκράτες . ουν δ' συ ου πανταχου ησθησαι την αληθειαν του γραμματος .
although , just as Spartan hounds , you **have** indeed well pursued and tracked their **intent** .

128C καιτοι ωσπερ αι Λακαιναι σκυλακες γε ευ μεταθεις τε και ιχνευεις τα λεχθεντα .

127c πολλούς
127e πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
128b πολλά, πολλά
128d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
129a πολλά

127d αὐτός, αὐτοῦ, αὐτός
127e αὐτά, αὐτοῦ
128b αὐτός, αὐτῶν
128d αὐτόν, αὐτῷ, αὐτῶν
128e αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

127e λέγεις, λέγεις, λεγόμενα, λέγεις
128a λέγων
128b λέγειν, λέγοντας, λεχθέντα
128c λέγεις
128d λέγοντας

128a ταῦτόν
128b ταῦτά
128d ταῦτά
129b ταῦτά

128b ἀλήθειαν
131c ἀληθεία
134a ἀλήθεια, ἀληθείας
128b ἥσθησαι
135c ἥσθησθαι
142a αἰσθάνεται

Loeb

and he, on the other hand, says it is not many, and he also furnishes very numerous and weighty proofs. That one of you says it is one, and the other that it is not many, and that each of you expresses himself so that although you say much the same you seem not to have said the same things at all, appears to the rest of us a feat of expression quite beyond our power.”

“Yes, Socrates,” said Zeno, “but you have not perceived all aspects of the truth about my writings. You follow the arguments with a scent as keen as a Laconian hound's,

Thomas Taylor

but Zeno says that *the many* is not, and delivers many and mighty arguments in defence of this assertion. As, therefore, you assert that *The One* is, and he, that *the many* has no subsistence; and each speaks in such a manner as to disagree totally according to appearance from one another, though you both nearly assert the same; on this account it is that your discourses seem to be above our comprehension.

That Zeno said -Indeed, Socrates, so it is: but you do not perfectly apprehend the truth of my writings; though, like Laconic dogs, you excellently pursue and trace the meaning of the assertions.

Morrow and Dillon

but he on the other hand says it is not many, and himself brings forward many and lengthy proofs. For one of you to say it is one, and the other that it is not many, and for each of you to speak so as to seem not to be saying the same things, although what you say is almost the same, this way of speaking of yours appears to be above us hearers.”

“Yes, Socrate,” said Zeno; “but you have not altogether sensed the truth about this composition. Although you are as keen as a Laconion dog in picking up the sent and following the track of my arguments,

Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὥστε ἅπερ σὺ **λέγεις** διανοηθὲν γραφῆναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὥς τι **μέγα** διαπραττόμενον· ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν **συμβεβηκότων** τι, ἔστι δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδου **λόγῳ** πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας

Balboas

But in the first place , this , remains *unnoticed* by you , that the written words are *not* ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο λανθάνει σε , ὅτι το γράμμα σου *in every respect* so venerable , so that it was composed , as you say then , with the intention παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται , ὥστε γραφῆναι ἀπερ συ ληγεις δε διανοηθεν of **concealing** from men , as if I was doing something of great importance ; but on the one hand , επικρυπτομενον τους ανθρωπους , ως διαπραττομενον τι μεγα : ἀλλὰ μὲν you have spoken something of those things which happen to be the case , but on the other hand , συ ειπες τι των συμβεβηκοτων , δε **The Truth** of the matter is indeed that these writings were composed for the purpose of **providing** το αληθες εστι γε ταυτα τα γραμματα a certain **assistance** to **The Logos** of Parmenides , against those who try their hand at τις βοηθεια τω λογῳ Παρμενιδου προς τους επιχειρουντας

128a λέγων
128b λέγειν, λέγοντας, λεχθέντα
128c λέγεις
128d λέγοντας
129a λέγεις

127a μέγала
128c μέγα
130e μέγала
131d μεγάλων, μέγα, μείζον, μείζον, μείζον

128c συμβεβηκότων
128d συμβαίνει
134b συμβαίνοι

127d λόγου
127e λόγοι, λόγων, λόγους
128c λόγῳ
128d λόγῳ
130b λόγους

Loeb

but you do not observe that my treatise is not by any means so pretentious that it could have been written with the intention you ascribe to it, of disguising itself as a great performance in the eyes of men. What you mentioned is a mere accident, but in truth these writings are meant to support the argument of Parmenides against those who attempt to

Thomas Taylor

But this in the first place is concealed from you, that this discourse is not in every respect so venerable, that it was composed, as you say, for the purpose of concealing its real doctrines from men, as if effecting a thing of great importance: yet you have spoken something of that which happens to be the case. But indeed the truth of the matter is this: These writings were composed for the purpose of affording a certain assistance to the doctrine of Parmenides, against those who endeavour to

Morrow and Dillon

nevertheless you are first of all mistaken in thinking that my writing, whose purpose was exactly what you say it was, made any lofty pretension of deceiving the public into thinking that something great was being worked out. What you mentioned is one of the incidental consequences. It is indeed true that these writings are a kind of aid to Parmenides' discourse against those who try to

αὐτὸν κωμωδεῖν ὥς εἰ ἓν ἐστι, **πολλά** καὶ γελοῖα **συμβαίνει** **πάσχειν** τῷ **λόγῳ** καὶ ἐναντία **αὐτῷ**. ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ **πολλά** **λέγοντας**, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι **ταῦτά** καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὥς ἔτι γελοιότερα **πάσχοι** ἢ **αὐτῶν** ἢ **ὑπόθεσις**, εἰ **πολλά** ἐστίν, ἢ ἢ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίῃ.

Balboas

comically representing **Self** ; by asserting that if **One Is** , many ridiculous and opposite results
 128D κωμωδεῖν αὐτον ὡς εἰ ἐν ἐστι , πολλά και γελοια και εναντια συμβαινει
 happen to **The Self Logos** .
 πασχειν τω αυτω λογω .

Truly then , this writing , contradicts the advocates of **the many** , and
 δη ουν τουτο το γραμμα αντιλεγει τους λεγοντας προς τα πολλα , και
 opposes this and many other **such opinions** ; by being willing to make clear that the hypothesis
 ανταποδιδωσι τουτο και πλειω ταυτα , βουλομενον δηλουν ως η υποθεσις
 that asserts that **many** is , will undergo/suffer **even more** absurd consequences , than that
 ει πολλα εστιν , αν πασχοι ετι γελοιοτερα η η
 which asserts that **The One Is** ; if anyone **of them** is sufficiently gone through in detail .
 του εν ειναι , ει τις αυτων ικανως επεξειμι .

127e αὐτά, αὐτοῦ

128b αὐτός, αὐτῶν

128d αὐτόν, αὐτῷ, αὐτῶν

128e αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

129a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτά

127e πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

128b πολλά, πολλά

128d πολλά, πολλά , πολλά

129a πολλά

129b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

128c συμβεβηκότων

128d συμβαίνει

134b συμβαίνοι

136a συμβαίνοντα, συμβαίνειν, συμβήσεται,

127e πάσχοι

128d πάσχειν, πάσχοι

129b πεπονθότα

129c πάσχοντα

127e λόγοι, λόγων, λόγους

128c λόγῳ

128d λόγῳ

130b λόγους

132c λόγον

128b λέγειν, λέγοντας, λεχθέντα

128c λέγεις

128d λέγοντας

129a λέγεις

129c λέγων

128a ταῦτόν

128b ταῦτά

128d ταῦτά

129b ταῦτά

129d ταῦτόν

127d ὑπόθεσιν

128d ὑπόθεσις

136a ὑποθέσεως, ὑποθέσεως

136b ὑποθέσεως

Loeb

jeer at him and assert that if the all is one many absurd results follow which contradict his theory. Now this treatise opposes the advocates of the many and gives them back their ridicule with interest, for its purpose is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one.

Thomas Taylor

defame it by attempting to show that if The One is many, ridiculous consequences must attend such an opinion; and that things contrary to the assertion must ensue. This writing, therefore, contradicts those who say that *the many* is, and opposes this and many other opinions; as it is desirous to evince that the hypothesis which defends the subsistence of *the many* is attended with more ridiculous consequences than that which vindicates the subsistence of *The One*, if both are sufficiently examined.

Morrow and Dillon

make fun of it by saying that if it is One, many ridiculous and self-contradictory consequences follow for his doctrine. This writing is directed against those who affirm the many, and it more than repays their attacks; its purpose is to show that the hypothesis of the many has ever more ridiculous consequences than the hypothesis of the one, if we examine it thoroughly.

Oxford Greek

διὰ **τοιαύτην** δὴ φιλονικίαν ὑπὸ **νέου** ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καὶ τις **αὐτὸ** ἔκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλευσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἴτ' ἐξοιστέον **αὐτὸ** εἰς τὸ φῶς εἴτε μή. ταύτη οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ **νέου** φιλονικίας οἶει **αὐτὸ** γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ **πρεσβυτέρου** φιλοτιμίας: ἐπεὶ, ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπήκασας.

Balboas

Therefore , it has *escaped your notice* , O Socrates , that *this discourse* , which was composed
 128E ουν λανθάνει σε , ὦ Σωκράτες , ὅτι ταύτη , γεγράφθαι
 by me when I was a youth , through such a thing indeed as the *love of contention* , and the writing
 ἐμοῦ ὑπο ὄντος νέου , διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονεικίαν , καὶ γραφέν
 itself was stolen by someone , so that I was not able to consult whether *Self should* be brought out
 αὐτο ἐκλεψε (κλεπτῶ) τις , ὥστε οὐδε βουλευσασθαι εἴτ' αὐτο ἐξοιστέον
 or *Led* into *The Light* or not . It has *escaped your notice* , I say , that it was not composed
 ἐξεγένετο εἰς τὸ φῶς εἴτε μη . οἶει ὅτι οὐχ
 through that *Love of Honor* , which belongs to a more advanced period of life , but through
 ὑπο φιλοτιμίας πρεσβυτέρου , ἀλλ' ὑπο
 a juvenile *love of contention* ; although , just as I have said indeed , you do not conjecture amiss .
 νέου φιλονεικίας ; ἐπεὶ , ὅπερ εἶπον γ' , οὐ ἀπεικασάς κακῶς .

128d τοιαύτην

129a τοιοῦτῳ
 129d τοιαῦτα, τοιαῦτα

127c νέον

128e νέου,
 νέου

128b αὐτός, αὐτῶν

128d αὐτόν, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

128e αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

129a αὐτό, αὐτό
 129b αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτό

128e πρεσβυτέρου

137a πρεσβυτέρῳ
 140e πρεσβύτερον

Loeb

It was in such a spirit of controversy that I wrote it when I was young, and when it was written some one stole it, so that I could not even consider whether it should be published or not. So, Socrates, you are not aware of this and you think that the cause of its composition was not the controversial spirit of a young man, but the ambition of an old one. In other respects, as I said, you guessed its meaning pretty well."

Thomas Taylor

You are ignorant, therefore, Socrates, that this discourse, which was composed by me when a youth, through the love of contention, and which was privately taken from me, so that I was not able to consult whether or not it should be issued into the light - you are ignorant, I say, that it was not written through that desire of renown which belongs to a more advanced period of life, but through a juvenile desire of contention: though, as I have said, you do not conjecture amiss.

Morrow and Dillon

In this controversial spirit I wrote it when a young man; and someone stole a copy of it, so that it was no longer open to me to consider whether or not it should be published. This is where you are mistaken, Socrates; you did not see that it was written in a youthful spirit of controversy, not in the emulous ambition of an older man. And yet, as I said, your likening of it (to Parmenides' discourse) is not ill-taken."

ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς **λέγεις** ἔχειν. τόδε δέ μοι εἶπέ: οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι **αὐτὸ** καθ' **αὐτὸ εἶδος** τι **ὁμοιότητος**, καὶ τῷ **τοιούτῳ** αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν **ἀνόμοιον**: τούτοις δὲ **δυοῖν** ὄντοις καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλα ἃ δὴ **πολλὰ** καλοῦμεν **μεταλαμβάνειν**; καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς **ὁμοιότητος** **μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια γίνεσθαι** ταύτῃ τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν **μεταλαμβάνῃ**, τὰ δὲ τῆς **ἀνομοιότητος** **ἀνόμοια**, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφοτέρω; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων **μεταλαμβάνει**,

Balboas

Socrates: **3** I admit it then , and I am **Led** to believe that the case is just as you have stated it .
 ἀποδεχομαι Ἀλλ' , καὶ ἡγουμεν ὡς εχειν λεγεις .
 But explain to me about the following particulars : Do you not consider that there is a certain
 δε ειπε μοι τοδε : ου νομιζεις ειναι τι
Idea/Species of Likeness , **Self According to Self** , and another one such as this but opposite ,
 129A ειδος ομοιοτητος αυτο καθ' αυτο , και τω αλλο τι τοιουτω εναντιον ,
 that is in turn , an **Unlike Idea/Species** . But that **you and me** , and **all the other things**
 εστιν αυ ανομοιον ο : δε σε και εμε και ταλλα
 which we surely call **many** , have a **Share** of **These Two Beings** ? And that on the one hand ,
 α δη καλουμεν πολλα μεταλαμβανειν τουτοις δυοις οντοις ; και μεν
things that **Share** of **Likeness** become **like** , and according that the degree that **such things** may
 τα μεταλαμβανοντα της ομοιοτητος γινεσθαι ομοια , και κατα οσον τοσουτον αν
Share in **This** ; but **those** that **Share** of **Unlikeness** become **unlike** ; but that **those that Share**
 μεταλαμβανη ταυτη , δε τα της ανομοιοτητος ανομοια , δε τα
 of **Both** become **both** ? Therefore , if **all things** also **Share** of both opposite **Beings** ,
 αμφοτερων αμφοτερα ; δε ει παντα και μεταλαμβανει αμφοτερων εναντιων οντων ,

128c λέγεις
 128d λέγοντας
129a λέγεις
 129c λέγων
 129d λέγειν

128d αὐτόν, αὐτῷ, αὐτόν
 128e αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό
129a αὐτό, αὐτό
 129b αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτό
 129c αὐτά, αὐτοῖς

129a εἶδος
 129c εἶδη

129a ὁμοιότητος, ὁμοιότητος
 129c ὁμοιοτήτῃ
 130b ὁμοίτης, ὁμοιότητος

128d τοιαύτην
129a τοιούτῳ
 129d τοιαύτα, τοιαῦτα
 129e τοιότῃ

127e ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια
129a ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοια
 129b ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια
 135e ἀνόμοια

129a δυοῖν
 138b δύο
 142e δυοῖν

128b πολλά, πολλά
 128d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
129a πολλά
 129b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
 129c πολλά, πολλά

129a μεταλαμβάνειν, μεταλαμβάνοντα, μεταλαμβάνῃ, μεταλαμβάνει
 130e μεταλαμβάνοντα, μεταλαμβάνοντα
 131a μεταλαμβάνον, μεταλαμβάνει

127e ὁμοιά, ὅμοια, ὅμοια, ὅμοια, ὅμοια
129a ὅμοια
 129b ὁμοιά, ὁμοιά, ὅμοια
 130e ὅμοια

129a ἀνομοιότητος
 129e ἀνομοιότητα
 140e ἀνομοιότητός

127b γεγονέναι
 127d γενόμενον
129a γίνεσθαι
 129b γιγνόμενα
 130c γέγονα

Loeb

“I see,” said Socrates, “and I accept your explanation. But tell me, do you not believe there is an idea of likeness in the abstract, and another idea of unlikeness, the opposite of the first, and that you and I and all things which we call many partake of these two? And that those which partake of likeness become like, and those which partake of unlikeness become unlike, and those which partake of both become both like and unlike, all in the manner and degree of their participation? And even if all things partake of both opposites,

Thomas Taylor

I admit it (says Socrates); and I think the case is just as you have stated it. But satisfy me in the following particulars. Do you think that there is a certain form of similitude, itself subsisting from itself? And another which is contrary to this, and is that which is dissimilar? But that you and me, and other things which we call many, participate of these two? And that such things as participate of similitude become similar, so far as they participate? But those which participate of dissimilitude become dissimilar? And that those which participate of both become both? But if all things participate of both, which are contrary to each other,

Morrow and Dillon

“I accept your explanation,” said Socrates, “and believe that it is as you say. But tell me this. Do you not think there exists a form, Likeness, itself by itself, and another form contrary to it which is Unlikeness? And that of these two Forms you and I and the other things which we call “many” partake? Also that things which partake of Likeness come to be alike in that respect and just in so far as they partake of it, and those that partake of Unlikeness come to be unlike, while those that partake of both become both? Even if all things partake of both, contrary as they are,

καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά τις ἀπέφαιεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια, τέρας ἂν οἶμαι ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφοτέρα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ, οὐδὲ γε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ταῦτά ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους αὖ μετέχειν. ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ ἔστιν ἕν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει καὶ αὖ τὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἕν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι.

Balboas

and are both like and unlike their Selves by Participating in both ; then , what is wonderful ?
 129B καὶ ἐστὶ ὁμοία τε καὶ ἀνομοία αὐτοῖς αὐτὰ τῷ μετεχειν ἀμφοῖν , τι θαυμαστόν ;
 For if , on the one hand , anyone brings to Light that The Like Selves become Unlike ,
 γὰρ εἰ μὲν τις ἀπεφαιεν τα ὁμοία αὐτὰ γιγνόμενα ἀνομοία
 or The Unlike Selves become Like , then I think , that it would be monstrously absurd ; but if
 ἢ τα ἀνομοία ὁμοία , οἶμαι , ἂν ἦν , τέρας : εἰ
 on the other hand , someone were to bring to Light that such things that Participate of Both
 δε ἀποφαινει τα μετεχοντα ἀμφοτερων
 of These Ideas , undergo both of these conditions , then as far as I'm concerned , O Zeno ,
 τούτων πεπονθότα ἀμφοτέρα , ἐμοίγε , ὦ Ζήνων ,
 it does not appear to be out of the ordinary ; nor indeed , if anyone would show that all things
 οὐδὲν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀτοπον , οὐδε γε εἰ τις ἀποφαινει ἅπαντα
 are one , through their Participation of The One , and that these Same Selves are many , in turn ,
 ἐν τῷ μετεχειν τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα πολλὰ αὐ
 through their Participation of Plurality . But if someone were to show , that This Self which
 τῷ μετεχειν πλήθους : ἀλλ' εἰ ἀποδείξει τοῦτο αὐτο ὁ
 Is One , is many , and in turn that the many are indeed One ; I shall immediately wonder at this .
 ἐστὶν ἐν πολλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἐν , ἤδη θαυμάσομαι τοῦτο .

128e αὐτὸ, αὐτό, αὐτό

129a αὐτό, αὐτό

129b αὐτὰ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτό

129c αὐτά, αὐτοῖς

129d αὐτόν

127e ὁμοιά, ὁμοια, ὁμοια, ὁμοια, ὁμοια

129a ὁμοια

129b ὁμοιά, ὁμοιά, ὁμοια

130e ὁμοια

132d ὁμοῖον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοῖο, ὁμοιον

127e ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

129a ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοια

129b ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

135e ἀνόμοια

136b ἀνομοῖο

127d γενόμενον

129a γίγνεσθαι

129b γιγνόμενα

130c γέγονα

130e γίγνεσθαι

129b μετέχειν, μετέχοντα, μετέχειν, μετέχειν

129c μετέχω

129d μετέχων

127e πάσχει

128d πάσχειν, πάσχει

129b πεπονθότα

129c πάσχοντα

132b πάσχει

128b ταῦτά

128d ταῦτά

129b ταῦτά

129d ταῦτόν

128d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

129a πολλά

129b πολλά,

πολλά, πολλά

Loeb

and are enabled by their participation to be both like and unlike themselves, what is there wonderful about that? For if anyone showed that the absolute like becomes unlike, or the unlike like, that would, in my opinion, be a wonder; but if he shows that things which partake of both become both like and unlike, that seems to me, Zeno, not at all strange, not even if he shows that all things are one by participation in unity and that the same are also many by participation in multitude; but if he shows that absolute unity is also many and the absolute many again are one, then I shall be amazed.

Thomas Taylor

and become similar and dissimilar to each other through participating of both, is there any thing wonderful in the case? For, if any one should show that similars themselves become dissimilar, or dissimilars similar, I should think it would be a prodigy: but if he evinces that such things as participate both these suffer likewise both these, it does not appear to me, O Zeno, that there would be any thing absurd in the case; nor again, if any one should evince *that all things are one*, through their participating of *The One*, and at the same time *many*, through their participating multitude. But I should very much wonder if any one should show that that which is *one* is *many*, and that *the many* is *one*;

Morrow and Dillon

and by having a share in both are at once like and unlike one another, what is there surprising in that? If someone were proving that like things themselves become unlike, or unlike things themselves like, that, I think, would be a monstrosity; but if things which partake of both are shown to have both characters, it does not seem to me strange, Zeno, nor if somebody should prove that all things are one because partaking of unity and the same things many because partaking of plurality. But if he could show that the one itself is many and the many themselves one, at this I should be amazed.”

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὡσαύτως· εἰ μὲν **αὐτὰ** τὰ γένη τε καὶ **εἵδη** ἐν **αὐτοῖς** ἀποφαίνοι
τάναντία ταῦτα πάθη **πάσχοντα**, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ **πολλὰ**, τί
θαυμαστόν, **λέγων**, ὅταν μὲν βούληται **πολλὰ** ἀποφῆναι, ὡς **ἕτερα** μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μου ἔστιν,
ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ **ἕτερα** μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, **ἕτερα** δὲ τὰ ὀπίσθεν, καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω
ὡσαύτως—πλήθους γὰρ οἶμαι **μετέχω**

Balboas

And similarly in **All the other cases** ; if on the one hand , someone could bring to **Light** an
129C καὶ ὡσαυτως περὶ ἀπαντων των αλλων : εἰ μὲν ἀποφαίνοι
argument worthy of admiration ; by showing that both the **Generic** and **Ideal Selves** undergo
ἀξιον θαυμάζειν , τε τα γένη καὶ εἵδη αὐτὰ πασχόντα
these opposite **experiences** **Them Selves** . But if on the other hand , someone demonstrates that
ταῦτα τάναντία παθῆεν αὐτοῖς : εἰ δ' τις ἀποδείξει
I am both *one* and *many* , what would be wondrous about this ? And demonstrate this assertion ,
ἐμὲ ὄντα ἐν καὶ πολλὰ , τι θαυμαστόν ,
by saying , on the one hand , that when he wishes to bring to **Light** that I am **many** , that the parts
λέγων , μὲν ὅταν βούληται ἀποφαινεῖν πολλὰ , ὡς μὲν τὰ
on the right side of me are other , from those parts on the left , and that the front parts are other ,
ἐπὶ δεξιά μου ἔστιν ἕτερα , δὲ τὰ ἕτερα ἐπ' ἀριστερά , καὶ μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν ἕτερα ,
from the back parts , and in like manner , the upper from the lower parts ; for I think that
δὲ τὰ ὀπίσθεν ἕτερα , καὶ ὡσαυτως ἄνω καὶ κάτω : γὰρ οἶμαι
I participate of **Plurality** .
129D μετέχω πληθους :

129a αὐτὸ, αὐτό
129b αὐτὰ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτὰ, αὐτό
129c αὐτὰ, αὐτοῖς
129d αὐτὸν
129e αὐτὰ, αὐτὰ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτῆς, αὐτοῖς

129a εἶδος
129c εἵδη
129d εἵδη
129e εἵδεν
128d πάσχειν, πάσχει
129b πεπονθότα
129c πάσχοντα
132b πάσχει
135c πάσχοντα

129a πολλά
129b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
129c πολλά, πολλά
129d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
129e πολὺ

128d λέγοντας
129a λέγεις
129c λέγων
129d λέγειν
129e ἔλεγον, λέγω
128a ἕτερόν
129c ἕτερα, ἕτερα, ἕτερα, ἕτερα
132b ἕτερον
132c ἕτερον

129b μετέχειν, μετέχοντα, μετέχειν, μετέχειν
129c μετέχω
129d μετέχων
130b μετέχοντα

Loeb

The same applies to all other things. If he shows that the kinds and ideas in and by themselves possess these opposite qualities, it is marvellous but if he shows that I am both one and many, what marvel is there in that? He will say, when he wishes to show that I am many, that there are my right parts and my left parts, my front parts and my back parts, likewise upper and lower, all different; for I do, I suppose, partake of multitude;

Thomas Taylor

and in a similar manner concerning all the rest: for, doubtless, he would produce a proper subject of admiration, who should evince that both genera and species suffer these contrary affections. But what occasion of wonder would there be, should any one show that I myself am both *one* and *many*? and should prove his assertion by saying, when he wishes to assert that I am *many*, that the parts on the right hand of me are different from those on the left, the anterior from the posterior, and in like manner the upward from the downward parts (for I think that I participate of multitude):

Morrow and Dillon

“And likewise in all other cases. If he shows that genera and species themselves have in them these contrary attributes, that would be worthy of admiration; but what is there astonishing in showing that I am both one and many? When he wants to show I am many, he would say my right side is different from my left, that my front is other than my back, and so also my upper and lower parts; for I do partake of plurality, I think.

Oxford Greek

—ὅταν δὲ ἓν, ἐρεῖ ὡς ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἰς ἐγὼ εἰμι ἄνθρωπος **μετέχων** καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. ἐὰν οὖν τις **τοιαῦτα** ἐπιχειρῇ **πολλὰ** καὶ ἐν **ταῦτόν** ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ **τοιαῦτα**, τὶ φήσομεν **αὐτόν πολλὰ** καὶ ἐν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ ἐν **πολλὰ** οὐδὲ τὰ **πολλὰ** ἓν, οὐδὲ τι θαυμαστὸν **λέγειν**, ἀλλ' ἅπερ ἂν πάντες ὁμολογοῖμεν:

Balboas

But on the other hand , when he desires to show that I am **one** ,
 δε οταν εν
 he should say that since there are seven of us , I am **one** man and **Participate** of **The One** ,
 ερει ως οντων επτα ημων εγω ειμι εις ανθρωπος και μετεχων του ενος
 so that in this way he would bring to Light **The Truth** of both these assertions . Thus , if anyone ,
 ωστε αποφαινει αληθη αμφοτερα . ουν εαν τις
 should **endeavor** to show that stones and wood and such particulars , are both **many** and **one** ,
 επιχειρη αποφαινειν λιθους και ξυλα και τα τοιαυτα , πολλα και εν ,
 we would say that he exhibits to our view such things as are **many** and **one** , but that he does not
 αν φησομεν αυτον αποδεικνυναι ταυτα τοιαυτα πολλα και εν , ου
 show that **The One** is **Many** , nor **The Many** , **One** ; nor speak of anything wonderful , but we
 το εν πολλα ουδε τα πολλα εν , ουδε λεγειν τι θαυμαστον , αλλ'
 would agree to that which is affirmed by all .
 ομολογοιμεν απερ παντες .

129b μετέχων, μετέχοντα, μετέχων, μετέχων
 129c μετέχω
129d μετέχων
 130b μετέχοντα
 131c μετέχοντα, μετέχοι

128d τοιαύτην
 129a τοιοῦτω
129d τοιαῦτα, τοιαῦτα
 129e τοιαῦτα
 130b τοιαῦτα, τοιοῦτων

129b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
 129c πολλά, πολλά
129d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
 129e πολὺ
 130b πολλά

128d ταῦτά
 129b ταῦτά
129d ταῦτόν
 130d ταῦτόν
 131b ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

129b αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτό
 129c αὐτά, αὐτοῖς
129d αὐτόν
 129e αὐτά, αὐτά, ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτήν, αὐτοῖς
 130a αὐτός, αὐτή, αὐτό

129a λέγεις
 129c λέγων
129d λέγειν
 129e ἔλεγον, λέγω
 130a λέγοντος

Loeb

and when he wishes to show that I am one, he will say that we here are seven persons, of whom I am one, a man, partaking also of unity and so he shows that both assertions are true. If anyone then undertakes to show that the same things are both many and one—I mean such things as stones, sticks, and the like—we shall say that he shows that they are many and one, but not that the one is many or the many one; he says nothing wonderful, but only what we should all accept.

Thomas Taylor

but when he desires to show that I am *one*, should say, that as we are seven in number, I am *one* man, and participate of *The One*? so that he would by this means evince the truth of both these assertions. If any one, therefore, should endeavour to show that stones, wood, and all such particulars, are both *many* and *one*, we should say that he exhibits to our view such things as are *many* and *one*, but that he does not assert that *The One* is *many*, nor *the many one*; nor speak of any thing wonderful, but asserts that which is confessed by all men.

Morrow and Dillon

And when he wants to show that I am one, he will say that I, as one person among the seven of us, also partake of unity; and so he shows that both statements are true. Consequently, if someone undertakes to prove that things like these—stones and sticks and the like—are many and one, we shall say that he is showing that such things are many and one, but not that one is many nor that many is one; and that he is not saying anything remarkable, but only what we would all agree to be true.”

ἐὰν δέ τις ὦν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ **ἔλεγον** πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται **χωρὶς αὐτὰ** καθ' **αὐτὰ** τὰ **εἶδη**, οἷον **ὁμοιότητά** τε καὶ **ἀνομοιότητά** καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ **στάσιν** καὶ **κίνησιν** καὶ πάντα τὰ **τοιαῦτα**, εἶτα ἐν **ἑαυτοῖς** ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνει, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πάνυ ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι: **πολὺ** μεντὰν ὥδε μᾶλλον, ὡς **λέγω**, ἀγασθεῖν εἴ τις ἔχοι τὴν **αὐτὴν** ταύτην ἀπορίαν ἐν **αὐτοῖς** τοῖς **εἶδεσι** παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις διήλθετε, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῷ **λαμβανομένοις** ἐπιδειξαι.

Balboas

But if on the one hand , anyone would first

δε εαν μεν τις πρωτον
divide/separate **The Ideas** apart/separate , **Those** of which I have just now been speaking , **The**
129E διαιρῆται τα εἶδη χωρὶς , ο εγω δη νυν ελεγον ,
Selves according to **Selves** , such as **In Likeness** and **Unlikeness** and **Plurality** and **The One** ,
αυτα καθ' αυτα , οιον ομοιοτητα τε και ανομοιοτητα και πληθος και το εν
Rest and **Motion** and all such as **These**, then reveal himself as being able to **Blend-together** and
και στασιν και κινήσιν και παντα τα τοιαυτα , εἶτα αποφαινη δυναμενα συγκεραννυσθαι και
Separate-Apart Selves In Them Selves , then *I will indeed* be in wondrous admiration , O Zeno.
διακρινεσθαι ταυτα εν εαυτοις , εγω' αν θαυμαστος αγαιμην , ω Ζηνων .
Thus on the one hand , I am **LED** to think that we should strenuously labor in the investigation of
δε μεν ηγουμαι πανυ ανδρειως πεπραγματευσθαι
these particulars ; but yet on the other hand , it would be deserving of much more admiration ,
ταυτα : μεντ' αν πολυ μαλλον , αγασθειην ,
if anyone could solve the following puzzle , as I said , about **This (Ousia) Self** that is woven-
ει τις αν εχοι ωδε αποριαν , ως λεγω , την ταυτην αυτην πλεκο-
-together **Into The Ideal Selves** , in-a-manifold-way ; just as you demonstrated in detail about
130A -μενην εν τοις ειδεσι αυτοις παντωδαπως , ωσπερ επιδειξει διηλθετε
objects we see by the faculty of sight , if you could also in the same way , demonstrate in detail
τοις ορωμενοις [**Republic** 508A–1] , και ουτως εν
about **The Ideas** which we grasp by **The Activity of The Logos** .
λαμβανομενοις λογισμω .

129c λέγων
129d λέγειν
129e ἔλεγον, λέγω
130a λέγοντος
130b λέγεις

129e χωρὶς
130b χωρὶς, χωρὶς, χωρὶς
130c χωρὶς, χωρὶς

129e αὐτὰ, αὐτοῖς
129d αὐτόν
129e αὐτὰ, αὐτὰ, ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτήν, αὐτοῖς

129a εἶδος
129c εἶδη
129e εἶδη, εἶδεσι
130b εἶδη, εἶδος
130c εἶδος, εἶδος

129a ὁμοίότητος, ὁμοίότητος
129e ὁμοιότητά
130b ὁμοιότης, ὁμοιότητος
130c ὁμοιότητος

129a ἀνομοιότητος
129e ἀνομοιότητά
140e ἀνομοιότητός
139e ἀνομοιότης, ἀνομοιότητα

129e στάσιν
130d στώ
132d ἐστάναι

129e κίνησιν
138b κινεῖσθαι
138c κινούμενόν, κινήσεις, κινεῖται

129a τοιοῦτο
129d τοιαῦτα, τοιαῦτα
129e τοιαῦτα
130b τοιαῦτα, τοιοῦτων
131b τοιοῦτον

129c πολλά, πολλά
129d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
129e πολὺ
130b πολλά
131a πολλῶν
126a λαβόμενος
129e λαμβανομένοις
135e λάβοι
143a λάβομεν

Loeb

If, however, as I was saying just now, he first distinguishes the abstract ideas, such as likeness and unlikeness, multitude and unity, rest and motion, and the like, and then shows that they can be mingled and separated, I should,” said he, “be filled with amazement, Zeno. Now I think this has been very manfully discussed by you; but I should, as I say, be more amazed if anyone could show in the abstract ideas, which are intellectual conceptions, this same multifarious and perplexing entanglement which you described in visible objects.”

Thomas Taylor

But if any one should, in the first place, distribute the forms of things, concerning which I have just been speaking, separating them essentially apart from each other, such as *similitude* and *dissimilitude*, *multitude* and *The One*, and the rest of this kind, and should afterwards show himself able to mingle and separate them in themselves, I should be astonished (says he), O Zeno, in a wonderful manner. But it appears to me that we should strenuously labour in the investigation of these particulars: yet I should be much astonished if any one could solve this doubt, which is so profoundly involved in species; so as to be able no less clearly to explain this affair in the forms which are apprehended by the reasoning power, than in those belonging to visible objects, and which you have already discussed.

Morrow and Dillon

“But if someone of those I was talking of just now would first distinguish Ideas as they are by themselves—such as Likeness and Unlikeness, Plurality and Unity, Rest and Motion, and all the like—and then would show that these Ideas in themselves are capable of blending and separating, that, Zeno,” he said, “I should remarkably admire. You have dealt with this subject very valiantly, I think; but as I say, my admiration would be much greater if anyone could show that these same perplexities are everywhere involved in the Forms themselves, among the objects we apprehend by reasoning, just as you have shown them to be involved in the things we see.”

λέγοντος δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος, τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα **αὐτὸς** μὲν ἂν οἴεσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἄχθεσθαι τὸν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ τε **αὐτῷ** προσέχειν τὸν **νοῦν** καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλήλους βλέποντας μειδιᾶν ὥς ἀγαμένους τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ παυσάμενου **αὐτοῦ** εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην:

Balboas

Antiphon : **4** Pythodorus said , that on the one hand , when Socrates had said these particulars ,
 ο Πυθοδωρος εφη , μιν δη του Σωκρατους Λεγοντος ταυτα
 he believed that , both Parmenides and Zeno would be annoyed at each one of them , whereas on
 αυτος οιεσθαι τε τον Παρμενιδην και τον Ζηνωνα αν αχθεσθαι εφ' εκαστου
 the other hand , They Themselves **Offered-up Their Mind** entirely to what he said ,
 δε (Sym **174D-210E-217B**, Rep **432B**) προσεχειν τον νουν πανυ τους αυτω
 and frequently looked at each other , smiling , as if in admiration of Socrates .
 τε και θαμα βλεποντας εις αλληλους μειδιαν ως αγαμενους τον Σωκρατη .
 And that once Socrates ceased to speak , Parmenides then spoke , saying . . .
 και οπερ αυτου παυσαμενου ειπειν τον Παρμενιδην ουν φαναι

129d λέγειν
 129e ἔλεγον, λέγω
130a λέγοντος
 130b λέγεις
 130d ἐλέγομεν

129d αὐτὸν
 129e αὐτὰ, αὐτά, ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτὴν, αὐτοῖς
130a αὐτός, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ
 130b αὐτός, αὐτά, αὐτή, αὐτό, αὐτό
 130c αὐτό, αὐτῶν

127c νέον
130a νοῦν
 135b νοῦν
 136c νοῦν

Loeb

Pythodorus said that he thought at every word, while Socrates was saying this, Parmenides and Zeno would be angry, but they paid close attention to him and frequently looked at each other and smiled, as if in admiration of Socrates, and when he stopped speaking Parmenides expressed their approval.

Thomas Taylor

Pythodorus said, that when Socrates had thus spoken, he thought that Parmenides and Zeno seemed to be indignant at the several particulars of Socrates's discourse; but that they bestowed the greatest attention on what he said, and frequently looking at each other smiled, as wondering at Socrates: and that, in consequence of his ceasing to speak, Parmenides said -

Morrow and Dillon

While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus said he was expecting that Parmenides and Zeno would both of them be annoyed; but, he says, they gave him their close attention and frequently looked at each other and smiled, as if in admiration of Socrates. And this indeed is what Parmenides said when Socrates had finished.

ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς ἄξιός ἐστι ἄγασθαι τῆς ὀρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς **λόγους**. καὶ μοι εἰπέ, **αὐτὸς** σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς **λέγεις**, **χωρὶς** μὲν **εἶδη αὐτὰ** ἅττα, **χωρὶς** δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐτὸ **μετέχοντα**; καὶ τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι **αὐτῇ ὁμοιότης χωρὶς** ἢς ἡμεῖς **ὁμοιότητος** ἔχομεν, καὶ ἔν δὴ καὶ **πολλὰ** καὶ πάντα ὅσα νυνδὴ Ζήνωνος ἤκουες;

ἔμοιγε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

ἦ καὶ τὰ **τοιαῦτα**, εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οἷον **δικαίου** τι **εἶδος αὐτὸ** καθ' **αὐτὸ** καὶ **καλοῦ** καὶ **ἀγαθοῦ** καὶ πάντων αὐτῶν **τοιούτων**;

ναί, φάναι.

Parmenides: O Socrates , how worthy of admiration *is Your Impulse* in *Your Pursuit* of 130B ὦ Σωκράτες , ὡς ἀξίος ἀγασθαι εἰ (ειμι-Pres-Act) τῆς ὀρμῆς ἐπὶ τῆς **The Logos** ! And tell me , have *You Your Self* thus **Separated** certain **Ideas apart** from **Selves** , τοὺς λόγους . καὶ εἰπε μοι , σὺ αὐτός οὕτω διήρησαι ἅττα εἶδη χωρὶς αὐτὰ as you say , on the one hand , and in turn on the other hand , in the same way , **Set apart** ὡς λέγεις μὲν , αὐτὰ δὲ οὕτω χωρὶς **those that Participate** of **These** ? And does there appear to you , to be a **certain likeness** that is τα μετέχοντα τούτων ; καὶ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τι ὁμοιοτήτος **Separate** from **Self Likeness** , and indeed a **certain One/Unity** and **Many/Plurality** and all other χωρὶς αὐτῇ ὁμοιοτήτος καὶ δὴ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα **such particulars** , which we **possess** , and **of which** , you have just now heard of from Zeno ? ὅσα ἡς ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν , δὴ νυν ἤκουες Ζηνωνος ;

Socrates: It does to me indeed . (Εμοιγε .)

Parmenides: And how about the following ones ; is there a **Certain Idea** , like that of **Justice** , Ἡ καὶ τα τοιαῦτα , τι εἶδος οἷον δικαίου **(Eternally)Self by Self** ; and also of **Beauty** and of **Good** and all such **Ideas (by Them-Selves)** ? αὐτο καθ' αὐτο καὶ αὐ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων τοιούτων ;

Socrates: Yes . (Ναί .)

128c λόγῳ

128d λόγῳ

130b λόγους

132d λόγον

134e λόγον, λόγος

129e αὐτὰ, αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖς, αὐτῇ, αὐτοῖς

130a αὐτὸς, αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖς

130b αὐτὸς, αὐτὰ, αὐτῇ, αὐτὸ,
αὐτὸ

129e ἔλεγον, λέγω

130a λέγοντος

130b λέγεις

130d ἐλέγομεν

131b λέγειν

129e χωρὶς

130b χωρὶς, χωρὶς, χωρὶς

130c χωρὶς, χωρὶς

131a χωρὶς

129e εἶδη

129e εἶδη, εἶδεσι

130b εἶδη, εἶδος

130c εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος

130d εἶδος, εἶδη

129e μετέχω

129d μετέχων

130b μετέχοντα

131c μετέχοντα, μετέχοι

132b μετέχοντα

129a ὁμοιότητος, ὁμοιότητος

129e ὁμοιότητά

130b ὁμοιότης, ὁμοιότητος

130c ὁμοιότητος

133a ὁμοιότητι

129d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

129e πολλὰ

130b πολλὰ

131a πολλῶν

131b πολλοῖς, πολλοῖς, πολλοῖς

129d τοιαῦτα, τοιαῦτα

129e τοιαῦτα

130b τοιαῦτα, τοιούτων

131b τοιούτων

131c τοιούτων

130b δικαίου

130e δίκαιά

135c δίκαιον

127b καλόν

128a καλῶς, καλῶς

130b καλοῦ

133c καλῶς

134c καλόν

127b κάγαθόν

130b ἀγαθοῦ

134c ἀγαθόν

135c ἀγαθόν

Loeb

“Socrates,” he said, “what an admirable talent for argument you have! Tell me, did you invent this distinction yourself, which separates abstract ideas from the things which partake of them? And do you think there is such a thing as abstract likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and abstract one and many, and the other abstractions of which you heard Zeno speaking just now?”

“Yes, I do,” said Socrates.

“And also,” said Parmenides, “abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good, and all such conceptions?”

“Yes,” he replied.

Thomas Taylor

How worthy, O Socrates, of admiration is your ardour in the pursuit of liberal disciplines! Tell me, therefore, have you separated, as you say, certain species apart by themselves, and likewise the participants of these species apart? And does there appear to you to be a certain *similitude* separate from that *similitude* which we possess, and a certain *one* and *many*, and all such other particulars, which you have just now heard mentioned by Zeno?

That Socrates said, So it appears to me.

And (that Parmenides said) does it also appear to you, that there is a certain species or form of *justice*, itself subsisting by itself; likewise of *beauty* and *the good*, and every thing of this kind?

That Socrates said, It does.

Morrow and Dillon

“Socrates,” he said, “your urge for discussion is worthy of admiration. Tell me. Do you yourself make this distinction you mention and separate the Forms themselves from the things that participate in them? And do you think that there is a Likeness itself separate from the Likeness which we have, and a One and a Many and all the other things in Zeno’s argument that you have just been listening to?”

“I think so,” said Socrates.

“And of things like these,” said Parmenides, “is there a form of Justice in and by itself, and of Beauty and Goodness and all such things?”

“Yes,” said Socrates.

Oxford Greek

τί δ', ἀνθρώπου **εἶδος χωρίς** ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν πάντων, **αὐτό** τι **εἶδος** ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος;

ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολλάκις δὴ, ὦ Παρμενίδη, περὶ **αὐτῶν γέγονα**, πότερα χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως.

ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θρίξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀτιμωτάτον τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου **εἶδος** εἶναι **χωρίς**, ὃν ἄλλο αὖ ἢ ὧν τι ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ μή;

Balboas

Parmenides: What next then ? Is there also an **Idea** of Man and of All the Elements such as 130C Τι δ' ; εἶδος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῶν παντῶν οἷοι we are composed of ; and a certain **Ideal** Human **Self** and **One** of Fire and **One** of Water ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν , καὶ τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου αὐτοῦ ἡ πυρὸς ἡ ὕδατος that is **Separate** from us ? (χωρίς ἡμῶν ;)

Socrates: I have certainly often been in *dire-straits/puzzled/at-a-loss* , O Parmenides , δη πολλάκις γέγονα ἐν ἀπορίᾳ , ὦ Παρμενίδη , concerning whether it is necessary to speak of **Selves** , just as we did about **Those Ideas** , περὶ ποτέρον χρὴ φάναι αὐτῶν , ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων or in another way . ἢ ἄλλως .

Parmenides: And are you also *at-a-loss/puzzled* , about the following particulars , O Socrates ? Ἡ καὶ ἀπορεῖς περὶ τῶνδε ὦ Σώκρατες , **Whether it is necessary** to affirm that there is a **Separate Idea/Form/Species** of **each one of these** εἴτε χρὴ φάναι εἶναι **χωρίς** εἶδος ἐκάστου τούτων which may also appear to be ridiculous , such as of **hair** and **clay** and **dust** , or of anything else αὐτῶν καὶ δόξειεν εἶναι γελοῖα , οἷον θρίξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥυπὸς ἢ τι ἄλλο which may also appear to be quite **without** honor and most **worthless** , by **Being Other** in turn , ἀτιμωτάτον τε καὶ φαυλότατον , ὃν ἄλλο αὐτῶν of **those particulars** with which we are familiar , or **whether it is not necessary** ? 130D τῶν ὧν ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα , εἴτε καὶ μή ;

129e εἶδη, εἶδεσι

130b εἶδη, εἶδος

130c εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος

130d εἶδος, εἶδη

130e εἶδη

129e χωρίς

130b χωρίς, χωρίς, χωρίς

130c χωρίς, χωρίς

131a χωρίς

131b χωρίς, χωρίς, χωρίς

130a αὐτός, αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

130b αὐτός, αὐτὰ, αὐτῇ, αὐτό, αὐτό

130c αὐτό, αὐτῶν

130d αὐτῶν

130e αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

129a γίνεσθαι

129b γιγνόμενα

130c γέγονα

130e γίνεσθαι

131a γένεσθαι

Loeb

“And is there an abstract idea of man, apart from us and all others such as we are, or of fire or water?”

“I have often,” he replied, “been very much troubled, Parmenides, to decide whether there are ideas of such things, or not.”

“And are you undecided about certain other things, which you might think rather ridiculous, such as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else particularly vile and worthless? Would you say that there is an idea of each of these distinct and different from the things with which we have to do, or not?”

Thomas Taylor

And likewise of all such things as we are composed from: so that there is a certain form of *man*, or of *fire*, or *water*?

That Socrates answered - I have often been in doubt, O Parmenides, concerning these; whether it is necessary to speak of them in the same manner as of the former particular, or in a different manner.

And do you doubt, O Socrates, whether it is necessary to say that there is a certain form of every such particular as may appear to be ridiculous, I mean hair, clay, and mud, or any thing else which is vile and abject; and that these forms are different from the particulars with which we are conversant?

Morrow and Dillon

“And a form of Man separate from us and from all beings like us—a separate form of Man, and of Fire, and of Water?”

“I have often been in doubt, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “whether or not we should say the same of them as of the others.”

“And of things that might seem ridiculous, Socrates, such as hair, mud, and dirt, or some other unseemly or trivial thing, are you in doubt whether or not we ought to say there is an Idea of each of these, separate and other than the things that we handle?”

οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν γε ἅπερ ὀρώμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι: **εἶδος** δέ τι **αὐτῶν** οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἢ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μέντοι **ποτέ** με καὶ ἔθραξε μὴ τι ἢ περὶ πάντων **ταῦτόν**: ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτη **στώ**, φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσας μὴ **ποτε** εἷς **τινα** βυθὸν φλυαρίας ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ: ἐκείσε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἷς ἃ νυνδὴ **ἐλέγομεν εἶδη** ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματευόμενος **διατρίβω**.

Balboas

Socrates: On the one hand , I do not affirm that **these** exist **in any other way** from **these** which ^{μεν} ταυτα ειναι Ουδαμως αλλα ^{ταυτα ειναι Ουδαμως αλλα} απερ ταυτα we do indeed also **see** ; whereas on the other hand , is it not the height of absurdity , insofar as ^{γε και ορωμεν :} δε ^{μη} ^{λιαν} ^{ατοπον} η one imagines that there is a **certain Idea** of **these selves** ? Nevertheless at times it also actually ^{οιηθηναι} ^{ειναι} ^{τι} ^{ειδος} ^{αυτων .} ^{μεντοι} ^{ποτε} ^{και} ^{ηδη} **troubles** me ; in regards to **whether or not** the very same thing , **can be** affirmed of **everything** . ^{εθραξε με} ^{περι} ^{μη} ^{ταυτον} ^{τι} ^η ^{παντων :} But thereafter , having been fixed in **this** opinion , I then run-away fleeing , in **fear** of falling ^{μη} ^{επειτα} ^{οταν} ^{στω} ^{ταυτη} , ^{οιχομαι} ^{φευγων} , ^{δεισας} ^{εμπεσων} at that time , into a certain **abyss of nonsense** , and **utterly perish** . But then , **I reach up** from ^{ποτε} ^{εις} ^{τινα} ^{βυθον} ^{φλυαριας} ^{διαφθαρω .} ^{δ' ουν} ^{αφικομενος} those considerations , and again **I seriously apply myself** to those considerations , concerning ^{εκεισε} , ^{πραγματευομενος} ^{διατριβω} ^{εις} ^{εκεινα} ^{περι} which , we have just now asserted , whether **such Ideas/Forms/Species have** to exist . ^α ^{δη} ^{νυν} ^{ελεγομεν} ^{ειδη} ^{εχειν} .

130d οὐδαμῶς

131c οὐδαμῶς
131e οὐδαμῶς

130b εἶδη, εἶδος

130c εἶδος, εἶδος

130d εἶδος, εἶδη

130e εἶδη

131a εἶδους, εἶδος

130b αὐτός, αὐτά, αὐτῇ, αὐτό, αὐτό

130c αὐτό, αὐτῶν

130d αὐτῶν

130e αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

131b αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῆς

126c ποτε

127a ποτε

130d ποτέ, ποτε

134d ποτέ

138d ποτ

129b ταῦτά

129d ταῦτόν

130d ταῦτόν

131b ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

138b ταῦτόν

129e στάσιν

130d στώ

132d ἐστάναι

138b ἐστάναι

127c τινός

128a τινά

130d τινα

131e τίνα

132b τινός

130a λέγοντος

130b λέγεις

130d ἐλέγομεν

131b λέγειν

132a λέγεις

126c διατρίβει

130d

Loeb

“By no means,” said Socrates. “No, I think these things are such as they appear to us, and it would be quite absurd to believe that there is an idea of them; and yet I am sometimes disturbed by the thought that perhaps what is true of one thing is true of all. Then when I have taken up this position, I run away for fear of falling into some abyss of nonsense and perishing; so when I come to those things which we were just saying do have ideas, I stay and busy myself with them.”

Thomas Taylor

That Socrates said, I do not by any means think that the forms of these can be different from those which are the objects of our inspection: but is it not vehemently absurd to think that there is a certain form of these? For this has formerly disturbed me, whether or not something of this kind does not take place about every thing: but, after having been fixed for some time in this opinion, I have hastily withdrawn myself and fled away; fearing lest, falling into a certain abyss of trifles, I should utterly perish and be lost; but, returning from thence, I have seriously applied myself to consider those particulars, to which, as we have just now asserted, forms belong.

Morrow and Dillon

“By no means,” replied Socrates, “these things are exactly what we see them to be. To think there is any Idea of them would, I fear, be altogether ridiculous. And yet sometimes I have been seized by the disturbing thought that the same thing may be true of them as of the others. Then when I reach this point I retreat in haste, fearing that I may fall into bottomless nonsense and perish; and so, coming back to the things which we said just now to have Ideas, I spend my time working with them.”

Oxford Greek

νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὥς ἔτι ἀντιλήφεται κατ' ἐμὴν **δόξαν**, ὅτε οὐδὲν **αὐτῶν** ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις **δόξας** διὰ τὴν **ἡλικίαν**. τόδε δ' οὖν μοι εἶπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὥς φῆς, εἶναι **εἶδη** ἅττα, ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα **μεταλαμβάνοντα** τὰς ἐπωνυμίας **αὐτῶν** ἴσχειν, οἷον **ὁμοιότητος** μὲν **μεταλαβόντα ὅμοια**, μεγέθους δὲ **μεγάλα**, κάλλους δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης **δίκαιά** τε καὶ καλὰ **γίγνεσθαι**;

πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

Balboas

Parmenides: That is because you are still a young man , O Socrates , and **Philosophy** has not
 130E εἰ γὰρ εἰ Νεος , ὦ Σωκράτες , καὶ φιλοσοφία οὐπω
 as of yet , received you into **Her Embraces** . For in **my opinion** , when you **are** received by **Her** ,
 ὡς εἰ , σου ἀντείληπται κατ' ἐμὴν δοξαν , ὅτε ἀντιληφεται
 you **will not dishonor any of these selves** ; but now since you are still young , you give heed ,
 οὐδὲν ἀτιμάσεις αὐτῶν : δε νυν διὰ εἰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀποβλέπεις
 to the **opinions of men** .
 πρὸς δοχας ἀνθρώπων .

~~Are **The Ideas** Related to **Wholes/Parts** and **Genera/Species** ?~~

5 Tell me then , the following . Does it appear to you , as you say , that there exist **certain**
 εἶπε μοι οὖν Τόδε . δοκεῖ σοι , ὡς φῆς , εἶναι ἅττα
Ideas/Forms/Species , of which **the other things** have a **Share** , thus retaining **Their Names** ;
 εἶδη ὧν τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τάδε ἴσχειν αὐτῶν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ,
 such as , on the one hand , **those** that have a **Share** of **Likeness** are **like** ; therefore , **those** that
 131A οἷον μὲν μεταλαβόντα ὁμοιότητος ὅμοια , δε
 have a **Share** of **Greatness/Magnanimity/Generosity/Magnitude** are **great/generous/big** , whereas
 μεγέθους μεγάλα ,
 on the other hand , **those** that **Share** of **Righteousness** and **Beauty** become **just** and **beautiful** ?
 δε δικαιοσύνης καὶ κάλλους γίγνεσθαι δίκαια τε καὶ καλὰ ;

Socrates: Entirely so indeed . (Πάνυ γε.)

127c νέον

128e νέου, νέου

130e νέος

135d νέος

130e δόξαν, δόξας

132a δόξη

142a δόξα, δοξάζεται

130c αὐτό, αὐτῶν

130d αὐτῶν

130e αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

131b αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῆ, αὐτῆς

131c αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτῶν

130e ἡλικίαν

140e ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν

141a ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν

130c εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος

130d εἶδος, εἶδη

130e εἶδη

131a εἶδους, εἶδος

131b εἶδων

129a μεταλαμβάνειν, μεταλαμβάνοντα, μεταλαμβάνη, μεταλαμβάνει

130e μεταλαμβάνοντα, μεταλαβόντα

131a μεταλαμβάνον, μεταλαμβάνει

131e μεταλήφεται, μεταλαμβάνειν

129e ὁμοιότητά

130b ὁμοιότης, ὁμοιότητος

130e ὁμοιότητος

133a ὁμοιότητι

136b ὁμοιότης

129a ὅμοια

129b ὁμοιά, ὁμοιά, ὁμοια

130e ὅμοια

132d ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὁμοίω, ὅμοιον

132e ὅμοιον, ὁμοίω, ὅμοια, ὅμοια, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον

127a μέγα

128c μέγα

130e μεγάλα

131d μεγάλων, μέγα, μείζον, μείζον, μείζον

132a μεγάλα, μέγα, μέγα, μεγάλα, μέγα, μεγάλα,

130b δικαίου

130e δίκαιά

135c δίκαιον

129b γηγόνενα

130c γέγονα

130e γίγνεσθαι

131a γένοίτο

131d γένοίτο

Loeb

“Yes, for you are still young,” said Parmenides, “and philosophy has not yet taken hold upon you, Socrates, as I think it will later. Then you will not despise them; but now you still consider people’s opinions, on account of your youth. Well, tell me do you think that, as you say, there are ideas, and that these other things which partake of them are named from them, as, for instance, those that partake of likeness become like, those that partake of greatness great, those that partake of beauty and justice just and beautiful?”

“Certainly,” said Socrates.

Thomas Taylor

That Parmenides then said, You are as yet but a young man, O Socrates, and Philosophy has not yet received you into her embraces: for, in my opinion, when you are received by her, you will not despise any of these particulars: but now, on account of your juvenile age, you regard the opinions of men. Tell me, then, does it appear to you, as you say, that there are certain forms, of which other things participating retain the appellations; as, for instance, that such things as participate of *similitude* are *similar*s; of *magnitude*, *great*; and that the participants of *beauty* and *justice* are *beautiful* and *just*?

That Socrates replied, Entirely so.

Morrow and Dillon

“That is because you are still young, Socrates,” said Parmenides, “and philosophy has not taken hold of you as it will, in my opinion, when you have learned not to despise any of these things. As it is, your youth still causes you to defer to the opinions of men. Then tell me this: you say you think there exists certain Forms in which these other things here participate and so carry their designations? For example, things become like by partaking of Likeness, and great by partaking of Greatness, and just or beautiful by partaking of Justice or Beauty?”

“Exactly,” said Socrates.

οὐκοῦν ἤτοι **ὅλου** τοῦ **εἴδους** ἢ **μέρους** ἕκαστον τὸ **μεταλαμβάνον μεταλαμβάνει**; ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν μετάληψις **χωρίς** τούτων **γένοιτο**;

καὶ πῶς ἂν; εἶπεν.

πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι **ὅλον** τὸ **εἶδος** ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν **πολλῶν** ἐν ᾧ, ἢ πῶς;

τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ἐν εἶναι;

Balboas

Parmenides: Now surely , is it not the case then , that **each thing** which has a **Share** , either
 ἤτοι Οὐκ οὐν ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον
 has a **Share** of **The Whole** (**Genera**) **Idea** or of only a **Part** (**Species**) of **It** ? Or , can there be
 μεταλαμβάνει του ολου ειδους η μερους ; η αν γενοιτο
some other way of **Participation/Transference/Succession** apart from these **Two** ways ?
 τις αλλη μεταληψις χωρις τουτων ;

Socrates: And how could there be ? (Και πως αν ;)

Parmenides: Therefore , does it appear to you , that **The Whole Idea** , **Being One** , exists
 ουν ποτερον δοκει σοι το ολον ειδος ον εν ειναι
 in **each** of **the many** , or in what way ?
 εκαστω των πολλων , η πως ;

Socrates: What is there to prevent **The Whole Idea** , O Parmenides , to exist in **each** of **them** ?
 Τι γαρ κωλυει , ω Παρμενιδη , ενειναι ;

128a ὅλον
131a ὅλου, ὅλον
 131b ὅλον, ὅλον
 131c ὅλον, ὅλον

130d εἶδος, εἶδη
 130e εἶδη
131a εἴδους, εἶδος
 131b εἰδῶν
 131c εἶδη, εἶδος

131a μέρος
 131c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος
 131d μέρος, μέρος

129a μεταλαμβάνειν, μεταλαμβάνοντα, μεταλαμβάνη, μεταλαμβάνει
 130e μεταλαμβάνοντα, μεταλαμβάνοντα
131a μεταλαμβάνον, μεταλαμβάνει
 131e μεταλήφεται, μεταλαμβάνειν
 133a μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνει

130c γέγονα
 130e γίνεσθαι
131a γένοιτο
 131d γένοιτο
 132a γεγονός

130b χωρίς, χωρίς, χωρίς
 130c χωρίς, χωρίς
131a χωρίς
 131b χωρίς, χωρίς, χωρίς
 139e χωρίς

129e πολὺ
 130b πολλά
131a πολλῶν
 131b πολλοῖς, πολλοὺς, πολλοῖς
 131d πολλῶν

Loeb

“Well then, does each participant object partake of the whole idea, or of a part of it? Or could there be some other third kind of participation?”

“How could there be?” said he.

“Do you think the whole idea, being one, is in each of the many participants, or what?”

“Yes, for what prevents it from being in them, Parmenides?” said Socrates.

Thomas Taylor

Does not every thing which participates either participate the whole form, or only a part of it? Or can there be any other mode of participation besides these?

That Socrates said, How can there be?

Does it then appear to you that the whole form is one in each individual of *many things*? Or what other opinion have you on this subject?

That then Socrates said, What hinders, O Parmenides, but that it should be one?

Morrow and Dillon

“Therefore does not every thing that participates participate in either the whole or a part of the Form? Or could there be some way of participation other than these?”

“How could there be?” he replied.

“Then do you think that the Form, being one, is as a whole in each of its many particulars, or what?”

“What is to prevent it from being in them, Parmenides?” said Socrates.

ἐν ἅρᾳ ὃν καὶ **ταὐτόν** ἐν **πολλοῖς** καὶ **χωρὶς** οὖσιν **ὅλον** ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως **αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ** **χωρὶς** ἂν εἴη.

οὐκ ἂν, εἴ γε, φάναι, οἶον εἰ ἡμέρα εἴη μία καὶ ἡ **αὐτὴ οὐσα** πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον **αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς** ἐστίν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν **εἰδῶν** ἐν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα **ταὐτόν** εἴη.

ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν **ταὐτόν** ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἶον εἰ ἰστίῳ καταπετάσας **πολλοὺς** ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ **πολλοῖς** εἶναι **ὅλον**: ἢ οὐ τὸ **τοιούτον** ἡγῆ **λέγειν**; ἴσως, φάναι.

Balboas

Parmenides: Accordingly then , by **Being One** and **The Same** in many separate existents , then 131B ἀρα ὄν Εν και ταυτον εν πολλοις χωρις ουσιν **The Whole** is in **each** at the same time , and in this way **The Self will be separate** from **The Self** . ὅλον ενεσται αμα , και ουτως αυτο αν ειη χωρις αυτου .

Socrates: It cannot be in this way ; but if **This Idea** were indeed such as **The Self** of **Day** , αν Ουκ , ει γε οιον η αυτη ημερα by **Being One** , **It** is at-once present in many places and yet **Self** is in no way more separate ουσα μια εστιν αμα εστι πολλαχου και αυτη ουδεν μαλλον χωρις from **The Self** ; if then in this way , every **Idea** may also be At-Once **One** and **The Same** in all . αυτης , ει ουτω εκαστον των ειδων και ειη αμα εν ταυτον εν πασιν .

Parmenides: You have made , O Socrates , **One** and **The Same** aspect present at the same time , ποιεεις , ω Σωκρατες , εν ταυτον αμα in many places , in a very pleasant way ; just as if you covered-over many **humans** with a **sail** . πολλαχου , γε Ηδεως , οιον ει καταπετασας πολλους ανθρωπους ιστιω Thus you say , that there is **One Whole** , over **many** . φαιης , ειναι εν ολον επι πολλοις .

Or is it not something such as this that you are **Led** to say ?

131C η ου το τοιουτον ηγει λεγειν ;

Socrates: Perhaps . (Ισως .)

129d ταὐτόν
130d ταὐτόν
131b ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν

138b ταὐτόν
139b ταὐτόν

130b πολλά
131a πολλῶν
131b πολλοῖς, πολλοὺς, πολλοῖς
131d πολλῶν
132a πᾶσι

130c χωρὶς, χωρὶς
131a χωρὶς
131b χωρὶς, χωρὶς, χωρὶς
139e χωρὶς
140a χωρὶς

128a ὅλον
131a ὅλου, ὅλον
131b ὅλον, ὅλον
131c ὅλου, ὅλον
131e ὅλα

130d αὐτόν
130e αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν
131b αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῆ, αὐτῆς
131c αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτῶν
131d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

131b οὐσα
142b οὐσα
150a οὐσα

130e εἶδη
131a εἶδους, εἶδος
131b εἰδῶν
131c εἶδη, εἶδος
131e εἰδῶν

129e τοιαῦτα
130b τοιαῦτα, τοιοῦτων
131b τοιοῦτον
131e τοιοῦτον
133b τοιαῦτα

130b λέγεις
130d ἐλέγομεν
131b λέγειν
132a λέγεις
132b ἐλέγετο

Loeb

“Then while it is one and the same, the whole of it would be in many separate individuals at once, and thus it would itself be separate from itself.”

“No,” he replied, “for it might be like day, which is one and the same, is in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself; so each idea, though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once.”

“That,” said he, “is very neat, Socrates you make one to be in many places at once, just as if you should spread a sail over many persons and then should say it was one and all of it was over may. Is not that about what you mean?”

“Perhaps it is,” said Socrates.

Thomas Taylor

As it is, therefore, one and the same in things many and separate from each other, the whole will be at the same time one, and so itself will be separate from itself.

That Socrates said, It would not be so: but just as if this form was *day*, this being *one* and *the same*, is collectively present in many places, and yet is not any thing the more separate from itself; in the same manner, every form may be at once *one* and *the same* in all.

That Parmenides then said, You have made, O Socrates, one and the same thing to be collectively present in many places, in a very pleasant manner; just as if, covering many men with a veil, you should say that there is *one whole*, together with *the many*. Do you not think that you would make an assertion of this kind?

That Socrates said, Perhaps so.

Morrow and Dillon

“Then, while remaining one and the same, it will be, as a whole, in many separate things at the same time, and thus will be separate from itself.”

“No,” he said, “at least if it is like day, which being one and the same, is in many places at once, but is not for that reason separated from itself—if, I say, it is like this, then each Form is the same and simultaneously present to all things.”

“How readily, Socrates,” he said, “You make one and the same thing present in many places at the same time. It is as if you spread a sail over a number of men and say that it is a single whole over many. Is not this the sort of thing you are saying?”

“Perhaps,” said Socrates.

Oxford Greek

ἢ οὖν **ὅλον** ἐφ' ἐκάστω τὸ ἰστίον εἴη ἄν, ἢ **μέρος αὐτοῦ** ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ;

μέρος.

μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν **αὐτὰ** τὰ **εἶδη**, καὶ τὰ **μετέχοντα αὐτῶν** **μέρους** ἂν **μετέχοι**, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἐκάστω **ὅλον**, ἀλλὰ **μέρος** ἐκάστου ἂν εἴη.

φαίνεται οὕτω γε.

ἢ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἐν **εἶδος** ἡμῖν τῇ **ἀληθείᾳ** μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἔσται; **οὐδαμῶς**, εἰπεῖν.

Balboas

Parmenides: Then either , will **the whole** **sail** exist over **each individual** ,

οὐν Η αν ο ολον ιστιον ειη εφ' εκαστω

or will **another part** of **the whole** **self** exist over **each individual** ?

η αλλο μερος αυτου επ' αλλω ;

Socrates: The part .(Μερος .)

Parmenides: Accordingly then , O Socrates , “**these ideal selves** ” are **divisible** ,

αρα , ω Σωκρατες , τα ειδη αυτα εστιν Μεριστα

and **those that participate** can only participate of “**parts of selves**” ; and hence there will

και τα μετεχοντα αν μετεχοι μερους αυτων , και αν

no longer be **one whole** in **each individual** , but only **one part** of each .

ουκετι ειη ολον εν εκαστω , αλλα μερος εκαστου .

Socrates: It has come to **Light** in this way indeed .

Φαινεται ουτω γε .

Parmenides: Or are you willing then , O Socrates , to affirm to us **The Truth** , that **One** “**idea**”

Η εθελησεις ουν , ω Σωκρατες , φαναι ημιν τη αληθεια το εν ειδος

is susceptible of being **divided** , and yet “**it**” will still be **One** ?

μεριζεσθαι , και ετι εσται εν ;

Socrates: By no means .(Ουδαμως .)

131a ὅλον, ὅλον

131b ὅλον, ὅλον

131c ὅλον, ὅλον

131e ὅλα

137c ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

131a μέρος

131c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

131d μέρος, μέρος

131e μέρη

130e αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

131b αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇς

131c αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτῶν

131d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό

132a αὐτῇ, αὐτό

131a εἶδους, εἶδος

131b εἰδῶν

131c εἶδη, εἶδος

131c εἰδῶν

132a εἶδος

129d μετέχων

130b μετέχοντα

131c μετέχοντα, μετέχοι

132b μετέχοντα

132c μετέχων

128b ἀλήθειαν

131c ἀλήθεια

134a ἀλήθεια

134b ἀληθείας

130d οὐδαμῶς

131c οὐδαμῶς

131e οὐδαμῶς

132b οὐδαμοῦ

Loeb

“Would the whole sail be over each person, or a particular part over each?”

“A part over each.”

“Then,” said he, “the ideas themselves, Socrates, are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each idea.”

“So it appears.”

“Are you, then, Socrates, willing to assert that the one idea is really divided and will still be one?”

“By no means,” he replied.

Thomas Taylor

Will, therefore, the whole veil subsist together with each man, or a different part of it with each individual?

A different part only.

That Parmenides said, These forms then, O Socrates, are divisible, and their participants participate only parts of them: and hence there will no longer be one whole form in each individual, but only one part of each form.

So indeed it seems.

Are you then willing to assert that one form is in reality divided, and that nevertheless it is still one?

That Socrates said, By no means.

Morrow and Dillon

“Then would the whole sail be over each man, or a part of it over him and another part over another?”

“A part.”

“Consequently, Socrates,” he said, “the Forms themselves are divided, and the things that participate in them will participate in a part of them. No longer will the whole of a Form be in each thing, but a part of it.”

“So it appears.”

“Then, Socrates,” he said, “will you allow that our one Form is really divided? And will it still be one?”

“By no means,” Socrates replied.

ὅρα γάρ, φάναι: εἰ **αὐτό** τὸ μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν **πολλῶν μεγάλων** μεγέθους μέρει
σμικροτέρῳ **αὐτοῦ** τοῦ μεγέθους **μέγα** ἔσται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανεῖται;

πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

τί δέ; τοῦ ἴσου **μέρος** ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἔξει ᾧ **ἐλάττονι** ὄντι **αὐτοῦ** τοῦ ἴσου τὸ
ἔχον **ἴσον** τῷ ἔσται;

ἀδύνατον.

ἀλλὰ τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἔξει, τούτου δὲ **αὐτοῦ** τὸ σμικρὸν **μείζον** ἔσται ἅτε **μέρους**
ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ **αὐτό** τὸ σμικρὸν **μείζον** ἔσται: ᾧ δ' ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν,
τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἔσται ἀλλ' οὐ **μείζον** ἢ πρίν.

οὐκ ἂν **γένοιτο**, φάναι, τοῦτό γε.

Balboas

Parmenides: For See , that if you attempt to **divide The Great Self** , then in that case

131D γὰρ Ορα εἰ μεριεῖς το μέγεθος αὐτο ἀρα
would it not be shown to be **irrational** , and that each of **The Many** that are **Great** , will then be
οὐκ φανεῖται ἀλογον , και εκαστον των πολλων μεγαλων εσται

great/big by a “**part**” (like **The Day/sail**) of “**greatness**” that is **less** than **The Greatness** of Self ?
μεγα μερει μεγαθους σμικροτερω του μεγαθους αουτου ;

Socrates: Most **irrational** indeed .(Πανυ γ' .)

Parmenides: What then ? **Will each thing** , by possessing some “small **part**” of “**equality**”

Τι δε ; εσται εκαστον τω εξει τι σμικρον μερος του ισου
which is **less** than **The Equality** of Self , **be equal** to another **thing** by having the **part** received ?
ω οντι ελαττονι του ισου αουτου ισον το εχον απολαβον ;

Socrates: Impossible .(Αδυνατον .)

Parmenides: Then if **one of us** has a “**part of the small**” , then in that case **The Small** of Self

Αλλα τις ημων εξει μερος του σμικρου , δε το σμικρον αουτου
will be “**bigger**” than **this** , since **it** is a **part of Itself** , and thus **The Small Self** will then be
εσται μειζον τουτου , ατε οντος μερους εαυτου και ουτω το σμικρον αουτο δη εσται
that which is “**bigger**” ; but then on the other hand , **this** to which the **part** of **The Small** will be
μειζον : δ' τουτο ω αν

added and then subtracted , **will be smaller** , but not **greater** , than before .

131E προστεθη αφαιρεθεν εσται σμικροτερον αλλ' ου μειζον η πριν .

Socrates: This most certainly cannot come to pass .

τουτο γε αν Ουκ γενοιτο .

131b αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῆς, αὐτῆς

131c αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτῶν

131d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό

132a αὐτῇ, αὐτό

132b αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ

131a πολλῶν

131b πολλοῖς, πολλοῦς, πολλοῖς

131d πολλῶν

132a πόλλ'

133b πολλά, πολλῶν, πολλά

128c μέγα

130c μεγάλα

131d μεγάλων, μέγα, μείζον, μείζον, μείζον

132a μεγάλα, μέγα, μέγα, μεγάλα, μέγα, μεγάλα

132b μεγάλα

131a μέρος

131c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

131d μέρος, μέρος

131e μέρος

137c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

131d ἐλάττονι

140c ἔλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλάττω

140d ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττον

131d ἴσον

137c ἴσον

140b ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

130e γίνεσθαι

131a γένοιτο

131d γένοιτο

132a γεγονός

132d γίνεσθαι

Loeb

“No,” said Parmenides, “for if you divide absolute greatness, and each of the many great things is great by a part of greatness smaller than absolute greatness, is not that unreasonable?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“Or again, will anything by taking away a particular small part of equality possess something by means of which, when it is less than absolute equality, its possessor will be equal to anything else?”

“That is impossible.”

“Or let one of us have a part of the small; the small will be greater than this, since this is a part of it, and therefore the absolute small will be greater; but that to which the part of the small is added will be smaller, not greater, than before.”

“That,” said he, “is impossible.”

Thomas Taylor

For see (said Parmenides), whether upon dividing magnitude itself, it would not be absurd that each of the many things which are great, should be great by a part of magnitude less than magnitude itself?

Entirely so, said Socrates.

But what then? Can that which participates a part of equal itself, be equal to any thing by this its part of equality, which is less than equal itself?

It is impossible.

But some one of us must possess a part of this small quantity; and that which is *small itself* will be greater than this, this small quantity being a part of *small itself*; and thus *small itself* will be that which is *greater*: but that to which this part which was taken away is added, will become smaller, and not greater than it was before.

That Socrates said - This cannot take place.

Morrow and Dillon

“For consider,” he said, “if you divide Greatness itself, and if each of the many great things is great by a part of Greatness smaller than Greatness itself, does that not appear illogical?”

“Very much so,” Socrates replied.

“Or again, if each thing that participates in Equality will take off a small part of it, will it, by having something less than Equality itself, be equal to anything?”

“Impossible.”

“But suppose one of us has a portion of Smallness. Smallness itself will be greater than this, since this is a part of it, and so Smallness itself will be greater; and when this part that is taken off is added to anything, that thing will be smaller, not greater, than it was before.”

“That certainly cannot be,” said Socrates.

Oxford Greek

τίνα οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν **εἰδῶν** σοι τὰ ἄλλα **μεταλήψεται**, μήτε κατὰ **μέρη** μήτε κατὰ **ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν** δυνάμενα;

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκόλον εἶναι τὸ **τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς** διορίσασθαι.

τί δὲ δῆ; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις;

τὸ ποῖον;

Balboas

Parmenides: To you then , O Socrates , in what way are **the other existents** **able** to have a **Share** σοι ουν , ω Σωκρατες , Τίνα τροπον τα αλλα δυναμενα μεταλαμβανειν of **The Ideas** , since they are **unable** to do so according to **Parts** , nor according to **Wholes** ? των ειδων , μητε κατα μερη μητε κατα ολα ;

Socrates: No by Zeus , it does not **appear** to me to be in any way an easy matter to **define** Ου μα τον Δια , ου δοκει μοι , ειναι ουδαμως ευκολον διορισασθαι something such as this . το τοιουτον .

Parmenides: What next then ? What do you say to this ? Τι δη δε ; πως εχεις προς τοδε ;

Socrates: To what ? (Το ποιον ;)

128a τίνα
130d τίνα
131e τίνα
132b τινός
132c τινος, τίνα

131b εἰδῶν
131c εἶδη, εἶδος
131e εἰδῶν
132a εἶδος
132b εἶδος, εἰδῶν, εἰδῶν

130e μεταλαμβάνοντα, μεταλαμβάντα
131a μεταλαμβάνον, μεταλαμβάνει
131e μεταλήψεται, μεταλαμβάνειν
133a μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνει
136a μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνειν

131c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος
131d μέρος, μέρος
131e μέρη
137c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος
137d μερῶν, μέρη, μέρη, μέρος, μέρη

131b ὅλον, ὅλον
131c ὅλον, ὅλον
131e ὅλα
137c ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλον
137d ὅλον, ὅλον

130b τοιαῦτα, τοιοῦτων
131b τοιοῦτον
131e τοιοῦτον
133b τοιαῦτα
135b τοιαῦτα

130d οὐδαμῶς
131c οὐδαμῶς
131e οὐδαμῶς
132b οὐδαμοῦ
138a οὐδαμοῦ

Loeb

“How, then, Socrates, will other things partake of those ideas of yours, if they cannot partake of them either as parts or as wholes?”

“By Zeus,” he replied, “I think that is a very hard question to determine.”

“Well, what do you think of this?”

“Of what?”

Thomas Taylor

But after what manner then, O Socrates, can individuals participate of forms, if they are neither able to participate according to parts, nor according to wholes?

That Socrates said, It does not appear to me, by Jupiter, to be in any respect an easy matter to define a circumstance of this kind.

But what will you say to this?

To what?

Morrow and Dillon

“In what way, then, Socrates,” he said, “will other things participate in your Forms if they can participate in them neither in part nor as wholes?”

“In the name of Zeus,” he said, “there is no easy way that I see of determining such a question.”

“Well, what do you say of the following problem?”

“What is it?”

οἶμαι σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἑκάστων **εἶδος** οἶσθαι εἶναι: ὅταν **πολλ'** ἅττα **μεγάλα** σοι **δόξη** εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ **ιδέα** ἢ **αὐτὴ** εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ **μέγα** ἡγή εἶναι.

ἀληθῆ **λέγεις**, φάναι.

τί δ' **αὐτὸ** τὸ **μέγα** καὶ τὰλλα τὰ **μεγάλα**, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς, οὐχὶ ἐν τῷ **μέγα** φανεῖται, ὥ τὰυτα πάντα **μεγάλα** φαίνεσθαι;

ἔοικεν.

Parmenides: I suspect that your reason for believing that each **Idea** is **One** arises from something
 132A Οἶμαι σε οἰεσθαι ἑκάστων εἶδος ἐν εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ
 such as this . When a **multitude of particulars appear** to you to be **great** , you may think , that by
 τοιοῦδε : ὅταν πολλ' ἅττα δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεγάλα , δόξη
 looking at all of **them** , **One Certain (Common) Ideal Self** is found to be **Equally in their case** ,
 ἰδόντι πάντα μία τις ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἴσως ἐπὶ
 from whence you are **Led** to believe that **The Great/Big** is **One** . (Inferred **concept** , not **Idea** . PG)
 ὅθεν ἡγείτο **τὸ μέγα** εἶναι ἐν .

Socrates: You speak **The Truth** .

λέγεις Ἀληθῆ .

Parmenides: What then if when you **See** with **The Soul** , **The Great Self** , and **All**

Τι δ' ἐὰν ἴδῃς ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ καὶ πάντα

The Other Ideas that are **Great in a similar way** . Then in turn , will not a **Certain Great One** ,
 τα ἀλλὰ μεγάλα ὡσαύτως , αὐ οὐχὶ τι μέγα ἐν
 necessarily come to **Light** , through which , **All These come to Light as Great/Big** ?
 ἀναγκῇ φανεῖται , ὡ πάντα ταῦτα φαίνεσθαι μεγάλα ;

Socrates: It seems so .(Εοικεν .)

131c εἶδη, εἶδος

131e εἰδῶν

132a εἶδος

132b εἶδος, εἰδῶν, εἰδῶν

132c εἶδος, εἰδῶν

131b πολλοῖς, πολλοῖς, πολλοῖς

131d πολλῶν

132a πολλ'

133b πολλά, πολλῶν, πολλὰ

134c πολὺ

130e μέγα

131d μεγάλων, μέγα, μείζον, μείζον, μείζον

132a μέγαλα, μέγα, μέγα, μεγάλα, μέγα, μεγάλα

132b μεγάλα

132c μεγάλη

132a ιδέα

132c ιδεῶν

133c ιδεῶν

131c αὐτοῦ, αὐτὰ, αὐτῶν

131d αὐτὸ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτὸ

132a αὐτῇ, αὐτό

132b αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ

132c αὐτό

130d λέγομεν

131b λέγειν

132a λέγεις

132b ἐλέγετο

132c λέγεις

130e δόξαν, δόξας

132a δόξη

142a δόξα, δοξάζεται

153d δόξα

Loeb

“I fancy your reason for believing that each idea is one is something like this; when there is a number of things which seem to you to be great, you may think, as you look at them all, that there is one and the same idea in them, and hence you think the great is one.”

“That is true,” he said.

“But if with your mind's eye you regard the absolute great and these many great things in the same way, will not another great appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great?”

“So it seems.”

Thomas Taylor

I think that you consider every form as one, on this account; because, since a certain multitude of particulars seems to you to be great, there may perhaps appear to him who surveys them all to be one idea, from whence you think them to be one great thing.

That then Socrates said, You speak the truth.

But what if you consider the *great itself*, and other things which are *great*, in the same manner, with the eye of the soul, will not again a certain something which is *great* appear to you, through which all these necessarily seem to be great?

It seems so.

Morrow and Dillon

“I believe your reason for thinking each Form is one is the following. When you observe that several things are large, then no doubt you conjecture a single character that is the same when you look at them all; hence you consider largeness to be a single thing.”

“That’s true,” he replied.

“But now take Largeness itself and the many large particulars. Suppose you contemplate all these in the same way in your soul, will not yet another unity make its appearance, by virtue of which all these appear large?”

“So it would seem.”

ἄλλο ἄρα **εἶδος** μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' **αὐτό** τε τὸ μέγεθος **γεγονός** καὶ τὰ **μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ**: καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτὰ πᾶσιν **ἕτερον**, ὥς ταῦτα πάντα **μεγάλα** ἔσται: καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἐν ἑκάστῳ σοὶ τῶν **εἰδῶν** ἔσται, ἀλλὰ **ἄπειρα** τὸ πλῆθος.

ἀλλὰ, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν **εἰδῶν** ἑκάστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ **οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκη** ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐν γε ἑκάστῳ εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι **πάσχοι** ἃ νυνδὴ **ἐλέγετο**.

τί οὖν; φάναι, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶ τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός;

ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν.

ἀλλὰ **τινός**;

ναί.

Parmenides: Accordingly then , **another** offspring idea of **Greatness** will appear , besides
 ἀρα Ἄλλο γεγονός εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται , παρ'
The Great Self , **and also** of those that partake of **The Self** : and besides **all these** , yet **another**
 το μέγεθος αὐτο τε καὶ τὰ μετεχόντα αὐτοῦ : καὶ ἐπὶ πασὶν τούτοις ἕτερον
 in turn , through which , all these will appear to be great/big . And surely then , each of
 132B αὐ ὦ παντα ταυτα εἰσται μεγάλα : καὶ δὴ ἑκάστον
 your “ideas” , will no longer be **One** , but an **infinite multitude** .
 σοὶ τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκετι εἰσται ἐν , ἀλλ' το ἀπειρα πλῆθος .

~~~~Socrates the empiricist !?!~~~~

**Socrates:** 6 Then , O Parmenides , each one of **these ideas** is nothing more than a **conception** ,  
 Ἀλλὰ , ὦ Παρμενίδη , ἑκάστον τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν μὴ ἢ νόημα ,  
 and will not subsist in any place other than in the proper **Self** in **Souls** ; for in this way , each  
 καὶ ἐγγίγνεσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν προσήκῃ αὐτῷ ψυχῇ : γὰρ οὕτω ἑκάστον  
 will indeed be one ; and that which was just now mentioned will not still happen .  
 ἀν γε εἴη ἐν καὶ ἀ δὴ νυν ἐλέγετο ἀν οὐκ ἐτι πάσχοι .

**Parmenides:** What then ? Is **each** of these conceptions **One** ,  
 Τί οὖν ; ἐστὶ ἑκάστον τῶν νοημάτων ἐν  
 but on the other hand , a conception of **nothing** ?  
 δε νόημα οὐδενός ;

**Socrates:** But this is impossible . ( Ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον . )

**Parmenides:** Hence , it is a conception of **something** ? ( Ἀλλὰ τίνος ; )

**Socrates:** Yes . ( Ναί . )

131e εἰδῶν  
 132a εἶδος  
**132b εἶδος, εἰδῶν, εἰδῶν**  
 132c εἶδος, εἰδῶν  
 132d εἶδῃ, εἰδῶν, εἰδῇ, εἶδος  
 131d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό  
 132a αὐτῇ, αὐτό  
**132b αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ**  
 132c αὐτό  
 132d αὐτοῖς, αὐτῷ

131a γένοιτο  
 131d γένοιτο  
**132b γεγονός**  
 132d γίγνεσθαι  
 132e γιγνόμενον, γίγνηται  
 130b μετέχοντα  
 131c μετέχοντα, μετέχει  
**132b μετέχοντα**  
 132c μετέχειν  
 132e μετέχειν, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντι  
 128a ἕτερόν  
 129c ἕτερα, ἕτερα, ἕτερα, ἕτερα  
**132b ἕτερον**  
 132e ἕτερον  
 138b ἕτερον, ἕτερονδε

131d μεγάλων, μέγα, μείζον, μείζον, μείζον  
 132a μεγάλα, μέγα, μέγα, μέγα, μέγα, μέγα  
**132b μέγала**  
 132c μεγάλη  
 133b μέγιστον  
**132b ἄπειρα**  
 137d ἄπειρον, ἄπειρον  
 143a ἄπειρον  
 131e οὐδαμῶς  
 131c οὐδαμῶς  
**132b οὐδαμοῦ**  
 138a οὐδαμοῦ  
 140a οὐδαμῶς

**132b προσήκη**  
 133b προσήκειν  
 138d προσήκει  
 129b πεπονθῶτα  
 129c πάσχοντα  
**132b**  
**πάσχοι**  
 131b λέγειν  
 132a λέγεις  
**132b ἐλέγετο**  
 132c λέγεις  
 133b λέγοντι  
 130d τίνα  
 131c τίνα  
**132b τινός**  
 132c τίνος, τίνα  
 133c τίνα

## Loeb

“That is, another idea of greatness will appear, in addition to absolute greatness and the objects which partake of it; and another again in addition to these, by reason of which they are all great; and each of your ideas will no longer be one, but their number will be infinite.”

“But, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “each of these ideas may be only a thought, which can exist only in our minds then each might be one, without being exposed to the consequences you have just mentioned.”

“But,” he said, “is each thought one, but a thought of nothing?”

“That is impossible,” he replied.

“But of something?”

“Yes.”

## Thomas Taylor

Hence, another form of *magnitude* will become apparent, besides *magnitude itself* and its participants: and besides all these another *magnitude*, through which all these become great; so that each of your forms will no longer be one thing, but an infinite multitude.

But that upon this Socrates replied, Perhaps, O Parmenides, each of these forms is nothing more than an intellectual *conception*, which ought not to subsist any where but in the soul; and if this be the case, each will be one: and the consequences just now mentioned will not ensue.

That Parmenides said, What then? is each of these *conceptions* one, but at the same time a *conception* of nothing?

That Socrates said, This is impossible.

It is a *conception*, therefore, of something?

Certainly.

## Morrow and Dillon

If so, a third form of Largeness will present itself, over and above Largeness itself and the things that share in it; and again, covering both of these yet another, which will make all of them large. So each of your Forms will no longer be one, but infinite in number.”

“But Parmenides,” said Socrates, “may it not be that each of these Forms is a thought, which cannot properly come into being anywhere but in souls. In that way each of them would be one, and would thus not be liable to the difficulties which have just been described.”

“Then, is each Form one of these thoughts, and yet a thought of nothing?”

“No, that is impossible.”

“So it is a thought of something?”

“Yes.”

ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος;

ὄντος.

οὐχ ἑνός **τινος**, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὶ νοεῖ, μίαν **τινὰ** οὕσαν **ιδέαν**;

ναί.

εἴτα οὐκ **εἶδος** ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἐν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὃν τὸ **αὐτὸ** ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;

ἀνάγκη αὖ φαίνεται.

τί δὲ δὴ; εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ τᾶλλα φῆς τῶν **εἰδῶν μετέχειν** ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι;

### Balboas

**Parmenides:** Of **Being** or of non-being ?

132C Οντος η ουκ οντος ;

**Socrates:** Of being . (Οντος .)

**Parmenides:** Will it not be of **One Certain Entity** , which that conception **Intellects**

Ουχ ενος τινος επον , ο εκεινο το νοημα νοει  
in the case of all things , as **Being One Certain Idea** ?  
επι πασιν ουσαν μιαν τινα ιδεαν ;

**Socrates:** Yes . (Ναι .)

**Parmenides:** Then will not **This Idea** that is **Being Intellected** be **One** ,

Ειτα εσται ουκ τουτο ειδος το νοουμενον ειναι εν ,  
by **Always Being The Self in every case** ?  
αιει ον το αυτο επι πασιν ;

**Socrates:** This again , has come to **Light** as **Necessary** .

αυ φαίνεται Αναγκη .

**Parmenides:** But what then ? Or does it not appear **Necessary** , for you to say that inasmuch

δε Τι δη ; η ουκ δοκει αναγκη σοι φης η  
as **other things Participate** of **The Ideas/Species** , that each one of **Them** must be composed of  
ταλλα μετεχειν των ειδων εκαστον ειναι εκ

**Thoughts/Intellections** and that **All** of **Them** in turn , must be **Able** to **Intellect/Think** ?

νοηματων και παντα νοειν ,

Or will you say that although by **Being Intellections** , yet **They** are **without Intelligence/Mind** ?

η οντα νοηματα ειναι ανοητα ;

131e τίνα  
132b τινός  
**132c τινος, τινὰ**  
133c τίνα  
134c τινα

132a ιδέα  
**132c ιδέαν**  
133c ιδεῶν  
134c ιδέας

132a εἶδος  
132b εἶδος, εἰδῶν, εἰδῶν  
**132c εἶδος, εἰδῶν**  
132d εἶδη, εἰδῶν, εἶδει, εἶδος  
132e εἶδους, εἶδος, εἶδει, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος

132a αὐτὴ, αὐτό  
132b αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ  
**132c αὐτὸ**  
132d αὐτοῖς, αὐτῶ  
132e αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, ἐαυτοῦ

131c μετέχοντα, μετέχοι  
132b μετέχοντα  
**132c μετέχειν**  
132e μετέχειν, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντι  
133d μετέχοντες

Loeb

“Of something that is, or that is not?”

“Of something that is.”

“A thought of some single element which that thought thinks of as appertaining to all and as being one idea?”

“Yes.”

“Then will not this single element, which is thought of as one and as always the same in all, be an idea?”

“That, again, seems inevitable.”

“Well then,” said Parmenides, “does not the necessity which compels you to say that all other things partake of ideas, oblige you also to believe either that everything is made of thoughts, and all things think, or that, being thoughts, they are without thought?”

Thomas Taylor

Of *being* or of *non-being*?

Of *being*.

Will it not be of one particular thing, which that conception understands as one certain idea in all things?

Undoubtedly.

But now will not that which is understood to be one, be a form always the same in all things?

This seems to be necessary.

That Parmenides then said, But what, is it not necessary, since other things participate of forms, that each should be composed from intellectual conceptions; and thus all of them be endued with intellection? Or will you assert that though they are intellectual conceptions, yet they understand nothing?

Morrow and Dillon

“Of something that is, or of something that is not?”

“Of something that is.”

“In fact, of some one thing which that thought understands to preside over all the cases, as being some one single idea?”

“Yes.”

“Then will not this thing that is thought of as being one and always the same in all cases be a from?”

“That again seems necessary.”

“And besides,” said Parmenides, “according to the way in which you assert that the other things have a share in the Forms, must you not hold either that each of those things consists of thoughts, so that all things think, or else that they are thoughts which nevertheless do not think?”

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει **λόγον**, ἀλλ', ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν: τὰ μὲν **εἶδη** ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα **ἑστάναι** ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις εἰκέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα, καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις **γίγνεσθαι** τῶν **εἰδῶν** οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι **αὐτοῖς**.

εἰ οὖν τι, ἔφη, ἔοικεν τῷ **εἶδει**, οἷόν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ **εἶδος** μὴ **ὅμοιον** εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ' ὅσον **αὐτῷ** ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ **ὅμοιον** μὴ **ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον** εἶναι; οὐκ ἔστι.

Balboas

**Socrates:** But this has to be *in no way Rational* . But , O Parmenides , it seems to me indeed ,  
 132D Ἀλλ' τουτο εχει ουδε λογον , αλλ , ω Παρμενιδη , εμοιγε  
 to be clearly seen especially , as follows : On the one hand , **These Ideas/Species** are **Set-Up**  
 καταφαινεται μαλιστα ωδε : μεν ταυτα τα ειδη εσταναι  
 in **Their Very Nature** , just as **Paradigms/Models** , whereas on the other hand , **the others** are  
 εν τη φυσει ωσπερ παραδειγματα , δε τα αλλα  
**Assimilated** to **These Models** , and are **Their likenesses** ; and **The Self Participation** , by **the**  
 εοικεναι τουτοις και ειναι ομοιωματα : και η αυτη μεθεξις τοις  
**other things** , is nothing else than to become **Assimilated** to **The Selves of The Ideas/Species** .  
 αλλοις ουκ τις αλλη η γιγνεσθαι εικασθηναι αυτοις των ειδων .

**Parmenides:** Therefore , if **anything** becomes **Like The Idea/Species** , *can it be possible that*  
 ουν ει τι εοικε τω ειδει , οιον  
**The Idea/Species** not be **Like that** which becomes **assimilated** , and by as much as **the assimilated**  
 το ειδος μη ειναι ομοιον εκεινο τω εικασθεντι , τε οσον αφωμοιωθη  
**nature** is rendered **Like The Self** ? Or *is there any reason why* , **the like** not be **like The Like** ?  
 καθ' αυτω ; η εστι τις μηχανη το ομοιον μη ειναι ομοιον ομοιω ;

**Socrates:** There is not .  
 εστι Ουκ .

128d λόγῳ  
 130b λόγους  
**132d λόγον**  
 134e λόγον, λόγος  
 135d λόγους

132a εἶδος  
 132b εἶδος, εἰδῶν, εἰδῶν  
**132d εἶδη, εἰδῶν**  
 132d εἶδη, εἰδῶν, εἶδει, εἶδος  
 132e εἶδους, εἶδος, εἶδει, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος

129e στάσιν  
 130d στῶ  
**132d ἑστάναι**  
 138b ἐστάναι  
 139b ἔστηκεν, ἔστηκεν

131d γένοιτο  
 132b γεγονός  
**132d γίγνεσθαι**  
 132c γιγνόμενον, γίγνηται  
 138d γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται

132b αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῷ  
 132c αὐτό  
**132d αὐτοῖς, αὐτῷ**  
 132e αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ  
 133a αὐτά, αὐτό, αὐτῆς

132b εἶδον  
 132c εἶδος, εἰδῶν  
**132d εἶδει, εἶδος**  
 132e εἶδους, εἶδος, εἶδει, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος  
 133a εἰδῶν, εἶδη, εἶδος

129b ὁμοιά, ὁμοιά, ὁμοια  
 130c ὁμοια  
**132d ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὁμοίῳ, ὅμοιον**  
 132e ὁμοιον, ὁμοίῳ, ὁμοια, ὁμοια, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον  
 134e ὁμοίως

Loeb

“That is quite unreasonable, too,” he said, “but Parmenides, I think the most likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation in ideas is assimilation to them, that and nothing else.”

“Then if anything,” he said, “resembles the idea, can that idea avoid being like the thing which resembles it, in so far as the thing has been made to resemble it; or is there any possibility that the like be unlike its like?”

“No, there is none.”

Thomas Taylor

But that Socrates said, This is by no means rational. But, O Parmenides, the affair appears to be to take place, in the most eminent degree, as follows: that these forms are established paradigms, as it were, in nature; but that other things are assimilated to these, and are their resemblances: and that the participation of forms by other things, is nothing more than an assimilation to these forms.

If any thing, therefore, becomes similar to a form, can it be possible that the form should not be similar to the assimilated, so far as the assimilated nature is rendered similar to the form? Or can any reason be assigned why similar should not be similar to similar?

There cannot.

Morrow and Dillon

“That too is unreasonable, said Socrates. But, Parmenides, it appears to me very likely that the case is as follows: that these Forms stand fixed as patterns, as it were, in the nature of things; the other things are made in their image and are likenesses; and this participation they come to have in the Forms is nothing but their being made in their image.”

“Well, if a thing is made in the image of the Form, can that Form fail to be like the image of it, in so far as the image was made in its likeness? Or is there any way that what is like can avoid being like what is like it?”

“No way.”

τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἄρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶδους μετέχειν;  
ἀνάγκη.

οὐ δ' ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾗ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος;  
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἶδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλω: εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό τῷ ὅμοιον ᾗ, ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἀεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται.  
ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

**Parmenides:** Accordingly then , is there not a **Great Necessity** , that **The Relationship**  
αρ' δε ου μεγαλη αναγκη Το

of **like** to **Like** should **Participate** of **One Idea/Species/Paradigm** of **The Self** ?

132E ομοιον τω ομοιω μετεχειν ενος ειδους του αυτου ;

**Socrates:** Necessarily . (Ανάγκη .)

**Parmenides:** But will not **That** through **The Participation** of which , **likes** are **like**

δ' ουκ εκεινο μετεχοντα Ου τα ομοια η ομοια

be **The Ideal Self** ?

το ειδος αυτο ;

**Socrates:** Yes , entirely so .

μεν Πανταπασι συν .

**Parmenides:** Hence , neither can a (**partible**) **thing Be Like The (Impartible) Idea/Species** , nor  
αρα τε Ουκ οιον τι ειναι ομοιον τω ειδει , ουδε

**The Species Be Like the thing** . For if this were not the case , another **species** will always appear

το ειδος αλλω . δε ει μη , αλλο ειδος αι αναφανησεται  
besides that **species** ; and that **species** will again become **like** another ; and so a new **species** 133A

παρα εκεινο αν αυ η ομοιον τω ετερον , και καινον ειδος

would never cease to always come to be , as long as any **species becomes like its participant** .

και ουδεποτε παυσεται αι γιγνομενον , εαν το ειδος γιγνηται ομοιον τω εαυτου μετεχοντι .

**Socrates:** You speak most truly . (λέγεις Αληθεστατα .)

130e ὅμοια

132d ὅμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοίῳ, ὁμοιον

**132e ὅμοιον, ὁμοίῳ, ὅμοια, ὅμοια, ὁμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον**

132a μεγάλα, μέγα, μέγα, μεγάλα, μέγα, μεγάλα

132b μεγάλα

**132e μεγάλα**

133b μέγιστον

140c μείζον, μείζονων, μείζονον

132c αὐτὸ

132d αὐτοῖς, αὐτῷ

**132e αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸ, ἑαυτοῦ**

133a αὐτά, αὐτά, αὐτῆς

133b αὐτά, αὐτά

129c ἕτερα, ἕτερα, ἕτερα, ἕτερα

132d εἶδη, εἰδῶν, εἶδει, εἶδος

**132e εἶδους, εἶδος, εἶδει, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος**

129c ἕτερα, ἕτερα, ἕτερα, ἕτερα

132b ἕτερον

**132e ἕτερον**

138b ἕτερον, ἕτερον

138c ἐτέραν, ἐτέρας

132b μετέχοντα

132c μετέχειν

**132e μετέχειν, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντι**

133d μετέχοντες

134b μετέχονεν

132b γιγνός

132d γίγνεσθαι

**132e γιγνόμενον, γίγνηται**

138d γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται

139a γιγνόμενον

132a λέγεις

132b ἐλέγετο

**132e**

**λέγεις**

Loeb

“And must not necessarily the like partake of the same idea as its like?”

“It must.”

“That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not?”

“Certainly.”

“Then it is impossible that anything be like the idea, or the idea like anything; for if they are alike, some further idea, in addition to the first, will always appear, and if that is like anything, still another, and a new idea will always be arising, if the idea is like that which partakes of it.”

“Very true.”

Thomas Taylor

Is there not, therefore, a mighty necessity that the similar to similar should participate of one and the same form?

It is necessary.

But will not that through the participation of which similars become similars be *form itself*?

Entirely so.

Nothing, therefore, can be similar to *a form*, nor *a form* to any other. For in this case another *form* will always appear besides some particular *form*: and if this again should become similar to another, another would be required; and a new *form* would never cease to take place, as long as any *form* becomes similar to its participant.

You speak most truly.

Morrow and Dillon

“And must not the thing which is like share with the thing that is like it in one and the same Form?”

“It must.”

“And will not that in which the like things share, so as to be alike, be just that Form? itself?”

“Certainly.”

“If so, nothing can be like the Form, nor can the Form be like anything. Otherwise a second Form will always make its appearance over and above the first Form; and if that second Form is like anything, yet a third; and there will be no end to this emergence of fresh Forms; if the Form is to be like the thing that partakes of it.”

“Quite true.”



οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τάλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει.

ἔοικεν.

ὁρᾷς οὖν, φάναι, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ὅση ἡ ἀπορία ἐάν τις ὡς εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διορίζηται; καὶ μάλα.

εὐ τοίνυν ἴσθι, φάναι, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἅπτη αὐτῆς ὅση ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, εἰ ἐν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων αἰεὶ τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις.

πῶς δῆ; εἰπεῖν.

### Balboas

**Parmenides:** So if the other things *do not* have a **Share** of **The Ideas/Species** through Likeness ;  
 ἀρα τάλλα Οὐκ μεταλαμβάνει τῶν εἰδῶν ὁμοιοτητι ,  
 then it is necessary to seek after something else through which they may have a **Share** .  
 ἀλλὰ δεῖ ζητεῖν τι ἄλλο ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει .

**Socrates:** So it seems .(Εοικεν .)

**Parmenides:** Do you see then , O Socrates , how great a doubt arises ,  
 Ὅρας οὖν , ὦ Σωκράτες , ὅση ἡ ἀπορία  
 if any one defines/delimits/separates **The Ideas** , as **Being Selves** according to Selves ?  
 εἰ τις διορίζεται εἶδη ὡς ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ;

**Socrates:** I do , very much so .(Και μάλα .)

**Parmenides:** Accordingly then , know well that you do not yet grasp how great is the difficulty  
 τοίνυν ἴσθι Εὐ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀπτεῖ ὅση ἡ ἀπορία  
 of **Self** , as the saying goes , if you should place **Each One Idea** of **The Real Beings**  
 133B αὐτῆς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἰ θήσεις ἕκαστον ἐν εἶδος τῶν ὄντων  
 as always being something that is separate/set-apart .  
 αἰεὶ τι ἀφοριζόμενος .

**Socrates:** What do you mean then ? (Πῶς δὲ ;)

130b ὁμοίτης, ὁμοιότητος

130c ὁμοιότητος

133a ὁμοιότητι

136b ὁμοιότητος

140c ὁμοιότητος, ὁμοιότητος

132d εἶδη, εἰδῶν, εἶδει, εἶδος

132e εἶδους, εἶδος, εἶδει, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος

133a εἰδῶν, εἶδη, εἶδος

133b εἶδη

133d εἶδη

131a μεταλαμβάνον, μεταλαμβάνει

131c μεταλήφεται, μεταλαμβάνειν

133a μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνει

156a μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνειν

158b μεταλαμβάνοντα, μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνει

132d αὐτοῖς, αὐτῶν

132e αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ

133a αὐτὰ, αὐτά, αὐτῆς

133b αὐτά, αὐτά

133c αὐτήν, αὐτήν, αὐτῶν, αὐτή, αὐταί, αὐτήν, αὐτάς

133a ἅπτη

138a ἅπτοιτο, ἅπτεσθαι

148d ἅπτεσθαι, ἅπτεσθαι

Loeb

“Then it is not by likeness that other things partake of ideas we must seek some other method of participation.”

“So it seems.”

“Do you see, then, Socrates, how great the difficulty is, if we maintain that ideas are separate, independent entities?”

“Yes, certainly.”

“You may be sure,” he said, “that you do not yet, if I may say so, grasp the greatness of the difficulty involved in your assumption that each idea is one and is something distinct from concrete things.”

“How is that?” said he.

Thomas Taylor

Hence, then, other things do not participate of *forms* through similitude; but it is necessary to seek after something else through which they participate.

So it seems.

That Parmenides then said, Do you see, O Socrates, how great a doubt arises, if any one defines forms as having an essential subsistence by themselves?

I do very much so.

Know, then, that you do not apprehend what dubious consequences are produced, by placing every individual form of beings separate from its participants.

But that Socrates said, How do you mean?

Morrow and Dillon

“It follows that the other things do not partake of Forms in virtue of likeness; we must look for some other means by which they partake.”

“So it seems.”

“You see, then, Socrates,” he said, “what great difficulties there are in asserting their existence as Forms just by themselves?”

“I do indeed.”

“I assure you, then, you have as yet hardly grasped how great they will be, if you are going to set up a single Form for every distinction you make among things.”

“How so?”

**πολλὰ** μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, φάναι, **μέγιστον** δὲ τόδε. εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ **προσῆκειν αὐτὰ** **γινώσκεσθαι** ὄντα **τοιαῦτα** οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ **εἶδη**, τῷ ταῦτα **λέγοντι** οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ **πολλῶν** μὲν **τύχοι** ἔμπειρος ὧν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφυῆς, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάνυ **πολλὰ** καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἔπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπιθανος εἶη ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων **αὐτὰ** εἶναι.

πῆ δὴ, ὦ Παρμενίδη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

## Balboas

**Parmenides:** On the one hand , there are many other doubts indeed , but on the other hand , the following one , is the greatest . If anyone should say that **The Ideal Selves** cannot even be properly known , being **Such as** we have said **They Must Be** . It could not even be proven **προσηκειν γινωσκεσθαι οντα τοιαυτα οια φαμεν δειν ειναι** , **αν ουκ εχοι ενδειξασθαι** to anyone , that he is mistaken , if it were not the case , on the one hand , that he who argues that it **could** be proven , happened to be **experienced/practiced** in a multitude of particulars and who is **του ενδεικνυμενου τυχοι εμπειρος πολλων και ων** not without **natural talent** , and on the other hand , he should also **be willing to follow** the proof **μη αφυης δε εθελοι επεσθαι** through many long and elaborate details ; but even then , he who contends that **πολλα πανυ και πορρωθεν πραγματευομενου , αλλ' ο αναγκαζων** **The Ideal Selves** are unknowable , may still remain un-persuaded .

133C **αυτα ειναι αγνωστα ειη απιθανος .**

**Socrates:** **In what way** then , O Parmenides ? (Πη δη , ω Παρμενιδη ;)

131d πολλῶν

132a πόλλ'

**133b πολλὰ, πολλῶν, πολλὰ**

134c πολὺ

135a πολλά, πολλή

132b μεγάλη

132c μεγάλη

**133b μέγιστον**

140c μείζον, μειζόνων, μειζόνων

140d μείζον

132b προσήκη

**133b προσήκειν**

138d προσήκει

139c προσήκει

132e αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ

133a αὐτά, αὐτὰ, αὐτῆς

**133b αὐτά, αὐτά**

133c αὐτήν, αὐτῇ, αὐτῶν, αὐτῇ, αὐταί, αὐτῇ, αὐτάς

133d αὐτά, αὐτὰ αὐτά, ἑαυτῶν

**133b γινώσκεσθαι**

134b γινώσκεται, γινώσκεται

134d γινώσκειν, γινώσκειν

131b τοιοῦτον

131c τοιοῦτον

**133b τοιαῦτα**

135b τοιαῦτα

135c τοιοῦτου

132e εἶδους, εἶδος, εἶδει, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος, εἶδος

133a εἰδῶν, εἶδη

**133b εἶδη**

133d εἶδη

134b εἶδη, εἶδους, εἰδών

132b ἐλέγετο

132c λέγεις

**133b λέγοντι**

133c λέγεις

133d λέγεις

127c τυχεῖν

**133b τύχοι**

138e τυγχάνει

142b τυγχάνει

Loeb

“There are many reasons,” he said, “but the greatest is this; if anyone should say that the ideas cannot even be known if they are such as we say they must be, no one could prove to him that he was wrong, unless he who argued that they could be known were a man of wide education and ability and were willing to follow the proof through many long and elaborate details; he who maintains that they cannot be known would be unconvinced.”

“Why is that, Parmenides?” said Socrates.

Thomas Taylor

That Parmenides answered, There are many other doubts, indeed, but this is the greatest: if any one should assert that it is not proper *forms* should be known, if they are such as we have said they ought to be, it is impossible to demonstrate that he who asserts this is deceived, unless he who doubts is skilled in a multitude of particulars, and is naturally of a good disposition. But he should be willing to pursue *him* closely who endeavours to support his opinion by a multitude of far-fetched arguments: though, after all, he who contends that *forms* cannot be known will remain unpersuaded.

That Socrates said, In what respect, O Parmenides?

Morrow and Dillon

“The worst difficulty will be this, though there are plenty more. Suppose someone should say that the Forms, if they are such as we are saying they must be, cannot be know. One could not convince him that he was mistaken in that objection, unless he chanced to be a man of wide experience and natural ability, and were willing to follow one through a long and remote train of argument. Otherwise there would be no way of convincing a man who maintained that the Forms were unknowable.”

“Why so, Parmenides?” said Socrates.

ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις **αὐτὴν τινά** καθ' **αὐτὴν** ἐκάστου **οὐσίαν** τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογῆσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν **αὐτῶν** εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν.

πῶς γάρ ἂν **αὐτὴ** καθ' **αὐτὴν** ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

**καλῶς λέγεις**, εἰπεῖν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν **ιδεῶν** πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἱ εἰσιν, **αὐταὶ** πρὸς αὐτὰς τὴν **οὐσίαν**

## Balboas

**Parmenides:** **In a way** that I think both you and any other person , O Socrates , who would **τινά** . **Οτι** οἶμαι καὶ σε καὶ **ἄλλον** , ὦ Σωκράτες , ὅστις **αν** set-up **The Ousia** of each **Idea** as **Subsisting Herself** by **Herself** ; **you must agree** **τιθεται** οὐσίαν ἐκάστου εἶναι **αὐτὴν** καθ' **αὐτὴν** , **αν** ὁμολογῆσαι in the first place , that **None** of **The Ideal Selves** , **Exist in us** . **πρῶτον** μὲν **μηδεμίαν** **αὐτῶν** εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν .

**Socrates:** For if **They** did , then how could **Their Ousia** still **Subsist Herself** by **Herself** ? **γὰρ** **Πῶς** **αν** **ετι** **ειη** **αὐτὴ** καθ' **αὐτὴν** ;

**Parmenides:** You speak **Well** . Is it not also the case , that of **The Ideas** that exist in **relation** to **λέγεις** **Καλῶς** . **Ουκουν** καὶ **τῶν** **ιδεῶν** **εἰσιν** **πρὸς** **Each Other** , however many **They** Are , **They Maintain Their Own Ousia** in relation to **Their** **ἀλλήλας** **αἱ** **οσαι** **εἰσιν** , **εχουσιν** **αὐται** **τὴν** **ουσίαν** **πρὸς** **Selves** , **133D** **αυτας** ,

133a αὐτά, αὐτὰ, αὐτῆς

133b αὐτά, αὐτὰ

133c αὐτὴν, αὐτὴν, αὐτῶν, αὐτὴ, αὐταὶ, αὐτὴν, αὐτάς

133d αὐτά, αὐτὰ αὐτὰ, ἐαυτῶν

133e αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῆ, αὐτῆς, αὐτῆ, αὐτῆς

132b τινός

132c τινός, τινά

133c **τινά**

134c τινά

138d τινι

133c οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν

135a οὐσία

141e οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίας

128a καλῶς, καλῶς

130b καλοῦ

133c **καλῶς**

134c καλόν

135c καλόν

132e λέγεις

133b λέγοντι

133c **λέγεις**

133d λέγεις

134a λέγω, λέγω

132a ἰδέα

132c ἰδέαν

133c **ιδεῶν**

134c ἰδέας

135a ἰδέαι

Loeb

“Because, Socrates, I think that you or anyone else who claims that there is an absolute idea of each thing would agree in the first place that none of them exists in us.”

“No, for if it did, it would no longer be absolute,” said Socrates.

“You are right,” he said. “Then those absolute ideas which are relative to one another have their own nature in relation to themselves,

Thomas Taylor

Because, O Socrates, I think that both you and any other, who establishes the essence of each *form* as subsisting by itself, must allow, in the first place, that no one of these subsists in us.

For (that Socrates said) how if it did, could it any longer subsist itself by itself?

That Parmenides replied, You speak well. But will you not admit that such ideas as are, with relation to each other, such as they are, possess also their essence with respect to themselves,

Morrow and Dillon

“Because, Socrates, I imagine that you or anyone else who asserts that each of them has a real being ‘just by itself,’ would admit, to begin with, that no such real being exists in us.”

“True; for how could it then exist by itself?”

“Very good.” Said Parmenides. “And further, those of the Ideas which are what they are with reference to one another, have their being in such references among themselves,

## Oxford Greek

ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ τις **αὐτὰ** τίθεται, ὧν ἡμεῖς **μετέχοντες** εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα: τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις **αὐτὰ** αὖ πρὸς **αὐτὰ** ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ **εἶδη**, καὶ **ἐαυτῶν** ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ **ὀνομάζεται** οὕτως.

πῶς **λέγεις**; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

## Balboas

but **not in relation to those** existing among us ; whether in relation to some likeness ,  
 ἀλλ' ου προς τα ημιν ειτε ομοιωματα  
 or in whatever way one may then set **selves** up ; and we do **Participate** of each relationship ,  
 ειτε οπη τις δη αυτα τιθεται , ημεις ειναι μετεχοντες εκαστα  
**to which** we apply by some particular name ; but on the other hand , that **those relations** that exist  
 ων επονομαζομεθα : δε τα οντα  
**among us** bear the same name as **Those** , and again our **selves** also exist in relation to our **selves** ,  
 παρ' ημιν ταυτα ομωνυμα αυ αυτα εστιν προς αυτα  
 but not in relation to **Those Ideas** ; and again **selves** exist in relation to **them selves** , but not  
 αλλ' ου προς εκεινοις τα ειδη , αυ εαυτων , αλλ' ουκ  
**in relation to Those** with whom they thus **only Share Their Name** .  
 εκεινων οσα ουτως ονομαζεται .

**Socrates:** How do you mean this ? (Πως λεγεις ;)

**The LORD-Master-tyrant-δεσποτης / SERVANT-Student-slave-δουλος-Relationship**  
 (Or the **lack** of It)

**Stewardship : Lordship : : Good-Steward : Good King Relationship**  
 : : Adapt-Student : Able-Master Relationship  
 Compared to a **deficient copy** : : **slave** : **tyrant**  
**LORD : SERVANT : : APOLLO : SOCRATES**  
 Master : Student : : Diotima : Socrates  
 tyrant : slave : : non-lover : victim

133b αὐτὰ, αὐτά

133c αὐτήν, αὐτήν, αὐτῶν, αὐτῇ, αὐταί, αὐτήν, αὐτάς

**133d αὐτὰ, αὐτὰ αὐτά, ἐαυτῶν**

133e αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῆς, αὐτῇ, αὐτῆς

134a αὐτὰ, αὐτῶν, αὐτά, αὐτά, αὐτῇ, αὐτῆς

132c μετέχων

132e μετέχειν, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντι

**133d μετέχοντες**

134b μετέχομεν

134c μετέχει

133a εἰδών, εἶδη, εἶδος

133b εἶδῃ

**133d εἶδη**

134b εἶδῃ, εἶδους, εἰδῶν

134d εἶδη

133b λέγοντι

133c λέγεις

**133d λέγεις**

134a λέγω, λέγω

135a λέγοντα, λέγειν, ἐλέγομεν

126b ὄνομα, ὄνομα

**133d ὀνομάζεται**

142a ὄνομα, ὀνομάζεται

147d ὀνομάτῃ, ὄνομα, τοῖνομα, ὄνομα, ὀνομά

Loeb

and not in relation to the likenesses, or whatever we choose to call them, which are amongst us, and from which we receive certain names as we participate in them. And these concrete things, which have the same names with the ideas, are likewise relative only to themselves, not to the ideas, and, belong to themselves, not to the like-named ideas.”

“What do you mean?” said Socrates.

Thomas Taylor

and not with reference to things subsisting among us, whether they are resemblances, or in whatever manner you may establish such things; each of which, while we participate, we distinguish by some peculiar appellation? But that the things subsisting among us, and which are synonymous to these, subsist also with reference to each other, and not with relation to forms; and belong to themselves, but not to those which receive with them a common appellation.

That then Socrates said, How do you mean?

Morrow and Dillon

not with reference to those likenesses (or whatever we are to call them) in our world, which we participate in and so come to be called by their several names. And, on the other hand, these things in our world which are homonymous with the Forms are related among themselves, not to the Forms; and all the names of that sort that they bear have reference to one another, not to the Forms.”

“How do you mean?” asked Socrates.



## Oxford Greek

οἶον, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, εἴ τις ἡμῶν τοῦ **δεσπότης** ἢ **δοῦλός** ἐστίν, οὐκ **αὐτοῦ** δεσπότου  
 δήπου, ὃ ἔστι **δεσπότης**, ἐκείνου **δοῦλός** ἐστίν, οὐδὲ **αὐτοῦ** **δούλου**, ὃ ἔστι **δοῦλος**,  
**δεσπότης** ὁ **δεσπότης**, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφότερα ταῦτ' ἐστίν: **αὐτὴ** δὲ  
 δεσποτεία **αὐτῆς** δουλείας ἐστίν ὅ ἐστι, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως **αὐτῇ** δουλεία **αὐτῆς** δεσποτείας,  
 ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς,

## Balboas

**Parmenides:** **Such as** , if one of us were **The Lord** or **the servant** of any one ; then , the one who  
 133E Οἶον , εἰ τις ἡμῶν ἐστὶν δεσποτῆς ἢ δοῦλος τοῦ , οὐκ ὁ  
 is a **servant** , is certainly not in any way , **the servant** of **That Selfhood** of **The Lordship** of **The**  
 ἐστὶ δοῦλος , ἐστὶν δὲ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος δοῦλος ἐκείνου αὐτοῦ δεσποτῆς  
**Lord** , nor is **The One** who is **Lord** , **The Lord** of **The Selfhood** of **the servant** ; whereas by  
 δεσποτοῦ οὐδὲ ὁ ἐστὶ δεσποτῆς , ὁ δεσποτῆς αὐτοῦ δοῦλου , ἀλλ'  
 being **human** , they **Share** in both these **human relations** . On the other hand , **Self Mastership**  
 ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἀνθρώπου , δεσποτείας αὐτῆς  
 is **That** which **It Is** , from **Its Relation** to **Self Stewardship** ; and **Self Stewardship** ,  
 ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστι , αὐτῇ δουλείᾳ καὶ αὐτῇ δουλείᾳ  
**in the same way** , is **Stewardship in Relation to Lordship** . Thus **the relationships in us**  
 ὡσαύτως δουλεία δεσποτείας , ἀλλ' ἐν ἡμῖν  
 exercise none of **Their Power** in relation to **Those Ideas** nor **Those in relation to us** .  
 134A ἐχει οὐ τὴν δύναμιν ἐκεῖνα οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ,

**133e δεσπότης, δεσπότου, δεσπότης, δεσπότης, δεσπότης**

134e δεσπότης

**133e δοῦλος, δοῦλος, δούλου, δοῦλος**

133e αὐτὴν, αὐτὴν, αὐτῶν, αὐτῇ, αὐταί, αὐτῇ, αὐτάς

133d αὐτά, αὐτά, αὐτά, αὐτῶν

**133e αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῆς, αὐτῇ, αὐτῆς**

134a αὐτά, αὐτῶν, αὐτά, αὐτά, αὐτῇ, αὐτῆς

134b αὐτά, αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτῆς

Loeb

“For instance,” said Parmenides, “if one of us is master or slave of anyone, he is not the slave of master in the abstract, nor is the master the master of slave in the abstract; each is a man and is master or slave of a man but mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract, and likewise slavery in the abstract is slavery to mastership in the abstract, but our slaves and masters are not relative to them, nor they to us;

Thomas Taylor

As if, Parmenides answered, some one of us should be the master or servant of any one; he who is master is not the *master* of servant, nor is he who is servant, *servant* of master; but he sustains both these relations, as being a man; while, in the mean time, *dominion itself* is that which it is from its relation to *servitude*; and *servitude*, in a similar manner, is servitude with reference to *dominion*. But the ideas with which we are conversant possess no power over the ideas which subsist by themselves, nor have *they* any authority over us:

Morrow and Dillon

"Suppose, for instance, one of us is master or slave of another, he is not, of course, the slave of Master itself, the essential Master, nor, if he is a master, is he master of Slave itself, the essential Slave, but, being a man, is master or slave of another man; whereas Mastership itself is what it is of Slavery itself; and Slavery itself is slavery to Mastership itself. The significance of things in our world is not with reference to things in that other world, nor have these their significance with reference to us;

ἀλλ', ὃ **λέγω**, **αὐτὰ αὐτῶν** καὶ πρὸς **αὐτὰ** ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως πρὸς **αὐτά**. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὃ **λέγω**;

πάνυ γ', εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, μανθάνω.

οὐκοῦν καὶ **ἐπιστήμη**, φάναι, **αὐτὴ** μὲν ὃ ἐστὶ **ἐπιστήμη** τῆς ὃ ἐστὶν **ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς** ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη **ἐπιστήμη**;

πάνυ γε.

ἐκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν **ἐπιστημῶν**, ἣ ἐστὶν, ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἐστὶν, εἴη ἂν **ἐπιστήμη**: ἢ οὐ;  
ναί.

Thus

ἀλλ'

I say that **They both Subsist by Them Selves** and also **Selves in Relation to Selves** ; and **in a similar way** , **Those in us in relation to Them Selves** . Or do you not understand what I say ?  
ὡσαυτως τα παρ' ἡμιν προς εαυτα . η ου μανθανεις ο λεγω ;

**Socrates:** I understand quite well indeed .

μανθανω Πανυ γ' .

Mastership : Stewardship : : Self Mastership : Self Stewardship

**Parmenides:** 7 On the one hand , is it not also the case , that if **Self Knowledge** is

**The Knowledge** of **That which Is True** , then **Knowledge** would be of **That Self** ?  
μεν και Ουκουν αυτη επιστημη εστιν  
επιστημη ο εστιν αληθεια επιστημη αν ειη της εκεινης αυτης ;

**Socrates:** Perfectly so . (Πανυ γε.)

**Parmenides:** But on the other hand , will every **Knowledge** , which **Is** , then in turn ,

**Be The Knowledge** of **Each-one** of **The Real Beings** that **Exist** ; or not ?  
δε αν η Εκαστη των επιστημων , ο εστιν , αυ ,  
ειη επιστημη εκαστου των οντων εστιν : η ου ;

**Socrates:** Yes , it will . (Ναι .)

133c λέγεις

133d λέγεις

**134a** λέγω, λέγω

135a λέγοντα, λέγειν, ἐλέγομεν

135b λέγεις

133d αὐτά, αὐτὰ αὐτά, αὐτῶν

133e αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῆ, αὐτῆς, αὐτῆ, αὐτῆς

**134a** αὐτά, αὐτῶν, αὐτά, αὐτά, αὐτῆ, αὐτῆς

134b αὐτά, αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτῆς

134c αὐτό, αὐτάς, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῆς

**134a** ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστημῶν,  
ἐπιστήμη

128b ἀλήθειαν

131c ἀληθεία

**134a** ἀλήθεια

134b ἀληθείας

135d ἀλήθεια

Loeb

they, as I say, belong to themselves and are relative to themselves and likewise our slaves and masters are relative to themselves. You understand what I mean, do you not?"

"Certainly," said Socrates, "I understand."

"Then knowledge also, if abstract or absolute, would be knowledge of abstract or absolute truth?"

"Certainly."

"And likewise each kind of absolute knowledge would be knowledge of each kind of absolute being, would it not?"

"Yes."

Thomas Taylor

but I assert that they subsist from themselves, and with relation to themselves; and ours, in a similar manner, with relation to themselves. Do you understand what I say?

That Socrates replied, Entirely so.

That Parmenides then said, Is not science itself, so far as it is such, the science of truth itself?

Perfectly so.

But will each of the sciences which is, be the science of each of the things which are?

Certainly it will.

Morrow and Dillon

but, as I say, the things in that world are what they are with reference to one another and towards one another; and so likewise are the things in our world. You see what I Mean?"

"Certainly I do," said Socrates.

And similarly Knowledge itself, the essence of Knowledge, will be knowledge of Truth itself, the essentially real?"

"Certainly."

"And again any given branch of Knowledge in itself will be knowledge of some department of real things as it is in itself, will it not?"

"Yes."

## Oxford Greek

ή δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν **ἐπιστήμη** οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἂν **ἀληθείας** εἴη, καὶ αὐτὸ ἐκάστη ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν **ἐπιστήμη** τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου ἂν **ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι** εἶναι;

ἀνάγκη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν **αὐτά** γε τὰ **εἶδη**, ὥς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ' ἡμῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

## Balboas

**Parmenides:** But will not **The Knowledge** among us , be **The Truth** which exists among us ?

δε αν ου Η επιστημη παρ' ημιν ειη της αληθειας παρ' ημιν ,

And in turn , would not **Each Knowledge** among us , be a **Knowledge** of **Each of Those**

134B και αυ αν εκαστου η επιστημη παρ' ημιν ειναι επιστημη εκαστου των

**Beings/Reason Principles/Relationships** that happen to exist among us ?

οντων

συμβαينوι παρ' ημιν ?

**Socrates:** Necessarily so .(Ανάγκη .)

**Parmenides:** But certainly , **The Ideal Selves** , as you indeed agree , we neither possess ,

Αλλα μην , τα ειδη αυτα , ως γε ομολογεις , ουτε εχομεν

nor can **They** exist **As Such** among us .

ουτε τε ειναι οιον παρ' ημιν .

**Socrates:** Certainly not then . (Ου γαρ ουν.)

134a ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστημών, ἐπιστήμη

**134b ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμης**

134c ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμην

134d ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη

131c ἀλήθεια

134a ἀλήθεια

**134b ἀληθείας**

135d ἀλήθεια

128c συμβεβηκότων

128d συμβαίνει

**134b συμβαίνοι**

136a συμβαίνοντα, συμβαίνειν, συμβήσεται

136b συμβήσεται, συμβαίνοντα

133b εἶδη

133d εἶδη

**134b εἶδη, εἶδους, εἰδῶν**

134d εἶδη

135a εἶδν. εἶδος

133e αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῆ, αὐτῆς, αὐτῆ, αὐτῆς

134a αὐτά, αὐτῶν, αὐτά, αὐτά, αὐτῆ, αὐτῆς

**134b αὐτά, αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτῆς**

134c αὐτό, αὐτάς, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῆς

134d αὐτήν, αὐτά, αὐτά

Loeb

“And would not the knowledge that exists among us be the knowledge of the truth that exists among us, and each kind of our knowledge be the knowledge of each kind of truth that exists among us?”

“Yes, that is inevitable.”

“But the ideas themselves, as you, agree, we have not, neither can they be among us.”

“No, they cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

But will not our science be conversant with the truth which subsists among us? And will not each of our sciences be the science of that being which happens to reside with us?

It is necessary that it should be so.

But you have granted that we do not possess forms, and that they are not things with which we are conversant?

Certainly not.

Morrow and Dillon

While the knowledge in our world will be knowledge of the truth in our world? And again it would follow that each branch of knowledge in our world must be knowledge of a class of beings in our world?”

“Necessarily.”

“But, as you admit, we do not possess the Forms themselves, nor can they exist in our world.”

“No.”

## Oxford Greek

γινώσκεται δέ γε που ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἵδους τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἔστιν ἕκαστα;

ναί.

ὅ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γινώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

## Balboas

**Parmenides:** But **Every Genus/Class/Whole** of **Self** is *somehow* Recognized to be/Known to be  
 δε τα εκαστα γενη αυτη που Γινωσκεται  
**That** which **It Is indeed** , **by means of The Idea** of **The Knowledge** of **The Self** ?  
 α εστιν γε , υπ' του ειδους της επιστημης του αυτου ;

**Socrates:** Yes . (Ναι .)

**Parmenides:** Which **Ideal Real Being** , we do not *indeed* possess .  
 Ο ημεις ουκ γε εχομεν .

**Socrates:** We do not . (Ου γαρ.)

**Parmenides:** Accordingly then , not a **Single One** of **The Ideas** are Recognized/Known by us ,  
 αρα Ουκ γε ουδεν των ειδων γινωσκεται υπο ημων ,  
 seeing that we do not **Participate** of **Self Knowledge** !  
 επειδη ου μετεχομεν αυτης επιστημης .

**Socrates:** It does not seem likely . (Ουκ εοικεν .)

133b γινώσκεσθαι

**134b** γινώσκεται, γινώσκεται

134d γινώσκειν, γνοίη

134e γινώσκομεν, γινώσκοσι

133e αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῆς, αὐτῆς, αὐτῆς, αὐτῆς

134a αὐτὰ, αὐτῶν, αὐτά, αὐτά, αὐτῆς, αὐτῆς

**134b** αὐτά, αὐτοῦ, αὐτὰ, αὐτῆς

134c αὐτό, αὐτάς, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῆς

134d αὐτήν, αὐτά, αὐτά

133b εἶδη

133d εἶδη

**134b** εἶδη, εἶδους, εἰδῶν

134d εἶδη

135a εἶδη, εἶδος

134a ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστημῶν, ἐπιστήμη

**134b** ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμης

134c ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμην

134d ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη

132e μετέχεν, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντι

133d μετέχοντες

**134b** μετέχομεν

134c μετέχει

137e μετέχει, μετέχου

Loeb

“And the various classes of ideas are known by the absolute idea of knowledge?”

“Yes.”

“Which we do not possess.”

“No, we do not.”

“Then none of the ideas is known by us, since we do not partake of absolute knowledge.”

“Apparently not.”

Thomas Taylor

Is each genus of beings known to be what it is, through the *form itself* of science?

Undoubtedly.

But this *form* we do not possess?

By no means.

No form, therefore, is known by us, as we do not participate of science itself?

It does not appear it can.

Morrow and Dillon

“And presumably the classes of being, just as they are in themselves, are known by the Form of Knowledge itself?”

“Yes.”

“The Form which we do not possess.”

“True.”

“The none of the Forms is known by us, since we do not partake of Knowledge itself.”

“Apparently not.”



ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ **αὐτὸ** τὸ **καλὸν** ὃ ἔστι καὶ τὸ **ἀγαθὸν** καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς **ιδέας** αὐτάς οὕσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

κινδυνεύει.

ὄρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον τόδε.

τὸ ποῖον;

φαίης ἂν που, εἴπερ ἔστιν **αὐτό** τι γένος **ἐπιστήμης**, **πολὺ αὐτό** ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν **ἐπιστήμην**, καὶ κάλλος καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο **αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει**, οὐκ ἂν **τινα** μᾶλλον ἢ **θεὸν** φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην **ἐπιστήμην**;

ἀνάγκη.

### Balboas

**Parmenides:** Therefore , **The Beautiful Self** , which is also **The Good Self** and **All The Selves**  
 αρα το καλον αυτο ο εστι και το αγαθον και παντα αυτας

which we have surely taken-up as **Being Ideas** , are also **Un-Known** by us ?

134C α δη υπολαμβανομεν ως ουσας ιδεας εστι και Αγνωστον ημιν .

**Socrates:** I am **afraid** they are .(Κινδυνευει .)

**Parmenides:** Behold then , this **even more fearful** consequence .

Ορα δη τουτου ετι δεινότερον τοδε .

**Socrates:** What is it ? (Το ποιον ;)

**Parmenides:** You will say perhaps, that if indeed there is a **Certain Genus/Class** of **Knowledge** ,  
 αν Φαιης που ειπερ εστιν τι γενος επιστημης

then **It Is much more-Perfect** than the **knowledge** which exists among us ; and the same goes  
 αυτο ειναι πολυ ακριβεστερον η την επιστημην παρ' ημιν , ουτως

for **Beauty** , and all the other **Genera/Classes/Kinds/Wholes** .

και καλλος και παντα ταλλα .

**Socrates:** Yes . (Ναι .)

**Parmenides:** Is it not the case , that if indeed **anyone else Partakes** of **Self Knowledge** ,

Ουκουν ειπερ τι αλλο μετεχει αυτης επιστημης ,

then you will **not** affirm that **anyone Possesses That Most Perfect Knowledge more** than **God** ?

αν ουκ φαιης τινα εχειν την ακριβεστατην επιστημην μαλλον η θεον ;

**Socrates:** Necessarily not . (Αναγκη .)

134a αὐτά, αὐτῶν, αὐτά, αὐτά, αὐτῇ, αὐτῆς

134b αὐτά, αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτῆς

134c αὐτό, αὐτάς, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῆς

134d αὐτήν, αὐτά, αὐτά

134e αὐτῶν

130b καλοῦ

133c καλῶς

134c καλόν

135c καλόν

135e καλῶς

127b κάγαθόν

130b ἀγαθοῦ

134c ἀγαθόν

135c ἀγαθόν

134a ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστημῶν, ἐπιστήμη

134b ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμης

134c ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμην

134d ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη

134e ἐπιστήμη

132c ἰδέαν

133c ἰδεῶν

134c ἰδέας

135a ἰδέαι

135c ἰδεῶν

132a πολλά

133b πολλά, πολλῶν, πολλά

134c πολὺ

135a πολλά, πολλή

135d πολλῶν

133d μετέχοντες

134b μετέχομεν

134c μετέχει

137c μετέχει, μετέχοι

138a μετέχοντος

132c τινος, τινά

133c τινα

134c τινα

138d τιτι

138e τινος

134c θεὸν

134d θεός, θεῶ

134e θεοί, θεόν

Loeb

“Then the absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.”

“I am afraid they are.”

“Now we come to a still more fearful consequence.”

“What is it?”

“You would say, no doubt, that if there is an absolute kind of knowledge, it is far more accurate than our knowledge, and the same of beauty and all the rest?”

“Yes.”

“And if anything partakes of absolute knowledge, you would say that there is no one more likely than God to possess this most accurate knowledge?”

“Of course.”

Thomas Taylor

The beautiful itself, therefore, and the good itself, and all such things which we have considered as being ideas, are unknown to us?

So it seems.

But survey this, which is yet still more dire.

What?

You will say, perhaps, that if there is any certain *genus of science*, it is much more accurate than the science which resides with us; and that this is likewise true of beauty, and every thing else?

Certainly.

If, therefore, any one possesses *science itself*, will you not assert that no one possesses the most accurate science more than a God?

It is necessary so to assert.

Morrow and Dillon

“So Beauty itself or Goodness itself and all the things we take as Forms in themselves, are unknowable to us.”

“That may be so.”

“Then here is a still more dreadful consequence for you to consider.”

“What is that?”

“You will grant, I suppose, that there is such a thing as a Form of Knowledge, it is much more exact than the knowledge in our world; and so with Beauty and all the rest.”

“Yes.”

“And if anything has part in this Knowledge itself, you would agree that a god has a better title than anyone else to possess the most perfect knowledge?”

“Undoubtedly.”

ἀρ' οὖν οἴός τε αὖ ἔσται ὁ **θεός** τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν **γινώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην** ἔχων;

τί γὰρ οὐ;

ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὠμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μήτε ἐκεῖνα τὰ **εἶδη** πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἢν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ' **αὐτὰ** πρὸς **αὐτὰ** ἐκάτερα.

ὠμολόγηται γάρ.

### Balboas

**Parmenides:** Take notice then ; is it possible in turn , that **God** , can **Know** of our affairs ,  
134D Ἀρ' οὖν εἰσται οἴος αὐ τε ο θεος γινωσκειν παρ' ημιν τα  
by **Possessing Self Knowledge** ? (εχων αυτην επιστημην ;)

**Socrates:** Why would He not ? (Τι γαρ ου ;)

**Parmenides:** Since it has been agreed by us , O Socrates , that neither do **Those Ideas Have**  
Οτι ωμολογηται ημιν , ω Σωκρατες , μητ' εκεινα τα ειδη εχειν  
**The Power** which **They Possess** , in relation to those among us , nor those among us , in relation  
την δυναμιν ην εχει προς τα παρ' ημιν , μητε τα παρ' ημιν προς  
**to Those** ; but that **Selves** exist in relation to **Selves** in each realm .  
εκεινα , αλλ' αυτα προς αυτα εκατερα .

**Socrates:** It was so agreed . (γαρ Ωμολογηται .)

134c θεόν  
134d **θεός**  
134e θεοί, θεόν

133b γινώσκεισθαι  
134b γινώσκεται, γινώσκεται  
134d **γινώσκειν**  
134e γινώσκουμεν, γινώσκουσι  
142a γινώσκεται

134b αὐτά, αὐτοῖ, αὐτά, αὐτῆς  
134c αὐτό, αὐτάς, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῆς  
134d **αὐτήν, αὐτά, αὐτά**  
134e αὐτὸν  
135a αὐτα, αὐτό, αὐτά, αὐτή, αὐτὴν

134b ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμης  
134c ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμην  
134d **ἐπιστήμην**  
134e ἐπιστήμη  
142a ἐπιστήμη

133d εἶδη  
134b εἶδη, εἶδους, εἰδῶν  
134d **εἶδη**  
135a εἶδη, εἶδος  
135b εἶδη, εἶδος

Loeb

“Then will it be possible for God to know human things, if he has absolute knowledge?”

“Why not?”

“Because,” said Parmenides, “we have agreed that those ideas are not relative to our world, nor our world to them, but each only to themselves.”

“Yes, we have agreed to that.”

Thomas Taylor

But can a God, being such as he is, know our affairs through possessing science itself?

Why should he not?

That Parmenides said, Because it has been confessed by us, O Socrates, that neither do those forms possess the power which is peculiar to them, through relation to our concerns, nor ours from relation to theirs; but that the forms in each division are referred to themselves.

It was admitted by us.

Morrow and Dillon

“Then will the god, who possesses Knowledge itself, be able to know the things in our world?”

"Why not?"

"Because," said Parmenides, we have agreed that those forms have no significance with reference to things in our world, nor have things in our world any significance with reference to them. Each set has it only among themselves."

"Yes, we did agree on that."

οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ **θεῷ** αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη **ἐπιστήμη**, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἢ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν **ποτέ** ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὐτ' ἂν **ἐπιστήμη** ἡμᾶς **γνοίῃ** οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ **ὁμοίως** ἡμεῖς τε ἐκείνων οὐκ **ἄρχομεν** τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν **ἀρχῇ** οὐδὲ **γινώσκουμεν** τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρα **ἐπιστήμη**, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν **αὐτὸν λόγον** οὐτε **δεσπότην** ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὐτε **γινώσκουσι** τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα **θεοὶ** ὄντες. ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἔφη, ἢ θαυμαστός ὁ **λόγος**, εἴ τις τὸν **θεὸν** ἀποστερήσει τοῦ εἰδέναι.

Balboas

**Parmenides:** Is it not so, that if there is **The Most Perfect Mastership** among **Divinity**, and Ουκουν εἰ εστιν ἡ ακριβεστατη δεσποτεια παρα τω θεω και **The Most Perfect Self Knowledge**, then neither will **The Mastership** of **Those Gods Rule** ἡ ακριβεστατη αυτη επιστημη, οут' αν ἡ δεσποτεια εκεινων δεσποσειεν over us at any time, nor will **Their Knowledge Know** of us, nor of any other of our concerns, 134E αν ημων ποτε, οут' αν ἡ επιστημη γνοιη ημας ουδε τι αλλο παρ' ημιν των, and in a similar way, we cannot **rule** over **Them** by our **rule**, nor can we **Know/Recognize** αλλα ομοιως, ημεις ουκ αρχομεν τ' εκεινων παρ ημιν τη αρχη ουδε γινωσκομεν **That which Is Divine**, in any way, *through the assistance of our knowledge*. And again, του θειου ουδεν τη ημετερα επιστημη, αυ according to **The Self/Same Logos**, **They** will neither, be our (**Immediate**-JFB, Sym 202e-203a) κατα τον αυτον λογον εκεινοι τε ουτε εισιν ημων **Rulers** (Apology 31a, Phaedo 62b) nor have any **Cognition** of human affairs (by Self-Knowledge). δεσποται ουτε οντες γινωσκουσι τα ανθρωπεια πραγματα.

**Socrates:** But then would not **The Logos**, be wondrous in the extreme, Αλλα μη ο λογος Αλλα θαυμαστος λιαν insofar as one were to **deprive Divinity** of **knowing**? η τις ει αποστερησει τον θεον του ειδεναι.

134c θεόν

134e θεῷ, θεοί, θεόν

134b ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη

134c ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμην

134e ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη

134e ἐπιστήμη

142a ἐπιστήμη

127a ποτε

130d ποτέ, ποτε

134d ποτέ

138d ποτ

139a ποτ

133b γινώσκεισθαι

134b γινώσκειται, γινώσκειται

134e γνοίῃ

134e γινώσκουμεν, γινώσκουσι

142a γινώσκειται

132d ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοίω, ὁμοιον

132e ὁμοιον, ὁμοίω, ὁμοία, ὁμοία, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον

134e ὁμοίως

135e ὁμοία

139e ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον

134e ἄρχομεν, ἀρχῇ

137b ἀρξόμεθα, ἀρξώμαι

137d ἀρχὴν, ἀρχήν

134b γινώσκειται, γινώσκειται

134d γινώσκειν, γνοίῃ

134e γινώσκουμεν, γινώσκουσι

142a γινώσκειται

160d γινώσκειται, γινώσκεισθαι

134c αὐτό, αὐτάς, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτή

134d αὐτήν, αὐτά, αὐτά

134e αὐτόν

135a αὐταί, αὐτό, αὐτά, αὐτή, αὐτήν

135c αὐτήν

130b λόγους

132d λόγον

134e λόγον, λόγος

135d λόγους

135e λόγῳ

133c δεσπότης

134e δεσπότην

Loeb

“Then if this most perfect mastership and this most accurate knowledge are with God, his mastership can never rule us, nor his knowledge know us or anything of our world; we do not rule the gods with our authority, nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge, and by the same reasoning, they likewise, being gods, are not our masters and have no knowledge of human affairs.”

“But surely this,” said he, “is a most amazing argument, if it makes us deprive God of knowledge.”

Thomas Taylor

If, therefore, there is the most accurate dominion with Divinity, and the most accurate science, the dominion of the Gods will not rule over us, nor will their science take cognizance of us, or of any of our concerns; and in a similar manner, we shall not rule over them by our dominion, nor know any thing divine through the assistance of our science. And again, in consequence of the same reasoning, they will neither, though Gods, be our governors, nor have any knowledge of human concerns.

But would not the discourse be wonderful in the extreme, which should deprive Divinity of knowledge?

Morrow and Dillon

“Then, if this most perfect Mastership and most perfect Knowledge are in Gods world, the gods’ Mastership can never be exercised over us, nor their Knowledge know us or anything in our world. Just as we do not rule over them by virtue of rule as it exists in our world, and we know nothing that is divine by our knowledge, so they, on the same principle, being gods, are not our masters, nor do they know anything of human concerns.”

“But surely,” said Socrates, “an argument which would deprive the gods of knowledge would be too strange.”

ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ **πολλὰ** ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ **εἶδη**, εἰ εἰσὶν **αὐταὶ** αἱ **ιδεαὶ** τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὀριεῖται τις **αὐτό** τι ἕκαστον **εἶδος**: ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὥς οὔτε ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴ τε ὅτι μάλιστα εἴη, **πολλὴ** ἀνάγκη **αὐτὰ** εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα, καὶ ταῦτα **λέγοντα** δοκεῖν τε τι **λέγειν** καί, ὃ ἄρτι **ἐλέγομεν**, θαυμαστῶς ὥς δυσανάπειστον εἶναι. καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν ὥς ἔστι γένος τι ἑκάστου καὶ **οὐσία αὐτὴ** καθ' **αὐτήν**,

**Parmenides:** Nevertheless, O Socrates, these and very many other consequences besides these, 135A μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, Ταῦτα καὶ πανυ πολλὰ ἀλλὰ ἐτι τουτοις must be so in relation to **The Ideas**, if **The Ideal Selves** of **The Real Beings Exist**, and if one ἀναγκαιον εχειν προς τα ειδη, εἰ αἱ ιδεαὶ αὐταὶ τῶν ὄντων εἰσιν καὶ τις **determines** that **Each One** is a **Certain Ideal Self**; so that one who hears these words is puzzled ὀριεῖται ἑκάστον τι εἶδος αὐτο: ὥστε τον ακουοντα ἀπορεῖν and questions whether **Selves** do **exist**; or if **They** do **Exist**, that **They Exist** in **The Highest** τε καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς ταυτα ουτε εστι, τε εἰ ὅτι εἰη μάλιστα **Degree**, so that it appears abundantly necessary that **Selves** must be unknown by human nature. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀγνωστα τῇ ἀνθρωπινῇ φύσει: And whosoever speaks in this way, may appear to say something important; and, which καὶ λεγοντα ταυτα δοκειν λεγειν τε τι, καὶ, ο we just now said, may be thought of as being an extraordinary statement, by remaining **unable** ἀρτι ελεγομεν, εἶναι θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσ- to be persuaded. And yet on the one hand, as it **falls to The Ability** of an **Individual** of a **Very** -ἀναπειστον. καὶ μὲν ὡς δυνησομενου του ανδρος πανυ **Good Natural Disposition**, to be able to learn that there is a **certain Genus** of **Each Idea**, and ευφυους (**Phi32B**, **Rep399C**) μαθειν εστι τι γενοσ εκαστου και **That** of **The Self** of **Ousia** by **Her Self**, 135B αὐτὴ οὐσία καθ' αὐτήν,

133b πολλά, πολλῶν, πολλά

134c πολὺ

135a **πολλὰ, πολλή**

135d πολλῶν

136a πολλά, πολλοῖς, πολλά, πολλά, πολλοῖς

134b εἶδη, εἶδους, εἰδῶν

134d εἶδη

135a **εἶδη, εἶδος**

135b εἶδη, εἶδος

135c εἰδῶν

133c ἰδεῶν

134c ἰδέας

135a **ιδεαὶ**

135c ἰδέαν

137e ἰδέας

134d αὐτήν, αὐτά, αὐτά

134c αὐτὸν

135a **αὐταὶ, αὐτό, αὐτὰ, αὐτὴ, αὐτήν**

135c αὐτήν

136a αὐτό, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτό, αὐτά

133d λέγεις

134a λέγω, λέγω

135a **λέγοντα, λέγειν, ἐλέγομεν**

135b λέγεις

135c λέγεις

133c οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν

135a **οὐσία**

141e οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίας

142b οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία

Loeb

“And yet, Socrates,” said Parmenides, “these difficulties and many more besides are inseparable from the ideas, if these ideas of things exist and we declare that each of them is an absolute idea. Therefore he who hears such assertions is confused in his mind and argues that the ideas do not exist, and even if they do exist cannot by any possibility be known by man; and he thinks that what he says is reasonable, and, as I was saying just now, he is amazingly hard to convince. Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence,

Thomas Taylor

That Parmenides said, These, O Socrates, and many other consequences besides these, must necessarily happen to forms, if they are the ideas of things, and if any one separates each form apart from other things; so that any one who hears these assertions, may doubt and hesitate whether such forms have any subsistence; or if they do subsist in a most eminent degree, whether it is not abundantly necessary that they should be unknown by the human nature. Hence he who thus speaks may seem to say something to the purpose; and as we just now said, it may be considered as a wonderful thing, on account of the difficulty of being persuaded, and as the province of a man of a very naturally good disposition, to be able to perceive *that there is a certain genus of every thing, and an essence itself subsisting by itself*:

Morrow and Dillon

“And yet Socrates,” said Parmenides, “these difficulties and many more besides are inevitably involved in the forms if these ideas belong to things and one is going to distinguish each form as a thing just by itself. The result is that the hearer is in doubt and in two minds whether to question their existence, or to contend that, if they do exist, they must certainly be unknowable by our human nature. Moreover, there seems to be some weight in these objections, and as we were saying, it is extraordinarily difficult to convert the objector. Only a man of exceptional gifts will be able to see that a genus, or essence, just by itself, does exist in each case;



## Oxford Greek

ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὐρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον.

συγχωρῶ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὁ Σωκράτης: πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ **νοῦν λέγεις**.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ τις δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, αἰ μὴ ἐάσει **εἶδη** τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ καὶ ἄλλα **τοιαῦτα** ἀποβλέψας, μηδὲ τι ὀριεῖται **εἶδος** ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέφει τὴν **διάνοιαν** ἔξει,

## Balboas

so on the other hand , they will deserve - even

δε του θαυμασ- ετι  
greater admiration , who having made this **discovery** , shall be able to teach yet another person  
-τοτερου ευρησοντος δυνησομενου διδαξαι και αλλον  
how to **thoroughly-well-distinguish** all these particulars , in a **Sufficiently-Efficient Way** .  
διευκρινησαμενον παντα ταυτα ικανως .

**Socrates:** I agree with you entirely , O Parmenides , for you speak **According** to my **Mind** .  
Συγχωρω σοι πανυ , ω Παρμενιδη , γαρ λεγεις κατα μοι νουν .

**Parmenides:** But nevertheless in turn , O Socrates , if anyone indeed , does not permit **The**  
Αλλα μεντοι αυ , ω Σωκρατες , ει τις γε μη εασει  
**Ideas** of **Real-Beings** to be , by not **Keeping** their **Mind Fixed** upon all these recent objections  
ειδη των οντων ειναι , αποβλεψας εις παντα δη νυν τα  
and others like them , and does not **Define One** of **Each Particular Idea/Genus/Paradigm** ,  
και αλλα τοιαυτα , μηδε οριειται ενος εκαστου τι ειδος  
surely then , they will have **no where** to turn their **understanding** ,  
δη εχει ουδε οπη τρεψει την διανοιαν

127c νέον

130a νοῦν

135b νοῦν

136c νοῦν

134a λέγω, λέγω

135a λέγοντα, λέγειν, ἐλέγομεν

135b λέγεις

135c λέγεις

136a λέγεις

134d εἶδη

135a εἶδη, εἶδος

135b εἶδη, εἶδος

135c εἰδῶν

135c εἶδη

131e τοιοῦτον

133b τοιαῦτα

135b τοιαῦτα

135c τοιοῦτου

136d τοιαῦτα

135b διάνοιαν

143a διανοία

158c διανοή

Loeb

and only a still more wonderful man can find out all these facts and teach anyone else to analyze them properly and understand them.”

“I agree with you, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “for what you say is very much to my mind.”

“But on the other hand,” said Parmenides, “if anyone, with his mind fixed on all these objections and others like them, denies the existence of ideas of things, and does not assume an idea under which each individual thing is classed, he will be quite at a loss,

Thomas Taylor

but he will deserve still greater admiration, who, after having made this discovery, shall be able to teach another how to discern and distinguish all these in a becoming manner.

That then Socrates said, I assent to you, O Parmenides, for you entirely speak agreeably to my opinion.

That Parmenides further added, But indeed, O Socrates, if any one on the contrary takes away the forms of things, regarding all that has now been said, and other things of the same kind, he will not find where to turn his dianoëtic part,

Morrow and Dillon

and it will require someone still more remarkable to discover it and to instruct another who has thoroughly examined all these difficulties.”

“I agree with you, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “what you are saying is very much to my mind.”

“But on the other hand,” said Parmenides, “if, in view of all these difficulties and others like them, Socrates, a man refuses to admit that Forms of things exist or to distinguish a definite Form in every case, he will have no direction in which to turn his thought,

## Oxford Greek

μη ἐὼν **ιδέαν** τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν **αὐτὴν** αἰε εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ **τοιούτου** μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον **ἥσθησθαι**.

ἀληθῆ **λέγεις**, φάναι.

τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; πῇ τρέφῃ ἀγνοουμένων τούτων;

οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι.

## Balboas

while they **do not** allow that

μη εὼν

**The Idea** of **Each One** of **The Real Beings** **Is Always** of **The Self**, and **in this way**,

135C ιδεαν εκαστου των οντων ειναι αει την αυτην, και ουτως

entirely destroy **The Power of Dialectics**.

πανταπασι διαφθερει την δυναμιν του διαλεγεσθαι.

Therefore, in such a way, you *also* appear to perceive much **According** to my **Mind**.

ουν του τοιουτου και δοκεις ησθησθαι μαλλον μοι.

**Socrates:** You speak **The Truth**.

λεγεις Αληθη.

**Parmenides:** 8 What then will you do in **relation** to **Philosophy**?

Τι ουν ποιησεις περι φιλοσιφιας;

In what way will you **Turn** your **Mind**, if you are **ignorant** of these particulars?

πη τρεψει (3<sup>rd</sup> per.sin.) αγνοουμενων τουτων;

**Socrates:** At the present time, I do indeed appear, **not** to see in what way at all.

εν τω παροντι μοι γε δοκω Ου καθοραν πανυ.

134c ιδεας

135a ιδειν

**135c ιδεαν**

157c ιδεας

134e αυτων

135a αυται, αυτο, αυτα, αυτη, αυτην

**135c αυτην**

136a αυτο, αυτοις, αυτα, αυτο, αυτα

136b αυτοις, αυτα, αυτος, αυτοι, αυτο

133b τοιαυτα

135b τοιαυτα

**135c τοιούτου**

136d τοιαυτα

137a τοιούτων

128b ἥσθησαι

**135c ἥσθησθαι**

142a αἰσθάνεται

135a λέγοντα, λέγειν, ἐλέγομεν

135b λέγεις

**135c λέγεις**

136a λέγεις

136c λέγεις

Loeb

since he denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, and in this way he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. You seem to have been well aware of this."

"Quite true," he said.

"Then what will become of philosophy? To what can you turn, if these things are unknown?"

"I do not see at all, at least not at present."

Thomas Taylor

while he does not permit the idea of every thing which exists to be always the same, and by this means entirely destroys the dialectic power of the soul: but you also seem in this respect to perceive perfectly the same with myself.

That Socrates answered, You speak the truth.

What then will you do with respect to philosophy? Where will you turn yourself, being ignorant of these?

Indeed I do not seem to myself to know at present.

Morrow and Dillon

so long as he will not allow that each thing has a character which is always the same; and in so doing he will completely destroy the significance of all discourse. But that consequence I think you perceive only too well."

"Quite right," he said.

"What are you going to do about philosophy, then? Where will you turn while the answers to these questions remain unknown?"

"I can see no way out at the present moment."

πρῶ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς **καλόν** τέ τι καὶ **δίκαιον** καὶ **ἀγαθόν** καὶ ἕν ἕκαστον τῶν **εἰδῶν**. ἐνενόησα γάρ καὶ πρῶην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὐ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς **λόγους**: ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν **πολλῶν** ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι **νέος** εἶ: εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύζεται ἡ **ἀλήθεια**.  
 τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας;

Balboas

**Parmenides:** That is because , you exercise yourself *too early* in this manner , O Socrates .  
 γὰρ γυμνασθῆναι Πρω , ὦ Σωκράτης ,  
 You should endeavor beforehand **to Define** what is **Beautiful** and **Just** and **Good** , and **Each**  
 ἐπιχειρεῖς πρὶν ὀρίζεσθαι τι τε καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕκαστον  
**One of The Ideas** . For I also just recently mentally noted this , while hearing you discoursing  
 135D ἐν τῶν εἰδῶν. γὰρ καὶ πρῶην ἐνενόησα τῷδε ἀκούων σου διαλεγομένου  
 with Aristotle here . Thus on the one hand , that **Impulse** , by which you are impelled  
 Ἀριστοτέλει ἐνθάδε . οὖν μὲν ἡ ὁρμᾶς ἣν ὁρμῇ  
 towards discourse , is **Beautiful** and **Divine** -you may be sure of that- but on the other hand ,  
 ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους καλὴ καὶ θεία , εὐ ἴσθι : καὶ δε  
**you must collect Your Self together** , **by exercising** more in **that way** ; which appears to be  
 ἐλκυσὼν σαυτὸν διὰ γυμνασθῆναι μᾶλλον τῆς δοκούσης εἶναι  
 useless to the multitude , and is called by them empty talk ; while you are still young ,  
 ἀχρήστου τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ ἀδολεσχίας , ἕως εἰ ἐτι νέος ;  
 for if you do not , **The Truth** will utterly-elude you .  
 δε εἰ μὴ , ἡ ἀλήθεια διαφεύξεται σε .

**Socrates:** What then , O Parmenides , is *this manner* of exercise ?  
 Τίς οὖν , ὦ Παρμενίδη , ὁ τρόπος τῆς γυμνασίας ;

133c καλῶς  
 134c καλόν  
**135d καλόν**  
 135e καλῶς  
 130b δίκαιο  
 130c δικάιά  
**135d δίκαιον**  
 130b ἀγαθόν  
 134c ἀγαθόν  
**135d ἀγαθόν**

135a εἶδη, εἶδος  
 135b εἶδη, εἶδος  
**135d εἰδῶν**  
 135c εἶδη  
 149e εἶδει, εἶδη  
 132d λόγον  
 134e λόγον, λόγος  
**135d λόγους**  
 135e λόγῳ  
 136b λόγος, λόγῳ  
 134c πολὺ  
 135a πολλά, πολλή  
**135d πολλῶν**  
 136a πολλά, πολλοῖς, πολλά, πολλὰ, πολλοῖς  
 136d πολὺ, πολλῶν

128e νέος, νέος  
 130e νέος  
**135d νέος**  
 134a ἀλήθεια  
 134b ἀληθείας  
**135d ἀλήθεια**

Loeb

“No, Socrates,” he said, “for you try too soon, before you are properly trained, to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and all the other ideas. You see I noticed it when I heard you talking yesterday with Aristoteles here. Your impulse towards dialectic is noble and divine, you may be assured of that; but exercise and train yourself while you are still young in an art which seems to be useless and is called by most people mere loquacity; otherwise the truth will escape you.”

“What, then, Parmenides,” he said, “is the method of training?”

Thomas Taylor

That Parmenides said, Before you exercise yourself in this affair, O Socrates, you should endeavour to define what *the beautiful*, *the just*, and *the good* are, and each of the other forms: for I before perceived the necessity of your accomplishing this, when I heard you discoursing with Aristotle. Indeed that ardour of yours, by which you are impelled to disputation, is both beautiful and divine; but collect yourself together, and while you are young more and more exercise yourself in that science, which appears useless to the many, and is called by them empty loquacity; for if you do not, the truth will elude your pursuit.

That Socrates then said, What method of exercise is this, O Parmenides?

Morrow and Dillon

“That is because you are undertaking to define the ‘beautiful’, ‘just’, ‘good’, and each one of the Forms too soon, before you have had a preliminary training. I noticed that the other day when I heard you talking here with Aristotle. Believe me, there is something beautiful and divine in your impulse for argument; but you must make an effort and exercise yourself more, while you are still young, in that activity which seems to be useless and which the many call “idle talk.” Otherwise, the truth will escape you.”

“What form, then, Parmenides,” he said, “shall this exercise take?”

## Oxford Greek

οὗτος, εἶπεν, ὄνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος. πλὴν τοῦτό γε σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἡγάσθην εἰπόντος, ὅτι οὐκ εἷας ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστα τις ἂν **λόγῳ λάβοι** καὶ **εἶδη** ἂν ἡγήσαιο εἶναι.

δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἔφη, ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ **ὅμοια** καὶ **ἀνόμοια** καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τὰ ὄντα **πάσχοντα** ἀποφαίνειν.

καὶ **καλῶς** γ', ἔφη. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ

## Balboas

**Parmenides:** *The Way* is just *That* which you heard Zeno *practicing* . Except that I was also  
 135E ονπερ Ουτος ηκουσας Ζηνωνος . πλην και  
 quite pleased with what you said to him , because *you* would not allow *him* to look upon  
 γε ηγασθην προς τουτο σου ειποντος τουτον οτι ουκ εις (εαω) επισκοπειν  
**the wandering** that exists among the objects of sight nor upon **the wandering** that **exists**  
 την πλανην εν τοις ορωμενοις ουδε  
**in relation to** them , but to consider according to *That which one can grasp especially by Logos*  
 περι ταυτα , αλλα περι εκεινα α τις αν λαβοι μαλιστα λογω  
 and **in this way** , one would thus be led **to See The Ideas** .  
 και αν ειναι ηγησαιο ειδη .

**Socrates:** For it appears to me , that **in this way** it *may indeed* be shown *without difficulty* ,  
 γαρ Δοκει μοι ταυτη γε αποφαινειν ουδεν χαλεπον  
 that **The Beings** experience both **Like** and **Unlike** , and anything else that **exists** .  
 τα οντα πασχοντα και ομοια και ανομοια και οτιουν αλλο ειναι .

**Parmenides:** Quite rightly indeed . But it is also necessary that , besides this ,  
 γ' καλως και . δε και χρη προς τουτω

134e λόγον, λόγος  
 135d λόγους  
**135e λόγῳ**  
 136b λόγος, λόγῳ  
 137a λόγων

126a λαβόμενος  
 129e λαμβανομένοις  
**135e λάβοι**  
 143a λάβωμεν  
 152c ληφθεῖν

132e ὅμοιον, ὁμοίον, ὁμοια, ὁμοια, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον  
 134e ὁμοίως  
**135e ὅμοια**  
 139e ὁμοιόν, ὁμοιον  
 140a ὁμοιον

135b εἶδη, εἶδος  
 135c εἰδῶν  
**135e εἶδη**  
 149e εἶδει, εἶδη  
 158c εἶδους

129a ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοια  
 129b ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια  
**135e ἀνόμοια**  
 136b ἀνομοίου  
 139e ἀνόμοιον

134c καλόν  
 135c καλόν  
**135e καλῶς**

129c πάσχοντα  
 132b πάσχοι  
**135e πάσχοντα**  
 136b πάσχοντος  
 137a πεπονθέναι

Loeb

“That which you heard Zeno practising,” said he. “However, even when you were speaking to him I was pleased with you, because you would not discuss the doubtful question in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to what we conceive most entirely by the intellect and may call ideas.”

“Yes,” he said, “that is because I think that in that way it is quite easy to show that things experience likeness or unlikeness or anything else.”

“Quite right,” said he, “but if you wish to get better training, you must do something more than that;

Thomas Taylor

And that Parmenides replied, It is that which you have heard Zeno employing: but besides this, while you was speaking with Zeno, I admired your asserting that you not only suffered yourself to contemplate the *wandering* which subsists about the objects of sight, but likewise that which takes place in such things as are especially apprehended by reason, and which some one may consider as having a real subsistence.

For it appears to me (said Socrates), that after this manner it may without difficulty be proved, that there are both similars and dissimilars, or any thing else which it is the province of beings to suffer.

That Parmenides replied, You speak well: but it is necessary that, besides this,

Morrow and Dillon

“The Form,” he said, “which you heard Zeno employing with this exception: there was one thing you said to him that impressed me very much; you would not allow the survey to be confined to visible things or to range only over the field; it was to extend to those objects which are specially apprehended by rational discourse and can be regarded as Forms.”

“Yes,” he said, “because in the former field there seems to be no difficulty about showing that things are both like and unlike and have any other character you please.”

“You are right. But there is one more thing that you must do.



ποιεῖν, μὴ **μόνον** εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ **συμβαίνοντα** ἐκ τῆς **ὑποθέσεως**, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ **αὐτὸ** τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι.

πῶς **λέγεις**; φάναι.

οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει, περὶ ταύτης τῆς **ὑποθέσεως** ἦν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ **πολλά** ἐστι, τί χρὴ **συμβαίνειν** καὶ **αὐτοῖς** τοῖς **πολλοῖς** πρὸς **αὐτὰ** καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐν καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς τε **αὐτὸ** καὶ πρὸς τὰ **πολλά**: καὶ αὖ εἰ μὴ ἐστι **πολλά**, **πάλιν** σκοπεῖν τί **συμβήσεται** καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τοῖς **πολλοῖς** καὶ πρὸς **αὐτὰ** καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα:

you should still

ετι

also suppose the following ; to consider **not only** the consequences resulting from the hypothesis ,  
καὶ ποιεῖν τοδε , σκοπεῖν μὴ μονον τα συμβαινοντα εκ της υποθεσεως ,  
whether **Each Ideal-Self** being hypothesized **exists** , **but also** the consequences resulting from  
136A εἰ ἕκαστον ὑποτιθεμενον ἐστιν , ἀλλὰ καὶ  
hypothesizing if **This Ideal-Self** does **not exist** , if you wish to be more **exercised in this way** .  
υποτιθεσθαι εἰ τουτο το αυτο μη ἐστι , εἰ βουλει μαλλον γυμνασθῆναι .

**Socrates:** *In what way* do you mean ? (Πως λεγεις ;)

**Parmenides:** **Such as** , if you should wish to **exercise Your Self** in this same hypotheses , which  
Οιον , εἰ βουλει περι ταυτης της υποθεσεως ην  
**Zeno** hypothesized ; (1) that if **Many (Beings 127e) Exist** , what must result both to **The Many**  
Ζηνων υπεθετο , εἰ πολλὰ ἐστι , τι χρὴ συμβαινειν καὶ τοις πολλοῖς  
**Selves** in **relation** to **The Selves** and in **relation** to **The One** , and again if **Many (Beings) Exist** ,  
αυτοις προς αυτα καὶ προς το εν καὶ  
what must result for **The One** in **relation** to **The Self** and in **relation** to **The Many** ; and in turn ,  
τω ενι προς αυτο καὶ προς τα πολλὰ : καὶ αυ  
if **The Many do not Exist** , to consider in turn , what will result both in **relation** to **The One**  
εἰ πολλὰ μὴ ἐστι , σκοπεῖν παλιν , τι συμβησεται καὶ τω ενι  
and to **The Many** , both in **relation** to **The Selves** and in **relation** to **Each-Other** .  
136B καὶ τοις πολλοις καὶ προς αυτα καὶ προς αλληλα :

128a μόνον

136a μόνον

138c μόναι

138e μόνον

128d συμβαίνει

134b συμβαίνοι

136a συμβαίνοντα, συμβαίνειν, συμβήσεται

136b συμβήσεται, συμβαίνοντα

137b συμβαίνειν

127d ὑπόθεσιν

128d ὑπόθεσις

136a ὑποθέσεως, ὑποθέσεως

136b ὑποθέσεως

137b ὑποθέσεως

135b λέγεις

135c λέγεις

136a λέγεις

136c λέγεις

136d λέγει, λέγειν

135a πολλά, πολλή

135d πολλῶν

136a πολλά, πολλοῖς, πολλά, πολλὰ, πολλοῖς

136d πολὺ, πολλῶν

136e πολλοί

135a αὐται, αὐτά, αὐτή, αὐτήν

135c αὐτήν

136a αὐτὸ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτό, αὐτά

136b αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτός, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

136c αὐτά

127d πάλιν

136a πάλιν

142b πάλιν

142c πάλιν

Loeb

you must consider not only what happens if a particular hypothesis is true, but also what happens if it is not true."

"What do you mean?" he said.

"Take, for instance," he replied, "that hypothesis of Zeno's if the many exist, you should inquire what will happen to the many themselves in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and to the many, and also what will happen to the one and the many in relation to themselves and to each other, if the many do not exist.

Thomas Taylor

you should not only consider *if each of the things supposed is*, what will be the consequences from the hypothesis, but likewise what will result from supposing that *it is not*, if you wish to be more exercised in this affair.

How do you mean (said Socrates)?

As if (said Parmenides) you should wish to exercise yourself in this hypothesis of Zeno, *if there are many things*, what ought to happen both to *the many* with reference to themselves, and to *The One*; and to *The One* with respect to itself, and to *the many*: and again, *if many are not*, to consider what will happen both to *The One* and to *the many*, as well to them-selves as to each other.

Morrow and Dillon

If you want to be thoroughly exercised, you must not merely make the supposition that such and such a thing is, and then consider the consequences; you must also make the supposition that the same thing is not."

"How do you mean?" he said.

"Take," he said, "if you like, this hypothesis which Zeno made: 'If there are many things, what consequences must follow both for those many things with reference to themselves and to the One, and also for the One with reference to itself and to the many; and again, if there are not many, to consider in turn what will follow both for the One and for the many, with reference to themselves and to each other.'"

καὶ ἀδῆθις αὐτὸ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ εἰ ἔστιν **ὁμοιότης** ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς **ὑποθέσεως** **συμβήσεται** καὶ **αὐτοῖς** τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς **αὐτὰ** καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ **ἀνομοίου** ὁ **αὐτὸς λόγος** καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ περὶ στάσεως καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ **αὐτοῦ** τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι: καὶ ἐνὶ **λόγῳ**, περὶ ὅτου ἂν αἰεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο πάθος **πάσχοντος**, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ **συμβαίνοντα** πρὸς **αὐτὸ** καὶ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ πρὸς ἄλλων, ὅτι ἂν προέλη, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς σύμπαντα ὡσαύτως:

## Balboas

And again in turn (2) , one should hypothesize , if **Likeness Exists** , or if **It** does **not exist** ,  
 καὶ αὐθις αὐτὸ , εἰ ὑποθῇ , εἰ ὁμοιοῦς ἐστὶν ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ ,  
 what will result for each of the hypothesis , both to **The Selves** that are being hypothesized  
 τι συμβήσεται ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς υποθέσεως καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσι  
 and to **The Others** , both in **relation** to **The Selves** and to **Each-Other** .  
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα .  
 And (3) **The Self/Same Logos** must also be applied to **The Unlike** , to **Motion** and **Rest** ,  
 καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου περὶ κινήσεως καὶ στασεως  
 to **Generation** and **Dissolution** and to **The Self** that **Is** and to **The Self** that **Is not** , and in **One**  
 περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ; καὶ ἐνὶ  
**Logos** , concerning **That** which should be hypothesized as **Always-Being** and as **not-Being** and  
 λογῷ (Pro-Tim 168e) , περὶ οὗτου ἂν ὑποθῇ ὡς αἰεὶ ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ  
 anything else that **undergoes** any **experience** whatsoever , one must consider the consequences  
 ἄλλο πάσχοντος πάθος ὅτι οὐδὲν , δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαινόντα  
 in **relation** to **The Self** and in **relation** to each one of **The Others** being considered, which anyone  
 136C πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ πρὸς ἄλλων , ὅτι  
 may set-up for this purpose , and in **relation** to **Many** , and similarly in **relation** to **Everything** .  
 ἂν προέλη , καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ ὡσαύτως πρὸς σύμπαντα :

130e ὁμοιότητος  
 133a ὁμοιότητι  
**136b ὁμοιότης**  
 140e ὁμοιότητος, ὁμοιότητος  
 159e ὁμοιότης, ὁμοιότητι

128d ἐπὶ ὑποθέσεως  
 136a ὑποθέσεως, ὑποθέσεως  
**136b ὑποθέσεως**  
 137b ὑποθέσεως  
 142b ἐπὶ ὑποθέσιν

134b συμβαίνει  
 136a συμβαίνοντα, συμβαίνειν, συμβήσεται  
**136b συμβήσεται, συμβαίνοντα**  
 137b συμβαίνειν  
 142b συμβαίνοντα

135e αὐτὴν  
 136a αὐτὸ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτὰ, αὐτὸ, αὐτὰ  
**136b αὐτοῖς, αὐτὰ, αὐτὸς, αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸ**  
 136c αὐτὰ  
 136d αὐτοῦ

129b ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια  
 135e ἀνόμοια  
**136b ἀνομοίου**  
 139e ἀνόμοιον  
 140b ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον

134d λόγος  
 135e λόγῳ  
**136b λόγος, λόγῳ**  
 137a λόγων  
 141d λόγος

132b πάσχει  
 135e πάσχοντα  
**136b πάσχοντος**  
 137a πεπονθέναι  
 138b πείσεται

## Loeb

And likewise if you suppose the existence or non-existence of likeness, what will happen to the things supposed and to other things in relation to themselves and to each other under each of the two hypotheses. The same applies to unlikeness and to motion and rest, creation and destruction, and even to being and not being. In brief, whatever the subject of your hypothesis, if you suppose that it is or is not, or that it experiences any other affection, you must consider what happens to it and to any other particular things you may choose, and to a greater number and to all in the same way;

## Thomas Taylor

And again, if he should suppose *if similitude is*, or *if it is not*, what will happen from each hypothesis, both to the things supposed and to others, and to themselves and to each other; and the same method of proceeding must take place concerning *the dissimilar, motion and permanency, generation and corruption, being and non-being*: and, in one word, concerning every thing which is supposed either to be or not to be, or influenced in any manner by any other passion, it is necessary to consider the consequences both to itself and to each individual of other things, which you may select for this purpose, and towards many, and towards all things in a similar manner;

## Morrow and Dillon

Or, once more, if you suppose that Likeness exists or does not exist, what will follow on either supposition both for the terms supposed for other things, with reference to themselves and to each other; and the same story with Unlikeness. And with Motion and Rest, and with Generation and Corruption, and with Being and Not-Being themselves. And in a word, whenever you suppose that anything whatsoever exists or does not exist or has any other attribute, you ought to consider the consequences with reference to itself and to each one of the other things that you may select, and several of them, and all of them together;

## Oxford Greek

καὶ τᾶλλα αὖ πρὸς **αὐτά** τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅτι ἂν προαίρῃ αἰεῖ, ἔαντε ὡς ὃν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο, ἄντε ὡς μὴ ὃν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές.

ἀμήχανόν γ' ἔφη, **λέγεις**, ὦ Παρμενίδη, πραγματείαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω. ἀλλὰ μοι τί οὐ διήλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός τι, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω;

## Balboas

And in turn (4) , how **The Others** are **related** to **The Selves** and to any **Other** which one  
 καὶ αὐτὰ τε καὶ πρὸς τι ἄλλο ὃ  
 may select , whether you hypothesize as the subject of your hypothesis **That** which **Always Is** ,  
 ἂν προαίρῃ , εἴ μὲν ὑποθῇ ὡς ὑπετίθεσο ὃ αἰεὶ ὄν  
 or as **that** which **Is-not** ; if you care about **being Perfectly exercised** to **Thoroughly-Behold**  
 εἴ μὲν ὡς ὄν μὴ , εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος διόψεσθαι  
**The Truth** , in a **Masterful Way** .  
 τὸ ἀληθὲς κυρίως .

**Socrates:** You speak , O Parmenides , of an extraordinary undertaking , and I do not  
 λέγεις , ὦ Παρμενίδη , ἀμήχανον πραγματείαν , καὶ οὐ  
 quite understand . But why do you not hypothesize in detail a **Certain/Definite Self** for me ,  
 σφόδρα μανθάνω . ἀλλὰ τί οὐ υποθέμενός τι διήλθες αὐτὸς μοι ,  
 in order that I may be more able to understand ?  
 ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω ;

136a αὐτό, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτό, αὐτά

136b αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτός, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

**136c αὐτά**

136d αὐτοῦ

136e αὐτός, αὐτόν

135c λέγεις

136a λέγεις

**136c λέγεις**

136d λέγει, λέγειν

136e λέγει

Loeb

and you must consider other things in relation to themselves and to anything else you may choose in any instance, whether you suppose that the subject of your hypothesis exists or does not exist, if you are to train yourself completely to see the truth perfectly."

"Parmenides," he said, "it is a stupendous amount of study which you propose, and I do not understand very well. Why do you not yourself frame an hypothesis and discuss it, to make me understand better?"

Thomas Taylor

and again, how other things are related to themselves, and to another which you establish, whether you consider that which is the subject of your hypothesis as having a subsistence or as not subsisting; if, being perfectly exercised, you design through proper media to perceive the truth.

That Socrates then said, You speak, O Parmenides, of an employment which it is impossible to accomplish, nor do I very much understand what you mean; but why do you not establish a certain hypothesis yourself, and enter on its discussion, that I may be the better instructed in this affair?

Morrow & Dillon

and again you must study these others with reference both to themselves and to any one thing you may select, whether you have assumed the thing to exist or not to exist, if you are really going to win through to a sight of the truth after a complete course of discipline."

"It is an unmanageable task, Parmenides, of which you speak, and I don't altogether understand. Why not postulate some proposition and go through it yourself, that I may grasp this more clearly?"

**πολὺ** ἔργον, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῶδε.

ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, Ζήνων, τί οὐ διήλθες ἡμῖν;

καὶ τὸν Ζήωνα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι: **αὐτοῦ**, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου: μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον ἢ ὃ **λέγει**. ἢ οὐχ ὀρᾷς ὅσον ἔργον προστάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἡμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι: ἀπρεπὴ γὰρ τὰ **τοιαῦτα πολλῶν** ἐναντίον **λέγειν** ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ:

### Balboas

**Parmenides:** You assign , O Socrates , much work , for one as old as me .

136D προσταττεις , ω Σωκρατες , πολυ εργον , ως τηλικωδε .

**Socrates:** Then in that case , Zeno , why don't **you** unfold it in detail for us ?

Ἀλλὰ , Ζηνων , τι ου συ διηλθες (διερχομαι) ημιν ;

**Antiphon :** Then Zeno , laughing , said :

Και τον Ζηωνα γελασαντα φαναι :

**Zeno:** We must ask Parmenides himself , O Socrates . For , as it has been said , it is indeed , no

δεωμεθα Παρμενιδου αυτου , ω Σωκρατες . γαρ η ο λεγει μη ου

trifling matter . Or do you not see the **magnitude** of the work you are assigning ? If , then ,

φαιλον . η ουχ ορας οσον εργον προσταττεις ; ει ουν

on the one hand , more of us were present , it would not be appropriate to make such a request ;

μεν πλειους ημεν ην , αν ουκ αξιον δεισθαι :

for it is unsuitable , and especially for a man of his age , to speak of matters such as these

γαρ απρεπη τε και αλλως τηλικουτω λεγειν τα τοιαυτα

in the presence of many people .

136E εναντιον πολλων :

135d πολλῶν

136a πολλά, πολλοῖς, πολλά, πολλά, πολλοῖς

**136d πολὺ, πολλῶν**

136c πολλοί

137c πολλά

136b αὐτοῖς, αὐτό, αὐτός, αὐτοῖ, αὐτό

136c αὐτά

**136d αὐτοῦ**

136e αὐτός, αὐτόν

137a ἐαυτόν, αὐτός

136a λέγεις

136c λέγεις

**136d λέγει, λέγειν**

136e λέγοι

137b λέγει

135b τοιῶτα

135c τοιοῦτου

**136d τοιαῦτα**

137a τοιοῦτόν

137d τοιῶτα

Loeb

“That is a great task, Socrates,” he said, “to impose upon a man of my age.”

“But you, Zeno,” said Socrates, “why do not you do it for us?”

Pythodorus said that Zeno answered with a smile: “Let us ask it of Parmenides himself, Socrates; for there is a great deal in what he says, and perhaps you do not see how heavy a task you are imposing upon him. If there were more of us, it would not be fair to ask it of him; for it is not suitable for him to speak on such subjects before many, especially at his age;

Thomas Taylor

That Parmenides replied, You assign, O Socrates, a mighty labour to a man so old as myself!

Will you, then, O Zeno (said Socrates), discuss something for us?

And then Pythodorus related that Zeno, laughing, said - We must request Parmenides, O Socrates, to engage in this undertaking; for, as he says, it is no trifling matter; or do you not see the prodigious labour of such a discussion? If, therefore, many were present, it would not be proper to make such a request; for it is unbecoming, especially for an old man, to discourse about things of this kind before many witnesses.

Morrow and Dillon

“That is a heavy task, Socrates,” he said, “to lay on a man of such an age.”

“But you, Zeno,” said Socrates, “why don't you give us the illustration?”

He said that Zeno laughed and replied: “Let us beg Parmenides himself to do it, Socrates. What he means is no light matter, I'm afraid. Or do you not see what a task you are setting? If we were a greater multitude than we are, it would not be fair to ask him. Such a discourse would be unsuitable before a large audience, particularly in a man of his age;



## Oxford Greek

ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ **πολλοὶ** ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ **νοῦν** σχεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ **αὐτὸς** διακούσω διὰ **χρόνου**.

ταῦτα δι' εἰπόντος τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον, **αὐτόν** τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ **λέγοι** καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν.

## Balboas

For the many are ignorant that , without **This Discursive**

γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης διεξ-

**Procession** and **Wandering** through **All Beings/Cities (Poem-Frag1)** , it happens to be impossible  
-οδου τε καὶ πλάνης δια παντων ἐντυχόντα ἀδύνατον

for **The Mind** to hold-on to **The Truth** . Therefore , O Parmenides , I ask in conjunction with  
νοῦν σχεῖν τῷ ἀληθεῖ . μὲν οὖν , ὦ Παρμενίδη , ἐγὼ συνδέομαι

Socrates , that you yourself undertake the discussion , in order that I may also hear to the end ,  
Σωκράτει , αὐτοῦς ἵνα καὶ διακούσω

that which I heard some time ago .

δια χρόνου .

**Antiphon: 9** Then when Zeno asked this , Pythodorus said , that he also , and Aristotle , and  
δη Ζήνωνος τοῦ εἰπόντος Ταῦτα , τὸν Πυθόδωρον φάναι αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη  
the others asked Parmenides , to demonstrate that which he spoke of and not do otherwise .  
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου , ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἄλλως .

136a πολλά, πολλοῖς, πολλά, πολλά, πολλοῖς

136d πολὺ, πολλῶν

**136e πολλοὶ**

137c πολλὰ

137d πολλά, πολλά

130a νοῦν

135b νοῦν

**136e νοῦν**

136e αὐτῷ

136d αὐτοῦ

**136e αὐτὸς, αὐτόν**

137a ἐαυτόν, αὐτός

137b αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῦ

126b χρόνος

**136e χρόνου**

140c χρόνου

141a χρόνος, χρόνος

136c λέγει

136d λέγει, λέγειν

**136e λέγοι**

137b λέγει

137c λέγεις, λέγων

## Loeb

for the many do not know that except by this devious passage through all things the mind cannot attain to the truth. So I, Parmenides, join Socrates in his request, that I myself may hear the method, which I have not heard for a long time.”

Antiphon said that Pythodorus told him that when Zeno said this he himself and Antisthenes and the rest begged Parmenides to show his meaning by an example and not to refuse.

## Thomas Taylor

For the many are ignorant that, without this discursive progression and wandering through all things, it is impossible, by acquiring the truth, to obtain the possession of intellect. I, therefore, O Parmenides, in conjunction with Socrates, beg that you would undertake a discussion, which I have not heard for a long time.

But Zeno having made this request, Antiphon said that Pythodorus related that he also, and Aristotle, and the rest who were present, entreated Parmenides to exhibit that which he spoke of, and not to deny their request.

## Morrow and Dillon

because most people are unaware that you cannot hit upon truth and gain understanding without this discursive wandering over the whole Feld. So, Parmenides, I join with Socrates in his request, in the hope of being an auditor of yours once again after all this time.”

When Zeno had said this, Antiphon said that Pythodorus said that he himself begged Parmenides and so did Aristoteles and the others, not to disappoint them but to indicate what he has been describing.

## Oxford Greek

τὸν οὖν Παρμενίδην: ἀνάγκη, φάναι, πείθεσθαι. καίτοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἴβυκείου ἵππου  
**πεπονθέναι**, ᾧ ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητῇ ὄντι καὶ **πρεσβυτέρῳ**, ὑφ' ἄρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι'  
ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον, **ἑαυτὸν** ἀπεικάζων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ **αὐτὸς** οὕτω πρεσβύτης ὢν εἰς  
τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἵεναι: καγὼ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι πῶς χρή τηλικόνδε  
ὄντα διανεῦσαι **τοιοῦτόν** τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος **λόγων**:

## Balboas

**Parmenides:** It is necessary to comply with your request . And yet , I appear to myself  
**137A** ἀναγκη πειθεσθαι . και τοι δοκω μοι  
to sympathize with the fate of **the horse** of Ibycus , which being a race-horse , and being advanced  
πεπονθεναι το του ιππου Ιβυκειου , ω οντι εκεινος αθλητη και πρεσ-  
in years , when being about to contend in the **chariot** races , and by knowing the experience ,  
βυτερω , μελλοντι υφ' αγωνιεισθαι αρματι και δι' εμπειριαν  
trembled with fear at the forthcoming event , and to whom , Ibycus , comparing himself , said  
τρεμοντι το μελλον , απεικαζων εαυτον εφη

- Thus also , I that am so old , am involuntarily compelled to return to The Object of My **Love** -  
και αυτος ων ουτω πρεσβυτης ακων αναγκαζεσθαι ιεναι εις τον ερωτα :

And I also , being as old as I am , appear to myself to exceedingly dread the present undertaking ,  
καγω οντα τηλικονδε δοκω μοι μαλα φοβεισθαι  
remembering in what way it is required to swim through such and so great a sea of discourse .  
μεμνημενος πως χρη διανευσαι τοιουτον τε και τοσουτον πελαγος λογων :

135e πάσχοντα  
136b πάσχοντος  
**137a πεπονθέναι**  
138b πείσεται  
138e πείσεται, πάσχει

128e πρεσβυτέρου  
**137a πρεσβυτέρῳ**  
140e πρεσβύτερον  
141a πρεσβύτερον, προσβέτηρον, προσβέτηρον, προσβέτηρον, προσβέτηρον, προσβέτηρον

136d αὐτοῦ  
136e αὐτός, αὐτόν  
**137a ἑαυτὸν, αὐτός**  
137b αὐτοί, αὐτοῦ  
137c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

135c τοιοῦτου  
136d τοιαῦτα  
**137a τοιοῦτόν**  
137d τοιαῦτα  
138a τοιοῦτόν

135e λόγῳ  
136b λόγος, λόγῳ  
**137a λόγων**  
141d λόγος  
141e λόγῳ

## Loeb

And Parmenides said: “I must perforce do as you ask. And yet I feel very much like the horse in the poem of Ibycus—an old race-horse who was entered for a chariot race and was trembling with fear of what was before him, because he knew it by experience. Ibycus says he is compelled to fall in love against his will in his old age, and compares himself to the horse. So I am filled with terror when I remember through what a fearful ocean of words I must swim, old man that I am.

## Thomas Taylor

That then Parmenides said, It is necessary to comply with your entreaties, though I should seem to myself to meet with the fate of Ibycean horse, to whom as a courser, and advanced in years, when about to content in the chariot races, and fearing through experience for the event, Ibycus comparing himself, said - *Thus also I that am so old, am compelled to return to the subjects of my love*; in like manner, I appear to myself to dread vehemently the present undertaking, when I call to mind the manner in which it is requisite to swim over such, and so great a sea of discourse:

## Morrow and Dillon

Parmenides replied, “I must obey; although I feel like the old race-horse in Ibycus, who trembles at the start of a chariot-race, knowing from long experience what is in store for him, to whom the poet compares his own reluctance on finding himself so late in life forced into the fists of love. And my memories too make me frightened of setting out, at my age, to traverse so vast and various a multiplicity of arguments.

## Oxford Greek

ὅμως δὲ δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί, ὁ Ζήνων **λέγει, αὐτοί** ἐσμεν. πόθεν οὖν διὰ **ἀρξόμεθα** καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα; ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδὴ περ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, ἀπ' **ἐμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι** καὶ τῆς **ἐμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως**, περὶ τοῦ ἐνός **αὐτοῦ** ὑποθέμενος, εἴτε ἔν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔν, τί χρὴ **συμβαίνειν**;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα.

τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοι ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ **νεώτατος**; ἥκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοί, καὶ ἃ οἶεται μάλιστα ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο: καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις.

## Balboas

For thus it is necessary to take this task in hand , seeing that , it is at the request of Zeno ,  
137B γαρ δε δει χαρίζεσθαι , επειδη , ο λεγει Ζηνων ,  
and in any case , we are by ourselves .

και ομως εσμεν αυτοι .

Therefore , from whence then , shall we begin , and what shall we hypothesize first ?

ουν ποθεν δη αρξομεθα και τι υποθησομεθα πρωτον ;

Or are you willing , seeing that it certainly appears that we must play a very laborious game , I  
η βουλεσθε , επειδηπερ δοκει παιζειν πραγματειωδη παιδιαν ,  
should begin from **my Self** and the hypothesis of **my Self** ; by hypothesizing about **The One Self**,  
αρξωμαι απ' εμαυτου και της υποθησεως εμαυτου , υποθεμενος περι του ενος αυτου ,  
whether **One Is** , or whether **One is not** , what must the result be ?

ειτε εν εστιν ειτε εν μη , τι χρη συμβαινειν ;

**Zeno:** By all means .

Πανυ μεν ουν .

**Parmenides:** Who then , will answer to me ? Or will it be the youngest among you ?

Τις ουν αποκρινεται μοι ; η ο νεωτατος ;

For the **labor** will be very much less , should he answer what he thinks ; and his answer ,  
γαρ αν μαλιστα' πολυπραγμονοι ηκιστα αν αποκρινοιτο α οιεται , και αποκρισις  
at the same time , will afford me a time for resting from that arduous investigation .

αμα αν ειη εμοι αναπαυλα εκεινου η .

**137b ἐμαυτοῦ,**

136a λέγει, λέγει

136c λέγοι

**137b λέγει**

137c λέγεις, λέγων

140c ἐλέγομεν, ἐλέγομεν, ἐλέγομεν

136e αὐτός, αὐτόν

137a ἐαυτόν, αὐτός

**137b αὐτοί, αὐτοῦ**

137c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

137d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

134e ἄρχομεν, ἀρχῇ

**137b ἀρξόμεθα, ἄρξωμαι**

137d ἀρχήν, ἀρχήν

145a ἀρχήν

136a ὑποθέσεως, ὑποθέσεως

136b ὑποθέσεως

**137b ὑποθέσεως**

142b ὑπόθεσιν

142c ὑπόθεσις, ὑπόθεσιν

136a συμβαίνοντα, συμβαίνειν, συμβήσεται

136b συμβήσεται, συμβαίνοντα

**137b συμβαίνειν**

142b συμβαίνοντα

142c συμβαίνειν, συμβήσεται

**137b νεώτατος**

137c νεώτατον

140c νεώτερον

Loeb

However, I will do it, for I must be obliging, especially since we are, as Zeno says, alone. Well, how shall we begin? What shall be our first hypothesis? Or, since you are determined that I must engage in a laborious pastime, shall I begin with myself, taking my own hypothesis and discussing the consequences of the supposition that the one exists or that it does not exist?"

"By all means," said Zeno.

"Who then," said he, "to answer my questions? Shall we say the youngest? He would be least likely to be over-curious and most likely to say what he thinks and moreover his replies would give me a chance to rest."

Thomas Taylor

but yet it is necessary to comply, especially as it is the request of Zeno, for we are one and the same. Whence then shall we begin; and what shall we first of all suppose? Are you willing, since it seems we must play a very serious game, that I should begin from myself, and my own hypothesis, supposing concerning *The One Itself*, *whether The One is*, or *whether it is not*, what ought to be the consequence?

That Zeno said, By all means.

Who then (said Parmenides) will answer to me? Will the youngest among you do this? For the labour will be very little for him to answer what he thinks; and his answer will at the same time afford me a time for breathing in this arduous investigation.

Morrow and Dillon

"However, I must gratify your request; for after all, as Zeno says, we are just among ourselves here. Whence shall I begin, then? And what hypothesis shall I propound first? Would you like me, since we have decided to play out this laborious game, to begin from myself and my own hypothesis, hypothesizing about the One itself, that is, what must follow if one assumes that the One is, or that it is not?"

"By all means," said Zeno.

"Then who will answer the questions I shall put? Shall it be the youngest? He will be likely to give the least trouble, and to be the most ready to say what he thinks; and I shall get a moment's rest while he is answering."

## Oxford Greek

ἔτοιμός σοι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη· ἐμὲ γὰρ **λέγεις** τὸν **νεώτατον** **λέγων**. ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου.

## Balboas

**Aristotle:** I will attend to you in this , O Parmenides , for you may call upon me  
 137C Ετοιμος σοι τουτο , ω Παρμενιδη , γαρ λεγεις εμε  
 as calling upon the youngest . Ask me , then , as one who will answer you .  
 λεγων τον νεωτατον : ερωτα αλλ' ως αποκρινουμενου .

**IBYCUS**  
 6<sup>th</sup> Century B.C.

Eros ,  
 Even now  
 Looks at me ,  
 From Under Dark Eyelids  
 With Tenderness  
 And Casts me  
 Spellbound  
 Into Aphrodite's Nets  
 Where I lie  
 Inextricably Caught ,  
 For I Swear  
 His Mere Approach  
 Makes me tremble

EROS : Ibycus

: Like :

Race : Chariot-horse

An Old Champion Chariot Horse  
 As he draws  
 A swift cart  
 Unwillingly  
 To The Race .

Translated by Willis Barnstone  
 The Norton Book of Classical Literature  
 W.W. Norton & Company , Inc.

136e λέγοι  
 137b λέγει  
**137c λέγεις, λέγων**  
 140e ἐλέγομεν, ἐλέγομεν, ἐλέγομεν  
 141a λέγεις  
 137b νεώτατος  
**137c νεώτατον**  
 140e νεώτερον  
 141a νεώτερον, νεώτερόν, νεωτέρου, νεώτερον

Loeb

“I am ready, Parmenides, to do that,” said Aristoteles, “for I am the youngest, so you mean me. Ask your questions and I will answer.”

Thomas Taylor

That then Aristotle said, I am prepared to attend you, O Parmenides; for you may call upon me as being the youngest. Ask me, therefore, as one who will answer you.

Morrow and Dillon

“I am ready at your service, Parmenides,” said Aristoteles, “for you mean me when you say ‘the youngest.’ So ask away, and I will answer.”

[*Morrow and Dillon* pg. 433] That it is not **many**, that it is neither a **whole** nor a **part**, that it has neither **beginning** nor **middle** nor **end**, that it has no **limit**, that it is without **shape**, that it is neither **in [place]** **anything** else nor **in itself** that it is neither at **rest** nor in **motion**, that it is neither the **same** as itself nor **different**, that it is neither **like** nor **unlike**, that it is neither **equal** nor **greater** nor **less** than itself that it is neither **older** nor **younger** than itself, that, since it does not participate in **time**, it in no way participates in **generation**, that it does not even participate in **being**, that it is neither **nameable** nor **expressible**, that it is neither **opinable** nor **knowable**. These, then, are what are denied of it, in summary.



Oxford Greek  
1st

εἶεν δὴ, φάναι: εἰ ἔν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη **πολλὰ** τὸ ἔν;  
 πῶς γὰρ ἄν;  
 οὔτε ἄρα **μέρος αὐτοῦ** οὔτε **ὅλον αὐτό** δεῖ εἶναι.  
 τί δὴ;  
 τὸ **μέρος** που **ὅλου μέρος** ἐστίν.  
 ναί.  
 τί δὲ τὸ **ὅλον**; οὐχὶ οὐδ' ἂν **μέρος** μηδὲν ἀπὴ **ὅλον** ἂν εἴη;  
 πάνυ γε.  
 ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄρα οὕτως τὸ ἔν **πολλὰ** εἴη ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔν.  
 ἀληθῆ.

Balboas  
1st

**Parmenides:** 10 Well then , if **One Is** , could not **The One Be Many** in **Some Other Way** ?  
 Εἶεν δὴ , εἰ ἐν ἐστίν , ἀν οὐκ τὸ ἐν εἴη πολλὰ τι ἄλλο ;

**Aristotle:** How could it be many ? (πῶς ἀν γὰρ;)

**Par:** Accordingly then , neither **Can** any **Part Belong** to **The Self** nor **Can Self Be** a **Whole** .  
 ἀρα οὔτε δεῖ μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε αὐτὸ εἶναι ὅλον .

**Ari:** Why not then ? (τι δὴ ;)

**Par:** Because **The Part Is** in some way a **Part** of a **Whole** .  
 τὸ μέρος ἐστίν που μέρος οἴου .

**Ari:** Yes . (Ναί.)

**Par:** What then about **The Whole** ? Would not **That** from which **no Part Is absent Be Whole** ?  
 Τι δε τὸ ὅλον ; ἀν οὐχὶ οὐ μὴδὲν μέρος ἀν ἀπὴ εἴη ὅλον ;

**Ari:** Entirely so. (παννυ γε.)

**Par:** Accordingly then , from **both** these consequences **The One** would **Be Composed** of **Parts** ,  
 ἀρα ἀμφοτέρως τὸ ἐν ἀν εἴη ἐκ μερῶν ,  
 by **Being** a **Whole** and by **Possessing Parts** .  
 ὄν ὅλον τε καὶ ἐχόν μερῆ .

**Ari:** Necessarily . (ἀναγκη.)

136d πολλὰ, πολλῶν

136e πολλοί

**137c** πολλὰ

137d πολλὰ, πολλὰ

137e πολλὰ

131d μέρος, μέρος

131e μέρη

**137c** μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

137d μερών, μέρη, μέρη, μέρος, μέρη

137e μέρη, μέρη

137a ἐαυτὸν, αὐτός

137b αὐτοί, αὐτοῦ

**137c** αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

137d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

138a ἐαυτῶν, αὐτοῦ

131c ὅλον, ὅλον

131e ὅλα

**137c** ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλον

137d ὅλον, ὅλον

138b ὅλον

## Loeb 1st

“Well then,” said he, “if the one exists, the one cannot be many, can it?”

“No, of course not.”

“Then there can be no parts of it, nor can it be a whole.”

“How is that?”

“The part surely is part of a whole.”

“Yes.”

“And what is the whole? Is not a whole that of which no part is wanting?”

“Certainly.”

“Then in both cases the one would consist of parts, being a whole and having parts.”

“Inevitably.”

## Thomas Taylor 1st

That Parmenides said, Let us then begin. If *one* is, is it not true that *The One* will not be many?

For how can it be?

It is necessary, therefore, that there should neither be any part belonging to it, nor that it should be a whole.

Why?

Is not a part a part of a whole?

Certainly.

But what is a whole? Is not that to which no part is wanting a whole?

Entirely so.

From both these consequences, therefore *The One* would be composed of parts, being a whole and possessing parts?

It is necessary it should be so.

## Morrow and Dillon 1st

“Well then,” said Parmenides, “if there is a One, of course the One would not be many.”

“How could it?”

“So then, neither is there any part of it, nor should it be a whole.”

“Obviously.”

“A part is a part of a whole?”

“Yes.”

“How about a whole? Is it not the fact that a whole would be that from which no part is absent?”

“Yes indeed.”

“In either way, then, the One would be composed of parts, both as being a whole and as having parts.”

“Necessarily.”

## Oxford Greek

ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐκ **μερῶν** ἂν εἴη, **ὅλον** τε ὄν καὶ **μέρη** ἔχον.

ἀνάγκη.

δεῖ δέ γε μὴ **πολλὰ** ἀλλ' ἐν **αὐτὸ** εἶναι.

δεῖ.

οὔτ' ἄρα **ὅλον** ἔσται οὔτε **μέρη** ἔξει, εἰ ἐν ἔσται τὸ ἐν.

οὐ γάρ.

## Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly then , in both ways , **The One** will **Be Many** , but **Not-One** .

137D ἀρα ἀμφοτερωσ το εν αν ειη πολλα , αλλ' ουχ εν .

**Ari:** True . (αληθη.)

**Par:** But **It Must** indeed , **not Be Many** , but **One Self** . (See 142A)

δε Δει γε μη ειναι πολλα αλλ' εν αυτο .

**Ari:** It must . (δει .)

**Par:** Hence **It** will neither **Be a Whole** , nor **Possess Parts** , if **The One Is** to **Be One** .

αρα ουτε εσται ολον ουτε εξει μερη , ει το εν εσται εν .

**Ari:** It will not . (ου γαρ.)

131e μέρος  
137c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος  
**137d μερών, μέρη, μέρη** μέρος, μέρη  
137c μέρος, μέρος  
138c μέρος

131e ὅλα  
137c ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλον  
**137d ὅλον, ὅλον**  
138b ὅλον  
138e ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

136e πολλοί  
137c πολλὰ  
**137d πολλὰ, πολλὰ**  
137e πολλὰ  
138a πολλοίς

137b αὐτοί, αὐτοῖ  
137c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό  
**137d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ**  
138a ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτοῦ  
138b αὐτό, ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

131e ὅλα  
137c ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλον  
**137d ὅλον, ὅλον**  
138b ὅλον  
138e ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

Loeb

“Then in both cases the one would be many, not one.”

“True.”

“Yet it must be not many, but one.”

“Yes.”

“Then the one, if it is to be one, will not be a whole and will not have parts.”

“No.”

Thomas Taylor

And so both ways *The One* will be many, and not one.

True.

But it is necessary that it should not be many, but one.

It is necessary.

Hence, it will neither be a whole, nor possess parts, if *The One* is one.

It will not.

Morrow and Dillon

“In either case, then, the One would be Many, and not One.”

“True.”

“But it has to be not Many, but One.”

“Yes it must.”

“So then, the One will neither be a whole nor have parts, if it is to be One.”

“No indeed.”

## Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει **μέρος**, οὐτ' ἂν **ἀρχὴν** οὔτε **τελευτήν** οὔτε **μέσον** ἔχοι· **μέρη** γὰρ ἂν ἦδη **αὐτοῦ** τὰ **τοιαῦτα** εἴη.

ὀρθῶς.

καὶ μὴν **τελευτή** γε καὶ **ἀρχὴ** **πέρας** ἐκάστου.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

**ἄπειρον** ἄρα τὸ ἔν, εἰ μήτε **ἀρχὴν** μήτε **τελευτήν** ἔχει.

**ἄπειρον**.

## Balboas

**Par:** Is it not the case then , that if **It Can have No Part** , then neither **Can It have** a **Beginning**

Ουκουν εἰ εχει μηδεν μερος , ουτ' αν εχει αρχην  
nor **Middle** nor **End** ; for those such as these would already **Be Parts** of **The Self**?  
ουτε μεσον ουτε τελευτην : γαρ τα τοιαυτα αν ηδη ειη μερη αυτου .

**Ari:** Rightly so . (ορθως .)

**Par:** And certainly **The Beginning** and **End Are** indeed **The Limit** of **Each Part** ?

και μιν αρχη και τελευτη γε περας εκαστου .

**Ari:** How could they not ? (πως δ' ου ;)

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The One** is **Unlimited** , if **It has** either **Beginning** or **End** ?

αρα το εν απειρον , ει εχει μητε αρχην μητε τελευτην .

**Ari:** Unlimited . (απειρον.)

131e μέρος  
137c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος  
**137d** μερών, μέρη, μέρη, **μέρος, μέρη**  
137c μέρη, μέρη  
138c μέρη

134e ἄρχομεν, ἀρχῆ  
137b ἀρξόμεθα, ἄρξωμαι  
**137d** **ἀρχὴν, ἀρχὴν**  
145a ἀρχὴν  
145b ἀρχήν

**137d** **τελευτήν, τελευτή, τελευτήν**  
145a τελευτήν  
145b τελευτήν

**137d** **μέσον**  
137c μέσου, μέσον  
138c μέσου, μέσον

137b αὐτοί, αὐτοῦ  
137c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό  
**137d** **αὐτό, αὐτοῦ**  
138a ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτοῦ  
138b αὐτό, ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἐαυτοῦ

136d τοιαῦτα  
137a τοιοῦτόν  
**137d** **τοιαῦτα**  
138a τοιοῦτόν  
140b τοιοῦτόν

**137d** **ἀρχή**  
142b ἀρχῆς, ἀρχῆς  
153c ἀρχή

**137d** **πέρας**  
145a πέρας  
158d πέρας, πέρας

132a ἄπειρα  
**137d** **ἄπειρον, ἄπειρον**  
143a ἄπειρον  
144a ἄπειρον, ἄπειρος

Loeb

“And if it has no parts, it can have no beginning, or middle, or end, for those would be parts of it?”

“Quite right.”

“Beginning and end are, however, the limits of everything.”

“Of course.”

“Then the one, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”

“Yes, it is unlimited.”

Thomas Taylor

If, therefore, it has no part, it neither possesses beginning, middle, nor end; for such as these would be its parts?

Right.

But end and beginning are the bounds of every thing?

How should they not?

The One, therefore, is infinite, if it has neither beginning nor end?

Infinite.

Morrow and Dillon

"So then, if it has no parts, it has neither a beginning nor an end, nor a middle, for such things would already be parts of it."

"Quite right."

And further, the end and the beginning are the limits of each thing."

"Obviously."

"So then the One is unlimited, it has neither beginning nor end."

"It is unlimited."

## Oxford Greek

και ανευ σχήματος ἄρα: οὔτε γὰρ στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχει.

πῶς;

στρογγύλον γέ ποῦ ἐστὶ τοῦτο οὐδ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχη.

ναί.

και μὴν εὐθύ γε, οὐδ' ἂν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἐσχατοῖν ἐπίπροσθεν ᾗ.

οὕτως.

οὐκοῦν μέρη ἂν ἔχοι τὸ ἐν και πολλά ἂν εἴη, εἴτε εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦς μετέχοι.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

## Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly then , **It Must** also “Be” without **Figure/Form/Shape** ,  
αρα και ανευ σχηματος :

for **It Can** neither **Participate** of **The Circular** nor of **The Straight/Rectilinear** .

137E γαρ αν ουτε μετεχει στρογγυλου ουτε ευθεος .

**Ari:** How is this the case ? (πως ;)

**Par:** For **The Circular Is** indeed that in which **The Extremities Must Be**

στρογγυλον εστι γε τουτο ου τα εσχατα αν  
 in every way **Equally** distant from **The Middle** .

πανταχη που ισον απεχη απο του μεσου .

**Ari:** Yes . (Ναι .)

**Par:** And **The Straight Is** indeed that in which **The Middle**

και ευθυ γε μην η ου το μεσον  
**Is** situated in line with both **The Extremes** ?

πιπροσθεν αμφοιν τοιν εσχατοιν .

**Ari:** It is so . (ουτως .)

**Par:** It is not the case then , that **The One** will then **Possess Parts** and **Be Many** ,

ουκουν το εν αν εχει μερη και αν ειη πολλ' ,  
 by **Participating** of either a **Straight** or of a **Round Figure** ?

μετεχοι ειτε ευθεος ειτε περιφερους σχηματος .

**Ari:** Entirely so . (πανυ μεν ουν.)

137d μέσον

**137e** μέσου, μέσον

138c μέσου, μέσον

138d μέσου, μέσου

**137e** σχήματος, σχήματος

145b σχήματος

**137e** στρογγύλου, στρογγύλον

145b στρογγύλου

**137e** εὐθέος, εὐθύ, εὐθέος, εὐθύ

145b εὐθέος

148e εὐθες

131d ἴσον

**137e** ἴσον

140b ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

140c ἴσον

137c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

137d μερών, μέρη, μέρη, μέρος, μέρη

**137e** μέρη, μέρη

138c μέρη

138d μερίον

137c πολλά

137d πολλά, πολλά

**137e** πολλά

138a πολλοῖς

138e πολὺ

134b μετέχονεν

134c μετέχει

**137e** μετέχει, μετέχοι

138a μετέχοντος

Loeb

“And it is without form, for it partakes neither of the round nor of the straight.”

“How so?”

“The round, of course, is that of which the extremes are everywhere equally distant from the center.”

“Yes.”

“And the straight, again, is that of which the middle is in the nearest line between the two extremes.”

“It is.”

“Then the one would have parts and would be many, whether it partook of straight or of round form.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

And without figure, therefore, for it neither participates of the round figure nor the straight.

Why not?

For the round figure is that, the extremities of which are equally distant from the middle.

Certainly.

And the straight figure is that, the middle part of which is situated before, or in the view of both the extremes?

It is so.

Will not, therefore, *The One* consist of parts, and be many, whether it participates of a straight or round figure?

Entirely so.

Morrow and Dillon

“And it will be without shape, then, for it would not participate either in the curved or in the straight.”

“How would it?”

“Round is that whose extremity is everywhere equidistant from its centre?”

“Yes.”

“And straight is that of which the middle is in front of both extremities.”

“So it is.”

“So then, the One would have parts and would be Many if it partook of either straight shape or round?”

“Indeed it would.”



οὔτε ἄρα **εὐθύ** οὔτε **περιφερές** ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ **μέρη** ἔχει.

ὀρθῶς.

καὶ μὴν **τοιούτων** γε ὃν **οὐδαμοῦ** ἂν εἴη· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν **ἑαυτῷ** εἴη.

πῶς δὴ;

ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὃν κύκλῳ που ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπ’ ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἐνείη, καὶ πολλαχοῦ ἂν **αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο πολλοῖς**; τοῦ δὲ ἐνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ **μετέχοντος** ἀδύνατον πολλαχῇ κύκλῳ **ἄπτεσθαι**.

ἀδύνατον.

**Par:** Accordingly then , **It** is neither **Straight** nor **Round** , seeing that **It has No Part** .  
138a ἀρα ἐστίν ουτε ευθυ ουτε περιφερεις , επειπερ εχει ουδε μερη .

**Ari:** Rightly so . (ορθως.)

**Par:** And certainly , by “Being” **Such** , **It** will indeed *exist in-no-way-whatsoever* ,  
Και μὴν ὄν τοιούτων ἂν γε εἴη οὐδαμοῦ :  
for **It** will neither **exist In-Another** , nor **In-It-Self** .  
γὰρ ἂν ουτε εἴη ἂν ἀλλῳ ουτε ἐν εαυτῳ .

**Ari:** How so ? (πῶς δὴ ; )

**Par:** For on the one hand , by **Being In-Another** , **It** would somehow **Be Circularly Comprehended** by **That in which It Is** , and would **Be** touched by **The Self** in many places .  
γὰρ μὲν ὄν ἐν ἀλλῳ ἂν ποὺ κυκλῶ περιέχοιτο ὑπ’ ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἐνείη , καὶ ἂν ἀπτοιτο αὐτοῦ πολλοῖς πολλαχοῦ :  
Thus on the other hand , it is also **Impossible** , that **The One** which “**Is**” also **Partless** , and  
δε καὶ ἀδύνατον τοῦ ἐνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ  
which does *not* **Participate** of **The Circle** , to **Be** touched in a circular way , in many places .  
μὴ μετεχόντος κύκλου ἀπτεσθαι κυκλῶ πολλαχῇ .

**Ari:** Impossible . (ἀδύνατον.)

138a εὐθύ  
145b εὐθέος  
148e εὐθὺς

137e περιφερές  
138c περιφέροιτο, περιφερόμενον  
139a περιφερόμενον

137c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος  
137d μερών, μέρη, μέρη, μέρος, μέρος  
138a μέρη  
138c μέρη  
138d μερών

137a τοιούτων  
137d τοιαῦτα  
138a τοιούτων  
140b τοιούτων  
141a τοιούτων, τοιούτων

131e οὐδαμῶς  
132b οὐδαμοῦ  
138a οὐδαμοῦ  
140a οὐδαμῶς  
140b οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῶς

137e αὐτοῦ, αὐτό  
137d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ  
138a ἑαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ  
138b αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ  
138c αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ

133a ἄπτη  
138a ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτεσθαι  
148d ἄπτεσθαι, ἄπτεσθαι  
148e ἄπτοιτο, ἀπτεσθαι, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτοιτο, ἀφροῦ, ἀπτεσθαι

137d πολλά, πολλά  
137e πολλά  
138a πολλοῖς  
138e πολὺ  
139d πολλοῖς, πολλά

134c μετέχει  
137c μετέχει, μετέχει  
138a μετέχοντος  
140c μετέχον  
140d μετέχον, μετέχον

Loeb

“Then it is neither straight nor round, since it has no parts.”

“Right.”

“Moreover, being of such a nature, it cannot be anywhere, for it could not be either in anything else or in itself.”

“How is that?”

“If it were in something else, it would be encircled by that in which it would be and would be touched in many places by many parts of it; but that which is one and without parts and does not partake of the circular nature cannot be touched by a circle in many places.”

“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

It is, therefore, neither straight nor circular, since it is without parts.

Right.

And indeed, being such, it will be no where; for it will neither be in another, nor in itself.

How so?

For, being in another, it would after a manner be circularly comprehended by that in which it is, and would be touched by it in many places: but it is impossible that *The One* which is without parts, and which does not participate of a circle, should be touched by a circle in many places.

Impossible.

Morrow and Dillon

“Therefore, it is neither straight nor round, inasmuch as it has no parts.”

“Quite right.”

“Further, being such as we have described, it cannot any longer be anywhere; for it cannot be either in another or in itself.”

“How so?”

“If it were in another, it would be encircled all round by that in which it was contained, and would have many contacts with it at many points, but it is impossible for there to be contact at many points all round in a circle with a thing which is One and has not parts and is not round.”

“It is indeed impossible.”

## Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν κἂν ἑαυτῷ εἴη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη: ἐν τῷ γάρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον.

ἀδύνατον γάρ.

οὐκοῦν ἕτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον: οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταυτὸν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει: καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἐν ἀλλὰ δύο.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

## Balboas

**Par:** But surely, if **The Self** were indeed **In-It-Self**, then **The Self** would also **Contain**

138B ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτο εἴη γε ἐν εαυτῷ κἂν περιέχον

**It-Self**, and if indeed, by **Being** no other than **The Self**, **It** would **Subsist In-It-Self**;

εαυτῷ καὶ εἴπερ ὃν οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτο, εἴη ἐν εαυτῷ:

for it is **Impossible** that *anything not* be **Contained** by **That in which it is**.

γὰρ ἀδύνατον τι μὴ περιέχοντι τῷ ἐν εἶναι.

**Ari:** For it is impossible.

γὰρ ἀδύνατον.

**Par:** Is it not so then, that on the one hand, **The Self** that **Contains Is One Certain Aspect**,

ἀν οὐκοῦν μὲν το αὐτο περιέχον εἴη ἕτερον τι,

while on the other hand, **That** which is **Being Contained** is **Another**? For **The Same Whole**

δε το περιεχόμενον ἕτερον: γὰρ ταυτὸν ὅλον

can indeed not, be both **acted upon (Passive)** and also be **The Creative Principle (Active)**,

γε οὐ ἀμφῷ πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει

and in this way, **The One** would no longer be **One**, but **Two At-Once**.

καὶ οὕτω το ἐν ἂν εἴη ἐν ἀλλὰ δύο ἅμα.

**Ari:** For then it would not. (γὰρ οὐν οὐ.)

132b ἕτερον

132c ἕτερον

**138b ἕτερον, ἕτερον**

138c ἐτέραν, ἐτέρας

139b ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

137d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

138a ἑαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ

**138b αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ**

138c αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ

138d αὐτῷ

137c ὅλον, ὅλοι, ὅλον, ὅλον

137d ὅλον, ὅλον

**138b ὅλον**

138c ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

142d ὅλον, ὅλοι, ὅλοι, ὅλον

130d ταῦτόν

131b ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

**138b ταῦτόν**

139b ταῦτόν

139c ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

136b πάσχοντος

137a πεπονθέναι

**138b πείσεται**

138c πείσεται, πιάσχοι

139c πεπονθός

129a δυοῖν

**138b δύο**

142c δυοῖν

143a δύο

Loeb

“But, furthermore, being in itself it would also be surrounding with itself naught other than itself, if it were in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not surround it.”

“No, it cannot.”

“Then that which surrounds would be other than that which is surrounded; for a whole cannot be both active and passive in the same action; and thus one would be no longer one, but two.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor

But if it were in itself it would also contain itself, since it is no other than itself which subsists in itself: for it is impossible that any thing should not be comprehended by that in which it is.

It is impossible.

Would not, therefore, that which contains be one thing, and that which is contained another? For the same whole cannot at the same time suffer and do both these: and thus The One would no longer be one, but two.

It certainly would not.

Morrow and Dillon

“On the other hand, if it were in itself, it would have to encompass it, none other than itself, since it would actually be in itself; and nothing can be within something without being encompassed by that thing.”

“Indeed it cannot.”

“Thus the encompassing thing would be one thing, the encompassed another; for the same thing cannot as a whole both be acted upon and act in the same way at the same time; and so, in that case, the One would no longer be one, but two.”

“No indeed.”

## Oxford Greek

οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν που τὸ ἐν, μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν.

οὐκ ἔστιν.

ὄρα δὴ, οὕτως ἔχον εἰ οἶόν τέ ἐστιν **ἐστάναι** ἢ **κινεῖσθαι**.

τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ;

## Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly , **The One Is Not *Anywhere*** , by **Being Neither In-It-Self** nor **In-Another** .  
 αρα το εν εστιν ουκ που ενον μητε εν εαυτω μητε εν αλλω .

**Ari:** It is not .

ουκ εστιν.

**Parmenides:** 11 **Observe** then , if **It *Has*** to **Be Understood** in such a way as this ;  
 Ορα δη ει εχον οιον ουτως

then **It Is** either **Remaining-Stationary** or **Being-Moved** .  
 εστιν τε εσταναι η κινεισθαι .

**Aristotle:** Why then could it not ? (τι δη γαρ ου ;)

137d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

138a ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ

**138b** αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ

138c αὐτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ

138d αὐτῷ

130d σῶ

132d ἐστάναι

**138b** ἐστάναι

139b ἔστηκεν, ἔστηκεν

145e ἐστάναι, ἔστηκε

129e κίνησιν

**138b** κινεῖσθαι

138c κινούμενόν, κινήσεις, κινεῖται

138d κινεῖται

Loeb

“Then the one is not anywhere, neither in itself nor in something else.”

“No, it is not.”

“This being the case, see whether it can be either at rest or in motion.”

“Why not?”

Thomas Taylor

*The One*, therefore, is not any where, since it is neither in itself nor in another.

It is not.

But consider whether thus circumstanced it can either stand or be moved.

Why can it not?

Morrow and Dillon

“So then, the One is not anywhere, being neither in itself nor in another?”

“No, it is not.”

“Consider then, whether, such being the case, it is possible for it to be at rest or in motion.”

“Why not?”

## Oxford Greek

ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοίτο ἄν: αὐται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.  
ναί.

ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἐν ἔτι εἶναι.  
ἀδύνατον.

οὐκ ἄρα κατ' ἀλλοίωσίν γε κινεῖται.  
οὐ φαίνεται.

## Balboas

**Par:** Because indeed **That** which is **Moving** , will either **Move-in-place** or  
138C οτι γε κινουμενον αν η φεροιτο η  
**change-from-place-to-place** ; for these alone , are the types of **Motion** .  
αλλοιοιτο : γαρ αυται μοναι κινήσεις .

**Ari:** Yes . ( ναι . )

**Par:** But if **The One** were to in any way **undergo alteration of-or-from-It-Self** ,  
δε το εν που αλλοιουμενον εαυτου  
it is **Impossible** that **It** could still **Remain One** .  
αδυνατον ετι εν .

**Ari:** Impossible . ( αδυνατον . )

**Par:** Accordingly then , **It** will indeed not **Be Moved** according to **alteration** .  
αρα γε ουκ κινειται κατ' αλλοιωσιν .

**Ari:** It has come to **Light** that it will not . ( φαινεται ου . )

129e κίνησιν

138b κινεῖσθαι

138c κινούμενόν, κινήσεις, κινεῖται

138d κινεῖται

139a κίνησιν

138c φέροιτο, φέρεσθαι, φέροιτο, φερόμενα

138d ἐνεχθῆναι

138c ἀλλοιοίτο, ἀλλοιούμενον, ἀλλοίωσιν

138a ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ

138b αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ

138c αὐται, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ

138d αὐτῷ

138e αὐτοῦ

128a μόνον

136a μόνον

138c μόναι

138e μόνον

139c μόνω

Loeb

“Because if in motion it would be either moving in place or changing; for those are the only kinds of motion.”

“Yes.”

“But the one, if changing to something other than itself, cannot any longer be one.”

“It cannot.”

“Then it is not in motion by the method of change.”

“Apparently not.”

Thomas Taylor

Because whatever is moved is either locally moved, or suffers alteration; for these alone are the genera of motion.

Certainly.

But if The One should be altered from itself, it is impossible that it should remain in any respect the one.

Impossible.

It will not therefore be moved according to alteration?

It appears that it will not.

Morrow and Dillon

“Because if it were in motion, it would have to be either moving in place or undergoing alteration; for these are the only types of motion.”

“Yes.”

“Now if the One alters from itself, it is presumably impossible for it still to be One?”

“Impossible.”

“Therefore it does not move in the sense of alteration.”

“It seems not.”



ἀλλ' ἄρα τῷ **φέρεισθαι**;

ἴσως.

καὶ μὴν εἰ **φέροιτο** τὸ ἕν, ἦτοι ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ** ἂν **περιφέροιτο** κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν **έτέραν** ἐξ **έτέρας**.

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν κύκλῳ μὲν **περιφερόμενον** ἐπὶ **μέσου** βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ **μέσον** **φερόμενα** ἄλλα **μέρη** ἔχειν **ἑαυτοῦ**:

Balboas

**Par:** But will **It** then **Be Moved in-place** ?

ἀλλ' ἄρα φερεσθαι τῷ ;

**Ari:** Perhaps .(ἴσως .)

**Par:** But certainly , if **The One Is Moved in-place** , then **Self** will either

καὶ μὴν εἰ το ἐν φεροιτο , αὐτῷ ἂν ἦτοι

**Be Carried around in-a-circle** , or **It will Change from-one-place-to-another** .

περιφεροιτο ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι ἐξ ἑτέραν χώραν ἑτέρας .

**Ari:** Necessarily so . (ἀνάγκη.)

**Par:** So then on the one hand , **That** which is **Being Carried around in-a-circle** , must

οὐκοῦν μὲν περιφερομενον κύκλῳ ἀνάγκη

**Stand-firm** in **The Middle** , and **have** the other **Parts** of **It-Self Carried around The Middle** .

βεβηκεναι ἐπὶ μέσου , καὶ εἶναι τὰ ἄλλα μέρη ἑαυτοῦ φερόμενα τὸ μέσον .

**138c** *φέρειτο, φέρεσθαι, φέροιτο, φερόμενα*

138d *ἐνεχθῆναι*

138a *ἑαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ*

138b *αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ*

**138c** *αὐται, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ*

138d *αὐτῷ*

138e *αὐτοῦ*

137c *περιφερές*

**138c** *περιφέροιτο, περιφερόμενον*

139a *περιφερόμενον*

132e *ἕτερον*

138b *ἕτερον, ἕτερον*

**138c** *έτέραν, έτέρας*

139b *έτέρῳ, έτερον, έτέρου, έτερον, έτερον*

139c *έτέρῳ, έτερον, έτέρῳ, έτερον, έτερον, έτέρου, έτέρῳ, έτέρῳ, έτέρου*

137d *μέσον*

137c *μέσου, μέσον*

**138c** *μέσου, μέσον*

138d *μέσου, μέσου*

145a *μέσον*

137d *μερῶν, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος*

137c *μέρη, μέρη*

**138c** *μέρη*

138d *μερῶν*

138e *μέρη, μέρη, μέρη, μέρη*

Loeb

“But by moving in place?”

“Perhaps.”

“But if the one moved in place, it would either revolve in the same spot or pass from one place to another.”

“Yes, it must do so.”

“And that which revolves must rest upon a center and have other parts which turn about the center;

Thomas Taylor

But will it be moved locally?

Perhaps so.

But indeed if *The One* is moved locally, it will either be carried round in the same circle, or it will change one place for another.

Necessarily so.

But ought not that which is carried round in a circle to stand firm in the middle, and to have the other parts of itself rolled about the middle?

Morrow and Dillon

“Does it, then, move in place?”

“Perhaps.”

“And yet if it does, it must either be carried round in a circle in the same place or shift from one place to another.”

“Necessarily.”

“If it turns round in a circle, it must rest on a center, and have those parts which revolve around the center as different parts of itself.

## Oxford Greek

ὥς δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι;

οὐδεμία.

ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμείβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται;

εἴπερ γε δὴ.

## Balboas

But on the other hand , by what device would it **Be** fitting for **That** which **has** neither **Middle**

138D δε τις μηχανη προσηκει τουτο ω μητε μεσου

nor **Parts** to ever **Be Carried in-a-circle** about **The Middle** ?

μητε μερων ποτ' ενεχθηναι κυκλω επι του μεσου ;

**Ari:** By none at all . (ουδεμια .)

**Par:** But surely then , by **changing** place , **It** would become situated elsewhere ,

αλλα δη αμειβον χωραν γινεται αλλοτ' αλλοθι

and thus **Be Moved** ?

και ουτω κινειται ;

**Ari:** In this case it would most certainly indeed . (ειπερ γε δη.)

137e μέσου, μέσον

138c μέσου, μέσον

**138d μέσου, μέσου**

145a μέσον

145b μέσον, μέσον, μέσον

137e μέρη, μέρη

138c μέρη

**138d μερῶν**

138e μέρη, μέρη, μέρη, μέρη

140d μερῶν

132b προσήκει

133b προσήκειν

**138d προσήκει**

139c προσήκει

157b προσήκει

130d ποτέ, ποτε

134d ποτέ

**138d ποτ**

139a ποτέ

140d ποτε

138c φέροιτο, φέρεσθαι, φέροιτο, φερόμενα

**138d ἐνεχθῆναι**

132d γίνεσθαι

132e γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται

**138d γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται**

139a γιγνόμενον

139d γέννται, γίγνεται, γενόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, ἐγγίγνετο, ἐγγίγνετο

138b κινεῖσθαι

138c κινουμένον, κινήσεις, κινεῖται

**138d κινεῖται**

139a κίνησιν

139b κινεῖται

Loeb

but what possible way is there for that which has no center and no parts to revolve upon a center?"

"There is none."

"But does it change its place by coming into one place at one time and another at another, and move in that way?"

"Yes, if it moves at all."

Thomas Taylor

And can any method be devised by which it is possible that a nature which has neither middle nor parts can be circularly carried about the middle?

There cannot be any.

But if it changes its place, would it not become situated elsewhere, and thus be moved?

In this case it would.

Morrow and Dillon

But in the case of a thing which cannot have a center or parts, in what way could this ever be carried round on its center?

"In no way."

"It must move, then, by changing its place, and coming to be in different places at different times."

"Yes, if it moves at all."

## Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν εἶναι μέν που ἔν **τινι αὐτῷ** ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη;

ναί.

ἄρ' οὖν **γίγνεται** ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον;

οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ.

εἰ ἔν τῷ τι **γίγνεται**, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πῶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, μήτ' ἔτι **ἔξω** ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἴπερ ἤδη ἐγγίγνεται;

ἀνάγκη.

## Balboas

**Par:** Is it not the case then , that it has been declared **Impossible** , on the one hand ,  
οὐκ οὖν εφάνη ἀδύνατον μέν

for **The Self** , to **Be** , *in-anything* at all (**138B**) ?

αὐτῷ εἶναι ἐν τινι πού ;

**Ari:** Yes . (ναί .)

**Par:** Take notice then , is it not still *even more Impossible* that **It** **become in-anything** ?  
Ἀρ' οὖν ἐτι ἀδυνατώτερον γίγνεται ;

**Ari:** I do not grasp in what way , you mean this . (οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ .)

**Par:** If anything *comes to Be in-anything* , is it not **Necessary**

εἰ τι γίγνεται ἐν τῷ , οὐκ ἀνάγκη

that it should neither yet **Be in-that** , since it is still *coming to Be* ;

μήτε πῶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἐτι ἐγγιγνόμενον ,

nor yet can it **Be entirely out-of-that** , since then , it would already *have come to Be* ?

μήτ' ἐτι παντάπασιν ἐξω ἐκείνου , ἐπερ ἤδη ἐγγίγνεται ;

**Ari:** Necessarily . (ἀνάγκη.)

133c τινα

134c τινα

**138d τινι**

138e τινος

139a τινι

138b αὐτό, ἐαυτό, ἐαυτῶ, αὐτό, ἐαυτῶ, αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ

138c αὐτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτῶ, ἐαυτοῦ

**138d αὐτῷ**

138e αὐτοῦ

139a αὐτῶ, αὐτό, αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ

132d γίγνεται

132e γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται

**138d γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται**

139a γιγνόμενον

139d γένηται, γίγνεται, γενόμενον, γίγνεται, ἐγγίγνεται, ἐγγίγνεται

127c ἔξω

**138d ἔξω**

138e ἔξω, ἔξω

Loeb

“Did we not find that it could not be in anything?”

“Yes.”

“And is it not still more impossible for it to come into anything?”

“I do not understand why.”

“If anything comes into anything, it must be not yet in it, while it is still coming in, nor still entirely outside of it, if it is already coming in, must it not?”

“It must.”

Thomas Taylor

Has it not appeared to be impossible that The One should be in any thing?

It has.

Is it not much more impossible that it should become situated in any thing?

I do not understand how you mean.

If any thing is becoming to be in any thing, is it not necessary that it should not yet be in it, since it is becoming to be; nor yet entirely out of it, since it has already become?

It is necessary.

Morrow and Dillon

“But we say that it could not be anywhere in anything.”

“Yes.”

“Is it not then even more impossible for it to come to be there?”

“I don't quite understand how you mean.”

“If a thing is coming to be in something, is it not necessary that it cannot be in that thing so long as it is still coming to be in it, nor yet can it be altogether outside it, since it is already coming to be in it.”

“It is necessary.”

εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο **πείσεται** τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἂν **μόνον πάσχοι** οὐδὲ **μέρη** εἶη: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἂν τι **αὐτοῦ** ἦδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ **ἔξω** εἶη ἅμα: τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον **μέρη** οὐχ οἷόν τέ που ἔσται τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ **ὅλον** ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναι **τινος** μήτε **ἔξω**.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐδὲ μήτε **μέρη** εἰσὶ μήτε **ὅλον τυγχάνει** ὄν, οὐ **πολὺ** ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαι που, μήτε κατὰ **μέρη** μήτε κατὰ **ὅλον** ἐγγιγνόμενον;

φαίνεται.

**Par:** Then if this can take place in something else , then it **Must Only** happen to **That** which 138E ἀρα εἰ τουτο αν πεισεται τι ἄλλο , μονον πασχοι εκεινο ου has **Parts** ; for **One Part** of **The Self** will already **Be in-That Whole** , but **Another Part** will **Be** εἰη μερη : γαρ το μεν αυτου αν ηδη εν εκεινω τι , δε το εἰη **At-Once** , **out-of-That Whole** , whereas **That** which has **No Parts Cannot** in any way **Be** αμα εξω δε το εχον μη μερη οιον ουχ που τροπω εσται **Wholly-within** , nor again , **Wholly-without** anything , at the same time . ολον μητε εντος μητε τε εξω ουδενι τινος αμα .

**Ari:** True . (ἀληθῆ .)

**Par:** But is it not even *much more Impossible* that **That** which has neither **Parts** nor δε ου ετι πολυ αδυνατωτερον ου εἰσι μητε μερη μηθ' happens to **Be** a **Whole** to *become* in any way ; since **It can neither exist** τυγχανει ον ολον ἐγγιγνεσθαι που , μητε **in a state of becoming** according to **Parts** , nor according to a **Whole** ? ἐγγιγνομενον κατα μερη μητε κατα ολον ;

**Ari:** So it has come to **Light** . (φαίνεται .)

137a πεπονθέναι  
138b πείσεται  
**138e πείσεται, πάσχοι**  
139e πεπονθός  
140a πέπονθε, πεπόνθοι, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν, πεπόνθοι  
  
136a μόνον  
138c μόναι  
**138e μόνον**  
139c μόνῳ  
142d μόνον  
  
138c μέρη  
138d μερῶν  
**138e μέρη, μέρη, μέρη, μέρη**  
140d μερῶν  
142c μέρη

138c αὐταί, ἐαυτοῖ, αὐτῶ, ἐαυτοῦ  
138d αὐτῶ  
**138e αὐτοῦ**  
139a αὐτῶ, αὐτό, αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ  
139b αὐτῶ, ἐαυτῶ, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτοῦ  
  
127c ἔξω  
138d ἔξω  
**138e ἔξω, ἔξω**  
  
137d ὅλον, ὅλον  
138b ὅλον  
**138e ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον**  
142d ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλον  
144d ὅλον, ὅλον

134e τινα  
138d τινι  
**138e τινος**  
139a τινι  
139c τινός  
  
127c τυχῆιν  
133b τύχοι  
**138e τυγχάνει**  
142b τυγχάνει  
143c τυγχάνει  
  
137e πολλά  
138a πολλοῖς  
**138e πολὺ**  
139d πολλοῖς, πολλὰ  
140d πολλῶν

Loeb

“Now if anything goes through this process, it can be only that which has parts; for a part of it could be already in the other, and the rest outside; but that which has no parts cannot by any possibility be entirely neither inside nor outside of anything at the same time.”

“True.”

“But is it not still more impossible for that which has no parts and is not a whole to come into anything, since it comes in neither in parts nor as a whole?”

“Clearly.”

Thomas Taylor

If therefore this can take place in any other thing, it must certainly happen to that which possesses parts; for one part of it will be in this thing, but another out of it: but that which has no parts cannot by any means be wholly within or without any thing.

It is true.

But is it not much more impossible that that which neither has parts nor is a whole can be *becoming to be* in any thing; since it can neither subsist is *becoming to be* according to parts, nor according to a whole?

So it appears.

Morrow and Dillon

“If, then, something else should experience this, only that thing would experience it of which there would be parts; for part of it will be already in the other thing and part of it outside it at the same time, and a thing which has no part surely cannot possibly be at the same time neither wholly inside nor wholly outside something.”

“True.”

“Is it not still more impossible that a thing which has no parts and is not a whole should come to be in anything, since it cannot do so either part by part nor as a whole?”

“It would appear so.”



## Oxford Greek

τῷ **γιγνόμενον** χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὐτ' ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον** οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον.

οὐκ ἔοικε.

κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα **κίνησιν** τὸ ἐν **ἀκίνητον**.

**ἀκίνητον**.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι γέ φαμεν ἐν **τινὶ αὐτὸ** ἀδύνατον.

φαμὲν γάρ.

## Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The One does not Change** place by **going Anywhere** and by **becoming**  
 139A ἀρα οὐτ' ἀλλάττει χώραν ἰον ποι καὶ γιγνομενον  
*in-anything* , nor by **Being Carried around in-that** which **Is The Self** ,  
 ἐν τῷ , οὐτ' περιφερομενον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ  
 nor by **undergoing** any **Alteration** . (οὔτε ἀλλοιουμενον .)

**Ari:** It does not seem likely . (οὐκ εοικεν.)

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The One “Is” Immoveable** according to every kind of **Motion** .  
 ἀρα τὸ ἐν ἀκίνητον κατὰ πᾶσαν κίνησιν .

**Ari:** Immoveable . (ακίνητον.)

**Par:** But we have certainly indeed also said that it is **Impossible** for  
 ἀλλὰ μὴν γε καὶ φαμεν ἀδύνατον

**The Self** to **Be in-anything** (138b) .  
 αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν τινὶ .

**Ari:** We have said so. (γὰρ φαμεν .)

132e γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται

138d γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται

**139a γιγνόμενον**

139d γένηται, γίγνεται, γενόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, ἐγίγνετο, ἐγίγνετο

140d γίγνοιο

138d αὐτῷ

138c αὐτοῦ

**139a αὐτῷ, αὐτὸ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ**

139b αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτοῦ

139c αὐτὸ, ἐαυτοῦ

137e περιφέρεις

138c περιφέροιο, περιφερόμενον

**139a περιφερόμενον**

138c κινούμενόν, κινήσεις, κινεῖται

138d κινεῖται

**139a κίνησιν**

139b κινεῖται

145c κινεῖσθαι

**139a ἀκίνητον, ἀκίνητον**

162c ἀκίνητον

138d τινι

138c τινος

**139a τινι**

139c τινός

139c τινι

## Loeb

“Then it does not change its place by going anywhere or into anything, nor does it revolve in a circle, nor change.”

“Apparently not.”

“Then the one is without any kind of motion.”

“It is motionless.”

“Furthermore, we say that it cannot be in anything.”

“We do.”

## Thomas Taylor

Hence it will neither change its place by going any where, nor that it may *become situated* in any thing; nor, through being carried round in that which is the same, will it suffer any alteration.

It does not appear that it can.

*The One* therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion.

Immovable.

But we have likewise asserted that it is impossible for *The One* to be in any thing.

We have said so.

## Morrow and Dillon

“Hence it does not change its place either by traveling anywhere and coming to be in something, or by revolving in the same place, or by changing.”

“It seems not.”

“Therefore the One is unmoving in respect of every kind of motion.”

“It is unmoving.”

“On the other hand, we also assert that it cannot actually be in something.”

“we do.”

## Oxford Greek

οὐτ' ἄρα ποιὶὸν καὶ ἐν οὐδ' ἄρα **ποτε** ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ** ἐστιν.  
 τί δῆ;  
 ὅτι ἤδη ἂν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἴη ἐν ᾧ τῷ **αὐτῷ** ἐστιν.  
 πάνυ μὲν οὖν.  
 ἀλλ' οὐτε ἐν **αὐτῷ** οὐτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἷόν τε ἦν **αὐτῷ** ἐνεῖναι.  
 οὐ γὰρ οὖν.  
 οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ**.  
 οὐκ ἔοικεν.

## Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly then , **It** cannot ever **Be in-That** which **Is The Self** .  
 αρα ουδ' ποτε εστιν εν τω αυτω .

**Ari:** Why then ? (τι δη;)

**Par:** Because then **Self** would immediately **Be in-That** , in which **The Self Is** .  
 οτι τω αν ηδη ειη εν εκεινω , εν ω αυτω εστιν .

**Ari:** Entirely so . (πανυ μεν ουν.)

**Par:** But **Self** was also found to **Be** such that **It Can** neither **Be in-It-Self** nor **in-Another** .  
 αλλ' αυτω ην τε οιον ουτε ενειναι εν εαυτω ουτε εν αλλω .

**Ari:** It cannot . (ου γαρ ουν.)

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The One Is** never **in The Self** .  
 139B αρα το εν εστι ουδεποτε εν τω αυτω .

**Ari:** It does not seem likely . (ουκ εοικεν.)

134d ποτ'  
 138d ποτ  
**139a ποτε**  
 140d ποτε  
 141d ποτ'

138d αὐτῷ  
 138c αὐτοῦ  
**139a** αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ  
 139b αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτοῦ  
 139c αὐτὸ, ἐαυτοῦ

Loeb

“Then it is never in the same.”

“Why is that?”

“Because it would then be in that with which the same is identical.”

“Certainly.”

“But we saw that it cannot be either in itself or in anything else.”

“No, it cannot.”

“Then the one is never in the same.”

“Apparently not.”

Thomas Taylor

It can never therefore be in same.

Why?

Because it would now be in that in which same is.

Entirely so.

But the one can neither be in itself nor in another.

It cannot.

The one therefore is never in same.

It does not appear that it is.

Morrow and Dillon

“Consequently, it is not ever in the same (condition).”

“How so?”

“Because then it would be in that very (condition), in the process of being in the same (condition).”

“Certainly.”

“But we say that it could not be either in itself or in anything else.”

“No, indeed.”

“The One, then, is never in the same.”

“It would seem not.”

## Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄν οὔτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὔθ' ἔστηκεν.

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.

οὔκουν δὴ φαίνεται γε.

οὐδὲ μὴν ταυτόν γε οὔτε ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, οὐδ' αὖ ἕτερον οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου ἂν εἴη.

πῇ δῆ;

ἕτερον μὲν που ἑαυτοῦ ὄν ἐνὸς ἕτερον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἓν.

ἀληθῆ.

## Balboas

**Par:** But most certainly , since **It** can never **Be in The Self** , then

ἀλλὰ γε μὴν το μηδεποτε εν τω αυτω

**It** will never **Be At-Rest/At-Peace** nor **Be Led** to **Stand still** .

ουθ' ον ησυχιαν ουθ' αγει εστηκεν .

**Ari:** For it is not such that it can be . (γαρ τε ου οιον.)

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The One** , as it is likely , neither **Stands-still** nor **Is Moved** .

αρα το εν , ως εοικεν , ουθ' εστηκεν ουτε κινειται .

**Ari:** It certainly does not appear to be the case .

γε ουκουν φαινεται δη.

**Par:** **It** will certainly not indeed **Be The Same** , neither **with-The Other** ,

μην Ουδε γε εσται ταυτον ουθ' ετερω

nor **with It-Self** , nor in turn will **It Be Other** , neither **from-The Self** nor **from-The Other** .

ουτε εαυτω , ουδ' αυ αν ειη ετερον ουτε αυτου ουτε ετερου .

**Ari:** In what way then ? (πη δη ;)

**Par:** For if on the one hand , by **Being** in any way **Other** than **It-Self** , then

μεν ον που ετερον εαυτου

**It** would **Be Other** than **One** , and so **It** would **Be Not-One** .

αν ειη ετερον ενος και αν ειη ουκ εν .

**Ari:** True . (αληθῆ.)

138e αὐτοῦ

139a αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

**139b αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ**

139c αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ

139d ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

132d ἐσάναι

138b ἐσάναι

**139b ἔστηκεν,**

**ἔστηκεν**

138d κινεῖται

139a κίνησιν

**139b κινεῖται**

145e κινεῖσθαι

146a κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι

131b ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

138b ταῦτόν

**139b ταῦτόν**

139c ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

139d ταῦτόν, ταῦτοῦ, ταῦτόν, ταῖόν, ταῖόν, ταῖόν, ταῖόν

138b ἕτερον, ἕτερον

138c ἑτέραν, ἑτέρας

**139b ἑτέρῳ, ἕτερον, ἑτέρου, ἕτερον,**

**ἕτερον**

Loeb

“But that which is never in the same is neither motionless nor at rest.”

“No, it cannot be so.”

“The one, then, it appears, is neither in motion nor at rest.”

“No, apparently not.”

“Neither, surely, can it be the same with another or with itself; nor again other than itself or another.”

“Why not?”

“If it were other than itself, it would be other than one and would not be one.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor

But as it is never in same, it can neither be at rest nor stand still.

In this case it cannot.

The One, therefore, as it appears, neither stands still nor is moved.

It does not appear that it can.

Nor will it be the same either with another, or with itself; nor again different either from itself or from another.

How so?

For, if different from itself, it would be different from *The One*, and so would not be *The One*.

True.

Morrow and Dillon

“But what is never in the same is not at rest or stationary.”

“No, it could not be.”

“The One, then, as it would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion.”

“No, it would seem not.”

“Further, the One cannot be either the same as another or the same as itself, nor yet other than itself or other than another.”

“Why is that?”

“Were it other than itself it would be other than One, and so would not be One.”

“True.”

καὶ μὴν **ταυτόν** γε **ἐτέρῳ** ὃν ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη, **αὐτό** δ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη: ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως εἴη ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἔν, ἀλλ' **ἕτερον** ἑνός.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

**ταυτόν** μὲν ἄρα **ἐτέρῳ** ἢ **ἕτερον** **ἑαυτοῦ** οὐκ ἔσται.

οὐ γάρ.

**ἕτερον** δέ γε **ἐτέρου** οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν ἦ ἔν: οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ **προσῆκει ἐτέρῳ τινός** εἶναι, ἀλλὰ **μόνῳ ἐτέρῳ ἐτέρου**, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί.

ὀρθῶς.

τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἔν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον: ἢ οἶεις;

οὐ δῆτα.

**Par:** And most certainly by **Being The Same with-The Other** , **It** would **Be That** ;

139C καὶ γε μὴν οὐ ταυτον ετερω αν ειη εκεινο ,  
thus **It** could not **Be The Self** ; so that neither in this way could **It “Be”** just as **It “Is”** , **One** ,  
δ' αν ουκ ειη αυτο : ωστε ουδ' ουτως αν ειη οπερ εστιν , εν ,  
but **The Other One** . (αλλ' ετερον ενος .)

**Ari:** It could not . (ου γαρ ουν.)

**Par:** Accordingly then , on the one hand , **It** will not **Be The Same with-The Other** , or  
αρα μεν ουκ εσται ταυτον ετερω η  
**Other** than **It-Self** .  
ετερον εαυτου .

**Ari:** For It could not . (γαρ ου.)

**Par:** But on the other hand , surely **It** will not **Be Other from-Another** , so long as  
δε γε αν ουκ εσται ετερον ετερου , εως  
and in so far as **It “Is” One** . For it is not Proper for **The One** to **Be Other than anything** ,  
η εν . γαρ ου προσηκει ενι ειναι ετερω τινος ,  
but **Simply Other** , but not in any way **another from-The Other** .  
αλλα μονω ετερω δε ουδενι αλλω ετερου .

**Ari:** Properly so . (ορθως .)

**Par:** Thus , on the one hand , **It** will not **Be Other** since **It “Is” One** ; or what do you think ?  
αρα μεν ουκ εσται ετερον τω ειναι εν : η οiei ;

**Ari:** Not in any way at all . (ου δητα .)

138b ταυτόν

139b ταυτόν

**139c ταυτόν, ταυτόν**

139d ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν

139e ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν

138c ἐτέρων, ἐτέρως

139b ἐτέρω, ἕτερον, ἐτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

**139c ἐτέρω, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρου, ἐτέρω, ἐτέρω, ἐτέρου**

139a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

139b αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ

**139c αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ**

139d ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

139e ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

138c τινός

139a τινι

**139c**

**τινός**

138c μόνων

138c μόνον

**139c**

**μόνῳ**

133b προσήκειν

138d προσήκει

**139c**

**προσῆκει**

## Loeb

“And, surely, if it were the same with another, it would be that other, and would not be itself; therefore in this case also it would not be that which it is, namely one, but other than one.”

“Quite so.”

“Then it will not be the same as another, nor other than itself.”

“No.”

“But it will not be other than another, so long as it is one. For one cannot be other than anything; only other, and nothing else, can be other than another.”

“Right.”

“Then it will not be other by reason of being one, will it?”

“Certainly not.”

## Thomas Taylor

And if it should be the same with another, it would be that thing and would not be itself; so that neither could it thus be The One, but it would be something different from The One.

It could not indeed.

But, if it is the same with another, must it not be different from itself?

It must.

But it will not be different from another while it is The One. For it does not belong to The One to be different from another, but to that alone which is different from another, and to no other.

Right.

In consequence, therefore, of its being *The One*, it will not be another; or do you think that it can?

Certainly not.

## Morrow and Dillon

“And if it were the same as another, it would be that other, and not be itself; so that in this case, again, it would not be just what it is, one, but other than one.”

“In no way.”

“Therefore the One will not be the same as another, or other than itself.”

“No indeed.”

“Nor can it be other than another, so long as it is one. To be other than something properly belongs, not to ‘One,’ but only to an ‘Other than another,’ and to nothing else.”

“Correct.”

“So in so far as it is One it will not be Other; or do you think so?”

“No indeed.”



## Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ **ἑαυτῷ** ἔσται, εἰ δὲ μὴ **αὐτῷ**, οὐδὲ **αὐτό**: **αὐτό** δὲ μηδαμῇ ὄν ἕτερον οὐδενός ἔσται ἕτερον.

ὀρθῶς.

οὐδὲ μὴν **ταυτόν** γε **ἑαυτῷ** ἔσται.

πῶς δ' οὔ;

οὐχ ἥπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτῇ δῆπου καὶ τοῦ **ταύτοῦ**.

τί δῆ;

## Balboas

**Par:** But surely if not by reason of this , then **It** will not **Be Other from-It-Self** ; but if **Self**  
 139D ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ , οὐχ ἔσται ἑαυτῷ : δε εἰ αὐτο  
 is not at all **Other from-Self**, then by **Being** in no way **Other**, **Self** will **Be Other than-Nothing**.  
 ουδε μὴ αὐτῷ : δε οὐν μηδαμῇ ἕτερον αὐτο ἔσται ἕτερον ουδενός .

**Ari:** Rightly so .(ορθῶς .)

**Par:** Nor yet will **It Be The Same with-It Self** .  
 ουδε μὴν ἔσται ταυτον ἑαυτῷ .

**Ari:** Why not then ? (πῶς οὐ δ' ;)

**Par:** **For surely The Nature of The One** is not **in the same way as Her Self** and **The Same** .  
 δηπου φύσις του ενος ουχ ἥπερ αὐτῇ καὶ του ταυτου .

**Ari:** Why then ? (τι δη ;)

139b αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ

139c αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ

**139d ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ**

139e ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

140a ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

139b ταυτόν

139c ταυτόν, ταυτόν

**139d ταυτόν, ταύτοῦ, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν**

139e ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν

140a ταυτόν

138d γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται

139a γιγνώμενον

**139d γέννηταί, γίγνεται, γενόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, ἐγγίγνεται, ἐγγίγνεται**

140d γίγνεται

141a γίγνεσθαι, γιγνώμενον, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

Loeb

“And if not for this reason, not by reason of itself; and if not by reason of itself, not itself; but since itself is not other at all, it will not be other than anything.”

“Right.”

“And yet one will not be the same with itself.”

“Why not?”

“The nature of one is surely not the same as that of the same.”

“Why?”

Thomas Taylor

But if it is not different from another, neither will it be different from itself. But if not different from itself, it will not be that which is *different*; and being in no respect that which is different, it will be different from nothing.

Right.

Nor yet will it be the same with itself.

Why not?

Is the nature of The One the same with that of same?

Why?

Morrow and Dillon

“But if not in this way, then not in virtue of being itself; and if not in virtue of being itself then not as itself; and if as itself it is not in any sense other, it cannot be other than anything.”

“Correct.”

“Nor yet can it be the same as itself.”

“Why not?”

“That which the nature of the One is, such will surely not be the nature of the same?”

“Why not?”

## Oxford Greek

ὅτι οὐκ, ἐπειδὴν **ταὐτὸν γένηται** τῷ τι, ἐν **γίγνεται**.

ἀλλὰ τί μὴν;

τοῖς **πολλοῖς ταὐτὸν γενόμενον** **πολλά** ἀνάγκη **γίγνεσθαι** ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν.

ἀληθῆ.

ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ **ταὐτὸν** μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὅποτε τι **ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο**, αἰεὶ ἂν ἐν **ἐγίγνετο**, καὶ ὅποτε ἓν, **ταὐτόν**.

πάνυ γε.

## Balboas

**Par:** Since whenever anything **Comes to Be The Same** *with-anything* it does not **Become One** .  
 ὅτι ἐπειδὴν τι γένηται ταυτον τῷ οὐκ γίγνεται ἐν .

**Ari:** But what then indeed ? (ἀλλὰ τι μὴν ;)

**Par:** **That** which **Becomes The Same** *with-The Many* , **Must Come to Be Many** , but not **One** .  
 γενομενον ταυτον τοις πολλοις αναγκη γιγνεσθαι πολλα , ἀλλ' ουχ ἐν .

**Ari:** True .(ἀληθῆ.)

**Par:** But if **The One** and **The Same Differ** in no way , then when anything **Becomes The Same**  
 ἀλλ' εἰ το ἐν καὶ το ταυτον διαφέρει μηδαμῇ , ὅποτε τι ἐγίγνετο ταυτον ,  
 it will always **Become One** , and when it **Becomes One** , it will **Be The Same** .  
 ἀν αἰε ἐγίγνετο ἐν , καὶ ὅποτε ἐν , ταυτον .

**Ari:** Entirely so indeed . (πανυ γε.)

138a πολλοῖς

138e πολὺ

**139d πολλοῖς, πολλά**

140d πολλῶν

143a πολλά, πολλά

139b ταῦτόν,

139c ταὐτόν, ταῦτόν

**139d ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν**

139e ταῦτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν

140a ταῦτόν

138d γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται

139a γιγνόμενον

**139d γένηται, γίγνεται, γενόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, ἐγίγνετο, ἐγίγνετο**

140d γίγνοιτο

141a γίγνεσθαι, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

Loeb

“Because when a thing becomes the same as anything, it does not thereby become one.”

“But why not?”

“That which becomes the same as many, becomes necessarily many, not one.”

“True.”

“But if the one and the same were identical, whenever anything became the same it would always become one, and when it became one, the same.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Because, when any thing becomes the same with any thing, it does not on this account become one.

But what then?

That which becomes the same with many things must necessarily become many, and not one.

True.

But if The One and same differ in no respect, whenever any thing becomes same it will always become The One, and whenever it becomes The One it will be same.

Entirely so.

Morrow and Dillon

“Because when a thing becomes the same as something, it does not become one.”

“But why?”

“For instance, if it becomes the same as the many, it must become many, not one.”

“True.”

“Whereas if there were no difference whatever between unity and sameness, whenever a thing became the same it would always become one, and whenever one, the same.”

“Certainly.”

## Oxford Greek

εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν **ἑαυτῷ ταὐτόν** ἔσται, οὐχ ἐν **ἑαυτῷ** ἔσται· καὶ οὕτω ἐν ὃν οὐχ ἐν ἔσται. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον· ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ἡ **ἑτέρου ἕτερον** εἶναι ἢ **ἑαυτῷ ταυτόν**.

ἀδύνατον.

οὕτω δὴ **ἕτερόν** γε ἢ **ταὐτόν** τὸ ἐν οὐτ' ἂν **αὐτῷ** οὐτ' ἂν **ἐτέρῳ** εἴη.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

## Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly then , if **The One Is** to **Be The Same** *with-It-Self* , then **It** will **Be** ,

139E ἀρα εἰ το ἐν ἐσται ταυτον εαυτω , ἐσται

**That** which is **Not-One** *with-It-Self* . And in this way **One Being** will **Be Not-One** ;

ουχ ἐν εαυτω . καὶ οὕτω ἐν ον ἐσται ουχ ἐν :

but certainly , this is indeed **Impossible** . Accordingly then , it is also **Impossible** for **The One**

ἀλλὰ μὴν τουτο γε αδυνατον : ἀρα καὶ αδυνατον τω ἐνι

to **Be** either , **Other from-The Other** or **The Same** *with-It-Self* .

εἶναι ἡ ετερον ετερου ἡ ταυτον εαυτω .

**Ari:** Impossible . (αδυνατον.)

**Par:** So in this way **The One** will not **Be Other** or **The Same** *with-Self* nor *with- Other* .

δὴ οὕτω το ἐν ἀν γε οὐτ' εἰη ετερον ἡ ταυτον αὐτω οὐτ' ἀν ετερω .

**Ari:** For thus it could not .

γὰρ οὐν ου .

139c αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ

139d ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

139e ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

140a ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

140b ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτόν

139c ταὐτόν

139d ταὐτόν, ταὐτοῦ, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν

139e ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν

140a ταὐτόν

140b ταὐτόν

139b ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον, ἐτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

139c ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρου, ἐτέρῳ, ἐτέρῳ, ἐτέρου

139e ἐτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν, ἐτέρῳ, ἐτέρῳ

140a ἕτερόν

140b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἐτέρῳ

## Loeb

“Then if the one is the same with itself, it will not be one with itself; and thus, being one, it will not be one; this, however, is impossible; it is therefore impossible for one to be either the other of other or the same with itself.”

“Impossible.”

“Thus the one cannot be either other or the same to itself or another.”

“No, it cannot.”

## Thomas Taylor

If, therefore, The One should be the same with itself, it would be to itself that which is not one; and so that which is one will not be one. But this indeed is impossible. It is impossible, therefore, for The One to be either different from another, or the same with itself.

Impossible.

And thus The One will neither be different nor the same, either with respect to itself or another.

It will not.

## Morrow and Dillon

“So if the One is to be the same as itself, it will not be one with itself; and thus it will be one and not one. But this is impossible. Consequently it is equally impossible for the One to be either other than another or the same as itself.”

“It is impossible.”

“Thus the One cannot be other than, or the same as, either itself or another.”

“No indeed.”

## Oxford Greek

οὐδὲ μὴν ὅμοιόν τινι ἔσται οὐδ' ἀνόμοιον οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ.

τί δὴ;

ὅτι τὸ ταῦτόν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον.

ναί.

τοῦ δέ γε ἑνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταῦτόν.

ἐφάνη γάρ.

## Balboas

**Par:** Surely then , **The One** will neither **Be Like** nor **Unlike** *anything* ,  
 μὴν Ουδε εσται ομοιον ουδ' ανομοιον τινι  
 neither **in relation to It-Self** nor **in relation to The Other** .  
 ουθ' εαυτω ουθ' ετερω .

**Ari:** Why not then . (τι δη ;)

**Par:** Because **The Like Is That** which **Is** affected in some way by **The Same** .  
 οτι ομοιον πεπονθος που το ταυτον .

**Ari:** Yes . (ναί.)

**Par:** But it was shown that **The Nature of The Same Is** indeed **Separate** from **The One** .  
 δε εφανη την φυσιν το ταυτον γε χωρις του ενος .

**Ari:** It was so shown . (γαρ εφανη .)

134ε ὁμοίως  
 135ε ὁμοία  
**139ε ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον**  
 140α ὁμοιον  
 140b ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον

139α τι  
 139c τινός  
**139ε τινι**  
 141α τινός  
 141d τι

135ε ἀνόμοια  
 136b ἀνομοίου  
**139ε ἀνόμοιον**  
 140b ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον  
 147c ἀνόμοιον

139c αὐτό, ἐαυτοῦ  
 139d ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ  
**139ε ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ**  
 140α ἐαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ  
 140b ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῶν

139ε ἑτέρῳ, ἕτερον, ἑτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερον  
 139c ἑτέρῳ, ἕτερον, ἑτέρῳ, ἕτερον, ἑτέρου, ἑτέρῳ, ἑτέρῳ, ἑτέρου  
**139ε ἑτέρου, ἕτερον, ἑτερόν, ἑτέρῳ, ἑτέρῳ**  
 140α ἑτερόν, ἕτερον  
 140b ἕτερον, ἑτέρῳ, ἑτέρῳ

139c ταῦτόν  
 139d ταῦτόν, ταῦτοῦ, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν  
**139ε ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν**  
 140α ταῦτόν  
 140b ταῦτόν

138b πείσεται  
 138c πείσεται, πᾶσχοι  
**139ε πεπονθὸς**  
 140α πέπονθε, πεπόνθοι, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν, πεπόνθοι  
 140b πεπονθός, πεπονθός, πεπονθός

131a χωρίς  
 131b χωρίς, χωρίς, χωρίς  
**139ε χωρίς**  
 140a χωρίς  
 149a χωρίς

## Loeb

“And again it will not be like or unlike anything, either itself or another.”

“Why not?”

“Because the like is that which is affected in the same way.”

“Yes.”

“But we saw that the same was of a nature distinct from that of the one.”

“Yes, so we did.”

## Thomas Taylor

But neither will it be similar to any thing, or dissimilar either to itself or to another.

Why not?

Because the similar is that which in a certain respect suffers *same*.

Certainly.

But it has appeared that *same* is naturally separate from *The One*.

It has appeared so.

## Morrow and Dillon

“Nor can the One be like or unlike anything, whether itself or another.”

“Why ever not?”

“Because a like thing is a thing which has an identical character.”

“Yes.”

“But we have seen that the character ‘same’ is distinct from the character ‘one’.

“We have.”



ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι **πέπονθε χωρίς** τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἔν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι **πεπόνθοι** ἢ ἔν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον.

ναί.

**οὐδαμῶς** ἔστιν ἄρα **ταυτόν πεπονθός** εἶναι τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἄλλω οὔτε **ἐαυτῷ**.

οὐ φαίνεται.

οὐδὲ **ὅμοιον** ἄρα δυνατόν **αὐτὸ** εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλω οὔτε **ἐαυτῷ**.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

οὐδὲ μὴν **ἕτερόν** γε πέπονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐν: καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν **πεπόνθοι** εἶναι ἢ ἔν.

πλείω γάρ.

**Par:** But certainly , if **The One would experience** anything **Apart** from **Being One** ,  
**140A** ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ το ἐν πεπονθε τι χωρίς του ειναι εν ,  
 then **It would experience** to **Be More** than **One** , but this , is **Impossible** .  
 εν αν πεπονθοι ειναι πλειω η εν , δε τουτο αδυνατον .

**Ari:** Yes . (ναί.)

**Par:** Accordingly then , it is not in any way possible for **The One to experience**  
 αρα εστιν ουδαμως το εν πεπονθος  
**Being The Same** ; neither **with-Another** nor **with-It-Self** .  
 ειναι ταυτον , ουτε αλλω ουθ' εαυτω .

**Ari:** It has not come to **Light** . (ου φαίνεται.)

**Par:** Accordingly then , it **Is Not Possible** for **Self** to be **Like** , neither **to-Another** nor **to-It-Self** .  
 αρα ουδε δυνατον αυτο ειναι ομοιον ουτε αλλω ουθ' εαυτω .

**Ari:** It does not seem likely . (ουκ εοικεν.)

**Par:** Most certainly then , neither can **The One experience Being Other** ;  
 γε μὴν ουδε το εν πεπονθεν ειναι ετερον :  
 for in this way , **It** would also **experience** to **Be More** than **One** .  
 γαρ ουτω αν και πεπονθοι ειναι πλειω η εν .

**Ari:** For then It would be more . (γαρ πλειω .)

138e πείσεται, πάσχοι

139e πεπονθός

**140a** πέπονθε, πεπόνθοι, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν, πεπόνθοι

140b πεπονθός, πεπονθός, πεπονθός

146b πέπονθεν

131b χωρίς, χωρίς, χωρίς

139e χωρίς

**140a** χωρίς

149a χωρίς

151a χωρίς

132b οὐδαμοῦ

138a οὐδαμοῦ

**140a** οὐδαμῶς

140b οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῶς

141a οὐδαμῶς

139d ταῦτόν, ταῦτοῦ, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

139e ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

**140a** ταῦτόν

140b ταῦτόν

142b ταῦτόν

135e ὅμοια

139e ὁμοίον, ὁμοιον

**140a** ὅμοιον

140b ὅμοιον, ὁμοιον

142c ὅμοιον

139d ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτό, ἐαυτοῦ

139e ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

**140a** ἐαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ

140b ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ

140c αὐτοῦ, αὐτόν, αὐτόν, ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτόν

139e ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἐτέρω, ἐτέρω

139e ἐτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν, ἐτέρω, ἐτέρω

**140a** ἕτερόν

140b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἐτέρω

140d ἐτέρω

Loeb

“But if the one were affected in any way apart from being one, it would be so affected as to be more than one, and that is impossible.”

“Yes.”

“Then the one cannot possibly be affected in the same way as another or as itself.”

“Evidently not.”

“Then it cannot be like another or itself.”

“No, so it appears.”

“Nor can the one be so affected as to be other; for in that case it would be so affected as to be more than one.”

“Yes, it would be more.”

Thomas Taylor

But if The One should suffer any thing except being The One which is, it would become more than The One: but this is impossible.

Certainly.

In no respect, therefore, can The One suffer to be the same, either with another or with itself.

It does not appear that it can.

It cannot, therefore, be similar either to another or to itself.

So it seems.

Nor yet can *The One* suffer to be another; for thus it would suffer to be more than *The One*.

More, indeed.

Morrow and Dillon

“Now if the One has any character distinct from being One, it must have the character of being more things than One; and this is impossible.”

“Yes.”

“So it is quite impossible that the One should be a thing ‘having the same character’ as either another or itself.”

“It seems not.”

“Therefore the One cannot be like another or like itself.”

“It seems not.”

“But neither is it true that the One has the characteristic of being other; for in that case again, the One would have more characteristics than being one.”

“More, indeed.”

## Oxford Greek

τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταῦτόν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον.

ὀρθῶς.

τὸ δέ γε ἓν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιον ἐστὶν οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

## Balboas

**Par:** Most certainly then that which **undergoes Being Other than-It-Self** or **Another**, will **Be** **Unlike** either **It-Self** or **Another**, if indeed **That** which **experiences The Same Is Like** .  
 140B μὴν γε τὸ πεπονθὸς ἕτερον ἢ εαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ἀν εἴη  
 ἀνομοιον ἢ εαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ , εἴπερ τὸ πεπονθὸς ταυτον ὁμοιον .

**Ari:** Rightly so . (ορθῶς .)

**Par:** But **The One** , as it is indeed likely , **by not experiencing in any way**  
 δε το εν , ὡς γε εοικεν , ου— πεπονθὸς —δαμῶς  
**Being Other** , “Is” neither **Unlike It-Self** nor **The Other** .  
 ετερον ἐστὶν ουθ’ ἀνομοιον εαυτῷ ουθ’ ετερω .

**Ari:** For thus it cannot . (γὰρ οὐν ου .)

139e ἑτέρου, ἕτερον, ἑτερόν, ἑτέρῳ, ἑτέρῳ

140a ἕτερόν

**140b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἑτέρῳ, ἑτέρῳ**

140d ἑτέρου

141b ἕτερον, ἑτέρου

139e πεπονθός

140a πέπονθε, πεπόνθοι, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν, πεπόνθοι

**140b πεπονθός, πεπονθός, πεπονθός**

146b πέπονθεν

147c πέπονθεν, πεπονθότα

139e ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

140a ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ

**140b ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ**

140c αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ

140d αὐτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ

136b ἀνομοίου

139e ἀνόμοιον

**140b ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον**

147c ἀνόμοιον

148a ἀνομοίῳ

139e ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

140a ταῦτόν

**140b ταῦτόν**

142b ταῦτόν

143b ταῦτόν

138a οὐδαμοῦ

140a οὐδαμῶς

**140b οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῶς**

141a οὐδαμῶς

141e οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῶς

139e ὁμοίον, ὁμοιον

140a ὁμοιον

**140b ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον**

142c ὁμοιον

147c ὁμοίον, ὁμοίως

Loeb

“But that which is affected in a way other than itself or other, would be unlike itself or other, if that which is affected in the same way is like.”

“Right.”

“But the one, as it appears, being never affected in a way other than itself or other, is never unlike either itself or other.”

“Evidently not.”

Thomas Taylor

But that which suffers to be different, either from itself or from another, will be dissimilar either to itself or to another, if that which suffers same is similar.

Right.

But The One, as it appears, since it in no respect suffers different, can in no respect be dissimilar either to itself or to another.

It certainly cannot.

Morrow and Dillon

“But that which has the characteristic of otherness either than itself or than another would be unlike either itself or another, if it is the case that that which has the characteristic of sameness is like.”

“Correct.”

“So the One, as it seems, through in no way having the character of otherness, is in no way unlike either itself or another.”

“No indeed.”

## Oxford Greek

οὔτε ἄρα **ὅμοιον** οὔτε **ἀνόμοιον** οὔθ' **ἐτέρω** οὔτε **ἐαυτῷ** ἂν εἴη τὸ ἔν.

οὐ φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴν **τοιούτῳ** γε ὃν οὔτε **ἴσον** οὔτε **ἄνισον** ἔσται οὔτε **ἐαυτῷ** οὔτε ἄλλω.

πῇ;

**ἴσον** μὲν ὃν τῶν **αὐτῶν** μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν **ἴσον** ᾗ.

ναί.

## Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The One** will neither **Be Like** nor **Unlike** ,  
 ἀρα το ἐν ἀν οὔτε εἰη ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνομοιον  
 neither **to-The Other** nor **to-It-Self** .  
 οὐθ' ἐτέρω οὔτε εαυτῷ .

**Ari:** It has not come to **Light** .  
 οὐ φαίνεται.

**Par:** And most certainly then , by “Being” **Such** , **It** will neither **Be Equal** nor **Unequal** ,  
 Καὶ γε μὴν ὃν τοιούτων οὔτε ἐσται ἴσον οὔτε ἀνίσον  
 neither **to-It-Self** nor **to-Another** . (οὔτε εαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ .)

**Ari:** In what way ? (πῇ ;)

**Par:** For on the one hand , if **It** were **Equal** , **It** would **Be** of **The Same/Self Measures**  
 μὲν ἢ ἴσον ἀν ἐσται τῶν αὐτῶν μετρῶν  
**with-that-to-which It Is Being Equal** .  
 ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ὃν ἴσον.

**Ari:** Yes . (ναί .)

139e ὁμοῖον, ὅμοιον

140a ὅμοιον

**140b ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον**

142c ὅμοιον

147c ὁμοῖον, ὁμοίως

139e ἐτέρω, ἔτερον, ἑτερόν, ἐτέρω, ἐτέρω

140a ἑτερόν

**140b ἔτερον, ἔτερον, ἐτέρω, ἐτέρω**

140d ἐτέρω

141b ἔτερον, ἐτέρω

136b ἀνόμοιος

139c ἀνόμοιον

**140b ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον**

147c ἀνόμοιον

148a ἀνόμοιος

137d τοιαῦτα

138a τοιούτῳ

**140b τοιούτῳ**

141a τοιούτων, τοιούτων

141d τοιούτοι, τοιούτων

131d ἴσον

137c ἴσον

**140b ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον**

140c ἴσον

140d ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

**140b ἄνισον**

149d ἄνισον

154b ἀνίσκος

139e ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, ἀετῷ, ἀετῷ

140a ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῷ

**140b ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ**

140c αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῶν

140d αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ

Loeb

“Then the one will be neither like nor unlike either other or itself.”

“So it seems.”

“Since, then, it is of such a nature, it can be neither equal nor unequal to itself or other.”

“Why not?”

“If it is equal, it is of the same measures as that to which it is equal.”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

*The One*, therefore, will neither be similar nor dissimilar, either to another or to itself.

It does not appear that it can.

But since it is such, it will neither be equal nor unequal, either to itself or to another.

How so?

If it were equal, indeed, it would be of the same measures with that to which it is equal.

Certainly.

Morrow and Dillon

“Therefore the One cannot be either like or unlike either another or itself.”

“It seems not.”

“Further, the One, being such as we have described, will not be either equal or unequal either to itself or to another.”

“How is that?”

“If it is equal, it will have the same number of measures as anything to which it is equal.”

“Yes.”

**μείζον** δέ που ἢ **ἐλαττον** ὄν, οἷς μὲν ἂν σύμμετρον ᾖ, τῶν μὲν **ἐλαττόνων** πλείω μέτρα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ **μειζόνων** **ἐλάττω**.

ναί.

οἷς δ' ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν μικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ **μειζόνων** μέτρων ἔσται.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ **μετέχον** τοῦ **αὐτοῦ** ἢ μέτρων τῶν **αὐτῶν** εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν τῶν **αὐτῶν**;

ἀδύνατον.

**ἴσον** μὲν ἄρα οὐτ' ἂν **ἐαυτῷ** οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη μὴ τῶν **αὐτῶν** μέτρων ὄν.

οὐκ οὐ φαίνεται γέ.

Ballboas

**Par:** But on the other hand , by **Being** in some way **Greater** or **Lesser** than *that-to-which*

140C δε ον που μειζον η ελαττον μεν οις **It Is Commensurate** , **It** will **have more Measures** than the **lesser** , but **fewer** than the **greater** .  
αν ξυμμετρον , μεν εξει πλειω μετρα των ελαττονων , δε ελαττω των μειζονων .

**Ari:** Yes . ( ναι . )

**Par:** Thus to *those-to-which* **It** would *not* be **Commensurable** , on the one hand , **It** will **have**

δ' οις αν μη συμμετρον , μεν εσται **smaller Measures** than some , but on the other hand , **greater Measures** than others .  
μικροτερων των δε μειζονων μετρων των .

**Ari:** How could it not . ( πως γαρ ου ; )

**Par:** Is it not **Impossible** then , for **That** which does *not* **Participate** of **The Self**

ουκουν αδυνατον το μη μετεχον του αυτου  
to either **Be** of **The Same/Self Measures** , or *of anything else* of **The Same/Selves** ?  
η ειναι των αυτων μετρων η αλλων ωντινωνουν των αυτων ;

**Ari:** It is impossible . ( αδυνατον . )

**Par:** Accordingly then , on the one hand , **It** will neither **Be Equal to-It-Self** ,

αρα μεν αν ουτ' ειη ισον εαυτω  
nor **to-Another** , by not **Being** of **The Same/Self Measures** .  
ουτε αλλω , μη ον των αυτων μετρων .

**Ari:** It does indeed not appear to be so . ( ουκουν γε φαιναται . )

132e μεγάλη

133b μέγιστον

**140c** **μείζον, μειζόνων, μειζόνων**

140d μείζον

144b μεγίστοι, μέγιστα

131d ἐλάττονι

**140c** **ἐλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλάττω**

140d ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττον

141c ἐλάττω

137e μετέχει, μετέχει

138a μετέχοντος

**140c** **μετέχον**

140d μετέχον, μετέχον

140e μετέχει, μετέχει

140a ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῷ

140b ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῶν

**140c** **αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῶν**

140d αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ

140e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

137e ἴσον

140b ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

**140c** **ἴσον**

140d ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

141c ἴσον

Loeb

“And if it is greater or less than things with which it is commensurate, it will have more measures than the things which are less and less measures than the things which are greater.”

“Yes.”

“And in the case of things with which it is not commensurate, it will have smaller measures than some and greater measures than others.”

“Of course.”

“Is it not impossible for that which does not participate in sameness to have either the same measures or anything else the same?”

“Impossible.”

“Then not having the same measures, it cannot be equal either to itself or to anything else.”

“No, apparently not.”

Thomas Taylor

But that which is greater or lesser than the things with which it is commensurate, will possess more measures than the lesser quantities, but fewer than the greater.

Certainly.

But to those to which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will consist of lesser; and with respect to the other, of greater measures.

How should it not?

Is it not, therefore, impossible that that which does not participate of same should either be of the same measures, or admit any thing in any respect the same?

It is impossible.

It will, therefore, neither be equal to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of the same measures.

It does not appear that it will.

Morrow and Dillon

“If greater or less, it will have more or fewer measures than things, less or greater than itself, which are commensurate with it.”

“Yes.”

“Or, if they are incommensurate with it, it will have had smaller measures in the one case, and greater in the other.”

“Inevitably.”

“Now a thing which does not partake in sameness cannot have the same number of measures or of anything else.”

“It cannot.”

“Therefore the One, not having the same number of measures, cannot be equal to itself or to another.”

“It would seem not, at any rate.”



ἀλλὰ μὴν πλείονων γε μέτρων ὃν ἢ **ἐλαττόνων**, ὅσων περ μέτρων, τοσούτων καὶ **μερῶν** ἂν εἴη· καὶ οὕτω αὐτὸ οὐκέτι ἔν ἐσται ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσα περ καὶ τὰ μέτρα.

ὀρθῶς.

εἰ δέ γε ἑνὸς μέτρου εἴη, **ἴσον** ἂν **γίγνοιτο** τῷ μέτρῳ· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη, **ἴσον** τῷ **αὐτὸ** εἶναι.

ἐφάνη γάρ.

οὔτε ἄρα ἑνὸς μέτρου **μετέχον** οὔτε **πολλῶν** οὔτε ὀλίγων, οὔτε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ **αὐτοῦ μετέχον**, οὔτε **ἐαυτῷ ποτε**, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἔσται **ἴσον** οὔτε ἄλλῳ· οὔτε αὐτὸ **μειζον** οὐδὲ **ἐλαττον** οὔτε **ἐαυτοῦ** οὔτε **ἐτέρου**.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν οὕτω.

### Balboas

**Par:** But most certainly then , by **Being of more** or **fewer Measures It** will also **Be**  
 ἀλλὰ γε μὴν ὄν πλείονων ἢ ἐλαττονων μετρων , ἀν καὶ εἴη  
 of as many **Parts** as there are **Measures** ; and in this way it will again , no longer “**Be**” **One** ,  
 140D τοσαυτων μερων , ὁσων περ μετρων , καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ οὐκέτι ἐσται ἐν ,  
 but **Be as many as there are also Measures** .  
 ἀλλὰ τοσαυτα ὁσα περ καὶ τὰ μετρα .

**Ari:** Rightly so . (ορθῶς .)

**Par:** But if indeed **It** would **Be** of **One Measure** , **It** would **Become Equal to That Measure** .  
 δε εἰ γε εἴη ἐνὸς μετρου , ἀν γιγνοιτο ἴσον τῷ μετρῳ :  
 But This has come to **Light** that it is **Impossible** ; that **The Self Be Equal to anything** .  
 δε τουτο ἐφάνη ἀδύνατον , αὐτὸ εἶναι ἴσον τῷ .

**Ari:** It has so come to **Light** .(γὰρ ἐφάνη .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , **It** will neither **Participate** of **One Measure** , nor of **Many** , nor of a  
 ἀρα οὔτε μετεχον ἐνὸς μετρου οὔτε πολλων οὔτε  
 few ; for **That which in no way Participates** of **The Self** , **Can Ever Be Equal** , as it is likely ,  
 ὀλιγων το οὔτε παραπαν μετεχον του αυτου ποτε ἐσται ἴσον , ὥς ἔοικεν ,  
**to-It-Self** nor **to-Another** , nor in turn **Be greater** or **lesser than-It-Self** nor **than-The Other** .  
 ἐαυτῷ οὔτε ἀλλῷ : οὐδ’ αὐτὸ μείζον οὐδὲ ἐλαττον οὔτε ἐαυτοῦ οὔτε ἐτέρου .

**Ari:** It is thus so in every way .

μὲν οὖν οὕτω παντάπασι .

131d ἐλάττον  
 140c ἐλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλάττω  
**140d ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττον**  
 141c ἐλάττω  
 145c ἐλαττον

138d μερῶν  
 138e μέρη, μέρη, μέρη, μέρη  
**140d μερῶν**  
 142c μέρη  
 144b μέρη

140b ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον  
 140c ἴσον  
**140d ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον**  
 141c ἴσον  
 145b ἴσον

139a γινόμενον  
 139d γένηται, γίγνεται, γινόμενον, γίνεσθαι, ἐγίγνετο, ἐγίγνετο  
**140d γίγνοιτο**  
 141a γίγνεσθαι, γινόμενον, γίγνεται, γίγνεται  
 141b γίνεσθαι, γεγονότος, γεγονέναι, γιγνομένου, γεγονέναι, γίνεσθαι

140b ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῶν  
 140c αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῶν  
**140d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ,**  
**ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ**

138a μετέχοντος  
 140c μετέχον  
**140d μετέχον, μετέχον**  
 140e μεθέξει, μετέχει  
 141d μετέχει

138d ποτ  
 139a ποτέ  
**140d ποτε**  
 141d ποτέ  
 141e ποτέ, ποτέ

138e πολὺ  
 139d πολλοῖς, πολλὰ  
**140d πολλῶν**  
 143a πολλὰ, πολλὰ  
 143c πολλή  
 140a ἕτερόν  
 140b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἐτέρῳ  
**140d ἐτέρου**  
 141b ἕτερον, ἐτέρου  
 143b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερα

133b μέγιστον  
 140c μείζον, μείζονων, μείζονων  
**140d μείζον**  
 144b μεγίστου, μέγιστα  
 144c μείζονος

Loeb

“But whether it have more measures or less, it will have as many parts as measures and thus one will be no longer one, but will be as many as are its measures.”

“Right.”

“But if it were of one measure, it would be equal to the measure; but we have seen that it cannot be equal to anything.”

“Yes, so we have.”

“Then it will partake neither of one measure, nor of many, nor of few; nor will it partake at all of the same, nor will it ever, apparently, be equal to itself or to anything else; nor will it be greater or less than itself or another.”

“Perfectly true.”

Thomas Taylor

But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are measures; and so again it will no longer be *The One*, but as many as there are measures.

Right.

But if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure: but it has appeared that The One cannot be equal to any thing.

It has appeared so.

The One, therefore, neither participates of one measure, nor of many, nor of a few; nor (since it in no respect participates of same) can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again greater or lesser either than itself or another.

It is in every respect so.

Morrow and Dillon

“On the other hand, if it had more or fewer measures, it would have as many parts as measures; and thus, once more, it would no longer be one, but as many as its measures.”

“Correct.”

“And if it were of one measure it would be equal to that measure; but this we saw to be impossible, that it should be equal to anything .”

“We did indeed.”

“Therefore, since it partakes neither in one measure nor in many nor in few, nor does it partake in sameness at all, it appears that it can never be equal to itself or to another, nor yet greater or less than itself or another.”

“Absolutely so.”

τί δέ; **πρεσβύτερον** ἢ **νεώτερον** ἢ τὴν **αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν** ἔχειν τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατόν εἶναι;  
τί διὲ γὰρ οὐ;

ὅτι που **ἡλικίαν** μὲν τὴν **αὐτὴν** ἔχον ἢ **αὐτῷ** ἢ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος **χρόνου** καὶ **ὁμοιότητος** **μεθέξει**, ὧν **ἐλέγομεν** οὐ μετεῖναι τῷ ἐνί, οὔτε **ὁμοιότητος** οὔτε ἰσότητος.

**ἐλέγομεν** γὰρ οὖν.

καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι **ἀνομοιοτήτος** τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ **μετέχει**, καὶ τοῦτο **ἐλέγομεν**.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

**Parmenides** : 12 What next then ? Do you believe that **The One** **Has** to **Possess The Power**

140E Τι δε ; δοκει το εν εχειν δυνατον

to **Be Older** or **Younger** or of **The Self/Same Age** ?

ειναι τω πρεσβυτερον η νεωτερον η την αυτην ηλικιαν ;

**Aristotle** : Is there any reason why not ? (δη γαρ τι ου ;)

**Par**: Since on the one hand , if **It** somehow **Has The Same Age** as **The Self** , or as **Another** ,

οτι μεν που εχον την αυτην ηλικιαν η αυτω , η αλλω

then , **It** will **Participate** of the **Equality** and **Likeness** of **Time** ; of which we said ,

μεθεξει ισότητος και ομοιοτητος χρονου , ων ελεγομεν

**The One** , did not **Participate** ; that is , of neither **Likeness** nor **Equality** .

τω ενι ου μετειναι ουθ' ομοιοτητος ουτε ισότητος .

**Ari** : Yes , we said that . (ουν γαρ ελεγομεν .)

**Par**: We also said , that **It** certainly does not **Participate** of **Unlikeness** nor **Inequality** .

και ελεγομεν και μην και οτι τουτο ου μετεχει ανομοιοτητος τε και ανισότητος .

**Ari** : By all means . (πανυ μεν ουν .)

128e πρεσβύτερον

137a πρεσβυτέρω

**140e πρεσβύτερον**

141a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβυτέρω, πρεσβυτέρω, πρεσβυτέρω, πρεσβυτέρω, πρεσβυτέρω

141c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβυτέρω

137b νεώτατος

137c νεώτατον

**140e νεώτερον**

141a νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

141c νεώτερον, νεώτερον

140e αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

140d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

**140e αὐτήν, αὐτήν, αὐτῷ**

141a αὐτήν, αὐτήν, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

141b αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ

130e ἡλικίαν

**140e ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν**

141a ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν

141d ἡλικίαν

126b χρόνος

136e χρόνου

**140e χρόνου**

141a χρόνον, χρόνον

141c χρόνον, χρόνον

133a ὁμοίη

136b ὁμοίη

**140e ὁμοιότητος, ὁμοιότητος**

159e ὁμοιότης, ὁμοιότητα

161b ὁμοιότητα

140c μετέχον

140d μετέχον, μετέχον

**140e μεθέξει, μετέχει**

141d μετέχει

141e μετέχει, μετέχει, μετέχει, μετέχει

137b λέγει

137c λέγεις, λέγων

**140e ἐλέγομεν, ἐλέγομεν, ἐλέγομεν**

141a λέγεις

142a λέγεται

129a ἀνομοιότης

129e ἀνομοιότητα

**140e ἀνομοιοτήτος**

159e ἀνομοιότης, ἀνομοιότητα

161a ἀνομοιότης

Loeb

“Well, does anyone believe that the one can be older or younger or of the same age?”

“Why not?”

“Because if it has the same age as itself or as anything else, it will partake of equality and likeness of time, and we said the one had no part in likeness or equality.”

“Yes, we said that.”

“And we said also that it does not partake of unlikeness or inequality.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But what? Does it appear that *The One* can be either older or younger, or be of the same age?

What should hinder?

If it had in any respect the same age, either with itself or with another, it would participate equally of time and similitude, which we have nevertheless asserted *The One* does not participate.

We have asserted so.

And this also we have said, that it neither participates of dissimilitude nor inequality.

Entirely so.

Morrow and Dillon

“Well then, can it be held that the One can be older or younger than anything, or as the same age as anything?”

“Why not?”

“If it is of the same age with itself or another it will partake in equality of time and likeness; and we have said that the One does not partake of either likeness or equality.”

“We did indeed.”

“And that it does not participate in unlikeness and inequality, this also we said.”

“Indeed we did.”

πῶς οὖν οἶόν τε ἔσται **τινὸς** ἢ **πρεσβύτερον** ἢ **νεώτερον** εἶναι ἢ τὴν **αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν** ἔχειν τῷ **τοιούτῳ** ὄν;

**οὐδαμῶς.**

οὐκ ἄρα ἂν εἴη **νεώτερόν** γε οὐδὲ **πρεσβύτερον** οὐδὲ τὴν **αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν** ἔχον τὸ ἐν οὔτε **αὐτῷ** οὔτε ἄλλῳ.

οὐ φαίνεται.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν **χρόνῳ** τὸ παράπαν δύναιτο ἂν εἶναι τὸ ἐν, εἰ **τοιούτῳ** εἴη; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἐάν τι ἢ ἐν **χρόνῳ**, ἀεὶ **αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι**;

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν τό γε **πρεσβύτερον** ἀεὶ **νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον**;

τί μήν;

**Par:** How then , by “Being” of Such a Nature , can It be either **Older**

**141A** πῶς οὖν εἶναι οὐν τε τινος οἶον εἶναι ἢ πρεσβύτερον  
or **Younger** or of **The Self/Same Age** as such a thing that **has** to **Be** ?  
ἢ νεωτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι ;

**Ari :** In no way , whatsoever ! (οὐδαμῶς .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The One** , could not indeed **Be Younger** nor **Older**

ἀρ' οὖν το ἐν ἀν οὐκ γε εἶη νεωτερον οὐδε πρεσβύτερον  
nor have to **Be** of **The Self/Same Age** as **The Self** nor as **Another** .  
οὐδε εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτῷ οὐτε ἄλλῳ .

**Ari:** It has not come to **Light** . (οὐ φαίνεται .)

**Par:** Take notice then , **Neither Can** it **Be Possible** for **The One** to **Be** in **Time** , **at all** ,

ἀρ' οὖν οὐδε ἀν δύναιτ' το ἐν εἶναι ἐν χρόνῳ το παραπαν  
if It “**Must Be Such as This**” ? For if **Some Entity** were to **Be** in **Time** , then in that case ,  
εἰ εἶη τοιούτῳ ; εἰαν τι ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ

**Must** not **The Self** , **Necessarily** , for **All Time Be growing Older** than **The Self** .

οὐκ αὐτο ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον αὐτοῦ ;

**Ari :** Necessarily . (ἀνάγκη .)

**Par:** Is it not so then , that the **Older Is** indeed **Always growing Older** than the **Younger** ?

οὐκ οὖν το πρεσβύτερον γε ἀεὶ πρεσβύτερον νεωτερου ;

**Ari:** Certainly . What next ? (μὴν τι ;)

139c τινός  
139e τινι  
**141a τινὸς**  
141d τινι  
143c τινε

140d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ  
140e αὐτὴν, αὐτὴν, αὐτῷ  
**141a αὐτὴν, αὐτὴν, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ**  
141b ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ  
141c ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ

130e ἡλικίαν  
140e ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν  
**141a ἡλικίαν,**  
**ἡλικίαν**

140a οὐδαμῶς  
140b οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῶς  
**141a οὐδαμῶς**  
141c οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῶς  
144a οὐδαμῶς

137a πρεσβυτέρῳ  
140e πρεσβύτερον  
**141a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον**  
141c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον  
141d πρεσβύτερόν

137c νεώτατον  
140e νεώτερον  
**141a νεώτερον, νεώτερόν,**  
**νεωτέρου**

138a τοιοῦτόν  
140b τοιοῦτόν  
**141a τοιοῦτον,**  
**τοιοῦτον**

136e χρόνος  
140e χρόνου  
**141a χρόνῳ, χρόνῳ**  
141c χρόνον, χρόνον  
141d χρόνῳ, χρόνῳ; χρόνῳ, χρόνῳ  
139d γένηται, γίγνεται, γινόμενον, γίγνεται, ἐγγίγνεται, ἐγγίγνεται  
140d γίγνεται  
**141a γίγνεσθαι**  
141b γίγνεσθαι, γινόμενος, γινόμενος, γινόμενος, γινόμενος, γινόμενος  
141c γινόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γινόμενος, γινόμενος

Loeb

“How, then, being of such a nature, can it be either younger or older or of the same age as anything?”

“In no way.”

“Then the one cannot be younger or older or of the same age as anything.”

“No, evidently not.”

“And can the one exist in time at all, if it is of such a nature? Must it not, if it exists in time, always be growing older than itself?”

“It must.”

“And the older is always older than something younger?”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

How, therefore, being such, can it either be older or younger than any thing, or possess the same age with any thing?

It can in no respect.

The One, therefore, will neither be younger nor older, nor will it be of the same age, either with itself or with another.

It does not appear that it will.

Will it not, therefore, be impossible that The One should be at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not necessary that, if any thing is in time, it should always become older than itself?

It is necessary.

But is not that which is older, always older than the younger?

What then?

Morrow and Dillon

“How then will it, being such as it is, be able to be either older or younger than, or of the same age with, anything.”

“In no way.”

“Therefore the One cannot be younger or older than, or of the same age with, either itself or another.”

“It would seem not.”

“Would it not be the case, then, that the One could not even be in time at all, if it were such as I have described? Or is it not necessary that, if something is in time, it must be always becoming older than itself?”

“Necessarily.”

“Does not, then, ‘older’ always mean older than something younger?”

“Obviously.”

τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν οὗτο πρεσβύτερον γίγνηται.

πῶς λέγεις;

ὦδε: διάφορον ἕτερον ἐτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἤδη ὄντος διαφόρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἤδη ὄντος ἤδη εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος μέλλειν, τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε μέλλειν οὔτε εἶναι πῶ διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἶναι.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ δή.

Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly then , **That** which **Is growing Older** than **It Self** , **Is** also at **The Same Time** 141B ἀρα το γιγνομενον πρεσβυτερον εαυτου και αμα **growing Younger** than **It Self** , if indeed **It Must Possess** **That** which **It grows Older Than** . γιγνεται νεωτερον εαυτου , ειπερ μελλει εχειν οτου γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον .

**Aristotle** : What do you mean ? (πῶς λεγεις .)

**Parmenides:** The following ; *it is in no way necessary* for **One** which **Is Different** from **another** ὦδε : ουδεν δει ετερον διαφορον ετερου to **Become Different** , by **Being already Different** . Thus on the one hand , by **Being already** γιγνεσθαι οντος ηδη διαφορου , αλλα μεν οντος ηδη **Different** from *that which Is already Different* . Whereas , on the other hand , it will **have** του ειναι ηδη , δε γε— **Become Different** from that which **has Become Different** , and furthermore it **Is going to Be** —γονεναι του γεγονοτος δε μελλοντος **Different** from that which **will come to Be Different** ; whereas that which **Is in the process of** του μελλειν δε του γιγ— **Coming to Be Different** , can neither **have Become Different** , nor **Be about to Be Different** , —νομενου ουτε γεγονεναι ουτε μελλειν nor **Be at all Different** , but it must simply **Come to Be Different** , and not **Be in another way** . ουτε ειναι πω διαφορον , αλλα γιγνεσθαι ουκ ειναι αλλως .

**Ari:** Necessarily so . (αναγκη γαρ .)

137a πρεσβυτέρω

140e πρεσβύτερον

141b πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

141c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

141d πρεσβυτέρον

140e αἰτήν, αἰτήν, αὐτῷ

141a αἰτήν, αἰτήν, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

141b ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ

141c ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ

141d αἰτῶν, αἰτήν, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ

140d γίγνεται

141a γίγνεσθαι, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται, γίγνηται

141b γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται, γίγνηται, γίγνεσθαι, γεγονότος, γεγονέναι, γιγνομένου, γεγονέναι, γίγνεσθαι

137c νεώτατον

140e νεώτερον

141b νεώτερον

141c νεωτέρου, νεώτερον

141d νεώτερον

137c λέγεις, λέγων

140e ἐλέγομεν, ἐλέγομεν, ἐλέγομεν

141a λέγεις

142a λέγεται

142c λέγειν, λεγόμενον, λέγωμεν

140b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἐτέρω

140d ἐτέρου

141b ἕτερον, ἐτέρου

143b ἕτερον

143c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, καίτερον, ἕτερόν

Loeb

“Then that which grows older than itself grows at the same time younger than itself, if it is to have something than which it grows older.”

“What do you mean?”

“This is what I mean: A thing which is different from another does not have to become different from that which is already different, but it must be different from that which is already different, it must have become different from that which has become so, it will have to be different from that which will be so, but from that which is becoming different it cannot have become, nor can it be going to be, nor can it already be different: it must become different, and that is all.”

“There is no denying that.”

Thomas Taylor

That, therefore, which is becoming to be older than itself, is at the same time becoming to be younger than itself, if it is about to have that through which it may become older.

How do you say?

Thus: It is requisite that nothing should subsist in *becoming* to be different from another, when it *is* already different, but that it should *be* now different from that which *is* different, *have been* from that which *was*, and *will be* from that which is *to be hereafter*: but from that which is *becoming to be* different, it ought neither to *have been*, nor *to be hereafter*, nor *to be*, but to subsist in *becoming to be* different, and no otherwise.

It is necessary.

Morrow and Dillon

“Well then, whatever is becoming older than itself, must also be at the same time becoming younger than itself, if it is to have something than which it is becoming older.”

“What do you mean?”

“This. If one thing is already different from another, there is no question of its becoming different: either they both already are now, or they both have been, or they both will be, different. But if one is in the process of becoming different, you cannot say that the other has been, or will be, or as yet is, different; it can only be in process of becoming different.”

“Necessarily.”



ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε **πρεσβύτερον** διαφορότης **νεωτέρου** ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

ἔστι γάρ.

τὸ ἄρα **πρεσβύτερον** **ἑαυτοῦ** **γιγνόμενον** ἀνάγκη καὶ **νεώτερον** ἅμα **ἑαυτοῦ** **γίγνεσθαι**.

ἔοικεν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλείω **ἑαυτοῦ** **γίγνεσθαι** **χρόνον** μήτε **ἐλάττω**, ἀλλὰ τὸν **ἴσον** **χρόνον** καὶ **γίγνεσθαι** **ἑαυτῷ** καὶ εἶναι καὶ **γεγονέναι** καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα.

Balboas

**Par:** But certainly , **That** which Is **Older Is** simply a **Difference/Distinction**

141C ἀλλὰ μὴν το πρεβυτερον εστι γε διαφοροτης  
in relation to the **Younger** , and to nothing else . (νεωτερου και ουδενος αλλου.)

**Ari:** So it is . (γαρ εστι .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , **That** which Is **Becoming Older** than **It-Self** , **Must Necessarily** ,

αρα το γιγνομενον πρεσβυτερον εαυτου αναγκη  
at the same time , also **Become Younger** than **It-Self** .

αμα και γιγνεσθαι νεωτερον εαυτου .

**Ari :** It seems likely . (εοικεν.)

**Par:** But surely , neither can **It** also **Come to Be** in **more** nor **less Time** than **It-Self** ; whereas

αλλα μην μητε και γιγνεσθαι πλειω μητ' ελαττω χρονον εαυτου , αλλα  
**It Must Be** and **Become** and **have Become** and **Be about to Be** for an **Equal Time** with **It-Self** .  
ειναι και γιγνεσθαι και γεγονεναι και μελλειν εσεσθαι τον ισον χρονον εαυτω .

**Ari :** For this is also necessarily the case .

γαρ ταυτα και αναγκη ουν .

140e πρεσβύτερον

141a πρεσβύτερον, ηρεσβύτερον, ηρεσβύτερον, ηρεσβύτερον, ηρεσβύτερον, ηρεσβύτερον

**141c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον**

141d πρεσβύτερον

151e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

140e νεώτερον

141a νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεωτέρου, νεώτερον

**141c νεωτέρου, νεώτερον**

141d νεώτερον

151e νεώτερον, νεώτερον

141a αὐτήν, αὐτήν, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ

141b ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ

**141c ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ**

141d αὐτῶν, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

142a αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ

141a γίγνεσθαι, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

141b γίγνεσθαι, γεγονότος, γεγονέναι, γιγνόμενου, γεγονέναι, γίγνεσθαι

**141c γιγνόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γεγονέναι**

141d γίγνεσθαι, γέγονε, ἐγίγνετο, γεγονότος

141e γενήσεται, γενήσεται, γίγνεται, γέγονεν, ἐγίγνετο, γέγονεν, γίγνεται

140e χρόνου

141a χρόνῳ, χρόνῳ

**141c χρόνον, χρόνον**

141d χρόνῳ, χρόνου, χρόνῳ, χρόνου

141e χρόνου

140e ἔλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλάττω

140d ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττον

**141c ἐλάττω**

145c ἔλαττον

145d ἐλάττω

140c ἴσον

140d ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

**141c ἴσον**

145b ἴσον

149d ἴσον

Loeb

“But surely the notion 'older' is a difference with respect to the younger and to nothing else.”

“Yes, so it is.”

“But that which is becoming older than itself must at the same time be becoming younger than itself.”

“So it appears.”

“But surely it cannot become either for a longer or for a shorter time than itself; it must become and be and be about to be for an equal time with itself.”

“That also is inevitable.”

Thomas Taylor

But the older differs from the younger, and no other.

Certainly.

Hence, that which is *becoming to be* older than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in *becoming to be* younger than itself.

It seems so.

But likewise it ought not to subsist in *becoming to be* in a longer time than itself, nor yet in a shorter; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in *becoming to be*, should *be*, *have been*, and *be hereafter*.

For these are necessary.

Morrow and Dillon

“Now the difference signified by ‘older’ is always a difference from something younger and from nothing else.”

“It is.”

“Consequently, what is becoming older than itself must also at the same time be becoming younger than itself.”

“It would seem so.”

“Now, in the process of becoming it cannot take a longer or shorter time than itself, but must take the same time with itself, whether it is becoming, or it is, or has been, or will be.”

“Certainly, this too is necessary.”

ανάγκη ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν **χρόνῳ** ἐστίν καὶ **μετέχει** τοῦ **τοιούτου**, ἕκαστον **αὐτῶν** τὴν **αὐτὴν** τε **αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡλικίαν** ἔχειν καὶ **πρεσβύτερόν** τε **αὐτοῦ** ἅμα καὶ **νεώτερον γίνεσθαι**.

κινδυνεύει.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τῷ γε ἐνὶ τῶν **τοιούτων** παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν.

οὐ γὰρ μετῆν.

οὐδὲ ἄρα **χρόνου αὐτῷ** μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἐν **τινι χρόνῳ**.

οὔκουν δὴ, ὥς γε ὁ **λόγος** αἰρεῖ.

τί οὖν; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ **γέγονε** καὶ τὸ **ἐγίγνετο** οὐ **χρόνου** μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ **ποτέ γεγονότος**;

καὶ μάλα.

Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly then , it **Is Necessary** , as it is **Reasonable** , that **Each Self** that **Exists** in **Time** **141D** **α**ρα **ε**στιν **αναγκη** , **ω**ς **ε**οικεν , **ο**σα **ε**καστον **α**υτο **ε**στι **ε**ν **χ**ρονω and which indeed **Participates** of such an **Existence** , **has** to **Be** of **The Self/Same Age** **και** **γ**ε **μ**ετεχει **του** **τοιουτου** , **ε**χειν **την** **α**υτην **η**λικιαν **as The Self** , and **at the same time** , also **comes to Be Older** and **Younger** than **The Self** . **α**υτω **τε** **α**μα **και** **γ**ιγνεσθαι **π**ρεσβυτερον **και** **ν**εωτερον **α**υτου .

**Ari :** That is likely to be the case . (κινδυνευει .)

**Par:** But surely , **The One** , **Cannot** indeed , **Participate** of such **experiences** . **α**λλα **μ**ην **τ**ω **ε**νι **ο**υδεν **γ**ε **μ**ετην **τ**ων **τοιουτων** **π**αθηματων .

**Ari:** It cannot so participate . (ου γαρ μετην .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The Self** does not **Participate** in **Time** , nor does **It Exist** in any **Time** . **α**ρα **α**υτω **ο**υδε **μ**ετεστιν **χ**ρονω , **ο**υδ' **ε**στιν **ε**ν **τι**νι **χ**ρονω .

**Ari:** Surely then , such cannot be the case , as **The Logos** surely proves . **δ**η **ο**υκουν **ω**ς **ο** **λ**ογος **γ**ε **α**ιρει .

**Par:** What then ? Does it appear that “**Was**” and “**has Become**” and “**Was Becoming**” , **Τ**ι **ο**υν ; **δ**οκει **τ**ο **η**ν **και** **τ**ο **γ**εγονε **και** **τ**ο **ε**γίγνετο **signify the Participation** of **Time** at some period that **has come to Be** in **The Past** ? **σ**ημαιοειν **μ**εθεξιν **του** **χ**ρονου **πο**τε **γ**εγοντος ;

**Ari:** Indeed it does . (μαλα και .)

141a χρόνος, χρόνῳ  
141c χρόνον, χρόνον  
**141d χρόνῳ, χρόνου, χρόνῳ, χρόνου**  
141e χρόνου  
146e χρόνον, χρόνον

140d μετέχον, μετέχον  
140e μετέχει, μετέχει  
**141d μετέχει**  
141e μετέχει, μετάσχοι, μετέχει, μετέχον  
142b μετέχων

140b τοιούτον  
141a τοιούτον, τοιούτον  
**141d τοιούτου, τοιούτων**

141b ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ  
141c ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ  
**141d αὐτῶν, αὐτῇν, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ**  
142a αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ  
142b αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

140e ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν  
141a ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν  
**141d ἡλικίαν**  
152e ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν  
153e ἡλικίαν  
141a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον  
141c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον  
**141d πρεσβύτερόν**  
151e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον  
152a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

139e τινι  
141a τινός  
**141d τινι**

141a νεώτερον, νεώτερόν, νεωτέρου, νεώτερον  
141c νεωτέρου, νεώτερον  
**141d νεώτερον**  
151e νεώτερόν, νεώτερον  
152a νεωτέρου

141b γίνεσθαι, γεγονότος, γιγνόμεναι, γιγνόμενου, γιγνόμεναι, γιγνόμενου  
141c γιγνόμενον, γίνεσθαι, γίνεσθαι, γίνεσθαι, γιγνόμεναι  
**141d γίνεσθαι, γέγονε, ἐγίγνετο, γεγονότος**

136b λόγος, λόγῳ  
137a λόγων  
**141d λόγος**  
141e λόγῳ  
142a λόγος

139a ποτ'  
140d ποτε  
**141d ποτέ**  
141e ποτέ, ποτέ  
142b ποτε

Loeb

“Apparently, then, it is inevitable that everything which exists in time and partakes of time is of the same age as itself and is also at the same time becoming older and younger than itself.”

“I see no escape from that.”

“But the one had nothing to do with such affections.”

“No, it had not.”

“It has nothing to do with time, and does not exist in time.”

“No, that is the result of the argument.”

“Well, and do not the words 'was,' 'has become,' and 'was becoming' appear to denote participation in past time?”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

It is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that such things as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, should each one possess the same age with itself, and should subsist in becoming to be both older and younger than itself.

It seems so.

But no one of these passions belongs to *The One*.

None.

Neither, therefore, is time present with it, nor does it subsist in any time.

It does not, indeed, according to the decisions of reason.

What then? Do not the terms *it was*, *it has been*, *it did become*, seem to signify the participation of the time past?

Certainly.

Morrow and Dillon

“So, it seems, any one of the things that occupy time and have temporal character must be of the same age as itself and also be becoming at once both older and younger than itself.”

“It may be so.”

“But we saw that none of these characters can attach to the One.”

“No, they do not.”

“Therefore the One has nothing to do with time, nor does it occupy any stretch of time.”

“No indeed, at least as far as the argument goes.”

“Well now, the words ‘was,’ ‘has become,’ ‘was becoming,’ are understood to mean connection with past time, are they not?”

“Yes indeed.”

## Oxford Greek

τί δέ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ **γενήσεται** καὶ τὸ **γενηθήσεται** οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτα τοῦ μέλλοντος;  
ναί.

τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ **γίγνεται** οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν μηδαμῇ μηδενὸς **μετέχει χρόνου**, οὔτε **ποτέ γέγονεν** οὔτ' **ἐγίγνετο** οὔτ' ἦν **ποτέ**, οὔτε νῦν **γέγονεν** οὔτε **γίγνεται** οὔτε ἔστιν, οὔτ' ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτε ἔσται.

ἀληθέστατα.

## Balboas

**Par:** What then ? Does “**Will Be**” and “**Will come to Be**” and “**Will Be coming to Be**” ,  
141E τι δε ; το εσται και το γενησεται και το γενηθησεται  
not signify **Time** hereafter , at some period in **The Future** ?  
ου του επειτα που μελλοντος ;

**Ari:** Yes . (ναί.)

**Par:** But surely then , does not **That** which “**Is**” and **That** which “**Is Becoming**” signify  
δε δη ου το εστι και το γιγνεται  
**Time** which **Is Now** , in **The Present** ?  
του νυν παροντος ;

**Ari:** By all means . (πανυ μεν ουν .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , if **The One** , does not **Ever Participate** of **Time** in any way at all ,  
αρα ει το εν μηδενος ποτε μετεχει χρονου μηδαμη  
then neither has **It ever come to Be** , nor **was coming to Be** , nor **was** ,  
ουτε γεγονεν ουτε γιγνεται ουτ' ην  
neither **has It ever come to Be** , nor **Become** , nor **Is** in **The Now** ,  
ουτε γεγονεν ουτε γιγνεται ουτ' εστιν νυν ,  
neither **will It ever come to Be** , nor **will have come to Be** , nor **will It ever Be** .  
ουτ' γενησεται ουτε γενηθησεται ουτ' επειτα εσται .

**Ari:** Most True ! (αληθεστατα .)

141c γιγνόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γεγονέναι

141d γίγνεσθαι, γέγονε, ἐγίγνετο, γεγονότος

**141e** γενήσεται, γενηθήσεται, γίγνεται, γέγονεν, ἐγίγνετο, γέγονεν, γίγνεται

140e μετέχει, μετέχει

141d μετέχει

**141e** μετέχει, μετάρχοι, μετέχει, μετέχον

142b μετέχειν

142c μετέχεν, μετέχει

141c χρόνον, χρόνον

141d χρόνω, χρόνου, χρόνω, χρόνου

**141e** χρόνου

146c χρόνον, χρόνον

151e χρόνου, χρόνου

140d ποτε

141d ποτέ

**141e** ποτέ, ποτέ

142b ποτε

146d ποτε

Loeb

“And 'will be,' 'will become,' and 'will be made to become,' in future time?”

“Yes.”

“And 'is' and 'is becoming' in the present?”

“Certainly.”

“Then if the one has no participation in time whatsoever, it neither has become nor became nor was in the past, it has neither become nor is it becoming nor is it in the present, and it will neither become nor be made to become nor will it be in the future.”

“Very true.”

Thomas Taylor

And do not the terms *it will be*, *it may become*, and *it will be generated*, signify that which is about to be hereafter?

Certainly.

But are not the terms *it is*, and *it is becoming to be*, marks of the present time?

Entirely so.

If then *The One* participates in no respect of any time, it neither ever *was*, nor *has been*, nor *did become*: nor is it *now generated*, nor is *becoming to be*, nor *is*, nor *may become* hereafter, nor *will be generated*, nor *will be*.

It is most true.

Morrow and Dillon

“Again, ‘will be,’ ‘will be becoming,’ and ‘will become’ are connected with future time.”

“Yes.”

“And ‘is’ and ‘is becoming,’ with time now present.”

“Certainly.”

“Consequently, if the One has nothing to do with any time, it never has become nor was becoming nor was ever, nor can you say it has become now or is becoming or is; or that it will become, or will have become or will be hereafter.”

“Very true.”

## Oxford Greek

ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἂν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι;

οὐκ ἔστιν.

οὐδαμῶς ἄρα τὸ ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἔν.

οὐ φαίνεται.

οὐδ' ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἐν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὃν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ' ὥς ἔοικεν, τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν.

κινδυνεύει.

## Balboas

**Par:** Therefore , *is it possible* for **It** to **Participate** of **Ousia** ,  
οὖν εστιν αν μετασχοι ουσιας

in any other way other than according to any one of those ways ?

τι αλλως οπως η κατα τι τουτων ;

**Ari:** It is not possible . (εστιν ουκ .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The One** *in no way whatsoever* **Participates** of **Ousia** .  
αρα το εν ουδαμως , μετεχει ουσιας .

**Ari:** It is not likely . (ουκ εοικεν .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The One** , *in no way whatsoever* , **Is** .  
αρα το εν ουδαμως εστι .

**Ari:** It has not come to **Light** . (ου φαίνεται .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , neither **Is It** , in such a way , so as “**To Be**” **One** ,  
αρα ουδ' εστιν ουτως ωστε ειναι εν  
for **It** would already **Be** , by **Being** and by **Participating** of **Ousia** ; whereas **According**  
γαρ αν ηδη ειη ον και μετεχον ουσιας : αλλ' ως  
to **Reason** , **The One Is** neither **One** nor **Is** , if one **Must Trust** in such a **Logos** .  
εοικε το εν εστιν ουτε εν ουτε εστιν , ει δει πιστευειν τοιῳδε λογῳ .

**Ari:** I dare say so . (κινδυνεύει .)

133c οἰσίαν, οἰσίαν

135a οὐσία

141e

οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίας

140e μετέχει, μετέχει

141d μετέχει

141e μετέχει, μετάσχοι, μετέχει, μετέχον

142b μετέχειν

142c μετέχεν, μετέχει

140b οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῶς

141a οὐδαμῶς

141e οὐδαμῶς,

οὐδαμῶς

137a λόγον

141d λόγος

141e λόγῳ

142a λόγος

142e λόγον

Loeb

“Can it then partake of being in any other way than in the past, present, or future?”

“It cannot.”

“Then the one has no share in being at all.”

“Apparently not.”

“Then the one is not at all.”

“Evidently not.”

“Then it has no being even so as to be one, for if it were one, it would be and would partake of being; but apparently one neither is nor is one, if this argument is to be trusted.”

“That seems to be true.”

Thomas Taylor

Is it possible, therefore, that any thing can participate of essence, except according to some one of these?

It is not.

In no respect, therefore, does *The One* participate of essence.

It does not appear that it can.

*The One*, therefore, *is* in no respect.

So it seems.

Hence, it is not in such a manner as *to be* one, for thus it would be being, and participate of essence: but, as it appears, the one neither *is one* nor *is*, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind.

It appears so.

Morrow and Dillon

“Now, can anything participate in existence except according to one of these modes?”

“No.”

“So the One does not participate in existence in any way.”

“Evidently not.”

“So the One does not exist at all.”

“Evidently not.”

“It cannot then be even to the extent of being one, for then it would be a thing that is and participates in being; but it seems that the One neither is one nor exists at all if one is to believe such an argument as this.”

“There seems to be no way out of it.”



ὃ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἂν τι αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ;

καὶ πῶς;

οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδὲ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα.

οὐ φαίνεται.

οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γινώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ἢ δυνατόν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἐν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν;

οὐκ οἶμαι δοκεῖ.

**Par:** But , could any *non-Being Be of The Self* , of *The One* which *Is Not* ,

142A δε , αν τι μη οντι ειη αυτου , ο εστι μη ,  
or could any *non-Being Belong to This Self* ? (Not According to 137D : Pierre Grimes  
η τω τουτω αυτω ; “The Self must Be One”)

**Ari:** And how could it ? (και πως ;)

**Par:** Accordingly then , there *Is* neither *Name* , nor *Logos* , nor any *Knowledge*

αρα εστιν ουδ' ονομα ουδε λογος ουδε τις επιστημη  
nor perception , nor opinion , that can be *attributed to The Self* .  
ουδε αισθησις ουδε δοξα αυτω .

**Ari:** It has not come to *Light* . (ου φαίνεται .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , neither can *It Be* named , nor *Be* spoken of , nor *Be* opined of

αρα ουδ' ονομαζεται , ουδε λεγεται ουδε δοξάζεται  
nor *Be The Object of Knowledge* , nor do *The Real Beings have* a *perception of The Self* .  
ουδε γινώσκεται ουδε των οντων τι αισθάνεται αυτου .

**Ari:** It is not likely . (ουκ εοικεν .)

**Par:** Therefore *Is* it *Possible* that these conclusions *have* to *Be* in this way about *The One* ?

ουν δυνατον ταυθ' εχειν ουτως περι το εν ;

**Ari:** To me at least , it certainly does not appear to be in this way .

εμοιγε ουκ ον δοκει .

141c εαυτοῦ, ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ

141d αὐτῶν, αὐτήν, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ

142a αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ

142b αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

142d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

126b ὄνομα, ὄνομα

133d ὀνομάζεται

142a ὄνομα, ὀνομάζεται

147d ὀνομάτων, ὄνομα, τοῦνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομα

147e ὀνομάζει, ὄνομα, τοῦνομα

141d λόγος

141e λόγῳ

142a λόγος

142e λόγον

147b λόγῳ

134d ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμη

134e ἐπιστήμη

142a ἐπιστήμη

155d ἐπιστήμη

160d ἐπιστήμην

142a αἴσθησις

155d αἴσθησις

164b αἴσθησις

130e δόξαν, δόξας

132a δόξῃ

142a δόξα, δοξάζεται

155d δόξα

164b δόξα

140e ἐλέγομεν, ἐλέγομεν, ἐλέγομεν

141a λέγεις

142a λέγεται

142c λέγειν, λεγόμενον, λέγωμεν

142d λέγεται

134d γινώσκων, γινώσκων

134e γινώσκωμεν, γινώσκουσι

142a γινώσκεται

160d γινώσκεται, γινώσκεσθαι

128b ἥσθησαι

135c ἥσθησθαι

142a αἰσθάνεται

Loeb

“But can that which does not exist have anything pertaining or belonging to it?”

“Of course not.”

“Then the one has no name, nor is there any description or knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”

“Evidently not.”

“And it is neither named nor described nor thought of nor known, nor does any existing thing perceive it.”

“Apparently not.”

“Is it possible that all this is true about the one ?”

“I do not think so.”

Thomas Taylor

But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of, that which is not?

How can it?

Neither, therefore, does any name belong to it, nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion.

It does not appear that there can.

Hence, it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being.

So it seems.

Is it possible, therefore, that these things can thus take place about *The One*?

It does not appear to me that they can.

Morrow and Dillon [translation ends]

“And if a thing does not exist, can this non-existent have anything that either belongs to it or is of it?”

“How could it?”

“Therefore no name or description or knowledge or sensation or opinion applies to it.”

“Apparently not.”

“Therefore it is not named or spoken or judged or known, and nothing perceives it.”

“Apparently not.”

“Is it possible that all this holds true of the One?”

“I should say not.”

Oxford Greek  
2nd

βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν **ὑπόθεσιν** **πάλιν** ἐξ **ἀρχῆς** **ἐπανέλθωμεν**, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν **ἐπανιούσιν** ἀλλοῖον φανῇ;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι.

οὐκοῦν ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, φαμέν, τὰ **συμβαίνοντα** περὶ **αὐτοῦ**, ποῖά **ποτε** **τυγχάνει** ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα: οὐχ οὕτω;

ναί.

ὄρα δὴ ἐξ **ἀρχῆς**. ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα οἶόν τε **αὐτὸ** εἶναι μὲν, **οὐσίας** δὲ μὴ **μετέχειν**;

οὐχ οἶόν τε.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἢ **οὐσία** τοῦ ἐνὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ **ταὐτὸν οὐσα** τῷ ἐνί: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου **οὐσία**,

Balboas  
2nd

**Parmenides: 13** Do you wish then, that we **Return** again to The Hypothesis from **The Beginning** ,  
142B Βουλει ουν επανελθωμεν παλιν επι την υποθεσιν εξ αρχης ,  
to **See** if anything of **Another Kind** may come to **Light** for us who are **Returning** ?  
εαν τι αλλοιον φανη ημιν επανιουσιν ;

**Aristotle** : By all means then , I do so wish .

πανυ μεν ουν βουλομαι .

**Par**: Is it not the case then , that if we say “**One Is**” , then we must go through **The Same Logos**

ουκουν ει φαμεν εν εστιν , διομολογητεα

about these following conclusions about **The Self** , whatever they happen to **Be** ; or is it not so ?

περι ταυτα τα συμβαινοντα αυτου , ποια τυγχανει οντα , ουχ ουτω ;

**Ari**: Yes it is so . (Ναι .)

**Par**: **See** then , from **The Beginning** . Accordingly then , on the one hand , if **One Is** , then **Can**

ορα δη εξ αρχης . αρα μεν ει εν εστιν ,

**The Self Be** such as **It Is** , while on the other hand , **It** does not **Participate** of **Ousia** ?

αυτο ειναι οιον τε , δε μη μετεχειν ουσιας ;

**Ari**: It could not be so . (ουχ οιον τε .)

**Par**: And is it not the case then , that **The Ousia** of **The One Could Not Be The Same Being**

και ουκουν η ουσια του ενος αν ου ειη ταυτον ουσα

as **The One** ; for if **That Were Not The Ousia** of **That One** ,

τω ενι : γαρ εκεινη αν ην ου ουσια εκεινου ,

136b ὑποθέσεως

137b ὑποθέσεως

**142b ὑπόθεσιν**

142c ὑποθέσεις, ὑπόθεσιν

160b ὑπόθεσις

127d πάλιν

136a πάλιν

**142b πάλιν**

142c πάλιν

142e πάλιν

137d ἀρχῇ

**142b ἀρχῆς, ἀρχῆς**

153c ἀρχῇ

159b ἀρχῆς

**142b ἐπανέλθωμεν**

**142b ἐπανιούσιν**

136b συμβάσεται, συμβαίνοντα

137b συμβαίνειν

**142b συμβαίνοντα**

142c συμβαίνειν, συμβήσεται

143d συμβαίνει

141d αὐτόν, αὐτήν, αὐτό, αὐτή, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ

142a αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ

**142b αὐτοῦ, αὐτό**

142d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

142e αὐτόν

141d ποτέ

141e ποτέ, ποτέ

**142b ποτε**

146d ποτε

133b τέχῃ

138e τυγχάνει

**142b τυγχάνει**

145c τυγχάνει

145e τυγχάνει

135a οὐσία

141e οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίας

**142b οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία**

142c οὐσίας

142d οὐσία

141d μετέχει

141e μετέχει, μετάσχοι, μετέχει, μετέχον

**142b μετέχειν**

142c μετέχεν, μετέχει

143a μετέχεν, μετέχεν, μετέχεν

140a ταῦτόν

140b ταὐτόν

**142b ταὐτόν**

143b ταὐτόν

146a ταῖσδε

131b οὐσα

**142b οὐσα**

150a οὐσα

156e οὐσα

Loeb  
2nd

“Shall we then return to our hypothesis and see if a review of our argument discloses any new point of view?”

“By all means.”

“We say, then, that if the one exists, we must come to an agreement about the consequences, whatever they may be, do we not?”

“Yes.”

“Now consider the first point. If one is, can it be and not partake of being?”

“No, it cannot.”

“Then the being of one will exist, but will not be identical with one; for if it were identical with one, it would not be the being of one, nor would one partake of it,

Thomas Taylor  
2nd

Are you therefore willing that we should return again to the hypothesis from the beginning, and see whether or not by this means any thing shall appear to us different from what it did before?

I am entirely willing.

Have we not therefore declared if The One is, what circumstances ought to happen to it? Is it not so?

Certainly.

But consider from the beginning, if The One is, can it be possible that it should be, and yet not participate of essence?

It cannot.

Will not essence therefore be the essence of The One, but not the same with The One? for, if it were the same, it would not be the essence of The One, nor would The One participate of essence;

Jowett [translation begins]  
2nd

Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis; let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question appears.

I shall be very happy to do so.

We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is?

Yes.

Then we will begin at the beginning:-If one is, can one be, and not partake of being?

Impossible.

Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor would the one have participated in being,

## Oxford Greek

οὐδ' ἂν ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ἐν, ἐκείνης **μετεῖχεν**, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν **λέγειν** ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐν. νὺν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ **ὑπόθεσις**, εἰ ἐν ἐν, τί χρὴ **συμβαίνειν**, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἔστιν: οὐχ οὕτω;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν ὥς ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν;

ἀνάγκη.

ἄρα οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι **οὐσίας μετέχει** τὸ ἐν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ **λεγόμενον**, ἐπειδὴν τις **συλλήβδην** εἴπη ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν;

πάνυ γε.

**πάλιν** δὲ **λέγωμεν**, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, τί **συμβήσεται**. σκόπει οὖν εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν **ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον** ὃν τὸ ἐν σημαίνειν, οἷον **μέρη** ἔχειν;

πῶς;

## Balboas

then neither **Could This One**  
οὐδ' ἂν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν

**Participate** of **That**, for then to say **One** “Is” would also be like saying “**One One**”,

142c μετεχειν εκεινης, ἀλλ' λεγειν εν ειναι αν τε και ην ομοιον εν εν .

Whereas our **Present** Hypothesis is **not This (First) One**; that is; “What **Must** “Be” the result

δε νυν η υποθεσις εστιν ουχ αυτη, τι χρη συμβαινειν

if **One One**?” but “What **Must Be** the result, if **One Is**”. Is it not so?

ει εν εν, ἀλλ' ει εν εστιν, ουχ ουτω?

**Ari**: It certainly is so. (πανυ μεν ουν .)

**Par**: Is it not the case then, that **That** which **Is**, signifies **Something Different** than **The One**?  
ουκουν ως το εστι σημαινον τι αλλο του εν;

**Ari**: Necessarily. (αναγκη .)

**Par**: Take notice then, that whenever anyone says that **One Is**, that another way

αρα ουν οτι επειδαν τις ειπη οτι εν εστιν, αλλο η

to say this **concisely**, would be; “**The One Participates** of **Ousia**”.

το λεγομενον τουτ' συλληβδην αν ειη το εν μετεχει ουσιας .

**Ari**: By all means indeed, (πανυ γε .)

**Par**: Surely then, let us say again, what will happen “If **One Is**”. Consider then,

δη λεγωμεν παλιν τι συμβησεται, ει εν εστι. σκοπει ουν

if it is not **Necessarily** the case, that This Hypothesis signifies **The One Being**,

ει ουκ αναγκη ταυτην την υποθεσιν σημαινειν το εν ον

in such a way, as to **Possess/Contain Parts/Members**

τοιουτον οιον εχειν μερη ;

**Ari**: How? (πως ;)

141e μετέχει, μετάσχει, μετέχει, μετέχον

142b μετέχειν

**142c μετεῖχεν, μετέχει**

143a μετέχειν, μετέχειν, μετέχειν

143b μετέσχεν

140a ὅμοιον

140b ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον

**142c ὅμοιον**

147c ὁμοίον, ὁμοίως

148a ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον

141a λέγεις

142a λέγεται

**142c λέγειν, λεγόμενον, λέγωμεν**

142d λέγεται

143c λέγω

137b ὑπόθεσις

142b ὑπόθεσιν

**142c ὑπόθεσις, ὑπόθεσιν**

160b ὑπόθεσις

161b ὑπόθεσις

137b συμβαίνειν

142b συμβαίνοντα

**142c συμβαίνειν, συμβήσεται**

143d συμβαίνει

149b συμβαίνει

141e οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίας

142b οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία

**142c οὐσίας**

142d οὐσία

143a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

**142c συλλήβδην**

166c συλλήβδην

136a πάλιν

142b πάλιν

**142c πάλιν**

142c πάλιν

154d πάλιν

141a τοιοῦτον, τοιοῦτον

141d τοιούτου, τοιούτων

**142c τοιοῦτον**

145b τοιοῦτον

148c τοιοῦτον

138e μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

140d μερῶν

**142c μέρη**

144b μέρη

144c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

Loeb

but the statement that one is would be equivalent to the statement that one is one but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is. Do you agree?"

"Certainly."

"In the belief that one and being differ in meaning?"

"Most assuredly."

"Then if we say concisely 'one is,' it is equivalent to saying that one partakes of being?"

"Certainly."

"Let us again say what will follow if one is and consider whether this hypothesis must not necessarily show that one is of such a nature as to have parts."

"How does that come about?"

Thomas Taylor

but it would be all one to say The One is, and one one. But now our hypothesis is not if one, what ought to happen, but if The One is - Is it not so?

Entirely so.

Does it not signify that the term is is something different from The One?

Necessarily.

If, therefore, any one should summarily assert that *The One is*, this would no other one than that which participates of essence.

Certainly.

Again, therefore, let us say, if *The One is*, what will happen. Consider then whether it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify such a *one* as possesses parts?

How?

Jowett

for the proposition that one is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one; but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is:-am I not right?

Quite right.

We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?

Of course.

And when we put them together shortly, and say "One is," that is equivalent to saying, "partakes of being"?

Quite true.

Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?

How so?

## Oxford Greek

ὥδε: εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος **λέγεται** καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ **αὐτό** ἢ τε **οὐσία** καὶ τὸ ἐν, τοῦ **αὐτοῦ** δὲ ἐκείνου οὐ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν **ὅλον** ἐν ὄν εἶναι **αὐτό**, τούτου δὲ **γίγνεσθαι** μόρια τὸ τε ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι;

ἀνάγκη.

πότερον οὖν ἐκάτερον τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον **μόνον** προσερούμεν, ἢ τοῦ **ὅλου** μόριον τὸ γε μόριον προσρητέον;

τοῦ **ὅλου**.

καὶ **ὅλον** ἄρα ἐστί, ὃ ἂν ἐν ᾗ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει.

πάνυ γε.

## Balboas

**Par:** In the following way . If **That** which **Is** , is said to **Belong** to **The One Being** ,  
 142D ὥδε : εἰ το ἐστι λέγεται του ἐνος ὄντος  
 it will also mean that , **The One Belongs** to **The Being** of **The One** . Whereas , it is **not** the case  
 καὶ το ἐν του ὄντος ἐνος , δε ἐστι ου  
 that both **The Ousia** and **The One Are The Self** , since both **Belong** to **That Self** which  
 τε η ουσια καὶ το ἐν το αυτο , δε του ἐκεῖνου αὐτου ου  
 we hypothesized ; such as **The One Being** . Accordingly then , on the one hand , **Must** not  
 ὑπεθεμεθα , του ἐνος ὄντος , ἀρα μεν οὐκ  
**The One Being** , **Necessarily Be The Whole Self** , whereas on the other hand ,  
 ἐν ὄν ἀνάγκη εἶναι το ὅλον αυτο δε  
**The One** and **That** which **Is Have Come into Being** as **Parts** of **This Whole** (ET 116 , 152) ?  
 το ἐν τε καὶ το εἶναι γίγνεσθαι μορια τουτου ;

**Ari:** Necessarily . (ἀνάγκη .)

**Par:** Then shall we call **Each** of **These Parts** , simply a **piece** , or **Must The Part**  
 οὐν ποτερον προσερούμεν ἐκατερον τουτων των μορίων μονον μοριον , η μοριον  
 be called , at the very least , a **Member/Part** of **The Whole** ?  
 προσρητεον το γε μοριον του ὅλου ;

**Ari:** Of The Whole . (του ὅλου .)

**“Snatch All The Wine-Members , and Lead Them to Me !”** -Orpheus-

**Par:** And since **It Is One** which **Is** also a **Whole** , **It** will **Contain** a **Part** .

142D-9 καὶ ἀρα ἐστὶν ἐν , ο η καὶ ὅλον ἂν ἔχει μοριον .

**Ari:** By all means indeed . (πάνυ γε .)

142a λέγεται  
 142c λέγειν, λεγόμενον, λέγωμεν  
**142d λέγεται**  
 143c λέγω  
 144d ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες

142a αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶ, αὐτοῦ  
 142b αὐτοῦ, αὐτό  
**142d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό**  
 142e αὐτὸν  
 143a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

142b οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία  
 142c οὐσίας  
**142d οὐσία**  
 143a οὐσίας, οὐσίας  
 143b οὐσίαν, οὐσία, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία, οὐσία, οὐσία

138b ὅλον  
 138c ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον  
**142d ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλον**  
 144d ὅλον, ὅλον  
 144e ὅλοο

141d γίγνεσθαι, γέγονε, ἐγίνετο, γεγονότος  
 141c γενήσεται, γενηθήσεται, γίνεταί, γέγονεν, ἐγίνετο, γέγονεν, γίνεταί  
**142d γίγνεσθαι**  
 142e γίγνεται, γένηται  
 143a γιγνόμενον

138e μόνον  
 139c μόνω  
**142d μόνον**  
 143a μόνον, μόνον  
 144e μόνον

Loeb

“In this way: If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our hypothesis, must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts?”

“Inevitably.”

“And shall we call each of these parts merely a part, or must it, in so far as it is a part, be called a part of the whole?”

“A part of the whole.”

“Whatever one, then, exists is a whole and has a part.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Thus. If the term it is is spoken of one being, and The One, of being which is one, and essence is not the same with The One, but each belongs to that same one being which we have supposed, is it not necessary that the whole of it should be one being, but that its parts should be The One and to be?

It is necessary.

Whether, therefore, should we call each of these parts a part along, or a part of the whole?

Each should be called a part of the whole.

That which *is one*, therefore, is a whole, and possesses a part.

Entirely so.

Jowett

In this way:-If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the same; and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?

Certainly.

And is each of these parts-one and being to be simply called a part, or must the word "part" be relative to the word "whole"?

The latter.

Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?

Certainly.



## Oxford Greek

τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἄρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου;

οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

**πάλιν** ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τό τε ἓν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ **γίνεται** τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ **δυοῖν** αὐ μορίων τὸ μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν **αὐτὸν λόγον** οὕτως αἰεῖ, ὅτιπερ ἂν μόριον **γένηται**, τούτω τῷ μορίῳ αἰεῖ ἴσχει: τό τε γὰρ ἓν τὸ ὄν αἰεῖ ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν τὸ ἓν:

## Balboas

**Par:** What then ? **Can** each of **These Parts** of **The One Being** ; both **The One**

τι ουν ; αρα εκατερον τουτων των μοριων του ενος οντος , τε το εν and **The Being** abandon each other , so that neither **The One** be a **Part** of **The Being** , nor 142E και το ον απολειπεσθον , η το εν ειναι μοριου του η

**The Being** be a **Part** of **The One** ?

το ον μοριου του ενος ;

**Ari:** That could not be . (ουκ αν ειη .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , once again , **Each** of **These Members** , **Maintains/Has** both **The One**

αρα παλιν και εκατερον των μοριων ισχει(ισχω) τε το εν and **The Being** so that the least (mud,hair,dirt) part in turn becomes a part composed of **The Two** , και το ον και το ελαχιστον το μοριον αυ γιγνεται μοριοι εκ δυοιν , and **The Self/Same Logos Is Always According to This Way** , so that whenever και τον αυτον λογον αει κατα ουτως , οτιπερ αν a Part comes to Be , This Relationship Is Always Maintained with **The Part** : For it Is Always γενηται τουτω αει ισχει τω μοριω : γαρ αει the case that both , **The One** will **Maintain/Keep The Being** and **The Being Keep The One** . τε το εν ισχει το ον και το ον το εν :

142b πάλιν

142c πάλιν

**142e πάλιν**

154d πάλιν

159b πάλιν

141e γενήσεται, γενηθήσεται, γίνεταί, γέγονεν, ἐγένετο, γέγονεν, γίνεταί

142d γίνεσθαι

**142e γίγνεται, γένηται**

143a γιγνόμενον

143d γίγνεται

129a δυοῖν

138b δύο

**142e δυοῖν**

143a δύο

143d δύο, δύο, δύο

142b αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

142d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

**142e αὐτόν**

143a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

143b αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

141e λόγῳ

142a λόγος

**142e λόγον**

147b λόγου

148c λόγον

Loeb

“Well then, can either of these two parts of existent one—unity and being—abandon the other? Can unity cease to be a part of being or being to be a part of unity?”

“No.”

“And again each of the parts possesses unity and being, and the smallest of parts is composed of these two parts, and thus by the same argument any part whatsoever has always these two parts; for always unity has being and being has unity;

Thomas Taylor

What then? Can each of these parts of one being, viz. *The One* and *being*, desert each other, so that *The One* shall not be a part of *being*, or *being* shall not be a part of *The One*?

It cannot be.

Again, therefore, each of the parts will contain both *one* and *being*, and each part will at least be composed from two parts; and, on the same account, whatever part takes place will always possess these two parts: for *The One* will always contain *being*, and *being The One*;

Jowett

Again, of the parts of the one, if it is—I mean being and one—does either fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or being to the one?

Impossible.

Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and is at the least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on for ever, and every part whatever has always these two parts; for being always involves one, and one being;

## Oxford Greek

ὥστε ἀνάγκη **δύ'** αἰ **γινόμενον** μηδέποτε ἓν εἶναι.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν **ἄπειρον** ἂν τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω τὸ ἓν ὄν εἴη;

ἔοικεν.

ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι.

πῇ;

## Balboas

So that it is **Necessary** that **The Two Members Always Come to Be** , but **Never only one** .

143A ὥστε εἶναι ἀνάγκη                      δυ                      αἰ γιγνομενον μηδεποτε    εν .

**Ari:** By all means , it is so ! (πανταπασι μεν ουν .)

(**The 3<sup>rd</sup> Intelligible Triad** , 1248 (P12) **Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8**)

**Par:** Is it not the case then , that **in This Way The One Being** will be **Unlimited Multitude** ?

143A-3    ουκουν                      ουτω            το εν ον    αν ειη το απειρον πληθος ;

**Ari:** It is likely . (εοικεν .)

**Par:** Surely then , let us proceed again in the following way , even further .

**143A-5**    δη                      Ιθι                      και                      τηδε                      ετι .

**Ari:** In what way ? (πη ;)

138b δύο

142c δυοῖν

**143a δύο**

143d δύο, δύο, δύο

143e δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο

142d γίνεσθαι

142e γίγνεται, γένηται

**143a γινόμενον**

143d γίγνεται

144a γίγνεται

132a ἄπειρα

137d ἄπειρον, ἄπειρον

**143a ἄπειρον**

144a ἄπειρον, ἄπειρος

144e ἄπειρα

Loeb

and, therefore, since it is always becoming two, it can never be one.”

“Certainly.”

“Then it results that the existent one would be infinite in number?”

“Apparently.”

“Let us make another fresh start.”

“In what direction?”

Thomas Taylor

so that two things will always be produced, and no part will ever be *one*.

Entirely so.

Will not, therefore, *one being* thus become an infinite multitude?

So it seems.

But proceed, and still further consider this.

What?

Jowett

so that one is always disappearing, and becoming two.

Certainly.

And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?

Clearly.

Let us take another direction.

What direction?

**οὐσίας** φαμέν **μετέχειν** τὸ ἓν, διὸ ἔστιν;

ναί.

καὶ διὰ ταῦτα διὴ τὸ ἐν ὃν **πολλὰ** ἐφάνη.

οὕτω.

τί δέ; **αὐτὸ** τὸ ἓν, ὃ δὴ φαμέν **οὐσίας μετέχειν**, ἐὰν **αὐτὸ** τῇ **διανοίᾳ μόνον** καθ' **αὐτὸ** **λάβωμεν** ἄνευ τούτου οὐ φαμέν **μετέχειν**, ἀρὰ γε ἐν **μόνον** φανήσεται ἢ καὶ **πολλὰ** τὸ **αὐτὸ** τοῦτο;

ἔν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

**Par:** We say that **The One Participates** of **Ousia** , on which account , **One Is** ?  
φαμέν το εν μετεχειν ουσιας , διο εστιν ;

**Ari:** Yes . (ναί.)

**Par:** And because of this , it was indeed brought to **Light** that **The One Being** is **Many** .  
και δια ταυτα δη εφανη το εν ον πολλα .

**Ari:** It is so . (ουτως .)

**Par:** What next ? What of **The One Self** , which we surely say **Participates** of **Ousia** .  
τι δε ; το εν αυτο , ο δη φαμεν μετεχειν ουσιας ,  
What if we grasp *Self According to Self* by **The Understanding** , **Alone** , **Without This Ousia** ,  
εαν λαβωμεν αυτο καθ' αυτο τη διανοια μονον ανευ τουτου  
of **Which** we say **It Participates** , would **One Alone** , indeed come to **Light** ,  
ου φαμεν μετεχειν , αρα εν μονον γε φανησεται  
or is **This Self** also **Many** ?  
η τουτο το αυτο και πολλα ;

**Ari:** One , at least , I think . (εν εγωγε οιμαι)

142c οὐσίας  
142d οὐσία  
**143a οὐσίας, οὐσίας**  
143b οὐσίαν, οὐσία, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία  
143c οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν, οὐσία, οὐσία

142b μετέχεν  
142c μετείχεν, μετέχει  
**143a μετέχειν, μετέχειν, μετέχειν**  
143b μετέγεν  
144a μετέχων, μετέχει, μετέχοι

139d πολλοίς, πολλά  
140d πολλῶν  
**143a πολλά, πολλά**  
143e πολλή  
144a πολλά

142d αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό  
142e αὐτόν  
**143a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό**  
143b αὐτοῦ, αὐτό  
143c αὐτόν, αὐτοῖν

135b διάνοιαν  
**143a διανοία**  
158c διανοία  
163a διανοία  
139c μόνον  
142d μόνον  
**143a μόνον, μόνον**  
144e μόνον  
149c μόνον  
129e λαμβανομένοις  
135e λάβοι  
**143a λάβωμεν**  
152c ληφθείη  
154d λαμβάνον

Loeb

“We say that the one partakes of being, because it is?”

“Yes.”

“And for that reason the one, because it is, was found to be many.”

“Yes.”

“Well then, will the one, which we say partakes of being, if we form a mental conception of it alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, be found to be only one, or many?”

“One, I should say.”

Thomas Taylor

We have said that the one participates of essence, so far as it is being.

We have said so.

And on this account one being appears to be many.

It does so.

But what then? If we receive dianoëetically that one which we said participates of essence, and apprehend it alone by itself without that which we have said it participates, will it appear to be one alone? Or will this also be many?

I think it will be one.

Jowett

We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?

Yes.

And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many?

True.

But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of being, and try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it partakes—will this abstract one be one only or many?

One, I think.

ἴδωμεν δὴ: ἄλλο τι **ἕτερον** μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν **οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ** εἶναι, **ἕτερον** δὲ **αὐτό**, εἴπερ μὴ **οὐσία** τὸ ἓν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἓν **οὐσίας μετέσχευ**.

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν εἰ **ἕτερον** μὲν ἢ **οὐσία**, **ἕτερον** δὲ τὸ ἓν, οὔτε τῷ ἓν τὸ ἓν τῆς **οὐσίας ἕτερον** οὔτε τῷ **οὐσία** εἶναι ἢ **οὐσία** τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄλλο,

ἀλλὰ τῷ **ἐτέρῳ** τε καὶ ἄλλῳ **ἕτερα** ἀλλήλων.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ὥστε οὐ **ταυτόν** ἐστὶν οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἕτερον.

πῶς γάρ;

Balboas

**Par:** Let us **See** then . On the one hand , must not **The Ousia** of **The Self Be/Exist**

**143B** ἴδωμεν δὴ : μὲν ἀνάγκη μὴ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι

**In-One-Certain-Way** , whereas on the other hand , **The Self Is Different** , if indeed

τι ἄλλο δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕτερον , εἴπερ

**The One Is Not The Ousia** , but is **Seen** as **Being One** , by **Participating** of **The Ousia** .

το ἐν μὴ οὐσία , ἀλλ' ὥς ἐν μετέσχευ οὐσίας .

**Ari:** Necessarily .(ἀνάγκη .)

**Par:** Is it not the case then , that if on the one hand , **The Ousia Is Different** ,

οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἡ οὐσία ἕτερον ,

while on the other hand , **The One Is Different** ; then in that case ,

δὲ το ἐν ἕτερον ,

it is neither by **The One** of **The Ousia** that **The One Is Different** ,

οὔτε τῷ ἐν τῆς οὐσίας το ἐν ἕτερον

nor by **The Ousia** of **The One** that **Is** , that **The Ousia** is **Other** ,

οὔτε τῷ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶναι ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ ,

but by **That** which is **Different** and also **Other** , that **They** are **Different** from **Each Other** .

ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων .

**Ari:** By all means so . (πάνυ μὲν οὖν .)

**Par:** So that **That** which **Is Different Is** not **The Same** with either **The One** nor **The Ousia** .

ὥστε το ἕτερον ἐστὶν οὐ ταυτόν οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ .

**Ari:** How is this the case ? (πῶς γὰρ ;)

140d ἐτέρου

141b ἕτερον, ἐτέρου

**143b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερα**

143c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, καὶ ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

145d ἐτέρῳ

142d οὐσία

143a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

**143b οὐσίαν, οὐσία, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία**

143c οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν, οὐσία, οὐσία

144a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

142e αὐτόν

143a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

**143b αὐτοῦ, αὐτό**

143c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖν

143d αὐτῷ, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῶν

142c μετέσχευ, μετέχει

143a μετέχειν, μετέχειν, μετέχειν

**143b μετέσχευ**

144a μετέχων, μετέχει, μετέχον

145b μετέχον, μετέχον

140b ταυτόν

142b ταυτόν

**143b ταυτόν**

146a ταὐτῷ

146b ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν

## Loeb

“Just let us see; must not the being of one be one thing and one itself another, if the one is not being, but, considered as one, partakes of being?”

“Yes, that must be so.”

“Then if being is one thing and one is another, one is not other than being because it is one, nor is being other than one because it is being,

but they differ from each other by virtue of being other and different.”

“Certainly.”

“Therefore the other is neither the same as one nor as being.”

“Certainly not.”

## Thomas Taylor

But let us consider another certain circumstance. It is necessary that its essence should be one thing, and itself another thing, if *The One* does not participate of essence; but as essence it participates of *The One*.

It is necessary.

If, therefore, *essence* is one thing, and *The One* another thing, neither is *The One*, so far as *The One*, difference from *essence*, nor *essence*, so far as *essence*, different from *The One*;

but they are different from each other through that which is *different* and *another*.

Entirely so.

So that *different* is neither the same with *The One* nor with *essence*.

How can it?

## Jowett

Let us see:-Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one is not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?

Certainly.

If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one is one that it is other than being; nor because being is being that it is other than the one; but they differ from one another in virtue of otherness and difference.

Certainly.

So that the other is not the same either with the one or with being?

Certainly not.



## Oxford Greek

τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα **αὐτῶν** εἴτε βούλει τὴν **οὐσίαν** καὶ τὸ **ἕτερον** εἴτε τὴν **οὐσίαν** καὶ τὸ ἐν εἴτε τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ **ἕτερον**, ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν ἐκάστη τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθ' **τινε** ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω;

πῶς;

ὥδε: ἔστιν **οὐσίαν** εἰπεῖν;

ἔστιν.

καὶ αὐθις εἰπεῖν ἔν;

καὶ τοῦτο.

## Balboas

**Par:** How then you ask ? If you wish that we make a **Selection** of **Selves** ; such as either

143C Τι ουν ; εαν βουλει προελωμεθα αυτων ειτε

**The Self** of **The Ousia** and **The Different** , or , of **The Ousia** and **The One** , or

την ουσιαν και το ετερον ειτε την ουσιαν και το εν ειτε

of **The One** and **The Different** , accordingly then , is it not the case , that in either way that

ειτε το εν και το ετερον , αρ' ουκ εν τη εκαστη

we may choose , we are choosing a certain **Duality** , which can **Correctly** be called , **Both** ?

προαιρεσει προαιρουμεθα τινε (dual) ω εχει ορθως καλεισθαι αμφοτερω ;

**Ari:** How ? (πως ;)

**Par:** In the following way . Is it possible to say **Ousia** ? (ωδε : εστιν ειπειν ουσιαν ;)

**Ari:** It is . (εστιν .)

**Par:** And in turn , is it possible to say **One** ? (και αυθις ειπειν εν ;)

**Ari:** This also . (τουτο και .)

143a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

143b αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

**143c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ**

143d αὐτῶ, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῶν

144a αὐτῆς

143a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

143b οὐσίαν, οὐσία, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία

**143c οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν, οὐσία, οὐσία**

144a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

144b οὐσία, οὐσία

141b ἕτερον, ἑτέρου

143b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἑτέρω, ἕτερα

**143c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν**

145d ἑτέρω

145e ἑτέρω

141a τινός

141d τινι

**143c τινε**

144a τινά

145b τινος, τινος

Loeb

“Well, then, if we make a selection among them, whether we select being and the other, or being and one, or one and the other, in each instance we select two things which may properly be called both?”

“What do you mean?”

“I will explain. We can speak of being?”

“Yes.”

“And we can also speak of one?”

“Yes, that too.”

Thomas Taylor

What, then, if we should select from them, whether if you will *essence* and *different*, or *essence* and *The One*, or *The One* and *different*, should we not, in each assumption, select certain things which might very properly be denominated both these?

How do you mean?

After this manner: Is there not that which we call *essence*?

There is.

And again, that which we denominate *The One*?

And this also.

Jowett

And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and the one, or the one and the other, in every such case we take two things, which may be rightly called both.

How so.

In this way—you may speak of being?

Yes.

And also of one?

Yes.

## Oxford Greek

ἄρ' οὐδὲν οὐχ ἑκάτερον **αὐτοῖν** εἴρηται;

ναί.

τί δ' ὅταν εἴπω **οὐσία** τε καὶ ἓν, ἄρα οὐκ ἀμφοτέρω;

πάνυ γε.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν **οὐσία** τε καὶ **ἕτερον** ἢ **ἕτερόν** τε καὶ ἓν, καὶ οὕτω πανταχῶς ἐφ' ἑκάστου ἄμφω **λέγω**;

ναί.

## Balboas

**Par:** Take notice then , have we not spoken of **Each One** of **The Two Selves** ?

αρ' ουν ουχ ειρηται εκατερον [dual] αυτοιν ;

**Ari:** Yes . ( ναι . )

**Par:** What about when I say **Ousia** and **One** , have I not accordingly mentioned **Both** ?

τι δ' οταν ειπω ουσια τε και εν , ουκ αρα αμφοτερω ;

**Ari:** By all means indeed . ( πανυ γε . )

**Par:** Is it not the case then , that if there is **Both Ousia** and **Different** , or **Both**

ουκουν εαν και ουσια τε και ετερον η τε

**Different** and **One** , then in this way , I speak of **Each Pair** , in every way , as **Both** ?

ετερον και εν , και ουτω λεγω εφ' εκαστου πανταχως αμφω ;

**Ari:** Yes . ( ναι . )

143a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

143b αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

**143c** αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖν

143d αὐτῶ, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῶν

144a αὐτῆς

143a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

143b οὐσίαν, οὐσία, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία

**143c** οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν, οὐσία, οὐσία

144a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

144b οὐσία, οὐσία

141b ἕτερον, ἑτέρου

143b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἑτέρω, ἕτερα

**143c** ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

145d ἑτέρω

145c ἑτέρω

142c λέγειν, λεγόμενον, λέγομεν

142d λέγεται

**143c** λέγω

144d ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες

147c λέγεις

Loeb

“Then have we not spoken of each of them?”

“Yes.”

“And when I speak of being and one, do I not speak of both?”

“Certainly.”

“And also when I speak of being and other, or other and one, in every case I speak of each pair as both?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

Is not, therefore, each of them denominated?

Each.

But what, when I say essence and The One, do I not pronounce both these?

Entirely so.

And if I should say essence and different, or different and The One, should I not perfectly, in each of these, pronounce both.

Certainly.

Jowett

Then now we have spoken of either of them?

Yes.

Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?

Certainly.

And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other-in any such case do I not speak of both?

Yes.

## Oxford Greek

ὦ δ' ἂν ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἄρα οἶόν τε ἄμφω μὲν **αὐτῶ** εἶναι, **δύο** δὲ μή;  
οὐχ οἶόν τε.

ὦ δ' ἂν **δύο** ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἐκότερον **αὐτοῖν** ἔν εἶναι;  
οὐδεμία.

## Balboas

**Par:** If **Both** of which have been **Named Correctly** ; then on the one hand , can it  
143D αν αμφω ω προσαγορευησθον ορθως , δ' μεν αρα  
possibly be the case , for **The Self** to be **Both** , and on the other hand , not be **Two** ?  
οιον τε αυτω ειναι αμφω , δε μη δυο ;

**Ari:** It cannot exist in such a way . (ουχ οιον τε .)

**Par:** Concerning which then , if **Two** should exist [ητον-subj.dual for εἰμι] , then could **Each**  
ω δ' δυο αν ητον , μη εκα-  
**One** of **The Two Selves Exist** by some (**Divine**) **Resource/Efficacy/Design** and not be **One** ?  
-τερον αυτοιν εστι τις μηχανη ουχ ειναι εν ;

## [The Metaphysical Creative Process

that **First Produces The Multiplying Power** of **Number**. Pierre Grimes]

[[The LS Lexicon shows that **Herodotus** used **This** word to bring to Light **The Arts** of **Zeus**]]

**Ari:** Not in any way ! (ουδεμια .)

143b αὐτοῖ, αὐτό

143c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖν

**143d αὐτῶ, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῶν**

144a αὐτῆς

144c αὐτῆς, αὐτῶν, αὐτό

142e δυοῖν

143a δύο

**143d δύο, δύο, δύο**

143e δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο

144c δύο

Loeb

“If things are correctly called both, can they be both without being two?”

“They cannot.”

“And if things are two, must not each of them be one?”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But can those things which are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two?

They cannot.

And can any reason be assigned why of two things each of them should not be one?

There cannot.

Jowett

And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?

Undoubtedly.

And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?

It cannot.

## Oxford Greek

τούτων ἄρα ἐπείπερ σύνδυο ἕκαστα **συμβαίνει** εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἅν εἴη ἕκαστον.

φαίνεται.

εἰ δὲ ἐν ἕκαστον **αὐτῶν** ἐστι, **συντεθέντος** ἐνὸς **ὁποιοῦν** ἡτινιοῦν **συζυγία** οὐ **τρία** **γίνεται** τὰ πάντα;

ναί.

**τρία** δὲ οὐ **περιττὰ** καὶ **δύο ἄρτια**;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

## Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly then , seeing that **Each** of **These Pairs** turns-out to be a **Couple** ,  
 ἀρα ἐπείπερ ἕκαστα τούτων συμβαίνει εἶναι σύνδυο ,  
 so that **Each Pair** would also be **One Couple** . (ἐκαστον ἀν καὶ εἴη ἐν .)

**Ari:** It has so come to **Light** . (φαίνεται .)

**Par:** But if **Each** of **The Selves** , **Is One** , by **Adding-together** [from συντιθημι] whatsoever  
 δε εἰ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστι ἐν , συντεθέντος ὁποιοῦν  
**Yoked-Pair** (**Phaedo 71c**) to any **One** , would not **All The Yoked-Pairs Become Three** ?  
 συζυγία ἡτινιοῦν ἐνός οὐ τὰ πάντα γίνεται τρία ;

**Ari:** Yes . (ναί.) **(End of 1<sup>st</sup> Intellectual Triad)**

1

**Par:** But is not **Three** an **Odd Number** and **Two** an **Even Number** ?  
 δε οὐ τρία περιττὰ καὶ δύο ἀρτια ;

2

**Ari:** How could they not be ; (πῶς δ' οὐ ;)

142b συμβαίνοντα  
 142c συμβαίνειν, συμβήσεται  
**143d συμβαίνει**  
 149b συμβαίνει  
 158d συμβαίνει

143b αὐτοῦ, αὐτό  
 143c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖν  
**143d αὐτῶ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν**  
 144a αὐτῆς  
 144c αὐτῆς, αὐτῶν, αὐτό

**143d συντεθέντος**

**143d ὁποιοῦν**

**143d συζυγία**

**143d τρία, τρία**

143c τριῶν, τρία, τριῶν, τρία, τριῶν, τρία  
 145a τριῶν

142c γίγνεται, γένηται  
 143a γιγνόμενον

**143d γίγνεται**

144a γίγνεται  
 144c γένοτο

142e δεοῖν

143a δό

**143d δό, δό, δύο**

143e δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο  
 144e δύο

**143d περιττὰ**

144a περιττὰ, περιττὰ  
 164e περιττὰ

**143d ἄρτια**

144a ἄρτιά, ἄρτια  
 160b ἀρτίος

Loeb

“Then since the units of these pairs are together two, each must be individually one.”

“That is clear.”

“But if each of them is one, by the addition of any sort of one to any pair whatsoever the total becomes three?”

“Yes.”

“And three is an odd number, and two is even?”

“Of course.”

Thomas Taylor

As, therefore, these two subsist together, each of them will be one.

It appears so.

But if each of them is one, and *The One* is placed together with them by any kind of conjunction, will not all of them become three?

Certainly.

But are not three *odd*, and two *even*?

How should they not?

Jowett

Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one?

Clearly.

And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three?

Yes.

And three are odd, and two are even?

Of course.



τί δέ; **δυοῖν** ὄντοι οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ **δῖς**, καὶ **τριῶν** ὄντων **τρίς**, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ τε **δύο** τὸ **δῖς** ἔν καὶ τῷ **τρία** τὸ **τρίς** ἔν;

ἀνάγκη.

**δυοῖν** δὲ ὄντοι καὶ **δῖς** οὐκ ἀνάγκη **δύο δῖς** εἶναι;

καὶ **τριῶν** καὶ **τρίς** οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὖ **τρία τρίς** εἶναι;

πῶς δ' οὖ;

τί δέ; **τριῶν** ὄντων καὶ **δῖς** ὄντων καὶ **δυοῖν** ὄντοι καὶ **τρίς** ὄντοι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε **τρία δῖς** εἶναι καὶ **δύο τρίς**;

**πολλή** γε.

**Par:** What next then ? By **Being Two** , (**Beginning** of **2<sup>nd</sup> Intellectual Triad**)

143E τι δε ; οντοι δυοιν

is it not **Necessary** , that **Twice** , also **Exists** ,

ουκ αναγκη δις και ειναι

and by **Being Three** , **Thrice** , if indeed **Two** , **First-Arises** from **Twice The One**

και οντων τριων τρις ειπερ τω δυο υπαρχει τε δις το εν

and **Three** , **First-Arises** from **Thrice The One** ?

και τω τρια τρις το εν ;

**Ari:** Necessarily . (αναγκη.)

**Par:** Then , by **Being Two** and **Twice** , is it not also **Necessary** that **Twice-Two Exist** ?

δε οντοι δυοιν και δις ουκ αναγκη δις δυο ειναι ;

and in turn by **Being Three** and **Thrice** , is it not **Necessary** that **Thrice-Three** also **Exist** ?

και αυ τριων και τρις ουκ αναγκη τρις τρια ειναι ;

**Ari:** How could they not ? (πως δ' ου ;)

**Par:** What next then ? By **Being Three** and **Twice** and by **Being Two** and **Thrice** ,

τι δε ; οντων τριων και οντων δις και οντοι δυοιν και οντοι τρις ;

is it not **Necessary** , that **Twice-Three** and **Thrice-Two Exist** ;

ουκ αναγκη δις τρια τε και τρις δυο ειναι ;

**Ari:** It is altogether so indeed . (πολλή γε .)

143a δὲ

143d δύο, δύο, δύο

**143e** δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο

144e δύο

149a δύο, δυοῖν, δύο, δύο

**143e** δῖς, δις, δις, δις, δις, δις

147e δις

143d τρία, τρία

**143e** τριῶν, τρία, τριῶν, τρία, τριῶν, τρία

145a τριῶν

149b τρία

**143e** τρίς, τρίς, τρίς, τρίς, τρίς, τρίς

140d πολλῶν

143a πολλά, πολλά

**143e** πολλή

144a πολλά

144b πολλά

Loeb

“Well, when there are two units, must there not also be twice, and when there are three, thrice, that is, if two is twice one and three is thrice one?”

“There must.”

“But if there are two and twice, must there not also be twice two? And again, if there are three and thrice, must there not be thrice three?”

“Of course.”

“Well then, if there are three and twice and two and thrice, must there not also be twice three and thrice two?”

“Inevitably.”

Thomas Taylor

But what then? Being two, is it not necessary that twice should be present? And being three, thrice; since twice one subsists in two, and thrice one in three?

It is necessary.

But if there are two and twice, is it not necessary that there should be twice two? And if there are three and thrice, then there should be thrice three?

How should it not?

But what, if there are three and twice, and two and thrice, is it not necessary that there should be thrice two and twice three?

Entirely so.

Jowett

And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three?

Certainly.

There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three?

Of course.

If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are two and thrice, there is thrice two?

Undoubtedly.

## Oxford Greek

**ἄρτιά** τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκις ἂν εἴη καὶ **περιττὰ** περιττάκις καὶ **ἄρτια** περιττάκις καὶ **περιττὰ** ἀρτιάκις.

ἔστιν οὕτω.

εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἶει **τινὰ** ἀριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι;

**οὐδαμῶς** γε.

εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἓν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι.

ἀνάγκη.

## Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly then , there would also **Exist Even-Times Even** and **Odd-Times Odd**

144A ἀρα ἀν τε εἰη ἀρτιακις ἀρτια καὶ περιττακις περιττα  
and **Odd-Times Even** and **Even-Times Odd** . (**End of 2<sup>nd</sup> Intellectual Triad**)  
καὶ περιττακις ἀρτια καὶ ἀρτιακις περιττα .

**Ari:** It is so . (ἐστὶν αὐτῷ .) (Beginning of The 3<sup>rd</sup> Intellectual Triad)

**Par:** If then , These Aspects **have to Be** in this way , can you think of some **Number**

εἰ οὖν ταῦτα ἐξεῖ οὕτως , οἶει τίνα ἀριθμὸν  
that has been left out , which does not **Necessarily Exist** ? (**Beginning of 3<sup>rd</sup> Intellectual Triad**)  
υπολείπεσθαι , ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι ;

**Ari:** Not in any way indeed .(οὐδαμῶς γε .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , if **One Is** , then also , **Number** has to **Necessarily Exist** .  
ἀρα εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν , καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι .

**Ari:** Necessarily . (ἀνάγκη .)

143d ἄρτια

**144a ἄρτιά, ἄρτια**

160b ἀρτίου

164e ἄρτια

143d περιττὰ

**144a περιττὰ, περιττὰ**

164e περιττὰ

141d τιν

143c τινε

**144a τινὰ**

145b τινος, τινος

145d τινί, τινι, τοῖ, τοῖ

141a οὐδαμῶς

141e οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῶς

**144a οὐδαμῶς**

144b οὐδαμῶς

144d οὐδαμῶς

Loeb

“Then there would be even times even, odd times odd, odd times even, and even times odd.”

“Yes.”

“Then if that is true, do you believe any number is left out, which does not necessarily exist?”

“By no means.”

“Then if one exists, number must also exist.”

“It must.”

Thomas Taylor

Hence, there will be the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and the evenly odd.

It will be so.

If, therefore, this be the case, do you think that any numbers will be left which is not necessarily there?

But no means.

If, therefore, The One is, it is also necessary that there should be number.

It is necessary.

Jowett

Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd times, and even taken odd times, and odd taken even times.

True.

And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be?

None whatever.

Then if one is, number must also be?

It must.

## Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος **πολλὰ** ἂν εἴη καὶ πληθος **ἄπειρον** τῶν ὄντων· ἢ οὐκ **ἄπειρος**  
ἀριθμὸς πλήθει καὶ **μετέχων οὐσίας γίνεταί**;

καὶ πάνυ γε.

οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς **οὐσίας μετέχει**, καὶ τὸ μόνιον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ **μετέχει** ἂν **αὐτῆς**;  
ναί.

## Balboas

**Par:** Then certainly , if **Number Is** , then **Many** would also **Exist** ,  
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ οντος πολλ' ἂν καὶ εἴη  
and indeed An **Unlimited Multitude** of **Beings** ; or is not **Unlimited Number**  
καὶ γε ἀπειρον πληθος των οντων : ἢ οὐκ ἀπειρος ἀριθμος  
**Quantity/Multitude Arising into Existence while Participating** of **Ousia** ?  
πλήθει γιγνηται μετεχων ουσιας ;

**Ari:** By all means indeed ! (καὶ πανυ γε .)

**Par:** Is it not the case then , that if **All Number Participates** of **Ousia** ,  
οὐκοῦν εἰ πας ἀριθμος μετεχει ,  
then , **Each Part** of **Number** , would also **Participate** of **Her Self** ?  
το ἕκαστον μοριον του ἀριθμου ἂν καὶ μετεχει αὐτης ;

**Ari:** Yes ! (ναί .)

143a πολλά, πολλά

143c πολλή

**144a πολλά**

144b πολλά

144d πολλή

137d ἄπειρον, ἄπειρον

143a ἄπειρον

**144a ἄπειρον, ἄπειρος**

144e ἄπειρα

145a ἄπειρον

143a μετέχεν, μετέχεν, μετέχεν

143b μετέσχευ

**144a μετέχων, μετέχει, μετέχει**

145b μετέχει, μετέχει

146c μετέχοντα

143b οὐσίαν, οὐσία, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία

143c οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν, οὐσίαν, οὐσία, οὐσία

**144a οὐσίας, οὐσίας**

144b οὐσία, οὐσία

144c οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίας

143a γιγνόμενον

143d γίνεταί

**144a γίνεταί**

144c γένοιτο

149a γένοιτο

143c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖν

143d αὐτῷ, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῶν

**144a αὐτῆς**

144c αὐτῆς, αὐτῶν, αὐτό

144e αὐτό, αὐτό

Loeb

“But if number exists, there must be many, indeed an infinite multitude, of existences; or is not number infinite in multitude and participant of existence?”

“Certainly it is.”

“Then if all number partakes of existence, every part of number will partake of it?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

But if number is, it is necessary that the many should subsist, and an infinite multitude of beings: or do you think that number, infinite in multitude, will also participate of essence?

But all means I think so.

If, therefore, every number participates of essence, will not each part also of number participate of essence?

Certainly.

Jowett

But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite multiplicity of being; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and partakes also of being: am I not right?

Certainly.

And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also participate?

Yes.

ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα **πολλὰ** ὄντα ἢ **οὐσία** νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ **μεγίστου**; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν δὴ **οὐσία** γε τῶν ὄντων τοῦ ἀποστατοῖ;

**οὐδαμῶς.**

κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ὥς οἶόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ **μέγιστα** καὶ πανταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστι **μέρη** ἀπέραντα τῆς **οὐσίας**.

ἔχει οὕτω.

**Parmenides: 14** Accordingly then , **The Ousia** has been **Distributed** to **All Beings**

144B αρα η ουσια νενεμηται (νεμω) Επι παντα οντα  
which are **Many** , and will *not* **abandon a Single One** of **The Real-Beings** , neither **The Least**  
πολλα και αποστατει ουδενος των οντων , ουτε του σμικροτατου  
nor **The Greatest** ? Rather , is it not irrational to even ask this question ? For surely then ,  
ουτε του μεγιστου ; η και αλογον μεν ερεσθαι τουτο ; γαρ δη  
how can **Ousia** indeed **abandon Any** of **The Real-Beings** ?  
πως αν ουσια γε αποστατοι του των οντων ;

**Aristotle:** Not in any way . (ουδαμως .)

[[The Second Member of The Yoked-Pair/Couple : **The Dividing Power** of **Number**. Pierre Grimes]]

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The Ousia** , as **Such** , has been **thoroughly** and **in-every-way**

αρα της ουσιας ως οιον κατακεκερματισται και πανταχως  
**cut-up-in-pieces** ; into both **The Least** and **The Greatest Beings** , and so **She** is **The Most**  
τε σμικροτατα και μεγαιστα οντα , και εστι μαλιστα  
**divided** of **All Beings** , and thus **She Contains Unlimited/Inexterminable Parts/pieces** .  
144C μεμερισται παντων και απεραντα μερη .

**Ari:** It has to be so . (εχει ουτω .)

143e πολλή  
144a πολλά  
**144b πολλά**  
144d πολλή  
144e πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

143c ούσιαν, ούσιαν, ούσιαν, ούσια, ούσια  
144a ούσίας, ούσίας  
**144b ούσία, ούσία, ούσίας**  
144c ούσίας, ούσίας  
144d ούσίας, ούσια

140c μείζον, μείζονον, μείζονον  
140d μείζον  
**144b μεγίστου, μέγιστα**  
144c μείζονος  
149e μείζον, μείζω, μείζω, μείζον

141e οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῶς  
144a οὐδαμῶς  
**144b οὐδαμῶς**  
144d οὐδαμῶς  
145d οὐδαμῶς

140d μερῶν  
142c μέρη  
**144b μέρη**  
144c μέρη, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος  
144d μέρεσιν, μέρη, μέρη

Loeb

“Existence, then, is distributed over all things, which are many, and is not wanting in any existing thing from the greatest to the smallest? Indeed, is it not absurd even to ask that question? For how can existence be wanting in any existing thing?”

“It cannot by any means.”

“Then it is split up into the smallest and greatest and all kinds of existences nothing else is so much divided, and in short the parts of existence are infinite.”

“That is true.”

Thomas Taylor

Essence, therefore, will be distributed through all things which are many, and will not desert any being, whether the least or the greatest: for how can essence be absent from any being?

In no respect.

Essence, therefore, is distributed as much as possible into the least and the greatest, and into all things every way, and is divided the most of all things, and possesses infinite parts.

It is so.

Jowett

Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it? And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of being?

In no way.

And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into being of all sizes, and is broken up more than all things; the divisions of it have no limit.

True.



πλείστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ **μέρη αὐτῆς**.

πλείστα μέντοι.

τί οὖν; ἔστι τι **αὐτῶν** ὃ ἔστι μὲν **μέρος** τῆς **οὐσίας**, οὐδὲν μέντοι **μέρος**;

καὶ πῶς ἂν τοι τοῦτο **γένοιτο**;

ἀλλ' εἶπερ γε οἶμαι ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη **αὐτὸ** αἰεὶ, ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾗ, ἔν γέ τι εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον.  
ἀνάγκη.

πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἐκάστω τῷ τῆς **οὐσίας** **μέρει** πρόσσεστιν τὸ ἔν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε  
σμικροτέρου οὔτε **μείζονος** **μέρους** οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός.

οὕτω.

## Balboas

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The Parts**/pieces of **Her Self Are very Many** .

αῖρα                      τα μερη                      αὐτης ἐστι πλειστα .

**Ari:** Very many indeed . (πλειστα μεντοι .)

**Par:** What follows then ? Is there any one of **These Selves** which **Exists** , on the one hand ,

τι                      ουν ;                      ἐστι                      τι                      αὐτων                      ο                      ἐστι                      μεν

a **Part/piece** of **The Ousia** , but yet , it is **Not One Part/piece** ?

μερος                      της ουσιας , μεντοι                      ουδεν                      μέρος ;

**Ari:** And how can this come to be ? (καὶ πῶς ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο ;)

**Par:** But surely if it is indeed the case , then I suspect , that it **Must Always Be** the case , that as

αλλ' γε εἰπερ ἐστιν                      ,                      οἶμαι                      ,                      ἀνάγκη αἰε

long as **It Self** is such as **It Is** , **It Must Indeed Be a Certain One** ; and so **It** cannot be **nothing** .

ἕωσπερ αὐτο                      η                      αν                      γε                      εἶναι                      τι                      εν ,                      δε                      ἀδυνατον μηδεν .

**Ari:** Necessarily . (ἀνάγκη .)

**Par:** Accordingly then , **The One** , **Is Present** with **Each** and **Every Part/piece** of **The Ousia**

αῖρα                      το εν                      προεστι προς τω ἐκάστω ἀπαντι μερει                      της ουσιας

by **not abandoning** any **Part/piece** , neither **small** nor **Great** , nor any other **Singular Part** .

οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον μερους οὔτε σμικροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός .

**Ari:** It is so . (οὕτω .)

142c μέρος

144b μέρος

**144c** μέρη, μέρος, μέρος, μέρει, μέρους

144d μέρεσιν, μέρος, μέρος

145b μερών, μέρος

143d αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῶν

144a αὐτῆς

**144c** αὐτῆς, αὐτῶν, αὐτὸ

144e αὐτὸ, αὐτό

145a αὐτῶν

144a οὐσίας, οὐσία

144b οὐσία, οὐσία, οὐσίας

**144c** οὐσίας, οὐσίας

144d οὐσίας, οὐσία

144e οὐσίας

143d γίνεταί

144a γίνεταί

**144c** γένοιτο

149a γένοιτο

151e γίνεταί

140d μείζον

144b μεγίστου, μέγιστα

**144c** μείζονος

149e μείζον, μείζω, μείζω, μείζον

150a μείζων, μείζω

Loeb

“Its parts are the most numerous of all.”

“Yes, they are the most numerous.”

“Well, is there any one of them which is a part of existence, but is no part?”

“How could that be?”

“But if there is, it must, I imagine, so long as it is, be some one thing; it cannot be nothing.”

“That is inevitable.”

“Then unity is an attribute of every part of existence and is not wanting to a smaller or larger or any other part.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor

Very many, therefore, are its parts.

Very many, indeed.

But what, is there any one of these which is a part of essence, and yet is not *one* part?

But how can this be?

But if it is, I think it must always be necessary, as long as it is, that it should be a certain one; but that it cannot possibly be nothing.

It is necessary.

*The One*, therefore, is present with every part of essence, deserting no part, whether small or great, or in whatever manner it may be affected.

It is so.

Jowett

Then it has the greatest number of parts?

Yes, the greatest number.

Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?

Impossible.

But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot be none?

Certainly.

Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?

True.

ἄρα οὖν ἐν ὃν πολλαχοῦ ἅμα **ὅλον** ἐστί; τοῦτο ἄθρει.

ἀλλ' ἄθρῳ καὶ ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον.

μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ **ὅλον**: ἄλλως γάρ που **οὐδαμῶς** ἅμα ἅπασι τοῖς τῆς **οὐσίας** **μέρεσιν** παρέσται ἢ μεμερισμένον.

ναί.

καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν **πολλή** ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ **μέρη**.

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκ ἄρα ἀληθὴ ἄρτι **ἐλέγομεν λέγοντες** ὡς πλείστα **μέρη** ἢ **οὐσία** νενεμημένη εἶη.

**Par:** Therefore , can **One Being Be** a **Whole** that **Exists in Many Ways/Places At-Once** ?

144D ουν αρα εν ον ολον εστι πολλαχου αμα ;

Consider this .

αθρει τουτο .

**Ari:** But I do consider it and I “see” that it is impossible.

αλλ' αθρω και ορω οτι αδυνατον .

**Par:** Accordingly then , **One Being has been cut-up in pieces** , *if indeed It Is not Whole*

αρα μεμερισμενον ειπερ μη ολον :

for in no other way at all , can **It Be Present** with **All The Parts/pieces** of **The Ousia**

γαρ ουδαμως αλλως που παρεστι απασι τοις μερεσιν της ουσιας

other than by **existing in a cut-up/scattered state** (*At-Once* like **The Harmonic Inter-dependant**

η μεμερισμενον . **Parts** in a **Homogeneous Whole** and in the **pieces** of

**Ari:** Yes . (ναί.)

mud , hair ,dust in **The Living-Body** of **The All** . jfb)

~~~**Indivisible Beings/Parts** as opposed to **divisible pieces**~~~

Par: And most certainly then , **that which is partible Must Be** as many as **its pieces** .

και γε μην το μεριστον αναγκη ειναι οσαπερ πολλη τοσαυτα μερη .

Ari: Necessarily .(αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then we did **not** just now speak **The Truth** , when we said that **The Ousia** was

αρα ουκ αρτι λεγοντες αληθη ελεγομεν ως η ουσια

Distributed into **very many Parts** .

144E ειη νενεμημενη πλειστα μερη .

138e ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

142d ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλον

144d ὅλον, ὅλον

144e ὅλου

145a ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

144a οὐδαμῶς

144b οὐδαμῶς

144d οὐδαμῶς

145d οὐδαμῶς

146b οὐδαμῶς

144b οὐσία, οὐσία, οὐσία

144c οὐσίας, οὐσίας

144d οὐσίας, οὐσία

144e οὐσίας

149e οὐσίας

144b μέρη

144c μέρη, μέρος, μέρος, μέρει, μέρους

144d μέρει, μέρη, μέρη

145b μερών

145c μέρη, μέρη, μέρη

144a πολλά

144b πολλά

144d πολλή

144e πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

145a πολλά

142d λέγεται

143c λέγω

144d ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες

147c λέγεις

147d λέγειν

Loeb

“Can the one be in many places at once and still be a whole? Consider that question.”

“I am considering and I see that it is impossible.”

“Then it is divided into parts, if it is not a whole; for it cannot be attached to all the parts of existence at once unless it is divided.”

“I agree.”

“And that which is divided into parts must certainly be as numerous as its parts.”

“It must.”

“Then what we said just now—that existence was divided into the greatest number of parts—was not true for it is not divided, you see, into any more parts than one,

Thomas Taylor

Can *one being*, therefore, be a whole, subsisting in many places at once? Consider this diligently.

I do consider it, and I see that it is impossible.

It is divided, therefore, since it is not a whole; for it can no otherwise be present with all the parts of essence, than in a divided state.

Certainly.

But that which is divisible ought necessarily to be so many as its parts.

It ought.

We did not, therefore, just now speak truly, when we said that essence was distributed into very many parts; since it is not divided into more parts than *The One*,

Jowett

But reflect:-an one in its entirety, be in many places at the same time?

No; I see the impossibility of that.

And if not in its entirety, then it is divided; for it cannot be present with all the parts of being, unless divided.

True.

And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are?

Certainly.

Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more than the one,

Oxford Greek

οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω τοῦ ἐνὸς νενέμηται ἀλλ' ἴσα, ὡς ἔοικε, τῷ ἐνί: οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἐξισοῦσθον **δύο** ὄντε ἀεὶ παρὰ πάντα.

παντάπασι οὕτω φαίνεται.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα **αὐτὸ** κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς **οὐσίας πολλά** τε καὶ **ἄπειρα** τὸ πλήθος ἐστίν.
φαίνεται.

οὐ **μόνον** ἄρα τὸ ὄν ἐν **πολλά** ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ **αὐτὸ** τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενημμένον **πολλά** ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε **ὅλου** τὰ μόρια μόρια,

Balboas

For **She** is **not Distributed** into more **Parts** than **The One** is,
γὰρ οὐδε νενεμηται πλειω του ενος ,
but as it is likely , **She Is Equal** to **The One** . For **The Being** does **not abandon The One** , **nor**
ἀλλ' ὡς εοικε , ἴσα τω ἐνι . γὰρ το ον ουτε απολειπεται του ενος ουτε
does The One abandon The Being ; but **Always Subsist** as **Two Parts Equalized Through All** .
το ἐν του οντος , ἀλλ' αει ὄντε δυο εξισουσθον παρα παντα .

Ari: It has come to **Light** entirely in this way . (φαινεται πανταπασι ουτω .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One Self** , **has been Distributed** by **The Ousia**
ἀρα το ἐν αὐτο κεκερματισμενον υπο της ουσιας
which is both **Many** and also **Unlimited Multitude** .
ἐστίν τε πολλά καὶ ἀπειρα πλήθος .

Ari: So it has come to **Light** . (φαινεται .)

Par: Accordingly then , not only **Is The One Being** , **Many** , but it is also **Necessary**
ἀρα ου μονον ἐστίν το ἐν ον πολλά , ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη
that **The One Self** which is **Distributed** by **The Being** to **Be Many** .
το ἐν αὐτο διανενημμενον υπο του οντος ειναι πολλά .

Ari: Entirely so .(πανταπασι μὲν οὖν .) (**End** of **The 3rd Intellectual Triad**)

Parmenides: 15 And certainly , since **The Parts Are** indeed **Parts** of a **Whole** , in that case
Καὶ μὴν ὅτι τὰ μόρια γε μόρια ολου

143d δύο, δύο, δύο

143e δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο

144e δύο

149a δύο, δυοῖν, δύο, δύο

149b δυοῖν, δύο, δύο

144a αὐτῆς

144c αὐτῆς, αὐτῶν, αὐτό

144e αὐτό, αὐτό

145a αὐτῶν

145b αὐτό, αὐτῶν

144c οὐσίας, οὐσίας

144d οὐσίας, οὐσία

144e οὐσίας

149e οὐσίας

152a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

144b πολλά

144d πολλή

144e πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

145a πολλά

147d πολλή

143a ἄπειρον

144a ἄπειρον, ἄπειρος

144e ἄπειρα

145a ἄπειρον

158b ἄπειρα

142d μόνον

143a μόνον, μόνον

144e μόνον

149c μόνον

149d μόνον

142d ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλον

144d ὅλον, ὅλον

144e ὅλου

145a ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

145b ὅλου, ὅλου

Loeb

but, as it seems, into the same number as one for existence is not wanting to the one, nor the one to existence, but being two they are equal throughout.”

“That is perfectly clear.”

“The one, then, split up by existence, is many and infinite in number.”

“Clearly.”

“Then not only the existent one is many, but the absolute one divided by existence, must be many.”

“Certainly.”

“And because the parts are parts of a whole, the one would be limited by the whole;

Thomas Taylor

but into parts equal to those of *The One*: for neither does *being* desert *The One*, nor *The One, being*: but these two always subsist, equalized through all things.

It appears to be entirely so.

The One, therefore, which is distributed by essence is many and an infinite multitude.

So it appears.

One being, therefore, is not only many, but it is likewise necessary the *The One* which is distributed by essence should be many.

Entirely so.

And, indeed, in consequence of the parts being parts of a whole, *The One* will be defined according to a whole:

Jowett

into parts equal to the one; the one is never wanting to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-equal and coextensive.

Certainly that is true.

The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite?

True.

Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many?

Certainly.

Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, will be limited;

Oxford Greek

πεπερασμένον ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ **ὅλον** τὸ ἔν: ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ **ὅλου** τὰ μόρια;

ἀνάγκη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχον **πέρας** ἂν εἴη.

πῶς δ' οὔ;

τὸ ἔν ἄρα ὃν ἔν τέ ἐστί που καὶ **πολλά**, καὶ **ὅλον** καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ **ἄπειρον** πλήθει.

φαίνεται.

Balboas

The One will **Be Limited** by **The Whole** ; or are not **The Parts Contained** by **The Whole** ?

145A το εν αν ειη πεπερασμενον κατα το ολον : η ου τα μορια περιεχεται υπο του ολου ;

Aristotle: Necessarily so .(αναγκη .)

Par: Then certainly , **That** which **Contains** will indeed **Be The Limit** .

αλλα μην το περιεχον αν γε ειη περας .

The

Ari: How could it not be ? (πως δ' ου ;)

Connective

Par: Accordingly then , **The One Being** , **Is** in some way , both **One and Many** ,

Triad

αρα το εν ον εστι που τε εν και πολλα ,

both **Whole and Parts** , and **Limited and Unlimited Multitude** . (Nicomachus Book I Chapter 7 ,
και ολον και μορια , και πεπερασμενον και απειρον πληθει . **Introduction to Arithmetic**)

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται .)~**Beginning of The Perfective-Preservative Order**~

144d ὅλον, ὅλον

144e ὅλου

145a ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

145b ὅλου, ὅλου

145c ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλου

137d πέρας

145a πέρας

158d πέρας, πέρας

163a πέρας, πέρας

144d πολλά

144e πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

145a πολλά

147d πολλή

150d πολλή

144a ἄπειρον, ἄπειρος

144e ἄπειρα

145a ἄπειρον

158b ἄπειρα

158c ἄπειρον

Loeb

or are not the parts included by the whole?”

“They must be so.”

“But surely that which includes is a limit.”

“Of course.”

“Then the existent one is, apparently, both one and many, a whole and parts, limited and of infinite number.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

or are not the parts comprehended by the whole?

Necessarily so.

But that which contains will be a bound.

How should it not?

One being, therefore, is in a certain respect both one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite in multitude.

It appears so.

Jowett

for are not the parts contained the whole?

Certainly.

And that which contains, is a limit?

Of course.

Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number?

Clearly.

Oxford Greek

ἀρ' οὖν οὐκ, ἐπεὶ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον;

ἀνάγκη.

τί δέ; εἰ **ὅλον**, οὐ καὶ **ἀρχὴν** ἂν ἔχοι καὶ **μέσον** καὶ **τελευτήν**; ἢ οἷόν τέ τι **ὅλον** εἶναι ἀνευ **τριῶν** τούτων; ἅν του ἐν ὅτιον **αὐτῶν** ἀποστατῇ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι **ὅλον** εἶναι;

οὐκ ἐθελήσει.

Balboas

Par: Take notice then, if **It Has** indeed **Been Limited**, then **Must It** not also **Possess Extremes**?

αρ' ουν επειπερ πεπερασμενον, ουκ και εχον εσχατα;

Ari: It must. (ανάγκη.)

Par: What then? If **The One Being Is** a **Whole**, then will **It** not also **Possess** a **Beginning**,

τι δ' ; ει ολον, αν ου και εχοι και αρχην
a **Middle** and an **End**? Or is it *possible* for any **Whole** to **Exist without These Three**? And if
και μεσον και τελευτην ; η οιον τε τι ολον ειναι ανευ τουτων τριων ; καν οτιουν
any one of **These Selves** is absent, then will **It** be **Disposed** to **Exist** any longer as a **Whole**?
του εν αυτων αποστατη, εθελησει ειναι ετι ολον ;

Ari: It will not be so disposed. (ουκ εθελησει.)

137b ἀρξόμεθα, ἀρξομαι
137d ἀρχήν, ἀρχήν

145a ἀρχήν

145b ἀρχήν

153c ἀρχήν, ἀρχήν

138c μέσου, μέσον

138d μέσου, μέσου

145a μέσον

145b μέσον, μέσον, μέσον

149a μέσῳ

144d ὅλον, ὅλον

144c ὅλου

145a ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

145b ὅλω, ὅλου

145c ὅλοι, ὅλον, ὅλω, ὅλον, ὅλοι

137d τελευτήν, τελευτή, τελευτήν

145a τελευτήν

145b τελευτήν

153c τελευτήν, τελευτῇ

143d τρία, τρία

143c τριῶν, τρία, τριῶν, τρία, τριῶν, τρία

145a τριῶν

149b τρία

159d τρία

144c αὐτῆς, αὐτῶν, αὐτό

144c αὐτό, αὐτό

145a αὐτῶν

145b αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ

145c αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτό, ἐαυτῶ

Loeb

“Then if limited it has also extremes ?”

“Certainly.”

“Yes, and if it is a whole, will it not have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these is wanting, will it still be a whole?”

“It will not.”

Thomas Taylor

As it is bounded, therefore, must it not also have extremes?

It is necessary.

But what, if it be a whole, must it not also have a beginning, middle, and end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these be wanting, can it be willing to be any longer a whole?

It cannot.

Jowett

And because having limits, also having extremes?

Certainly.

And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

No.

καὶ **ἀρχὴν** δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ **τελευτήν** καὶ **μέσον** ἔχει ἂν τὸ ἓν.

ἔχει.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε **μέσον ἴσον** τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως **μέσον** εἴη.

οὐ γάρ.

καὶ **σχήματος** δὴ **τινος**, ὡς ἔοικε, **τοιούτων** ὃν **μετέχει** ἂν τὸ ἓν, ἦτοι **εὐθέος** ἢ **στρογγύλου** ἢ **τινος** μεικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.

μετέχει γὰρ ἂν.

ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ **αὐτό** τε ἐν **ἑαυτῷ** ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ;

πῶς;

τῶν **μερῶν** που ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ **ὅλῳ** ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ **ὅλου**.

οὕτω.

Par: And thus , **The One** , as it is **Reasonable** , will **Possess** a **Beginning** , an **End** and a **Middle** .
145B καὶ δὴ το ἐν , ὡς εοικεν , ἀν εχει ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μεσον .

Ari: It will possess these . (εχει .) **(Inherent Overall Symmetry)**

Par: Then **The Middle** will most certainly **Be Equally Distant** from **The Extremes** ;
ἀλλὰ το μεσον μὴν γε ἴσον ἐπεχει τῶν ἐσχάτων :

for **It** could not be **The Middle** in any other way . (Parmenides Poem , **Fragment 8 42-44**)
γὰρ ἀν οὐ εἴη μεσον ἄλλως .

Ari: It could not . (γὰρ οὐ .)

Par: And certainly , as it **Reasonable** , by **Being So Disposed** , **The One** will **Participate**
καὶ δὴ , ὡς εοικε , ὃν τοιούτων το ἐν ἀν μετεχει
of a **Certain Figure** , **whether Straight** or **Round** , or of a **Certain Mixture** from both .
τινος σχήματος ἦτοι εὐθέος ἢ στρογγύλου ἢ τινος μίκτου ἐξ ἀμφοῖν .

Ari: It will so participate . (ἀν γὰρ μετεχει .) ~ **End of The Perfective-Preservative Order** ~

Par: Take notice then , by **Being Maintained** in this way , will **The Self** not **Subsist**

Ἀρ' οὖν εχον οὕτως αὐτο οὐκ ἐσται
both **In-It-Self** and **In-Another** ?
τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ;

Ari: How ? (πῶς ;)

Par: For **Each One** of **The** (**Beginning-Middle-End/Future-Present-Past**) **Parts Is** , in some way ,
ἐκαστον τῶν μερῶν ἐστί που

In The Whole , and is *not in any way Outside* of **The Whole**.
ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου .

Ari: It is so . (οὕτως .)

| | | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| 137d ἀρχὴν, ἀρχὴν | 138d μέσου, μέσου | 143e τίς | 144e αὐτό, αὐτό |
| 145a ἀρχὴν | 145a μέσον | 144a τινά | 144a αὐτῶν |
| 145b ἀρχὴν | 145b μέσον, μέσον, μέσον | 145b τινος, τινος | 145b αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ |
| 153c ἀρχὴν, ἀρχὴν | 149a μέσῳ | 145d τινί, τινί, τισί, τισί, τινί | 145c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτός, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ |
| 153d ἀρχή | 153c μέσον | 145e τίς | 145e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ |
| 137d τελευτήν, τελευτή, τελευτήν | 140d ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον | 141d τοιούτου, τοιούτων | 144e μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος |
| 145a τελευτήν | 141c ἴσον | 142c τοιούτων | 144d μέρεσιν, μέρος, μέρος |
| 145b τελευτήν | 145b ἴσον | 145b τοιούτων | 145b μερῶν |
| 153c τελευτήν, τελευτή | 149d ἴσον | 148c τοιούτων | 145c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος |
| 153d τελευτή, τελευτή | 150d ἴσον | 149e τοιαῦτα | 145d μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος |
| | | | 144e ὅλου |
| | | | 145a ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλου |
| | | | 145b ὅλῳ, ὅλου |
| | | | 145c ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλου |
| | | | 145d ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλου, ὅλου |

Loeb

“Then the one, it appears, will have a beginning, a middle, and an end.”

“It will.”

“But surely the middle is equally distant from the extremes for otherwise it would not be a middle.”

“No.”

“And the one, apparently, being of such a nature, will partake of some shape, whether straight or round or a mixture of the two.”

“Yes, it will.”

“This being the case, will not the one be in itself and in other?”

“How is that?”

“Each of the parts doubtless is in the whole and none is outside of the whole.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, as it appears, will possess a beginning, end, and middle.

It will.

But the middle is equally distant from the extremes; for it could not otherwise be the middle.

It could not.

And, as it appears, *The One* being such, will participate of a certain figure, whether straight or round, or a certain mixture from both.

It will so.

Will it, therefore, being such, subsist in itself and in another?

How?

For each of the parts is in the whole, nor is any one external to the whole.

It is so.

Jowett

Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.

It will.

But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would not be in the middle?

Yes.

Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two?

True.

And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.

How?

Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.

True.

πάντα δὲ τὰ **μέρη** ὑπὸ τοῦ **ὅλου** περιέχεται;

ναί.

καὶ μὴν τά γε πάντα **μέρη** τὰ **αὐτοῦ** τὸ ἓν ἐστὶ, καὶ οὔτε τι πλεον οὔτε **ἔλαττον** ἢ πάντα.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ **ὅλον** τὸ ἓν ἐστίν;

πῶς δ' οὔ;

εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὰ **μέρη** ἐν **ὅλῳ** **τυγχάνει** ὄντα, ἔστι δὲ τά τε πάντα τὸ ἓν καὶ **αὐτὸ** τὸ **ὅλον**, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ **ὅλου** τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἂν περιέχοιτο τὸ ἓν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἓν **αὐτὸ** ἐν **ἑαυτῷ** εἴη.

φαίνεται.

Par: Thus **All The Parts Are Comprehended/Contained** by **The Whole** ?

145C δε παντα τα μερη περιεχεται υπο του ολου ;

Ari: Yes . (ναι .)

Par: And certainly , **The One Is** indeed **All The Parts** of **The Self** ;

και μην το εν εστι γε παντα τα μερη αυτου ,

and is **neither** any more , **nor** any less than **All** .

καυ ουτε τι πλεον ουτε ελαττον η παντα .

Ari: How could it not be . (γαρ ου .)

Par: Is it not the case then , that **The One** , **Is** also **The Whole** ?

ουκουν το εν εστιν και το ολον ;

Ari: How could it not be so ? (πως δ' ου ;)

Par: Accordingly then , if **All The Parts happen to Be In The Whole** , since **All**

αρα ει παντα τα μερη τυγχανει εν ολω , δε παντα

The Parts Are both **The One** and **It Is The Whole Self** , then since **All The Parts**

τα οντα τε το εν και εστι το ολον αυτο , δε παντα τα

Are Comprehended by **The Whole** , then **The One will Be Comprehended** by **The One** ,

περιεχεται υπο του ολου , το εν αν περιεχοιτο υπο του ενος ,

and in this way , **The One Self will already Be In-It-Self** .

και ουτως το εν αυτο αν ηδη ειη εν εαυτω .

Ari: It has so come to **Light** .

φαινεται .

144d μέρεσιν, μέρη, μέρη

145b μερών

145c **μέρη, μέρη, μέρη**

145d μέρεσιν, μερών, μέρεσι

145e μέρη

145a ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

145b ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

145c **ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλω, ὅλον, ὅλου**

145d ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

145e ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

140d ἐλαττόνιον, ἔλαττον

141c ἐλάττω

145c **ἔλαττον**

145d ἐλάττονι

149b ἐλάττως

138e τυγχάνει

142b τυγχάνει

145c **τυγχάνει**

145e τυγχάνει

152c τύχη

145a αὐτῶν

145b αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

145c **αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ**

145e αὐτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146a αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

Loeb

“And all the parts are included in the whole ?”

“Yes.”

“And surely the one is all its parts, neither more nor less than all.”

“Certainly.”

“But the whole is the one, is it not?”

“Of course.”

“Then if all the parts are in the whole and all the parts are the one and the one is also the whole, and all the parts are included in the whole, the one will be included in the one, and thus the one will be in itself.”

“Evidently.”

Thomas Taylor

But all the parts are comprehended by the whole.

Certainly.

But *The One* is all the parts of itself; and is neither more nor less than all.

Certainly.

Is not *The One*, therefore, a whole?

How should it not?

If, therefore, all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts are one, and *The One* is a whole, but all the parts are comprehended by the whole; hence, *The One* will be comprehended by *The One*, and so *The One* will be in itself.

It appears so.

Jowett

And all the parts are contained by the whole?

Yes.

And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?

No.

And the one is the whole?

Of course.

But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.

That is true.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε **ὅλον** αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς **μέρεσιν** ἐστίν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν **τινί**. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί: ἐν **τινι** γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι που δύναιτο ἐν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάντων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ **ὅλον** ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἐνι, πῶς ἔτι ἐν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται;

οὐδαμῶς.

οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν **τισὶ** τῶν **μερῶν**: εἰ γὰρ ἐν **τισὶ** τὸ **ὅλον** εἴη, τὸ πλεον ἂν ἐν τῷ **ἐλάττονι** εἴη, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον.

ἀδύνατον γάρ.

μὴ ὄν δ' ἐν πλεοσιν μὴδ' ἐν ἐνὶ μὴδ' ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς **μέρεσι** τὸ **ὅλον** οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν **ἐτέρῳ τινι** εἶναι ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι;

ἀνάγκη.

Par: But certainly in turn , **The Whole** , **Is** indeed **not In The Parts** ; **neither In All** ,
145D ἀλλὰ μεντοι αυ το ολον εστιν γε ουκ εν τοις μερεσιν , ουτε εν πασιν
nor In a Certain One . For if **It Were In All** , then **It** would **Necessarily** also **Be In One** : for if
ουτε εν τινι . γαρ ει εν πασιν , αναγκη και εν ενι : γαρ
It Were not In a Certain One , then **It** would **indeed not** still **Be Able** to **Be** , somehow , **In All** ;
μη εν τινι ενι αν γε ουκ ετι ον δυναιτο ειναι που εν απασιν ;
but if on the one hand , **This One Is The One** of **All The Parts** , whereas on the other hand ,
δε ει μεν , τουτο εστι το εν των απαντων , δε
The Whole Is not In This One , then how can **It** still indeed **Be In All The Parts** ?
το ολον μη εν τουτω ενι , πως ετι γε ενεσται εν πασιν τοις ;

Ari: In no way at all . (ουδαμῶς .)

Par: Surely then , **It** cannot **Be In Any** of **The Parts** . For if **The Whole Were In Any**
μην ουδε εν τισι των μερων . γαρ ει το ολον ειη εν τισι
of **The Parts** , then **The Greater** would **Be In The Less** , which is **Impossible** .
το πλεον αν ειη εν τω ελαττονι , ο εστιν αδυνατον .

Ari: It is impossible . (γαρ αδυνατον .)

Par: Then by not **Being In Many** , nor **In One** , nor **In All** of **The Parts** , then **Must** not
δ' μη ον εν πλεοσι μὴδ' ἐν ἐνὶ μὴδ' ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς μερεσιν ουκ
The Whole Necessarily Be , **In some other way** , or cease to **Be** in any way at all ?
το ολον αναγκη ειναι εν τινι ετερω η ετι ειναι μηδαμου ;

Ari: Necessarily . (αναγκη .)

144a τινῷ
145b τινος, τινος
145d τινί, τινι, τισί, τισί, τινί
146e τινι
147d τινι, τινι

145b ὅλω, ὅλου
145c ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλω, ὅλον, ὅλου
145d ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
145e ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
146b ὅλον, ὅλον

144b οὐδαμῶς
144d οὐδαμῶς
145d οὐδαμῶς
146b οὐδαμῶς
150c οὐδαμοῦ

145b μερῶν
145c μέρη, μέρη, μέρη
145d μέρεσιν, μερῶν, μέρεσι
145e μέρος
146b μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

141c ἐλάττω
145c ἐλαττον
145d ἐλάττονι
149b ἐλάττους
149c ἐλάττους

143b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, οὐσίας, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερα
143c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν
145d ἐτέρῳ
145e ἐτέρῳ
146a ἐτέρῳ, ἐτέρῳ

Loeb

“But the whole is not in the parts, neither in all of them nor in any. For if it is in all, it must be in one, for if it were wanting in any one it could no longer be in all; for if this one is one of all, and the whole is not in this one, how can it still be in all?”

“It cannot in any way.”

“Nor can it be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.”

“Yes, it is impossible.”

“But not being in one or several or all of the parts, it must be in something else or cease to be anywhere at all?”

“It must.”

Thomas Taylor

But again, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all, nor in a certain one. For, if it were in all, it would necessarily be in one: for, if it were not in some one, it would not be able to be in all. But if this one is a one belonging to all the parts, and the whole is not in this one, how can it any longer be a whole in all the parts?

In no respect.

Nor yet in any of the parts. For if the whole should be in some of the parts, the greater would be in the lesser; which is impossible.

Impossible.

But since the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not necessary that it should either be in some other, or that it should be nowhere?

It is necessary.

Jowett

But then, again, the whole is not in the parts-neither in all the parts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in one; for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts; for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the whole is not in this, how can it be in them all?

It cannot.

Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.

Yes, impossible.

But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὃν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, **ὅλον** δὲ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν **αὐτῷ** ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι;

πάνυ γε.

ἦ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν **ὅλον**, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν: ἦ δὲ τὰ πάντα **μέρη** ὄντα **τυγχάνει**, **αὐτὸ** ἐν **ἑαυτῷ**: καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν ἀνάγκῃ **αὐτό** τε ἐν **ἑαυτῷ** εἶναι καὶ ἐν **ἐτέρῳ**.

ἀνάγκη.

οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς τὸ ἐν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ **κινεῖσθαι** καὶ **ἐστάναι**;

πῆ;

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that on the one hand , by **Being in no way at all** , **It** would

145E ουκουν μεν ον μηδαμου αν
be **nothing** , but on the other hand , by **Being Whole** , if indeed **It Is not In The Self** ,
ειη ουδεν , δε ον ολον ειπερ εστιν ουκ εν αυτω ,
then **It Must Necessarily Be In-Another** ?
αναγκη ειναι εν αλλω ;

Ari: By all means indeed .(πανυ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then , on the one hand , inasmuch as **The One Is Whole** , **It Is In-Another** ,

αρα μεν η το εν ολον , εστιν εν αλλω
whereas on the other hand , by **Self Being In-It-Self** , **It** happens to **Be All The Parts** ,
δε η αυτο οντα εν εαυτω τυγχανει παντα τα μερη ,
and in this way **The One Self Must Necessarily Be** both **In-It-Self** and **In-Another** .
και ουτω το εν αυτο αναγκη ειναι τε εν εαυτω και εν ετερω .

Ari: It must be so .(αναγκη .)

Par: Surely then , since **The One Disposition Is-Established** in this way , is it not then

δη το εν πεφυκος εσταναι Ουτω ουκ αρ'
Necessary that **It** should also **Be Moved (In-Another)** and **Remain-Still (In-It-Self)** ?
αναγκη και κινεισθαι και εσταναι ;

Ari: In what way ? (πη ;)

145c ὅλον, ὅλω, ὅλον, ὅλοο, ὅλον

145d ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

145e ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

146b ὅλον, ὅλον

146c ὅλον

145c μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

145d μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

145e μέρος

146b μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

146c μέρος

142b τυγχάνει

145c τυγχάνει

145e τυγχάνει

152c τύχη

155d τυγχάνει

145b αὐτό, αὐτῷ

145c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῷ

145e αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ

146a αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ

146b αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

143b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

143c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

145e ἐτέρῳ

146a ἐτέρῳ, ἐτέρῳ

146b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

139a κίνησιν

139b κινεῖται

145e κινεῖσθαι

146a κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι

156c κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι

138b ἐστάναι

139b ἐστηκεν, ἐστηκεν

145e ἐστάναι

146a ἐστηκεν, ἐστὸς, ἐστάναι, ἐστὸς, ἐστάναι

156c ἵσθαι, ἐστὸς, ἐστὸς, ἐστάναι, ἐστάναι, ἐστὸς

Loeb

“And if it were nowhere, it would be nothing, but being a whole, since it is not in itself, it must be in something else, must it not?”

“Certainly.”

“Then the one, inasmuch as it is a whole, is in other and inasmuch as it is all its parts, it is in itself; and thus one must be both in itself and in other.”

“It must.”

“This being its nature, must not the one be both in motion and at rest?”

“How is that?”

Thomas Taylor

But if it is nowhere, will it not be nothing? And if it is a whole, since it is not in itself, is it not necessary that it should be in another?

Entirely so.

So far, therefore, as *The One* is a whole, it is in another: but so far as all things are its parts, and itself all the parts, it is in itself: and so *The One* will necessarily be in itself and in another.

Necessarily.

But as *The One* is naturally such, is it not necessary that it should both be moved and stand still?

How?

Jowett

If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not being in itself, it must be in another.

Very true.

The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as being all its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be itself in itself and also in another.

Certainly.

The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion?

How?

ἔστηκε μέν που, εἵπερ **αὐτό** ἐν **ἑαυτῷ** ἐστιν· ἐν γὰρ ἐνὶ ὧν καὶ ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ** ἂν εἴη, ἐν **ἑαυτῷ**.

ἔστι γάρ.

τὸ δέ γε ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ** αἰεὶ ὧν **ἐστός** δήπου ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι.

πάνυ γε.

τί δέ; τὸ ἐν **ἐτέρῳ** αἰεὶ ὧν οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀνάγκη μηδέποτε ἐν **ταύτῳ** εἶναι, μηδέποτε δὲ ὧν ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ** μηδὲ **ἐστάναι**, μὴ **ἐστός** δὲ **κινεῖσθαι**;

οὕτως.

ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ ἕν, **αὐτό** τε ἐν **ἑαυτῷ** αἰεὶ ὧν καὶ ἐν **ἐτέρῳ**, αἰεὶ **κινεῖσθαι** τε καὶ **ἐστάναι**. φαίνεται.

Par: On the one hand , **It** must somehow **Stand-still** , if indeed **Self Is In-It-Self** . For by μέν που ἐστηκε , εἵπερ αὐτο ἐστιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ . γὰρ **Being In One** and by not departing from **This** , **It** will **Be In-The Self** ; that is , **In-It-Self** . 146A γὰρ ὅν ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐκ τούτου ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ , ἐν ἑαυτῷ .

Ari: It is so . (ἐστι γὰρ .)

Par: But **That** which **Is** indeed **Always In The Self** , without a doubt , **Must Necessarily Always Be At-Rest** . (αἰεὶ εἶναι ἐστός .)

Ari: Entirely so . (πάνυ γε .)

Par: What follows then ? On the contrary , is it not **Necessary** that **That** which **Is** τι δέ ; τὸ ἐναντίον οὐ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὄν **Always In-Another Must Never Be In The Self** ? But if **It Never Is In The Self** , αἰεὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μὴδέποτε εἶναι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ , δὲ μὴδέποτε ὄν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ then neither **Can It Stand-still** . But if **It Cannot Stand-still** , then **It Must Be In-Motion** ? μὴδὲ ἐστάναι , δὲ μὴ ἐστός κινεῖσθαι ;

Ari: It must be so . (οὕτως .)

Par: Accordingly then , by **The Self Always Being** both **In-It-Self** and **In-Another** , ἀρα αὐτο αἰεὶ ὄν τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ , then **The One Must Necessarily Always Be In-Motion** , and also **Always Be Standing-still** . το ἐν ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἐστάναι .

Ari: So it has come to **Light** . (φαίνεται .)

139b ἔστηκεν, ἔστηκεν

145e ἐστάναι

146a ἔστηκε, ἐστός, ἐστάναι, ἐστός, ἐστάναι

156c ἴσθαι, ἐστός, ἐστός, ἐστάναι, ἐστάναι, ἐστός

156d ἐστάναι, ἐστός

145e αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

145e αὐτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146a αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146b αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ

146c ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

145d ἐτέρῳ

145e ἐτέρῳ

146a ἐτέρῳ, ἐτέρῳ

146b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

146c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

142b ταῦτόν

143b ταῦτόν

146a ταῦτόν

146b ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

139b κινεῖται

145e κινεῖσθαι

146a κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι

156c κινούμενόν, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινούμενον

156d κινούμενης

Loeb

“It is at rest, no doubt, if it is in itself; for being in one, and not passing out from this, it is in the same, namely in itself.”

“It is.”

“But that which is always in the same, must always be at rest.”

“Certainly.”

“Well, then, must not, on the contrary, that which is always in other be never in the same, and being never in the same be not at rest, and being not at rest be in motion?”

“True.”

“Then the one, being always in itself and in other, must always be in motion and at rest.”

“That is clear.”

Thomas Taylor

It must stand still, indeed, if it be in itself. For, being in one, and not departing from this, it will be in *same*, through being in itself.

It will.

But that which is always in the same must necessarily without doubt always stand still.

Entirely so.

But what, must not that, on the contrary, which is always in another, necessarily never be in *same*: But if it be never in *same*, can it stand still? And if it does not stand still, must it not be moved?

Certainly.

It is necessary, therefore, that *The One*, since it is always in itself and in another, must always be moved and stand still.

It appears so.

Jowett

The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.

True.

And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?

Certainly.

Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and if not at rest, in motion?

True.

Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion?

Clearly.

Oxford Greek

καὶ μὴν **ταὐτόν** γε δεῖ εἶναι **αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ** καὶ **ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ**, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως **ταὐτόν** τε καὶ **ἕτερον** εἶναι, εἶπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν **πέπονθεν**.

πῶς;

πάν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει, ἢ **ταὐτόν** ἐστὶν ἢ **ἕτερον**: ἢ ἐὰν μὴ **ταὐτόν** ἢ μὴδ' **ἕτερον**, **μέρος** ἂν εἴη τοῦτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς **μέρος ὅλον** ἂν εἴη.

φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: And The Self **Must** certainly **Be The Same** *With-It-Self* and **Other** *Than-It-Self* ;

146B Καὶ αὐτὸ δεῖ μὴν γε εἶναι ταυτὸν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτερον ἑαυτοῦ , and similarly **Be The Same** and also **Other Than-The Others** , if indeed **It** also **Experiences** καὶ ὡσαύτως εἶναι ταυτὸν τε καὶ ἑτερον τοῖς ἄλλοις , εἰπερ καὶ πέπονθεν **The Prior Relationships/Dispositions** . (τὰ πρόσθεν .)

Ari: How ? (πῶς ;)

Par: *In some way* , **Everything** **Has** to **Be in this way** in *Relation* to **Everything** . For **Everything**

που παν εχει ωδε προς απαν . **Is** either **The Self/Same** *with* or **Other than something** : or if **It Is not The Same nor Other** , ἐστὶν ἢ ταυτὸν ἢ ἑτερον : ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ταυτὸν μὴδ' ἢ ἑτερον then **It** will have **The Same Dynamic** that a **Part Has to** a **Whole** or that a **Whole Has to** a **Part** . ἂν εἴη οὕτως μέρος εχει προς τουτου , ἢ ὡς ὅλον ἂν εἴη προς μέρος .

Ari: It has so come to **Light** . (φαίνεται .)

143b ταὐτόν

146a ταὐτῷ

146b ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν

146c ταὐτόν

146d ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν, ταὐτῷ

145e αὐτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146a αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146b αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτό

146c ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146d αὐτό, αὐτῷ

145e ἐτέρῳ

146a ἐτέρῳ, ἐτέρῳ

146b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

146c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον

146d ἕτερόν, ἐτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον

140a πέπονθε, πεπόνθοι, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν, πεπόνθοι

140b πεπονθός, πεπονθός, πεπονθός

146b πέπονθεν

147c πέπονθεν, πεπονθότα

148a πεπονθένει, πεπονθός, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν

145d μέρειν, μερών, μέρει

145e μέρη

146b μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

146c μέρος

150a μέρει

145d ὅλον, ὅλον

145e ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

146b ὅλον, ὅλον

146c ὅλον

147b ὅλον, ὅλα, ὅλα

Loeb

“And again, it must be the same with itself and other than itself, and likewise the same with all other things and other than they, if what we have said is true.”

“How is that?”

“Everything stands to everything in one of the following relations: it is either the same or other; or if neither the same or other, its relation is that of a part to a whole or of a whole to a part.”

“Obviously.”

Thomas Taylor

But, likewise, it ought to be the same with itself, and different from itself; and, in like manner, the same with, and different from, others, if it suffers what we have related above.

How?

Every thing, in a certain respect, thus takes place with relation to every thing: for it is either the same with it or different: or if it is neither same nor different, it will be a part of this to which it is so related, or with respect to a part it will be a whole.

It appears so.

Jowett

And must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also the same with the others, and other than the others; this follows from its previous affections.

How so?

Every thing in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a whole, or of a whole to a part.

Clearly.

Oxford Greek

ἀρ' οὖν τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν;

οὐδαμῶς.

οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν.

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε.

ἀλλ' ἄρα **ἕτερόν** ἐστὶν ἑνὸς τὸ ἔν;

οὐ δῆτα.

Balboas

Par: Take notice then , **Is The One Self** a **Part** of **The Self** ?

αρ' ουν εστιν το εν αυτο μέρος αυτου ;

Ari: Not at all . (ουδαμως .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The Self** will not **Have** a **Whole** to **Part Relationship with It-Self** ,

αρα αυτο αν ουδ' ειη ολον προς μέρος προς εαυτου

as if **It** were a **Part** of **The Self** .

ως ον μέρος αυτου .

Ari: That is not possible . (γαρ ου οιον τε .)

Par: But accordingly then , **Oneness/Unity** is **Other** than **The One** ?

αλλ' αρα ενος(Genitive of εις) εστιν ετερον το εν ;

Ari: Without a doubt . (ου δητα .)

145e αὐτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146a αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146b αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτό

146c ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146d αὐτό, αὐτῷ

145d μέρειν, μερῶν, μέρει

145e μέρη

146b μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

146c μέρος

150a μέρει

144d οὐδαμῶς

145d οὐδαμῶς

146b οὐδαμῶς

150c οὐδαμοῦ

156a οὐδαμῶς

145c ἐτέρῳ

146a ἐτέρῳ, ἐτέρῳ

146b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

146c ἕτερόν, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

146d ἕτερόν, ἐτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον

145d ὅλον, ὅλον

145e ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

146b ὅλον, ὅλον

146c ὅλον

147b ὅλον, ὅλα, ὅλα

Loeb

“Now is the one a part of itself?”

“By no means.”

“Then it cannot, by being a part in relation to itself, be a whole in relation to itself, as a part of itself.”

“No, that is impossible.”

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Thomas Taylor

Is therefore *The One* a part of itself?

By no means.

It will not therefore be a whole, with respect to itself, as if itself were a part.

For it cannot.

But is The One, therefore, different from The One?

By no means.

Jowett

And is the one a part of itself?

Certainly not.

Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself as whole to part?

It cannot.

But is the one other than one?

No.

οὐδ' ἄρα **ἑαυτοῦ** γε **ἕτερον** ἂν εἴη.

οὐ μέντοι.

εἰ οὖν μήτε **ἕτερον** μήτε **ὅλον** μήτε **μέρος αὐτό** πρὸς **ἑαυτό** ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη **ταυτόν** εἶναι **αὐτό ἑαυτῷ**;

ἀνάγκη.

τί δέ; τὸ ἐτέρωθι ὃν **αὐτό ἑαυτοῦ** ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ** ὄντος **ἑαυτῷ** οὐκ ἀνάγκη **αὐτό ἑαυτοῦ**

ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἐτέρωθι ἔσται;

ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

οὕτω μὴν ἐφάνη ἔχον τὸ ἓν, **αὐτό** τε ἐν **ἑαυτῷ** ὃν ἅμα καὶ ἐν **ἐτέρῳ**.

ἐφάνη γάρ.

ἕτερον ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, εἴη ταύτη ἂν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἓν.

ἔοικεν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , nor can **Unity/Oneness** indeed be **Other than It-Self** .

146C αρα ουδ' αν γε ειη ετερον εαυτου .

Ari: Certainly not . (μεντοι ου .)

Par: Therefore , if **Self Is** neither **Other** nor a **Whole** nor a **Part in Relation to It-Self** ,

ουν ει αυτο εστιν μητε ετερον μηθ' ολον μητε μερος προς εαυτο ,
then **Self Must Necessarily not** already **Be** , **The Same with It-Self** ?
αυτο αναγκη ουκ ηδη ειναι ταυτον εαυτω ;

Ari: It must . (αναγκη .)

Par: What then? By **Self Being In The Self** , is not **That** which **Is elsewhere than with It-Self**

τι δε ; αυτο οντος εν τω αυτω ουκ το ον ετερωθι εαυτω
Necessarily Be Other than It-Self , if indeed **Self** will also **Be elsewhere than with It-Self** ?
αναγκη ειναι ετερον εαυτου , ειπερ αυτο και εσται ετερωθι εαυτου ;

Ari: It so appears to me at least . (δοκει εμοιγε .)

Par: **In this way** , as it has come to **Light** , **The One Being** certainly **Has** to **Be At-Once** ,

ουτω εφανε το εν ον μην εχον αμα
both **In-It-Self** and **In-Another** ?

τε εν εαυτου και εν ετερω ;

Ari: For it has come to **Light** . (γαρ εφανε .)

Par: Accordingly then , as it is likely , from this account **The One** will **Be Other than It-Self** .

αρα , ως εοικεν , ταυτη το εν αν ειη ετερον εαυτου .

Ari: It is likely . (εοικεν.)

146a ἐτέρω, ἐτέρω

146b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

146c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἕτερον

146d ἕτερόν, ἐτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἕτερον

146e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἕτερα, ἕτερ, ἐτέρου

145e ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον

146b ὅλον, ὅλον

146c ὅλον

147b ὅλον, ὅλα, ὅλα

148d ὅλω

145e μέρος

146b μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

146c μέρος

150a μέρει

150b μέρει, μέρει, μέρος, μέρος

146a ταῦτῳ

146b ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

146c ταῦτόν

146d ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτῳ

146e ταῦτῳ

146a αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ

146b αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτό

146c ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146d αὐτό

146e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῖς

Loeb

“Nor can it be other than itself.”

“Certainly not.”

“Then if it is neither other nor a part nor a whole in relation to itself, must it not therefore be the same with itself?”

“It must.”

“Well, must not that which is in another place than itself—the self being in the same place with itself— be other than itself, if it is to be in another place?”

“I think so.”

“Now we saw that this was the case with one, for it was in itself and in other at the same time.”

“Yes, we saw that it was so.”

“Then by this reasoning the one appears to be other than itself.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

It will not therefore be different from itself.

Certainly not.

If, therefore, it is neither different nor a whole, nor yet a part with respect to itself, is it not necessary that it should be the same with itself?

It is necessary.

But what, that which is elsewhere than itself, subsisting in *same* in itself, must it not necessarily be different from itself, since it has a subsistence elsewhere?

It appears so to me.

And in this manner *The One* appears to subsist, being at the same time both in itself and in another.

So it seems.

Through this, therefore, it appears that *The One* is different from itself.

It does so.

Jowett

And therefore not other than itself?

Certainly not.

If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself?

Certainly.

But then, again, a thing which is in another place from "itself," if this "itself" remains in the same place with itself, must be other than "itself," for it will be in another place?

True.

Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?

Yes.

Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?

True.

τί οὖν; εἴ τοῦ τι **ἕτερόν** ἐστίν, οὐχ **ἑτέρου** ὄντος **ἕτερον** ἔσται;
 ἀνάγκη.
 οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἓν ἐστίν, ἅπανθ' **ἕτερα** τοῦ ενός, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἓν;
 πῶς δ' οὐ;
ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων.
ἕτερον.
 ὅρα δὴ: **αὐτό** τε **ταυτόν** καὶ τὸ **ἕτερον** ἄρ' οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις;
 πῶς δ' οὐ;
 ἢ οὖν ἐθελήσει **ταυτόν** ἐν τῷ **ἐτέρῳ** ἢ τὸ **ἕτερον** ἐν **ταύτῳ ποτε** εἶναι;
 οὐκ ἐθελήσει.

Balboas

Par: What follows then ? If **Anything Is Other from Another** ,
 146D τι οὖν ; εἰ τι ἐστὶν ἕτερον τοῦ ,
 will **It** not **Be Other from That** to which **It Is Being Other** ?
 ἐστὶ οὐχ ἕτερον ὄντος ἑτέρου ;

Ari: Necessarily . (ἀναγκη .)

Parmenides: 16 Is it not the case then , that **As many as Are Not-One** ,
 Οὐκ οὖν ὅσα ἐστὶν μὴ ἐν ,
So many Are Other than **The One** ; and is not **The One Other** from **Those** that are **Not-One** ?
 ἀπανθ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἐνός , καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν ;

Aristotle: How could it not be ? (πῶς δ' οὐ ;)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** will be **Other** than **The Others** .
 ἀρα τὸ ἐν ἀνείη ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων .

Ari: It is other . (ἕτερον .)

Par: **See** then ; are not both **The Self/Same** and **The Other Opposite** to each other ?
 ὅρα δὴ : ἀρ' οὐκ τε ταυτόν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ;

Ari: How could they not be ? (πῶς δ' οὐ ;)

Par: Therefore , will **The Self/Same** ever **Be Truly Disposed In The Other** , or **The Other**
 οὖν ταυτόν ποτε εἶναι ἢ ἐθελήσει ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον
In The Self/Same ?
 ἐν ταύτῳ ;

Ari: They will not be so disposed . (οὐκ ἐθελήσει .)

146b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

146c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον

146d ἕτερόν, ἐτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον

146e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερα, ἕτερ, ἐτέρου

147a ἕτερα, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερα

146b αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ

146c ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146d αὐτό

146e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῖς

147a αὐτοῖς

146b ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν

146c ταυτόν

146d ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταύτῳ

146e ταύτῳ

147b ταῦτά, ταυτόν

141e ποτέ, ποτέ

142b ποτε

146d ποτε

150b ποτε

152b ποτέ

Loeb

“Well then, if a thing is other than something, will it not be other than that which is other than it?”

“Certainly.”

“Are not all things which are not one, other than one, and the one other than the not one?”

“Of course.”

“Then the one would be other than the others.”

“Yes, it is other.”

“Consider; are not the absolute same and the absolute other opposites of one another?”

“Of course.”

“Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?”

“No.”

Thomas Taylor

But what if any thing is different from any thing, is it not different from that which is different?

Necessarily so.

But are not all such things as are not one different from The One? And is not The One different from such things as are not one?

How should it not?

The One therefore will be different from other things.

Different.

But see whether *different* and *same* are not contrary to each other.

How should they not?

Do you think, therefore, that *same* can ever be in *different*, or *different* in *same*?

I do not.

Jowett

Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other?

Certainly.

And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not-one?

Of course.

Then the one will be other than the others?

True.

But, consider:-Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another?

Of course.

Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?

They will not.

Oxford Greek

εἰ ἄρα τὸ **ἕτερον** ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ** μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν τὸ **ἕτερον** **χρόνον** οὐδένα: εἰ γὰρ ὄντινόν ἐῖη ἐν τῷ, ἐκείνον ἂν τὸν **χρόνον** ἐν **ταύτῳ** εἴη τὸ **ἕτερον**. οὐχ οὕτως;

οὕτως.

ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ** ἐστὶν, οὐδέποτε ἐν **τινὶ** τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἴη τὸ **ἕτερον**.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν οὐτε ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ἐνείῃ ἂν τὸ **ἕτερον**.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **if The Other** will **Never Be In The Self/Same** , then there **Are None** of **The Beings In which The Other Ever Subsists** . For if **It Were** in **any Being at any time at all** , **146E** τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἕτερον οὐδένα χρόνον ἐστὶν . γὰρ εἰ εἴη ἐν τῷ ὄντιον **then at that time** , **The Other** would **also Be In The Self/Same** . Or is it not so ?
τον ἐκεῖνον χρόνον , τὸ ἕτερον ἂν εἴη ἐν ταύτῳ . οὐχ οὕτως ;

Ari: It would be so. (οὕτως .)

Par: But since **It Is** never **In The Self/Same** , **The Other** will never **Be In** any of **The Beings** .
δ' ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶν οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ , τὸ ἕτερον ἂν οὐδέποτε εἴη ἐν τινὶ τῶν ὄντων .

Ari: True . (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The Other** will not **Be In Those** that **Are Not-One** , nor **In The One** .
ἀρα τὸ ἕτερον ἂν οὐτ' εἴη ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν οὐτε ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ .

Ari: It will not be so . (γὰρ οὐ οὖν .)

146c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἕτερον

146d ἕτερόν, ἐτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἕτερον

146e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἕτερα, ἕτερ, ἐτέρου

147a ἕτερά, ἐτέρω, ἕτερα

147b ἕτερα, ἐτερόν

146c ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ

146d αὐτό, αὐτῷ

146e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῖς

147a αὐτοῖς

147b αὐτό, αὐτοῖς, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ

141d χρόνῳ, χρόνου, χρόνῳ, χρόνου

141e χρόνου

146e χρόνον, χρόνον

151e χρόνου, χρόνου

152a χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνον

146c ταῦτόν

146d ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτῳ

146e ταῦτῳ

147b ταῦτά, ταῦτόν

147c ταῦτόν

145b τινος, τινος

145d τινί, τινί, τισί, τισί, τινί

146e τινί

147d τινί, τινί

148c τίνα

Loeb

“Then if the other can never be in the same, there is no existing thing in which the other is during any time; for if it were in anything during any time whatsoever, the other would be in the same, would it not?”

“Yes, it would.”

“But since the other is never in the same, it can never be in any existing thing.”

“True.”

“Then the other cannot be either in the not one or in the one.”

“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

If therefore *different* is never in *same*, there is no being in which for any time *different* subsists; for, if it subsisted in it during any time whatever, in that time *different* would be in *same*. Would it not be so?

It would.

But since it is never in *same*, *different* will never subsist in any being.

True.

Neither therefore will *different* be in things which are not one, nor in The One.

It will not.

Jowett

If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small, the other would be in the same. Is not that true?

Yes.

And since the other-is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is.

True.

Then the other will never be either in the not one, or in the one?

Certainly not

Oxford Greek

οὐκ ἄρα τῷ **ἐτέρῳ** γ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς **ἕτερα**.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐδὲ μὴν **ἑαυτοῖς** γε **ἕτερ** ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων, μὴ **μετέχοντα** τοῦ **ἐτέρου**.

πῶς γάρ;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** , will indeed **not Be Other** from **Those** that **Are Not-One**

αῖρα το ἐν αν γ' ουκ ειη ετερα των μη εν
nor **The Beings** which **Are Not-One Be Other** than **The One** by **That** which is **Other** .
ουδε τα μη εν ετερα του ενος τω ετερω .

Ari: Indeed not .(γαρ ου .)

Par: Then **They** will not **Be Other** than **Each Other** by not **Participating** of **The Other** .

γε μην εαυτοις αν ουδε ειη ετερ' αλληλων μη μετεχοντα του ετερου .

Ari: How can they ? (πως γαρ ;)

146c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον

146d ἕτερόν, ἐτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον

146e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερα, ἕτερ, ἐτέρου

147a ἕτερά, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερα

147b ἕτερα, ἕτερόν

146c ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτό, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ

146d αὐτό

146e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῖς

147a αὐτοῖς

147b αὐτό, αὐτοῖς, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ

144a μετέχων, μετέχει, μετέχοι

145b μετέχοι, μετέχοι

146e μετέχοντα

147a μετέχει, μετεῖχε, μετεῖχεν

149c μετέχει

Loeb

“Then not by reason of the other will the one be other than the not one or the not one other than the one.”

“No.”

“And surely they cannot by reason of themselves be other than one another, if they do not partake of the other.”

“Of course not.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, will not through *different*, be different from things which are not one, nor things which are not one from *The One*.

Not, indeed.

Nor likewise will they be different from each other, since they do not participate of *different*.

For how can they?

Jowett

Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the not-one other than the one.

No.

Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other.

How can they be?

εἰ δὲ μήτε **αὐτοῖς ἕτερά** ἐστι μήτε τῷ **ἐτέρῳ**, οὐ πάντῃ ἤδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ **ἕτερα** εἶναι ἀλλήλων;

ἐκφεύγοι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐνός γε **μετέχει** τὰ μὴ ἓν: οὐ γάρ ἂν μὴ ἓν ἦν, ἀλλὰ πῃ ἂν ἓν ἦν.

ἀληθῇ.

οὐδ' ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἓν: οὐδὲ γάρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἓν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμὸν γε ἔχοντα.

οὐ γάρ οὖν.

τί δέ; τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἐνός ἄρα μόρια ἐστίν; ἢ καὶν οὕτω **μετεῖχε** τοῦ ἐνός τὰ μὴ ἓν;

μετεῖχεν.

Par: But if **They** are neither **Other from-Them Selves** , nor **from The Other** , then **Must**
 147A δε ει εστι μητε ετερα αυτοις μητε τω ετερω , αν μη
They not **Already Entirely Flee** from (Phaedo 104c) **That** which **Is Other from Each Other** ?
 ου ηδη παντη εκφευγοι το ειναι ετερα αλληλων ;

Ari: They must flee . (εκφευγοι .)

Par: Most certainly then , neither will **Those** that are **Not-One Participate** of **The One** ;
 γε μην αλλα ουδε τα μη εν μετεχει του ενος :
 for if **They** did , then **They** would no longer **Be Not-One** , but **in a certain way Be One** .
 γαρ αν αν ου ην μη εν αλλα πη εν .

Ari: **True** . (αληθῇ.)

Par: Accordingly then , **Those** that are **Not-One** will not **Be Number** ; for in this way ,
 αρα τα μη εν αν ουδ' ειη αριθμος : γαρ ουτω
 by indeed **Possessing Number** , **They** could not **entirely Be** , **Not-One** .
 γε εχοντα αριθμον αν πανταπασιν ην μη εν

Ari: Certainly not .(γάρ ουν ου .)

Par: What follows then ? **Are Those** that are **Not-One** , **Parts** of **The One** ? Or would **Those**
 τι δε ; εστιν τα μη εν μορια του ενος ; η καν τα
 that are **Not-One** , by **Possessing Number in this (Negative) way** , **Partake** of **The One** ?
 μη εν αρα ουτω μετειχε του ενος ;

Ari: They would so participate .(μετειχεν .)

146d αὐτό

146e αὐτῷ, αὐτῶ, ἑαυτοῖς

147a αὐτοῖς

147b αὐτό, αὐτοῖς, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῶ

147c ἑαυτῶ

146d ἕτερόν, ἐτέρου, ἕτερον, ἕτερα. ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον

146e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερα, ἕτερ, ἐτέρου

147a ἕτερά, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερα

147b ἕτερα, ἕτερόν

147c ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

145b μετέχοι, μετέχοι

146e μετέχοντα

147a μετέχει, μετεῖχε, μετεῖχεν

149c μετέχει

151e μετέχει, μετέχον

Loeb

“But if they are not other than one another either by reason of themselves or by reason of the other, will it not be quite impossible for them to be other than one another at all?”

“Quite impossible.”

“But neither can the not one partake of the one; for in that case they would not be not one, but would be one.”

“True.”

“Nor can the not one be a number; for in that case, too, since they would possess number, they would not be not one at all.”

“No, they would not.”

“Well, then, are the not one parts of the one? Or would the not one in that case also partake of the one?”

“Yes, they would partake of it.”

Thomas Taylor

But if they are neither different from themselves, nor from *different*, must they not entirely escape from being different from each other?

They must escape.

But neither will things which are not one participate of *The One*: for if they did they would no longer be *not one*, but in a certain respect one.

True.

Hence things which are *not one* will not be number; for they would not be entirely *not one* in consequence of possessing number.

Certainly not.

But what, can things which are *not one* be parts of one? Or would not things which are *not one* by this means participate of *The One*?

They would participate.

Jowett

But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another?

They will.

Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been in some way one.

True.

Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been not-one at all.

It would not.

Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?

It would.

Oxford Greek

εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὸ μὲν ἔν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔν, οὐτ' ἂν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἔν εἴη οὔτε **ὅλον** ὡς
μορίων: οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἔν τοῦ ἐνὸς μόρια, οὔτε **ὅλα** ὡς μορίῳ τῷ ἐνί.

οὐ γάρ.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήτε **ὅλα** μήτε **ἕτερα** ἀλλήλων **ταῦτά** ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις.
ἔφαμεν γάρ.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then on the one hand , if **The (Positive) One Is entirely One** , then
147B ἀρα μὲν εἰ το ἐν ἐστὶ παντὶ δε
in relation to Those that are **Not-One** ; **The One** will not **Be** a **Part** of **Those** that are **Not-One** ,
τα μὴ ἐν , το ἐν ἀν οὐτ' εἰη μοριον των μὴ ἐν
nor could **The One Be** a **Whole in relation to Them** , as if **They** were **Parts** ; nor in turn , will
οὐτε ολον ως μοριων : οὐτε αὖ
Those that are **Not-One Be Parts** of **The One** , nor **Wholes** , just as if **The One Were** a **Part** .
τα μὴ ἐν μορια του ενος , οὐτε ολα ως τω ἐνι μοριω.

Ari: They will not . (γὰρ οὐ .)

Par: But we have certainly said that **Those** that **Are** neither **Parts** nor **Wholes** ,
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐφαμεν τα μήτε μορια μήτε ολα
nor **Other** from **Each Other** , will have to **Be The Same** with **Each Other** .
μήτε ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐσεσθαι ταυτα ἀλλήλοις .

Ari: We have said so .
γὰρ ἐφαμεν .

146b ὅλον, ὅλον

146c ὅλον

147b ὅλον, ὅλα, ὅλα

148d ὅλω

150a ὅλων, ὅλων, ὅλου

146e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

147a ἕτερα, ἕτερα, ἕτερα

147b ἕτερα, ἕτερα

147c ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

147d ἕτερον

146d ταῦτον, ταῦτον, ταῦτον

146c ταῦτον

147b ταῦτά, ταῦτον

147c ταῦτον

147d ταῦτον, ταῦτον

Loeb

“If, then, in every way the one is one and the not one are not one, the one cannot be a part of the not one, nor a whole of which the not one are parts, nor are the not one parts of the one, nor a whole of which the one is a part.”

“No.”

“But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, are the same as one another.”

“Yes, we did.”

Thomas Taylor

If, therefore, this is entirely The One, but those not one, neither will The One be a part of things which are not one, nor a whole with respect to them, as if they were parts; nor, on the contrary, will things which are not one be parts of The One, nor yet wholes, as if The One were a part.

They will not.

But we have said that things which are neither parts nor wholes, nor different from each other, must be the same with each other.

We have said so.

Jowett

If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or whole of the one?

No.

But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another: -so we said?

Yes.

Oxford Greek

φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς;

φῶμεν.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταύτων ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ.

κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , shall we also say that **The One Has The Relationship to**

Those that **Are Not-One** , *in the same way as* **The Self Has** to **Be** to **Selves** ?
 αρα και φωμεν το εν εχον προς
 τα μη εν ουτως το αυτο ειναι αυτοις ;

Ari: We must say so. (φωμεν .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** , as it is **Reasonable** , **Is** both **Different from The Others**

αρα το εν , ως εοικεν , εστιν τε ετερον των αλλων
 and *from It Self* and **The Self/Same as Those** and *with It Self* .
 και εαυτου και ταυτον εκεινοις τε και εαυτω .

Ari: It has indeed come to **Light** from this **Logos** to venture saying it .

147C γε φαινεσθαι εκ του λογου κινδυνευει .

146e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοῖς

147a αὐτοῖς

147b αὐτὸ, αὐτοῖς, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ

147c ἑαυτῷ

147d αὐτό

146e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἑτέρω, ἕτερα, ἕτερ, ἑτέρου

147a ἑτερά, ἑτέρω, ἕτερα

147b ἑτερα, ἕτερόν

147c ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

147d ἕτερον

146d ταῦτον, ταῦτόν, ταῦτῳ

146c ταύτῳ

147b ταῦτά, ταῦτόν

147c ταῦτόν

147d ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

142a λόγος

142c λόγον

147b λόγου

148c λόγον

151b λόγον

Loeb

“Shall we say, then, that since the relations of the one and the not one are such as we have described, the two are the same as one another?”

“Yes, let us say that.”

“The one, then, is, it appears, other than all other things and than itself, and is also the same as other things and as itself.”

“That appears to be the result of our argument.”

Thomas Taylor

Must we not therefore assert that The One, since it subsists in this manner with respect to things which are not one, is the same with them?

We must.

The One, therefore, as it appears, is both different from others and itself, and the same with them and with itself.

It appears from this reasoning to be so.

Jowett

Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is the same with it?

Let us say so.

Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself and the others.

That appears to be the inference.

Oxford Greek

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὅμοιον τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἐαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;

ἴσως.

ἐπειδὴ γοὺν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τὰλλα που ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη.

τί μὴν;

οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἥττον;

τί γὰρ ἂν;

Balboas

Par: Take notice then , **Is It** also **Like** and **Unlike It Self** and also **The Others** ?

Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ὁμοιον τε καὶ ἀνομοιον εαυτω τε καὶ τοις ἀλλοις ;

Ari: Perhaps . (ἴσως .)

Par: Seeing that **The One Has** come to **Light Different from The Others** ,

ἐπειδὴ ἐφάνη ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ,

then surely **The Others** will also **Be Different in some (indefinite) way from That** .

γουν ταλλα ἀν καὶ εἰη ἕτερ' που ἐκείνου .

Ari: What next then ? (τι μὴν ;)

Par: **In the same way** , will not **The One Be Different from The Others** , just as

οὕτως οὐκ οὖν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων , ὥσπερ

The Others Are also **Different from It** , and **It** is neither **more** nor **less** (in this **Difference**) ?

ταλλα καὶ ἐκείνου , καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἥττον ;

Ari: How could it not be so ? (τι ἀν γὰρ ;)

140b ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον

142c ὁμοιον

147c ὅμοιον, ὁμοίως

148a ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον

148b ὁμοιον

139e ἀνόμοιον

140b ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον

147c ἀνόμοιον

148a ἀνομοίω

148b ἀνόμοιον

147a αὐτοῖς

147b αὐτὸ, αὐτοῖς, ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ

147c ἐαυτῷ

147d αὐτὸ

147e αὐτὸ, αὐτὸ

147a ἑτέρᾳ, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερα

147b ἕτερα, ἑτερόν

147c ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

147d ἕτερον

147e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

Loeb

“Is it, then, also like and unlike itself and others?”

“Perhaps.”

“At any rate, since it was found to be other than others, the others must also be other than it.”

“Of course.”

“Then it is other than the others just as the others are other than it, neither more nor less?”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But is it also similar and dissimilar to itself and others?

Perhaps so.

Since, therefore, it appears to be different from others, others also will be different from it.

But what then?

Will it not be different from others, in the same manner as others from it? And this neither more nor less?

How should it not?

Jowett

And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?

Perhaps.

Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also be other than the one.

Yes.

And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less?

True.

Oxford Greek

εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἥττον, **ὁμοίως**.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν ἢ **ἕτερον** εἶναι **πέπονθεν** τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτη **ταὐτόν** ἂν **πεπονθότα** εἶεν τό τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τᾶλλα τῷ ἐνί.

πῶς **λέγεις**;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , if **It** is neither **more** nor **less** , **They Are Different** in a **similar** way .
 ἀρα εἰ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἥττον , ὁμοίως .

Ari: Yes . (ναί .)

Par: Is it not so then , that inasmuch as **The One** **experiences Being Different** than **The Others** ,
 οὐκ οὐν ἢ πεπονθεν εἶναι ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων
 and **The Others also than The One** , then **in this way The One** will also **experience Being**
 καὶ τὰλλα ὡσαύτως ἐκείνου ταύτη ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν
The Self/Same both **in relation to The Others** and **The Others in relation to The One** .
 147D ταῦτον τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὰλλα τῷ ἐνί .

Ari: What do you mean ? (πῶς λέγεις ;)

140b ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον

142c ὁμοιον

147c ὁμοίον, ὁμοίως

148a ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον

148b ὁμοιον

147a ἕτερά, ἐτέρω, ἕτερα

147b ἕτερα, ἕτερόν

147c ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

147d ἕτερον

147e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

140b πεπονθός, πεπονθός, πεπονθός

146b πέπονθεν

147c πέπονθεν, πεπονθότα

148a πεπονθέναι, πεπονθός, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν

148c πέπονθε, πεπονθέναι, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν

146e ταῦτῳ

147b ταῦτά, ταῦτόν

147c ταὐτόν

147d ταὐτόν, ταὐτόν

148a ταῦτόν, ταῦτῳ, ταὐτόν

143c λέγω

144d ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες

147c λέγεις

147d λέγειν

147e λέγομεν, λέγομεν

Loeb

“And if neither more nor less, then in like degree?”

“Yes.”

“In so far as it is so affected as to be other than the others and the others are affected in the same way in relation to the one, to that degree the one will be affected in the same way as the others and the others in the same way as the one.”

“What do you mean?”

Thomas Taylor

If, therefore, neither more nor less, it must be different in a similar manner.

Certainly.

Will not that through which *The One* becomes different from others, and others in a similar manner from it, be also that through which both *The One* becomes the same with others, and others with *The One*?

How do you say?

Jowett

And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?

Yes.

In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and the others like the one.

How do you mean?

ὥδε: ἕκαστον τῶν **ὀνομάτων** οὐκ ἐπὶ **τινι** καλεῖς;

ἔγωγε.

τί οὖν; τὸ **αὐτὸ ὄνομα** εἴποισ ἂν πλεονάκις ἢ ἅπαξ;

ἔγωγε.

πότερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἅπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεις οὐπὲρ ἐστὶ **τοῦνομα**, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; ἢ ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις **ταυτόν ὄνομα** φθέγγῃ, **πολλή** ἀνάγκη σε **ταυτόν** καὶ **λέγειν** αἰεῖ;

τί μήν;

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ **ἕτερον ὄνομα** ἐστὶν ἐπὶ **τινι**;

πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: The following . Do you not **assign** every **Name** to something ?

ὥδε . οὐκ καλεῖς ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπὶ τινι ;

Ari: I do at least . (εἰς ἄντι .)

Par: What follows then ? Can you **pronounce The Self/Same Name** either often or once ?

τι οὖν ; ἂν εἴποισ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα πλεονάκις ἢ ἅπαξ ;

Aris I can at least . (εἰς ἄντι .)

Par: Therefore on the one hand , do you **Name That** to which the name **belongs** , when

οὖν μὲν πότερον εἰπῇς οὐπὲρ τοῦνομα ἐστὶ ἐὰν

you say **It** once ; but **not** on the other hand , when you say that **Name** often ? Or rather ,

προσαγορεύεις ἅπαξ , οὐκ δὲ ἐὰν ἐκεῖνο πολλάκις ; ἢ πολλή ἀνάγκη σε **always mean The Same Name** whether you utter **The Same Name** once or often ?

ἀνάγκη σε αἰεὶ λέγειν ταυτόν ὄνομα ἐάντε φθέγγῃ ταυτόν ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις ;

Ari: Of course , what follows then ?

μὴν τι ;

Par: Is it not the case then , that **Another Name** also **belongs** to some particular ?

οὐκοῦν τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομα καὶ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τινι .

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε .)

126b ὄνομα, ὄνομα

142a ὄνομα

147d ὀνομάτων, ὄνομα, τοῦνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομα

145d τινί, τινι, τισί, τισί, τινί

146e τινι

147d τινι, τινι

148c τίνα

148e τινος

147b αὐτό, αὐτοῖς, ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτῶ

147c ἑαυτῶ

147d αὐτό

147e αὐτό, αὐτό

148a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

147b ταῦτά, ταῦτόν

147c ταυτόν

147d ταυτόν, ταυτόν

148a ταυτόν, ταῦτῶ, ταυτόν

148b ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν

144e πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

145a πολλά

147d πολλή

150d πολλή

155e πολλά, πολλά

144d λέγομεν, λέγοντες

147c λέγεις

147d λέγειν

147e λέγωμεν, λέγομεν

148c λέγεις

147b ἕτερα, ἑτερόν

147c ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

147d ἕτερον

147e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

148a ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἑτερόν, ἑτερόν

Loeb

"I will explain. You give a particular name to a thing?"

"Yes."

"Well, you can utter the same name once or more than once?"

"Yes."

"And do you name that to which the name belongs when you utter it once, but not when you utter it many times? Or must you always mean the same thing when you utter the same name, whether once or repeatedly?"

"The same thing, of course."

"The word other is the name of something, is it not?"

"Certainly."

Thomas Taylor

Thus: Do not you call every name the name of something?

I do:

but what then? Do you pronounce the same name often or once?

I pronounce it once.

When, therefore, you enunciate that name once, do you denominate that thing to which the name belongs: but if often, not the same? Or, whether you pronounce the same name once or often, do you not necessarily always signify the same thing?

But what then?

Does not a different name belong to some certain thing?

Entirely so.

Jowett

I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a thing?

Yes.

And you may say the name once or oftener?

Yes.

And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once?

Of course it is the same.

And is not "other" a name given to a thing?

Certainly.

ὅταν ἄρα **αὐτὸ** φθέγγῃ, ἐάντε ἅπαζ ἐάντε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι **ὀνομάζεις** ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐπερ ἦν **ὄνομα**.

ἀνάγκη.

ὅταν δὴ **λέγωμεν** ὅτι **ἕτερον** μὲν τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, **ἕτερον** δὲ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, **δὶς** τὸ **ἕτερον** εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει **αὐτὸ** αἰεὶ **λέγομεν** ἡσπερ ἦν **τοῦτομα**.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Par: Accordingly then , when you utter **Self** whether once or often , you do not **apply** the **Name** 147E ἀρα ὅταν φθεγγῇ αὐτο , εἰντε ἀπαξ εἰντε πόλλακις , οὐκ ονομαζεις to nothing else , nor **mean** anything else , than **That** to which the **Name** belongs .
ἐπ' ἄλλῳ οὐδε ἄλλο τι ἡ ἐκεῖνο οὐπερ ονομα ἦν .

Ari: Necessarily so . (ἀναγκη .)

Par: Surely then when we **say** , on the one hand , that **The Others Are Other from The One** ,
δὴ ὅταν λεγωνεν μὲν ὅτι ταλλα ἕτερον τοῦ εἰνός ,
and on the other hand , that **The One Is Other from The Others** , by **saying Other Twice** ,
δε το ἐν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων , εἰποντες το ἕτερον δις
we still **signify** nothing else , but **That Nature** of which **This Name is Always The Self/Same** .
μαλλον λεγομεν οὐδεν τι ἐπ' ἄλλῃ , ἀλλ' τῇ φύσει ἡσπερ ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τουνομα ἦν αἰε αὐτο.

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ μὲν οὖν .)

147c εἰατῶ
147d αὐτὸ
147e αὐτὸ, αὐτὸ
148a αὐτὸ, αὐτὸ, αὐτὸ
148d εἰατῶ, εἰατῶ, εἰατῶ, αὐτοῖ,

142a ὄνομα, ὀνομάζεται
147d ὀνομάτων, ὄνομα, τοῦνομα, ὄνομα, ὀνομά
147e ὀνομάζεις, ὄνομα, τοῦνομα
149d ὄνομα
155d ὄνομα, ὀνομάζεται

147c λέγεις
147d λέγειν
147e λέγωμεν, λέγομεν
148c λέγεις
153a λέγειν, λέγειν

147c ἕτερον, ἕτερα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον
147d ἕτερον
147e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον
148a ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν, ἕτερον
148b ἕτερον, μὴνῆτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω

143c δις, δις, δις, δις, δις, δις
147e δις

Loeb

“Then when you utter it, whether once or many times, you apply it to nothing else, and you name nothing else, than that of which it is the name.”

“Assuredly.”

“Now when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one is other than the others, though we use the word other twice, we do not for all that apply it to anything else, but we always apply it to that nature of which it is the name.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

When, therefore, you pronounce this, whether once or often, you do not assign this name to any other, nor do you denominate any other thing than that to which this name belongs.

It is necessary it should be so.

But when we say that other things are different from *The One*, and that *The One* is different from others, twice pronouncing the name *different*, we yet signify nothing more than the nature of that thing of which this is the name.

Entirely so.

Jowett

Whenever, then, you use the word "other," whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?

True.

Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other than the others, in repeating the word "other" we speak of that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?

Quite true.

Oxford Greek

ἤι ἄρα **ἕτερον** τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, κατ' **αὐτὸ** τὸ **ἕτερον πεπονθέναι** οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ **αὐτὸ** ἂν **πεπονθὸς** εἴη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις: τὸ δέ που **ταύτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον**: οὐχί;

ναί.

ἤι δὴ τὸ ἐν **ἕτερον** τῶν ἄλλων **πέπονθεν** εἶναι, κατ' **αὐτὸ** τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασιν **ὅμοιον** ἂν εἴη: ἅπαν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἕτερον ἐστίν.

ἔοικεν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , inasmuch as **The One Is Other from The Others** , and **The Others**

148A αρα η το εν ετερον των αλλων και ταλλα
from The One , by **having experienced The Other Self** , otherwise , **The One** will not
του ενος , κατ' πεπονθεναι το ετερον αυτο αλλα το εν αν ουκ
experience Being Other , but **Be The Self/Same as The Others** . But **Is** not **That** which
πεπονθος αλλο ειη το αυτο τοις αλλοις : δε ουχι το
experiences The Self/Same in some way Similar ?
πεπονθος ταυτον που ομοιον ;

Ari: Yes . (ναι .)

Par: Surely then inasmuch as **The One experiences That** which **Is Other from All The Others** ,
δη η το εν πεπονθεν ειναι ετερον των αλλων
then **Absolutely All The Others** will **Be Similar to This Self** ; for **All Are Other from All** .
απαν απασιν αν ειη ομοιον τουτο αυτο ; γαρ απαν εστιν ετερον απαντων .

Ari: It is **Reasonable** . (εοικεν .)

147d ἕτερον
147c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον
148a ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν
148b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ
148c ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

147d αὐτό
147c αὐτό, αὐτό
148a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό
148d ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ
148e αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό

146b πέπονθεν
147c πέπονθεν, πεπονθότα
148a πεπονθέναι, πεπονθὸς, πεπονθὸς, πέπονθεν
148c πέπονθε, πεπονθέναι, πεπονθὸς, πέπονθεν
156c πάσχειν

147c ταῦτόν
147d ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν
148a ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν
148b ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν
148c ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

142c ὅμοιον
147c ὁμοῖον, ὁμοίως
148a ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὁμοιον
148b ὁμοιον
148c ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον

Loeb

“In so far as the one is other than the others and the others are other than the one, the one and the others are not in different states, but in the same state; but whatever is in the same state is like, is it not?”

“Yes.”

“Then in so far as the one is in the state of being other than the others, just so far everything is like all other things; for everything is other than all other things.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

If therefore *The One* be different from others, and others from *The One*, in consequence of suffering the same *different*, *The One* will not suffer that which is different from others, but the same with others: but is not that which in a certain respect suffers the same similar?

Certainly.

But, in the same manner, as *The One* becomes different from others, every thing becomes similar to every thing: for every thing is different from all things.

It appears so.

Jowett

Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than the one, in that the word "other" is applied to both, will be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition is like?

Yes.

Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other than every thing.

True.

Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ταύτῳ.

καὶ τοῦτο.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη, ὥς ἄρα τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ταυτόν.

ἐφάνη γάρ.

Balboas

Parmenides: 17 But surely then , **The Like Is** indeed contrary to **The Unlike** .
 Ἀλλὰ δὴ το ὁμοιον γε ἐναντιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ .

Aristotle: Yes . (ναί .)

Par: Is it not also the case , that **The Other Is** contrary to **The Self/Same** ?
 οὐκοῦν καὶ το ἕτερον τῷ ταύτῳ .

Ari: And this also . (καὶ τοῦτο .)

Par: But certainly this was indeed also shown ; that in an according way ,
 ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γ' καὶ ἐφάνη ὥς ἄρα

The One Is The Self/Same with The Others .
 το ἐν ταυτον τοις ἄλλοις .

Ari: For it has come to **Light** . (γὰρ ἐφάνη .)

142c ὁμοιον

147c ὁμοιόν, ὁμοίως

148a ὁμοιον, ὁμοιος, ὅμοιον

148b ὁμοιον

148c ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιόν

140b ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιόν, ἀνόμοιον

147c ἀνόμοιον

148a ἀνομοίῳ

148b ἀνόμοιον

148c ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον

147d ἕτερον

147c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

148a ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

148b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω

148c ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

147c ταῦτόν

147d ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

148a ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

148b ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

148c ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

Loeb

“But the like is opposed to the unlike.”

“Yes.”

“And the other to the same.”

“That is also true.”

“But this, too, was shown, that the one is the same as the others.”

“Yes, it was.”

Thomas Taylor

But is the similar contrary to the dissimilar?

It is.

And is not different contrary to same?

And this also.

But this likewise is apparent, that The One is both the same with and different from others.

It is apparent.

Jowett

Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?

Yes.

And the other to the same?

True again.

And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?

Yes.

Oxford Greek

τουναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι **ταυτόν** τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ **ἕτερον** εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων.

πάνυ γε.

ἦι γε μὴν **ἕτερον**, **ὅμοιον** ἐφάνη.

ναί.

ἦι ἄρα **ταυτόν**, **ἀνόμοιον** ἔσται κατὰ τουναντίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει. ὁμοίου δέ που τὸ **ἕτερον**;

ναί.

ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τὸ **ταυτόν**, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται τῷ **ἐτέρῳ**.

ἔοικεν.

Balboas

Par: But to **Be The Self/Same with The Others** is indeed the opposite *experience*

148B δε ειναι το ταυτον τοις αλλοις εστι γε τουναντιον παθος
from that to **Be Other from The Others** .
τω ειναι ετερον των αλλων .

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ γε .)

Par: Most certainly , insofar as **The One Is Other** , It has come to **Light** to **Be Like** .
γε μην η ετερον , εφανη ομοιον .

Ari: Yes . (ναι .)

Par: Accordingly then , insofar as **It Is The Self/Same** , It will **Be Unlike** ,
αρα η ταυτον εσται ανομοιον
by *experiencing the experience* that **Is** opposite to **That** which *makes It Like* .
κατα παθει παθος τουναντιον τω ομοιουντι .
Whereas on the other hand , **The Other in some way made It Like** ?
δε το ετερον που ωμοιου ;

Ari: Yes . (ναι .)

Par: Accordingly then , **That** which **Is The Self/Same** will *make It Unlike* ;
αρα το ταυτον ανομοιωσει ,
otherwise **The Same** will *not Be* opposite to **The Other** .
η ουκ εσται εναντιον τω ετερῳ .

Ari: It is reasonable .

εοικεν .

147d ταυτόν, ταυτόν

148a ταυτόν, ταύτῳ, ταυτόν

148b ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν

148c ταυτόν, ταυτόν, ταυτόν

148d ταυτόν

147e ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

148a ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

148b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ

148c ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

148d ἕτερόν

147c ὁμοῖόν, ὁμοῖος

148a ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον

148b ὅμοιον

148c ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὁμοῖόν

148d ὁμοῖόν

147c ἀνόμοιον

148a ἀνόμοιῳ

148b ἀνόμοιον

148c ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον

148d ἀνόμοιον

Loeb

“And being the same as the others is the opposite of being other than the others.”

“Certainly.”

“In so far as it was other it was shown to be like.”

“Yes.”

“Then in so far as it is the same it will be unlike, since it has a quality which is the opposite of the quality which makes it like, for the other made it like.”

“Yes.”

“Then the same will make it unlike; otherwise the same will not be the opposite of the other.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

But to be the same with others is a contrary passion to the being different from others.

Entirely so.

But *The One* appears to be similar, so far as different.

Certainly.

So far therefore as it is *same*, it will be dissimilar on account of its suffering a passion contrary to that which produces the similar: or was it not the similar which produced the different?

Certainly.

It will therefore render that which is dissimilar the same; or it would not be contrary to different.

So it appears.

Jowett

And to be, the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others?

Certainly.

And in that it was other it was shown to be like?

Yes.

But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite affection to that which made it and this was the affection of otherness.

Yes.

The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the opposite of the other.

True.

Oxford Greek

ὅμοιον ἄρα καὶ **ἀνόμοιον** ἔσται τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ μὲν **ἕτερον**, **ὅμοιον**, ἢ δὲ **ταυτόν**, **ἀνόμοιον**.

ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ, ὥς ἔοικεν, καὶ **τοιούτον λόγον**.

καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει.

τίνα;

ἢ **ταυτόν πέπονθε**, μὴ ἀλλοῖον **πεπονθέναι**, μὴ ἀλλοῖον δὲ **πεπονθὸς** μὴ **ἀνόμοιον**, μὴ **ἀνόμοιον** δὲ **ὅμοιον** εἶναι: ἢ δ' ἄλλο **πέπονθεν**, ἀλλοῖον, ἀλλοῖον δὲ ὃν **ἀνόμοιον** εἶναι.

ἀληθῆ **λέγεις**.

ταυτόν τε ἄρα ὃν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι **ἕτερόν** ἐστι, κατ' ἀμφοτέρα καὶ κατὰ ἐκάτερον, **ὅμοιον** τε ἂν εἴη καὶ **ἀνόμοιον** τοῖς ἄλλοις.

πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** will **Be** both **Like** and **Unlike The Others** . On the one hand ,
148C ἄρα το ἐν ἐσται ὁμοιον και ἀνομοιον τοις ἀλλοις , μὲν
insofar as **It Is Other** , **It** will **Be Like** ; but on the other hand , insofar as **It Is Same** , **Unlike** .
ἡ ἕτερον , ὁμοιον , δε ἡ ταυτον , ἀνομοιον .

Ari: As it is reasonable , and according to **This Logos** , it surely has to be so .
ὡς εοικεν , και γαρ τοιουτον λογον , δη εχει ουν .

Par: For **The One** also has to **Be** in the following way .
γαρ και εχει τονδε .

Ari: In what way ? (τινα ;)

Par: Insofar as **It experiences Being The Same** , **It does not experience alteration** ; whereas if
ἡ πεπονθε ταυτον , μη πεπονθεναι ἀλλοιον , δε
It does not experience alteration , **It Cannot Be Unlike** ; but if **It Is not Unlike** , **It Is Like** ;
μη πεπονθος ἀλλοιον μη ἀνομοιον , δε μη ἀνομοιον : ειναι ὁμοιον :
but insofar as **It experiences Being Other** , then **It experiences alteration** , thus by **Being**
δ' ἡ πεπονθεν ἀλλο ἀλλοιον , δε ον
altered It Is Unlike .
ἀλλοιον ειναι ἀνομοιον .

Ari: You speak **The Truth** . (λέγεις ἀληθῆ .)

Par: Accordingly then , since **The One Being Is** both **The Same** and **Other from The Others** ,
ἀρα οτι το ἐν ον ἐστι τε ταυτον και ἕτερον τοις ἀλλοις ,
according to both and according to each , thus , **It** will **Be** both **Like** and **Unlike The Others** .
148D κατ' ἀμφοτερα και καθ' ἐκατερον , αν ειη τε ὁμοιον και ἀνομοιον τοις ἀλλοις .

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ γε .)

148a ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον

148b ὁμοιον

148c ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον

148d ὁμοιον

156b ὁμοιον

148a ἀνόμοιο

148b ἀνόμοιον

148c ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον,
ἀνόμοιον

148a ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

148b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἑτέρω

148c ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

148d ἕτερόν

151a ἕτερον, ἑτέρω, ἕτερον

148a ταῦτον, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

148b ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

148c ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

148d ταῦτόν

150b ταῦτά

142c τοιούτον

145b τοιοῦτον

148c τοιοῦτον

149e τοιαῦτα

155d τοιούτων

142c λόγον

147b λόγου

148c λόγον

151b λόγον

154a λόγον

147c πέπονθεν, πεπονθῶτα

148a πεπονθέναι, πεπονθός, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν

148c πέπονθε, πεπονθέναι, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν

156c πάσχειν

157b πάσχει, πάσχειν, πεπονθέναι

146c τι

147d τι, τι

148c τίνα

148c τινος

150a τινός

147d λέγειν

147c λέγωμεν, λέγομεν

148c λέγεις

153a λέγειν, λέγειν

154a λέγειν

Loeb

“Then the one will be both like and unlike the others, like in so far as it is other, unlike in so far as it is the same.”

“Yes, that sort of conclusion seems to be tenable.”

“But there is another besides.”

“What is it?”

“In so far as it is in the same state, the one is not in another state, and not being in another state it is not unlike, and not being unlike it is like but in so far as it is in another state, it is of another sort, and being of another sort it is unlike.”

“True.”

“Then the one, because it is the same as the others and because it is other than the others, for both these reasons or for either of them would be both like and unlike the others.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

The One therefore will be both similar and dissimilar to others: and so far as different it will be similar; but so far as the same dissimilar.

The case appears to be so.

And it is likewise thus affected.

How?

So far as it suffers same it does not suffer that which is various; but not suffering that which is various, it cannot be dissimilar; and not being dissimilar, it will be similar: but so far as it suffers different it will be various; and being various it will be dissimilar.

You speak the truth.

Since, therefore, *The One* is both the same with and different from others, according to both and according to each of these, it will be similar and dissimilar to others.

Entirely so.

Jowett

Then the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far as it is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.

Yes, that argument may be used.

And there is another argument.

What?

In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected otherwise, and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is like; but in so far as it is affected by other it is otherwise, and being otherwise affected is unlike.

True.

Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like and unlike the others?

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν καὶ **ἐαυτῷ** ὡσαύτως, ἐπεὶ περ **ἕτερόν** τε **ἐαυτοῦ** καὶ **ταῦτόν** **ἐαυτῷ** ἐφάνη, κατ'
ἀμφοτέρω καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον **ὅμοιον** τε καὶ **ἀνόμοιον** φανήσεται;

ἀνάγκη.

τί δὲ δὴ; περὶ τοῦ **ἄπτεσθαι** τὸ ἐν **αὐτοῦ** καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ μὴ **ἄπτεσθαι** πέρι πῶς ἔχει,
σκοπεῖ.

σκοπῶ.

αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν **ἐαυτῷ ὅλῳ** τὸ ἐν ἐφάνη ὄν.

ὀρθῶς.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἔν;

ναί.

Balboas

Par: And in a similar way , is **This** not the case , *in relation to-Itself* , **Seeing** that **The One**
καὶ ὡσαυτως οὐκοῦν εαυτῷ ἐπεὶ περ
Being has come to **Light** both **Other from-It-Self** and **The Same with-It-Self** ;
ἐφάνη τε ἕτερον εαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτον εαυτῷ ,
according to both and according to each , thus , **It** will come to **Light** both **Like** and **Unlike** ?
κατ' ἀμφοτέρα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον φανήσεται τε ὁμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον ;

Ari: Necessarily so . (ἀνάγκη .)

Par: What then ? Consider how **The One Has** to **Be in relation to Grasping/Touching** ,
Τι δὲ δὴ ; σκοπεῖ , πῶς το ἐν εχει περὶ ἀπτεσθαι
according to **The Self** and to **The Others** , and then *in relation to not Grasping/Touching* .
περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀπτεσθαι .

Ari: I so consider . (σκοπῶ .)

Par: For **The One Being** has come to **Light in some way In The Whole It-Self** .
γὰρ το ἐν ὄν ἐφάνη που ἐν ὅλῳ εαυτῷ .

Ari: Rightly so . (ὀρθῶς .)

Par: Is it not the case then , that **The One Is** also **In The Others** ?
οὐκοῦν το ἐν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ;

Ari: Yes . (ναί .)

148b ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρω

148c ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

148d ἕτερόν

151a ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἕτερον

153a ἑτέρω, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἑτερά

148b ταῦτον, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

148c ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

148d ταῦτόν

150b ταῦτά

151c ταῦτά, ταῦτά

148b ὅμοιον

148c ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον

148d ὅμοιον

156b ὅμοιον

157a ὁμοίος, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον

148b ἀνόμοιον

148c ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον

148d ἀνόμοιον

156b ἀνόμοιον

157a ἀνόμοιον, ἀνομοίου, ἀνόμοιον

133a ἄπτη

138a ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτεσθαι

148d ἄπτεσθαι, ἄπτεσθαι

148e ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτεσθαι, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτεσθαί, ἄπτεσθαι

149a ἄπτεσθαι, ἄφεταί, ἄφεσθαι, ἄφεσθαι

147e αὐτό, αὐτό

148a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

148d ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ

148e αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτό

149a αὐτῇ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτόν

146c ὅλον

147b ὅλον, ὅλα, ὅλα

148d ὅλῳ

150a ὅλῳ, ὅλω, ὅλου

150b ὅλω, ὅλον, ὅλω

Loeb

“And likewise, since it has been shown to be other than itself and the same as itself, the one will for both these reasons or for either of them be both like and unlike itself.”

“That is inevitable.”

“Now, then, consider the question whether the one touches or does not touch itself and other things.”

“I am considering.”

“The one was shown, I think, to be in the whole of itself.”

“Right.”

“And the one is also in other things?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

And will not this in a similar manner be the case with relation to itself, since it has appeared to be both different from and the same with itself; so that, according to both these, and according to each, it will appear to be similar and dissimilar?

Necessarily so.

But consider now how *The One* subsists with respect to touching itself and others, and not touching.

I consider.

For *The One* appears in a certain respect to be in the whole of itself.

Right.

But is *The One* also in others?

Certainly.

Jowett

And in the same way as being other than itself, and the same with itself on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike itself.

Of course.

Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others?-Consider.

I am considering.

The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?

True.

And also in other things?

Yes.

ἥι μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων **ἄπτοιτο** ἄν: ἥ δὲ **αὐτὸ** ἐν **ἑαυτῷ**, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο **ἄπτεσθαι**, **αὐτὸ** δὲ **αὐτοῦ** **ἄπτοιτο** ἄν ἐν **ἑαυτῷ** ὄν.

φαίνεται.

οὕτω μὲν δὴ **ἄπτοιτο** ἄν τὸ ἐν **αὐτοῦ** τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ἄπτοιτο.

τί δὲ τῇδε; ἄρ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον **ἄψεσθαί τινος** ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κείσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὐ μέλλει **ἄπτεσθαι**, ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον ἥ ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ἥ ἔδρα ἥ ἂν κέηται, ἄπτεται;

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα εἰ μέλλει **αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ** ἄψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ **εὐθύς** μετὰ **ἑαυτὸ** κείσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης ἐν ἥ **αὐτό** ἐστίν.

δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

Par: Thus on the one hand insofar as **The One Is In Others** , **It** will **Grasp The Others** ;
148E ἀρα μὲν ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις , ἀν ἀπτοιτο τῶν ἄλλων :
but insofar as **Self Is In It-Self** , on the one hand , **It** will be kept from **Grasping The Others** ,
δε ἡ αὐτο ἐν ἐαυτῷ , μὲν ἀπειργοιτο ἀπτεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ,
whereas on the other hand , **Self** will **Grasp The Self** , by **Being In It-Self** .
δε αὐτο ἀν ἀπτοιτο αὐτοῦ ὄν ἐν ἐαυτῷ .

Ari: So it has come to **Light** .
φαίνεται .

Par: In this way then , on the one hand , **The One** will **Grasp** both **The Self** and **The Others** .
οὕτω δὴ μὲν τὸ ἐν ἀν ἀπτοιτο τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων .

Ari: It will so grasp . (ἀπτοιτο .)

Par: But on the other hand , what about the following ? **Must** not **Everything** which is about
δε τι τηδε ; ἀρ' δεῖ οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον
to **Grasp Anything** , be situated next to **That** which **It** is about to **Grasp** , by **Filling-up**
ἀψεσθαι τινός κείσθαι ἐφεξῆς ἐκείνῳ οὐ μέλλει ἀπτεσθαι , κατέχον
That Same Place , which lies **Besides That** , so as to **Grasp It** ?
τὴν ταύτην ἔδραν ἡ ἀν κέηται μετ' ἡ ἐκείνην , ἡ ἀπτεσθαι ;

Ari: It must . (ἀνάγκη .)

Par: Accordingly then , if **The One Self** were also about to **Grasp The Self** , must **It** be situated
ἀρα εἰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ μέλλει ἀψεσθαι αὐτοῦ , δεῖ κείσθαι
Immediately Next to **It-Self** ; by **Filling-up That Neighboring Place** , **In-which** , **The Self Is** .
εὐθύς μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ , κατέχον ἐκείνης χώραν τὴν ἐχομένην ἐν ἡ αὐτο ἐστίν.

Ari: It must do so . (γὰρ δεῖ οὖν .)

138a ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτεσθαι

148d ἄπτεσθαι, ἄπτεσθαι

148e ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτεσθαι, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτοιτο, ἄψεσθαί, ἄπτεσθαι

148a αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτό

148d ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ

148e αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτό, αὐτό

149a αὐτῇ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῶν

149b αὐτὰ

147d τινι, τινι

148c τίνα

148e τινός

150a τινός

157a τινόν

137e εὐθέος, εὐθός, εὐθέος, εὐθός

145b εὐθέος

148e εὐθύς

154b εὐθός

162a εὐθός

Loeb

“Then by reason of being in the others it would touch them, and by reason of being in itself it would be prevented from touching the others, but would touch itself, since it is in itself.”

“That is clear.”

“Thus the one would touch itself and the other things.”

“It would.”

“But how about this? Must not everything which is to touch anything be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy that position which, being next to that of the other, touches it?”

“It must.”

“Then the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie next to itself and occupy the position next to that in which it is.”

“Yes, it must.”

Thomas Taylor

So far therefore as The One is in others it will touch others; but so far as it is in itself it will be hindered from touching others, but it will touch itself because it subsists in itself.

So it appears.

And thus, indeed, The One will both touch itself and others.

It will so.

But what will you say to this? Must not every thing which is about to touch any thing be situated in a place proximate to and after that which it is about to touch, and in which when situated it touches?

It is necessary.

The One, therefore, if it is about to touch itself, ought to be situated immediately after itself, occupying the place proximate to that in which it is.

It ought so.

Jowett

In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching them, and would touch itself only.

Clearly.

Then the inference is that it would touch both?

It would.

But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is to touch another be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy the place nearest to that in which what it touches is situated?

True.

Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is?

It ought.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν **δύο** μὲν ὃν τὸ ἓν ποιήσειεν ἂν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν **δυοῖν** χώραιν ἅμα **γένοιτο**: ἕως δ' ἂν ᾗ ἓν,
οὐκ ἐθελήσει;

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ἢ **αὐτῇ** ἄρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἐνὶ μήτε **δύο** εἶναι μήτε **ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ**.

ἢ **αὐτῇ**.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that on the one hand , if **The One Being** were **made Two** ; then

149A οὐκ οὖν μὲν το ἐν ον ποιησειεν δυο

These Two Selves could also **come-to-Be** in **Two Places at the same time** ; but on the other

ταυτα αν και γενοιτο εν δυοιν χωραιν αμα : δ'

hand , as long as and inasmuch as **It Is One** , **It will not Be** so Disposed ?

, εως η εν ουκ εθελησει ;

Ari: It will not do so . (γαρ ου ουν .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The Self/Same Necessity Applies** to **The One** ;

αρα η αυτη αναγκη τω ενι

so that **It** can neither **Be Two** , nor can **The Self Be Grasped** by **The Self** .

μητε ειναι δυο μητε αυτου απτεσθαι αυτω .

Ari: The same necessity . (η αυτη .)

143e δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο, δυοῖν, δύο

144e δύο

149a δύο, δυοῖν, δύο, δύο

149b δυοῖν, δύο, δύο

149d δύο, δυοῖν

144a γίγνεται

144c γένοιτο

149a γένοιτο

151e γίγνεται

152a γίγνεται, γιγνομένου, γίγνεται

148d ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῷ

148e αὐτὸ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτὸ, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸ, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτὸ, αὐτὸ

149a αὐτῇ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῶν

149b αὐτὰ

149c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῖς

148d ἄπτεσθαι, ἄπτεσθαι

148e ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτεσθαι, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτεσθαι, ἄπτεσθαι

149a ἄπτεσθαι, ἄφεται, ἄφεται, ἄφεται

149b ἄφεις, ἄφεις, ἄφρων, ἄφεις, ἄφρων

149c ἄφεις

Loeb

“The one, then, might do this if it were two, and might be in two places at once; but so long as it is one, it will not?”

“No, it will not.”

“The one can no more touch itself than it can be two.”

“No.”

Thomas Taylor

Would not this be the case with The One if it was two; and would it not be in two places at once?
But can this be the case while it is The One?

It cannot.

The same necessity therefore belongs to The One, neither to be two nor to touch itself.

The same.

Jowett

And that would require that the one should be two, and be in two places at once, and this, while it is one, will never happen.

No.

Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two?

It cannot.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄψεται.

τί δῆ;

ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι χωρὶς ὃν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνω εἶναι οὐ μέλλει ἄψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι.

ἀληθῆ.

δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι.

δεῖ.

Balboas

Par: Certainly then , **It** will not **Grasp The Others** .

μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδε ἀψεται τῶν ἄλλων .

Ari: Why then ? (τι δη ;)

Par: For we say that , **That** which is about to **Grasp** , must be **Separate** from **That** , by **Being**

φαμεν οτι , το μελλον αψεσθαι δει ειναι χωρις εκεινω ον
next to **That** which **It Is** about to **Grasp** ; thus there **Is no Third Term Between Them Selves** .
εφεξης ου μελλει αψεσθαι , δε ειναι μηδεν τριτον εν μεσω αυτων .

Ari: True . (αληθη .)

Par: Accordingly then , at the very least **Two Terms Are Necessary** , if **Contact** is about to be .

αρα ολιγιστον δυο το ειναι δει , ει αψις μελλει ειναι .

Ari: It is necessary . (δει .)

148d ἄπτεσθαι, ἄπτεσθαι

148e ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτεσθαι, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτοιτο, ἄπτοιτο, ἄψεσθαί, ἄπτεσθαι

149a ἄπτεσθαι, ἄψεται, ἄψεσθαι, ἄψεσθαι

149b ἄφεις, ἄφεις, ἄψεων, ἄφεις, ἄψεων

149c ἄφεις

139e χωρίς

140a χωρίς

149a χωρίς

151a χωρίς

159b χωρίς, χωρίς

148d ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ

148e αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτό, αὐτό

149a αὐτῇ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῶν

149b αὐτά

149c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῖς

145a μέσον

145b μέσον, μέσον, μέσον

149a μέσῳ

153c μέσον

153e μέσοο

143e δυνῶν, δέο, δυνῶν, δέο, δυνῶν, δέο

144e δέο

149a δέο, δυνῶν, δέο, δέο, δέο

149b δυνῶν, δέο, δέο

149d δέο, δυνῶν

Loeb

“Nor, again, will it touch the others.”

“Why not?”

“Because, as we agreed, that which is to touch anything must be outside of that which it is to touch, and next it, and there must be no third between them.”

“True.”

“Then there must be two, at least, if there is to be contact.”

“There must.”

Thomas Taylor

But neither will it touch others.

Why?

Because we have said, that when any thing is about to touch any thing which is separate from it, it ought to be placed proximate to that which it is about to touch; but that there must be no third in the middle of them.

True.

Two things, therefore, at the least are requisite, if contact is about to take place.

Certainly.

Jowett

Neither can it touch others.

Why not?

The reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in separation from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and no third thing can be between them.

True.

Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?

They are.

ἐὰν δὲ τοῖν **δυοῖν** ὄροιν τρίτον προσγένηται ἐξῆς, **αὐτὰ** μὲν **τρία** ἔσται, αἱ δὲ **ἄψεις δύο**.

ναί.

καὶ οὕτω δὴ αἰ ἐνὸς προσγιγνομένου μία καὶ ἄψις προσγίγνεται, καὶ **συμβαίνει** τὰς **ἄψεις** τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾷ **ἐλάττους** εἶναι. ὧ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα **δύο** ἐπλεονέκτησεν τῶν **ἄψεων** εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὰς **ἄψεις**, τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς πασῶν τῶν **ἄψεων** πλεονεκτεῖ:

Balboas

Par: But if on the one hand , a **Third Term** is added right after **The Two** , then **(Their) Selves** **149B** δε εαν μεν τριτον προσγενηται εξης τοιν δυοιν , μεν αυτα will be **Three** , but **Their Contacts (Relationships)** will **Be Two** . εσται τρια , δε αι αψεις δυο .

Ari: Yes . (ναί.)

(Nicomachus Book I Chap 8 , Introduction to Arithmetic)

Par: And surely then in this way, whenever **One Term Is** added , **One Contact Is** also added , και δη ουτω συμβαινει ενος προσγιγνομενου μια αψις και προσγινεται , and the amount of all the **Contacts** will **Always Be One** less than **The Number of Terms** . For και του πληθους πας τας αψεις αι ειναι μια ελαττους η των αριθμων . γαρ every succeeding **Number** of **Terms exceeds** the amount of all **Contacts** , *by just as much as* , ο επειτα αριθμος ω πλεονεκτει το πλειω πασων των αψεων τω ισω **The Number** of their **Contacts was exceeded** by **The Number** of the first **Two Terms** . τουτω των αψεων ειναι επλεονεκτησε εις τον αριθμον τα πρωτα δυο .

144e δύο

149a δύο, δυοῖν, δύο, δύο

149b δυοῖν, δύο, δύο

149d δύο, δυοῖν

159e δύο, δύο, δυοῖν

148e αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό

149a αὐτῇ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῶν

149b αὐτά

149c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῖς

149d ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ

143e τριῶν, τρία, τριῶν, τρία, τριῶν, τρία

145a τριῶν

149b τρία

159d τρία

160b τριῶν

148e ἄπτοιο, ἄπτεσθαι, ἄπτοιο, ἄπτοιο, ἄπτοιο, ἄψεσθαι, ἄπτεσθαι

149a ἄπτεσθαι, ἄψεται, ἄψεσθαι, ἄψεσθαι

149b ἄψεις, ἄψεις, ἄψεων, ἄψεις, ἄψεων

149c ἄψεις

149d ἄπτεται, ἄπτεται, ἄπτεται

142c συμβαίνειν, συμβήσεται

143d συμβαίνει

149b συμβαίνει

158d συμβαίνει

160b συμβαίνειν

145c ελαττον

145d ἐλάττονι

149b ἐλάττους

149c ἐλάττους

149e Ελαττον, ἐλάττω, ἐλάττω, Ελαττον

Loeb

“And if to the two a third be added in immediate succession, there will be three terms and two contacts.”

“Yes.”

“And thus whenever one is added, one contact also is added, and the number of contacts is always one less than the number of terms; for every succeeding number of terms exceeds the number of all the contacts just as much as the first two terms exceeded the number of their contacts.

Thomas Taylor

But if a third thing succeeds to the two terms, these will now be three, but the contacts two.

Certainly.

And thus one always being added, one contact will be added, and it will come to pass that the contacts will be less by one than the multitude of the numbers: for by how much the two first numbers surpassed the contacts, so as to be more in number than the contacts, by so much will all the following number surpass the multitude of the contacts.

Jowett

And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two?

Yes.

And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the first two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in like manner;

Oxford Greek

ἤδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἅμα ἔν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἅψις ταῖς ἅψεσιν.

ὀρθῶς.

ὅσα ἄρα ἐστὶν τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἀριθμόν, αἰεὶ μιᾷ αἱ **ἅψεις ἐλάττους** εἰσὶν **αὐτῶν**.

ἀληθῆ.

εἰ δέ γε ἐν **μόνον** ἐστίν, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἅψις οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

πῶς γάρ;

Balboas

For the

γὰρ το

rest, **One Term Is** immediately added to both **The Number** of **Terms** and at the same time **One**

149C λοιπον εν ηδη προσγιγνεται τε τω αριθμω και αμα μια

Contact Is immediately added, to **The Contacts**. (ταις αψεσιν.)

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: Accordingly then, whatever **The Number** of **Terms** there **Are** of **The Selves**,

αρα οσα τον αριθμον τα οντα εστι αυτων

Their Contacts will **Always Be less**, by **One**.

αι αψεις αιει εισιν ελαττους μια.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: Then, if indeed **Only One Term Exists**, but **Two Are not**, then there can **Be no Contact**.

δε ει γε μονον εν εστι, δε δυας εστιν μη, αν ειη ουκ αψις.

Ari: How could there be? (πως γαρ;)

149a ἄπτεσθαι, ἄφεται, ἄφεσθαι, ἄφεσθαι

149b ἄψεις, ἄψεις, ἄψεων, ἄψεις, ἄψεων

149c ἄψεις

149d ἄπτεται, ἄπτεται, ἄπτεται

162d ἄπτεται

145d ἐλάττον

149b ἐλάττους

149c ἐλάττους

149c ἔλαττον, ἐλάττω, ἐλάττω, ἔλαττον

150c ἔλαττον

149a αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῶν

149b αὐτά

149c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ

149d ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ

149e αὐταῖς

143a μόνον, μόνον

144c μόνον

149c μόνον

149d μόνον

155c μόνος

Loeb

For after the first every additional term adds one to the number of contacts.”

“Right.”

“Then whatever the number of terms, the contacts are always one less.”

“True.”

“But if only one exists, and not two, there can be no contact.”

“Of course not.”

Thomas Taylor

For in that which remains one will be added to the number, and one contact to the contacts.

Right.

The contacts, therefore, less by one will always be as many in number as the things themselves.

True.

If therefore it is one alone, and not two, there can be no contact.

How can there?

Jowett

and for every one which is afterwards added to the number of terms, one contact is added to the contacts.

True.

Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one less.

True.

But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact?

How can there be?

Oxford Greek

οὐκουν, φαμέν, τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς οὔτε ἔν ἐστιν οὔτε **μετέχει αὐτοῦ**, εἶπερ ἄλλα ἐστίν.
οὐ γάρ.
οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐνὸς μὴ ἐνόντος ἐν **αὐτοῖς**.
πῶς γάρ;

Balboas

Par: Have we not said that , **Those** that **Are Other** than **The One Are Not-One** ,
ουκουν , φαμεν , τα αλλα του ενος εστιν ουτε εν
nor do **They Participate** of **The Self** , if indeed **They Are Other** ?
ουτε μετεχει αυτου , ειπερ εστιν αλλα .

Ari: Neither . (γαρ ου .)

Par: Accordingly then , there **Is no Number** that **Is Inherent In The Others** ,
αρα ουκ αριθμος ενεστιν εν τοις αλλοις ,
since **One/Unity Is not Inherent In Them** .
ενος μη ενοντος εν αυτοις .

Ari: How could it ? (πως γαρ ;)

146e μετέχοντα

147a μετέχει, μετείχε, μετείχεν

149c μετέχει

151e μετέχει, μετέχον

152a μετέχει

149a αὐτή, αὐτῇ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῶν

149b αὐτά

149c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῖς

149d ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ

149e αὐταῖς

Loeb

“We affirm that those things which are other than one are not one and do not partake of oneness, since they are other.”

“They do not.”

“Then there is no number in others, if one is not in them.”

“Of course not.”

Thomas Taylor

Have we not said that such things as are different from *The One* are neither one nor participate of it, since they are different?

We have.

The One, therefore is not number in others, as *The One* is not contained in them.

How can it?

Jowett

And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one?

True.

Then they have no number, if they have no one in them?

Of course not.

Oxford Greek

οὐτ' ἄρα ἓν ἐστί τα ἄλλα οὔτε **δύο** οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα **ὄνομα** οὐδέν.

οὔ.

τὸ ἓν ἄρα **μόνον** ἐστὶν ἓν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

οὐ φαίνεται.

ἅψις ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν **δυοῖν** μὴ ὄντοι.

οὐκ ἔστιν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **The Others Are neither One** nor **Two** ,

149D ἀρα τα αλλα εστι ουτ' εν ουτε δυο

nor do They Possess The Name of any other **Number** .

ουτε εχοντα ονομα ουδεν αλλου αριθμου .

Ari: They do not . (ου .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One Is One** , **Alone** , and **It** will not **Be Two** .

αρα το εν εστιν εν μονον , και αν ουκ ειη δυας .

Ari: It will not so come to **Light** . (ου φαίνεται.)

Par: Accordingly then , there is **no Contact** ; since there are **no Two Terms/Beings/Selves** .

αρα εστι ουκ αψις οντοι μη δυοιν .

Ari: There are not . (εστιν ουκ .)

149a δύο, δυοῖν, δύο, δύο

149b δυοῖν, δύο, δύο

149d δύο, δυοῖν

159e δύο, δύο, δυοῖν

160a δυοῖν

147d ὀνομάτων, ὄνομα, τοῦνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομά

147e ὀνομάζεις, ὄνομα, τοῦνομα

149d ὄνομα

155d ὄνομα, ὀνομάζεται

164b ὄνομα

144e μόνον

149c μόνον

149d μόνον

155e μόνως

156e μόνος

Loeb

“Then the others are neither one nor two, nor have they the name of any other number.”

“No.”

“The one is, then, only one, and there can be no two.”

“That is clear.”

“There is no contact if there are no two terms.”

“No, there is none.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, is neither others, nor two, nor any thing possessing the name of another number.

It is not.

The One, therefore, is one alone, and will not be two.

It will not, as it appears.

There is no contact, therefore, two not subsisting.

There is not.

Jowett

Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of any number?

No.

One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist?

Clearly not.

And if there are not two, there is no contact?

There is not.

Oxford Greek

οὐτ' ἄρα τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων **ἄπτεται** οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπεὶ περ ἄψις οὐκ ἔστιν.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὔτω δὲ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ **ἑαυτοῦ ἄπτεται** τε καὶ οὐχ **ἄπτεται**.

ἔοικεν.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ **ἴσον** ἐστὶ καὶ **ἄνισον αὐτῷ** τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;

πῶς;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** will *neither* **Grasp The Others** ,
 ἀρα το ἐν οὐτ' ἀπτεται τῶν ἄλλων
nor will **The Others Grasp The One** , if indeed there **Is no Contact** .
 οὔτε τα ἄλλα του ἐνος , ἐπεὶ περ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀψις .

Ari: Certainly not . (γὰρ οὐν οὐ .)

Par: Surely then in this way , according to all these statements , **The One** will both
 δη οὕτω κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα το ἐν τε
Grasp and *not Grasp The Others* and **It-Self** .
 ἀπτεται καὶ οὐχ ἀπτεται τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ .

Ari: So it appears . (εοικεν .)

Parmenides: 18 Take notice then , **Is The One Equal** and **Unequal** to **Self** and to **The Others** ?
 Ἀρ' οὐν ἐστὶ ἴσον καὶ ἀνίσον καὶ αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ;

Aristotle: How ? (πῶς ;)

149b ἄφεις, ἄφεις, ἄφρων, ἄφεις, ἄφρων

149c ἄφεις

149d ἄπτεται, ἄπτεται, ἄπτεται

162d ἄπτεται

165d ἀπομένους

149b αὐτά

149c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῖς

149d ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ

149e αὐταῖς

150a αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῆς

141c ἴσον

145b ἴσον

149d ἴσον

150d ἴσον

150e ἴσον, ἴσον

140b ἄνισον

149d ἄνισον

154b ἀνίστοις

161c ἄνισα, ἄνισα, ἀνίσω ἄνισα, ἄνισα

Loeb

“Then the one does not touch the others, nor the others the one, since there is no contact.”

“No, certainly not.”

“Thus on all these grounds the one touches and does not touch itself and the others.”

“So it appears.”

“And is the one both equal and unequal to itself and the others?”

“How is that?”

Thomas Taylor

The One therefore will neither touch other things, nor will other things touch *The One*, as there is no contact.

Certainly not.

On all these accounts, therefore, *The One* will both touch and not touch others and itself.

So it appears.

Is it therefore equal and unequal to itself and others?

How?

Jowett

Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if there is no contact?

Certainly not.

For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others?

True.

Further-is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?

How do you mean?

εἰ **μείζον** εἴη τὸ ἐν ἢ τὰλλα ἢ **ἐλαττον**, ἢ αὖ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός **μείζω** ἢ **ἐλάττω**, ἄρα οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰλλα ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός οὔτε τι **μείζω** οὔτε τι **ἐλάττω** ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων **αὐταῖς** γε ταύταις ταῖς **οὐσίαις**; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πρὸς τῷ **τοιαῦτα** εἶναι ἐκάτερα ἰσότητα ἔχοιεν, ἴσα ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἀλλήλα: εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἐν, σμικρότητα δὲ τὰλλα, ὅποτερῳ μὲν τῷ **εἶδει** μέγεθος προσεῖη, **μείζον** ἂν εἴη, ὧ δὲ σμικρότης, **ἐλαττον**; ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν ἐστὸν γέ τινε τούτῳ **εἶδη**, τό τε μέγεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που μὴ ὄντε γε ἐναντίῳ τε ἀλλήλοιν εἴτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐγγιγνοίστην.

πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

Balboas

Par: If **The One** were **bigger** or **smaller** than **The Others** , or in turn if **The Others** were **bigger** 149E εἰ το ἐν εἰη μείζον η ελαττον η ταλλα , η αυ ταλλα μείζω or **smaller** than **The One** , would it not follow that on the one hand , neither **The One** by **Being** η ελαττω η του ενος , αν ουκ αρα και μεν ουτε το εν τω ειναι **One** , nor **The Others** by **Being Other** than **The One** would **Be** something **bigger** nor something εν ουτε τα αλλα αλλα του ενος αν εἰη τι μείζω ουτε τι **smaller** than **Each Other** , by **Virtue** of **The Selfhood** of **Their Ousias** . But if **Each One** , ελαττω αλληλων γε ταις αυταις ταυταις ουσαις ; αλλ' εἰ εκατερα μεν **besides Being Such as They Are** , would also **Possess Equality** , then **They** would **Be Equal** to προς ειναι τοιαυτα εχοιεν ισοτητα αν εἰη ισα προς **Each Other** . But if , **The Others Possessed Bigness** but **The One Smallness** , or **The One** αλληλα : δε εἰ τα μεν μεγεθος δε το σμικροτητα , η το εν **Bigness** but **The Others Smallness** , then on the one hand , wherever **The Idea** of **Bigness** would μεγεθος δε ταλλα σμικροτητα , μεν οποτερω τω εἰδει μεγεθος **Be Present** , **One** would **Be bigger** ; but **The One** in which **Smallness Exists** would **Be smaller** ? προσεἰη , αν εἰη μείζον , δε ω σμικροτης ελαττον ;

Ari: Necessarily . (ἀναγκη .)

Par: Is it not the case then , that both **These Certain Ideas** ; **Bigness** and **Smallness** , ουκουν τε τούτῳ τινε εἶδη το μεγεθος και η σμικροτης do indeed **Exist** ? For if **They** did not **Subsist in some way** , then **They** would certainly never γε εστον ; γαρ εἴτην ου οντε που αν γε **oppose Each Other** and **They** would never have **Come to Be** among **The Real Beings** . ἐναντιω αλληλων και ἐγγιγνοίστην εν τοις ουσιν .

Ari: How could they ? (πῶς αν γαρ ;)

144b μεγίστου, μέγιστα

144c μείζονος

149e μείζον, μείζω, μείζω, μείζον

150a μείζων, μείζω

150b μείζων

149b ἐλάττω

149c ἐλάττω

149e ἐλαττον, ἐλάττω, ἐλάττω, ἐλαττον

150c ἐλαττον

150d ἐλάττω, ἐλαττον, ἐλαττον

149c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῖς

149d ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ

149e αὐταῖς

150a αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῆς

150b αὐτῆς

144d οὐσίας, οὐσία

144e οὐσίας

149e οὐσίαις

152a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

155e οὐσίας, οὐσίας

145b τοιοῦτον

148c τοιοῦτον

149e τοιαῦτα

155d τοιοῦτων

158c τοιοῦτων

135c εἶδόν

135e εἶδη

149e εἶδει, εἶδη

158e εἶδους

139e εἶδη

Loeb

“If the one were greater or less than the others, or, again, the others greater or less than the one, is it not true that the one, considered merely as one, and the others, considered merely as others, would be neither greater nor less than one another, so far as their own natures are concerned; but if in addition to their own natures, they both possessed equality, they would be equal to one another or if the others possessed greatness and the one smallness, or vice versa, that class to which greatness was added would be greater, and that to which smallness was added would be smaller?”

“Certainly.”

“These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another and could not come into being in things.”

“That is obvious.”

Thomas Taylor

If *The One* were greater or lesser than others, or others greater or lesser than *The One*, would it not follow that neither *The One*, because one, nor others, because different from *The One*, would be greater or lesser than each other from their own essences? But if each, besides being such as they are, should possess equality, would they not be equal to each other? But if the one should possess magnitude, and the other parvitude, or *The One* magnitude but *others* parvitude, would it not follow, that, with whatever species magnitude was present, that species would be greater; but that the species would be lesser with which parvitude was present?

Necessarily so.

Are there not, therefore, two certain species of this kind, magnitude and parvitude? For if they had no subsistence they could never be contrary to each other, and be present with beings.

How should they?

Jowett

If the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater or less than the one, they would not be greater or less than each other in virtue of their being the one and the others; but, if in addition to their being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one another, or if the one had smallness and the others greatness, or the one had greatness and the others smallness-whichever kind had greatness would be greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller?

Certainly.

Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness; for if they were not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that which is.

How could they?

εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται, ἥτοι ἐν **ὅλῳ** ἂν ἢ ἐν **μέρει αὐτοῦ** ἐνείη.

ἀνάγκη.

τί δ' εἰ ἐν **ὅλῳ** ἐγγίγνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δι' **ὅλου αὐτοῦ** τεταμένη εἴη ἢ περιέχουσα **αὐτό**;

δῆλον δὴ.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν **οὖσα** ἢ σμικρότης τῷ ἐνὶ ἴσῃ ἂν **αὐτῷ** εἴη, περιέχουσα δὲ **μείζων**;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

δυνατὸν οὖν σμικρότητα ἴσῃ τῷ εἶναι ἢ **μείζω τινός**, καὶ **πράττειν** τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ **ἑαυτῆς**;

ἀδύνατον.

Par: Accordingly then , if **Smallness Comes to Be In The One** , then **It** will either **Be Present**

150A ἄρα εἰ σμικροτης ἐγγιγνεται ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ , ἂν ἥτοι ἐνείη **In The Whole** of **The Self** or **In a Part** of **The Self** .
ἐν ὅλῳ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐν μέρει .

Ari: Necessarily . (ἀναγκη .)

Par: What then , if **Smallness** would **Come to Be In The Whole** ? Will **It** not either **Be**

τι δ' εἰ ἐγγιγνοιτο ἐν ὅλῳ ; ἂν οὐχὶ ἢ εἴη extended **Equally** throughout **The Whole** of **The One Self** or **Encompass/Contain The Self** ?
ἐξ τεταμῆ ἰσου δι' ὅλου τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτοῦ ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό ;

Ari: Manifestly so . (δῆλον δὴ .)

Par: Take notice then , if on the one hand , **Smallness Is** extended **Equally to The One** , then

ἄρ' οὖν ἢ μὲν σμικροτης ἐξ ἴσου τῷ ἐνὶ **It** will **Be Equal** to **The Self** ; whereas , if **It Encompasses It** , then **Smallness** will be **bigger** ?
ἂν εἴη ἰσῇ αὐτῷ , δὲ περιέχουσα μείζων ;

Ari: How could it not be so ? (πῶς οὐ δ' ;)

Par: Therefore , **Is** it indeed **Possible** for **Smallness** to **Be Equal** or **bigger** than **anything** , and to

οὖν γὰρ δυνατόν σμικροτητα εἶναι ἰσῇ ἢ μείζω τῷ τινός , καὶ do the functions of **Bigness/Magnitude** and **Equality** , but not perform the functions of **It-Self** ?
πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος , ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς ;

Ari: **Impossible** . (ἀδύνατον .)

147b ὅλον, ὅλα, ὅλα

148d ὅλῳ

150a ὅλῳ, ὅλῳ, ὅλου

150b ὅλῳ, ὅλον, ὅλῳ

153c ὅλοι, ὅλον

146b μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

146c μέρος

150a μέρος

150b μέρος, μέρος, μέρους, μέρος

151c μερών, μερών

149d ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτοῦ

149e αὐταῖς

150a αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, ἑαυτῆς

150b αὐτῆς

150c αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῆς, αὐτοῦ

131b οὖσα

142b οὖσα

150a οὖσα

156c οὖσα

161d οὖσα

144c μείζονος

149e μείζον, μείζω, μείζω, μείζον

150a μείζων, μείζω

150b μείζων

150c μείζον, μέγα, μείζον

148c τίνα

148e τινος

150a τινός

157a τινων

157e τινός, τινος

150a πράττειν

155d πράττομεν

Loeb

“Then if smallness comes into being in the one, it would be either in a part or in the whole of it.”

“Necessarily.”

“What if it be in the whole of one? Will it not either be on an equality with the one, extending throughout the whole of it, or else contain it?”

“Clearly.”

“And if smallness be on an equality with the one, will it not be equal to the one, and if it contain the one, greater than the one?”

“Of course.”

“But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, performing the functions of greatness or equality and not its own functions?”

“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

If therefore parvitude becomes inherent in The One, it will either be inherent in the whole or in a part of it.

It is necessary.

But if it should be inherent in the whole, will it not either be extended equally through the whole of The One or comprehend The One?

Plainly so.

If parvitude, therefore, is equally inherent in *The One*, will it not be equal to *The One*; but if it comprehends *The One* will it not be greater?

How should it not?

Can therefore parvitude be equal to or greater than any thing, and exhibit the properties of magnitude and equality, and not its own?

It is impossible.

Jowett

If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole?

Certainly.

Suppose the first; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive with the whole one, or will contain the one?

Clearly.

If it be co-extensive with the one it will be coequal with the one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one?

Of course.

But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?

Impossible.

ἐν μὲν **ὅλῳ** ἄρα τῷ ἐνὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη σμικρότης, ἀλλ' εἵπερ, ἐν **μέρει**.

ναί.

οὐδὲ γε ἐν παντὶ αὐτῷ **μέρει**: εἰ δὲ μή, **ταῦτά** ποιήσει ἅπερ πρὸς τὸ **ὅλον**: ἴση ἔσται ἢ **μείζων** τοῦ **μέρους** ἐν ᾧ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐνῇ.

ἀνάγκη.

οὐδενὶ **ποτε** ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων σμικρότης, μήτ' ἐν **μέρει** μήτ' ἐν **ὅλῳ** ἐγγιγνομένη: οὐδὲ τι ἔσται σμικρὸν πλην **αὐτῆς** σμικρότητος.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , on the one hand , **Smallness** will not **Be** extended throughout

150B ἀρα μὲν σμικροτης αν ουκ ειη

the **Whole** of **The One** , but in a **Part** , if indeed at all .

ολω τω ενι , αλλ' εν μερει ειπερ .

Ari: Yes . (ναι .)

Par: Nor indeed in turn , **In The Whole Part** ; for if **It** did , then would not these **Be** functions

ουδε γε αυ εν τω παντι μερει δε ει μη ταυτα ποιησει

of **The Whole Part** , just as it happened in relation to **The Whole** ; in which case , **It** will

του μερους απερ προς το ολον : εν ω

Always Be either **Equal** or **bigger** than that **in** which **Smallness** happens to **Be** extended .

αιε εσται ιση η μειζων ενη .

Ari: Necessarily . (αναγκη .)

Par: Accordingly then , **Smallness** will never **Exist in** any of **The Real Beings** , since **It** cannot

αρα σμικροτης ποτε ενεσται ουδενι των οντων , μητ'

Exist in a **Part** nor **in** a **Whole** ; nor will there **Be** anything **small** except **The Smallness** of **Self** .

εγγιγνομενη εν μερει μητ' εν ολω : ουδε εσται τι σμικρον πλην σμικροτητος αυτης .

Ari: It does not seem likely . (ουκ εοικεν .)

148d ὅλω

150a ὅλω, ὅλω, ὅλου

150b ὅλω, ὅλον, ὅλω

153c ὅλου, ὅλον

153e ὅλον

146c μέρος

150a μέρος

150b μέρος, μέρος, μέρους, μέρος

151c μερών, μερών

151d μερών, μερών

148e ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

148d ταῦτόν

150b ταῦτά

151c ταῦτά, ταῦτά

158e ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

149e μείζων, μείζω, μείζω, μείζων

150a μείζων, μείζω

150b μείζων

150c μείζων, μέγα, μείζων

150d μείζω, μείζων, μείζων

142b ποτε

146d ποτε

150b ποτε

152b ποτέ

152c ποτε

149e αὐταῖς

150a αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῆς

150b αὐτῆς

150c αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῆς, αὐτοῦ

150d αὐτῷ, αὐτό

Loeb

“Then smallness cannot exist in the whole of the one, but, if at all, only in a part of it.”

“Yes.”

“And neither can it exist in a whole part, for then it will behave just as it did in relation to the whole; it will be equal to or greater than the part in which it happens to exist.”

“Inevitably.”

“Then smallness will never exist in anything, either in a part or in a whole, nor will anything be small except absolute smallness.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in the whole of *The One*, but if at all, in a part.

Certainly.

Nor yet again in the whole part; as the same consequences would ensue in the *whole* part of *The One*, as in the whole of *The One*: for it would either be equal to or greater than the part in which it is inherent.

It is necessary.

Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in any being, since it can neither be in a part nor in a whole; nor will there be any thing small, except smallness itself.

It does not appear that there will.

Jowett

Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only?

Yes.

And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole will recur; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is.

Certainly.

Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part; nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.

True.

οὐδ' ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν **αὐτῷ**: **μεῖζον** γὰρ ἂν τι εἴη ἄλλο καὶ πλὴν **αὐτοῦ** μεγέθους, ἐκεῖνο ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ **αὐτῷ** οὐκ ὄντος, οὐδ' ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, ἐάνπερ ἢ **μέγα**: τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρότης **οὐδαμοῦ** ἐνι.

ἀληθῆ.

ἀλλὰ μὴν **αὐτὸ** μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου **μεῖζον** ἢ **αὐτῆς** σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ σμικρότης ἄλλου **ἔλαττον** ἢ **αὐτοῦ** μεγέθους.

οὐ γάρ.

Par: Accordingly then , neither will **Magnitude Be Inherent in The Self** . For then there will **Be**
 150C ἀρα οὐδ' μεγεθος ενεσται εν αυτω . γαρ ανειη
*some other **big** aspect* besides **The Magnitude** of **The Self** ; **That in which Bigness Is Inherent** ;
 τι αλλο μειζον και πλην μεγεθους αυτου , εκεινο εν ω το μεγεθος ενειη ,
 even if **The Being** of **Smallness** is not ; *these which The Self Must surpass* by whatever **Is big** ;
 και οντος σμικρου ουκ , ταυτα ου αυτω αναγκη υπερεχειν εανπερ η μεγα ;
 but this , **Is Impossible** , seeing that **Smallness** cannot ever **Be Inherent in any being** .
 δε τουτο αδυνατον , επειδη σμικροτης ουδαμου ενι .

Ari: True . (αληθῆ .)

Par: So then , **The Self** of **Magnitude** will not be *bigger* than another , except **The Smallness**
 αλλα μην αυτο μεγεθους (genitive) ουκ μειζον η αλλου σμικροτητος
 of **Her Self** , nor will **Smallness Be smaller** than another except **The Magnitude** of **Self** .
 αυτης , ουδε σμικροτης ελαττον η αλλου μεγεθους αυτου .

Ari: It will not . (γὰρ οὐ .)

150a αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῆς

150b αὐτῆς

150c αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῆς, αὐτοῦ

150d αὐτῷ, αὐτό

150e αὐτό, ἐαυτό, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἐαυτῷ, ἐαυτό, ἐαυτοῦ

150a μεῖζον, μεῖζω

150b μεῖζων

150c μεῖζον, μέγα, μεῖζον

150d μεῖζω, μεῖζον, μεῖζον

150e μεῖζον

145d οὐδαμῶς

146b οὐδαμῶς

150c οὐδαμοῦ

156a οὐδαμῶς

159d οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῇ

149c ἐλάττω

149e ἔλαττον, ἐλάττω, ἐλάττω, ἔλαττον

150c ἔλαττον

150d ἐλάττω, ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον

150e ἔλαττον

Loeb

“Nor will greatness exist in the one. For in that case, something other than absolute greatness and differing from it, namely that in which greatness exists, would be greater, and that although there is no smallness in it, which greatness must exceed, if it be great. But this is impossible, since smallness exists nowhere.”

“True.”

“But absolute greatness is not greater than anything but absolute smallness, and absolute smallness is not smaller than anything but absolute greatness.”

“No.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither will magnitude therefore be in *The One*: for there will be some other thing great besides magnitude itself. I mean that in which magnitude is inherent; and this, though parvitude is not, which ought to be surpassed by that which is great; but which in this case is impossible, since parvitude is not inherent in any being.

True.

But, indeed, magnitude itself will not surpass any thing else but parvitude itself, nor will parvitude be less than any other than magnitude itself.

It will not.

Jowett

Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything there will be something greater other and besides greatness itself, namely, that in which greatness is; and this too when the small itself is not there, which the one, if it is great, must exceed; this, however, is impossible, seeing that smallness is wholly absent.

True.

But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.

Very true.

οὔτε ἄρα τὰ ἄλλα **μείζω** τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ **ἐλάττω**, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχοντα, οὔτε **αὐτῷ** τούτῳ πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἔχετον τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων **μείζον** ἂν οὐδ' **ἐλαττον** εἴη, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον.

οὔκουν φαίνεται γε.

ἂρ' οὖν, εἰ μήτε **μείζον** μήτε **ἐλαττον** τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη **αὐτὸ** ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήτε ὑπερέχεσθαι;

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον **πολλή** ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ ὃν **ἴσον** εἶναι.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Par: Accordingly then , neither will **The Others Be bigger** nor **smaller** than **The One** , since
 ἀρα οὔτε τα αλλα μειζω ουδε ελαττω του ενος ,
They neither **Possess Bigness** nor **Smallness** , nor **Is This Self That** which **Has The Power**
 150D μητε εχοντα μεγεθος μητε σμικροτητα , ουτε τουτω αυτω εχετον την δυναμιν
 in relation to **The One** , of either **surpassing** or of **being surpassed** , but this will only be the case
 του την υπερεχειν και υπερεχεσθαι , αλλα
 in relation to **Each Other** ; nor in turn will **The One Be** either **bigger** nor **smaller** than **These**
 προς αλληλω , ουτε αυ αν το εν ειη μειζον ουδ' ελαττον τουτοις
 nor **The Others** , since **It** neither **Possesses Bigness** nor **Smallness** .
 ουδε των αλλων , μητε εχον μεγεθος μητε σμικροτητα .

Ari: It does not indeed appear to have come to **Light** . (οὐκουν φαίνεται γε .)

Par: Take notice then , if **The One** is neither **bigger** nor **smaller** than **The Others** ,
 αρ' ουν , ει το εν μητε μειζον μητε ελαττον των αλλων ,
 then **The Self Must Necessarily** neither **surpass** or **Be surpassed** by **Them** ?
 αυτο αναγκη μητε υπερεχειν μητε υπερεχεσθαι εκεινων ;

Ari: It is necessary . (αναγκη .)

Par: Is it not **Abundantly Necessary Indeed** , for **That** which neither **surpasses**
 οκουν πολλη αναγκη γε το μητε υπερχον
 nor **Is surpassed** to **Be Equally** extended ; for by **Being Equally** extended **It Must Be Equal** .
 μητε υπερεχομενον ειναι ισου εξ , δε ον ισου εξ ειναι ισον .

Ari: How could it not ? (πως γαρ ου ;) (Nicomachus Book I Chapter 17-3 , **Intro. to Arith.**)

150b μειζων
 150c μειζον, μέγα, μειζον
150d μείζω, μείζον, μείζον
 150e μειζον
 151a μειζον, μείζον

149e Ελαττον, ἐλάττω, ἐλάττω, Ελαττον
 150c ἔλαττον
150d ἐλάττω, ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον
 150e ἔλαττον
 151a Ελαττον, Ελαττον

150b αὐτῆς
 150c αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῆς, αὐτοῦ
150d αὐτῷ, αὐτό
 150e αὐτό, ἑαυτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτό, ἑαυτοῦ
 151a αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτά

145a πολλά
 147d πολλή
150d πολλή
 155e πολλά, πολλά
 156b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλή

145b ἴσον
 149d ἴσον
150d ἴσον
 150e ἴσον, ἴσον
 151b ἴσον, ἴσον

Loeb

“Then other things are neither greater nor smaller than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness, nor have even these two the power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to each other, nor can the one be greater or less than these two or than other things, since it has neither greatness nor smallness.”

“Evidently not.”

“Then if the one is neither greater nor smaller than the others, it can neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?”

“Certainly not.”

“Then that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded must be on an equality, and being on an equality, must be equal.”

“Of course.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither therefore will other things be greater than *The One*; nor lesser, since they neither possess magnitude nor parvitude: nor will these two possess any power with respect to *The One*, either of surpassing or of being surpassed, but this will be the case only with respect to each other: nor, on the contrary, will *The One* be either greater or lesser than these two, or others, as it neither possesses magnitude nor parvitude.

So indeed it appears.

If *The One* therefore is neither greater nor lesser than others, is it not necessary that it should neither surpass nor be surpassed by them?

It is necessary.

Is it not also abundantly necessary, that that which neither surpasses nor is surpassed should be equally affected? And must it not, if equally affected, be equal?

How should it not?

Jowett

Then other things not greater or less than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness; nor have greatness or smallness any power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to one another; nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, if it has neither greatness nor smallness.

Clearly not.

Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot either exceed or be exceeded by them?

Certainly not.

And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality; and being on an equality, must be equal.

Of course.

καὶ μὴν καὶ **αὐτό** γε τὸ ἐν πρὸς **ἑαυτὸ** οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι: μήτε μέγεθος ἐν **ἑαυτῷ** μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον οὐτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοιτο οὐτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοι **ἑαυτοῦ**, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου ὃν **ἴσον** ἂν εἴη **ἑαυτῷ**.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα **ἑαυτῷ** τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις **ἴσον** ἂν εἴη.

φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴν **αὐτό** γε ἐν **ἑαυτῷ** ὃν καὶ περὶ **ἑαυτὸ** ἂν εἴη ἔξωθεν, καὶ περιέχον μὲν **μείζον** ἂν **ἑαυτοῦ** εἴη,

Par: And most certainly , **The One Self** will also **have** to **Be in The Same relation to It-Self** ;

150E καὶ γε μὴν τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ ἀν καὶ ἐχοι οὕτως πρὸς ἑαυτο :

by neither **Possessing Bigness** nor **Smallness in It-Self** , nor will **It surpass** nor will

μητε ἐχον μέγεθος μητε σμικροτητα ἐν ἐαυτῷ οὐτ' ἀν ὑπερέχοιτο οὐτ' ἀν **It Be surpassed by It-Self** ; but by **Being Equally** extended , **It** will **Be Equal to It-Self** .

υπερχοι ἐαυτοῦ , ἀλλ' ὃν ἴσου ἐξ ἀν εἴη ἴσον ἐαυτῷ .

Ari: Entirely so . (πάνυ μὲν οὖν .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** will **Be Equal** both **to It-Self** and **to The Others** .

ἀρα τὸ ἐν ἀν εἴη ἴσον τε ἐαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις .

Ari: So it has come to **Light** . (φαίνεται .)

Par: And certainly if **Self** were **in It-Self** , then **It** would also be **Outside About It-Self** ,

καὶ μὴν αὐτὸ ὃν ἐν ἐαυτῷ ἀν καὶ εἴη ἔξωθεν περὶ ἑαυτο
and indeed on the one hand , by **Containing It-Self** , **It** would **Be bigger than It-Self** ;
γε μὲν περιέχον ἀν εἴη μείζον ἐαυτοῦ ,

150c αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῆς, αὐτοῦ

150d αὐτῷ, αὐτό

150e αὐτό, ἑαυτὸ, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτὸ, ἑαυτοῦ

151a αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτά

151b αὐτό, αὐτόν, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

149d ἴσον

150d ἴσον

150e ἴσον, ἴσον

151b ἴσον

151c ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

150c μείζον, μέγα, μείζον

150d μείζω, μείζον, μείζον

150e μείζον

151a μείζον, μείζονι

151b μείζω, μείζον, μείζον

150c ἑλαττον

150d ἐλάττω, ἑλαττον, ἑλαττον

150e ἑλαττον

151a ἑλαττον, ἑλαττον

151b ἑλαττον, ἐλάττω, ἐλαττόν

Loeb

“And the one will be in the same relation to itself also; if it have in itself neither greatness nor smallness, it cannot be exceeded by itself or exceed itself; it would be on an equality with and equal to itself.”

“Certainly.”

“The one is, then, equal to itself and to the others.”

“Evidently.”

“But the one, being within itself, would also be contained by itself, and since it contains itself it would be greater than itself,

Thomas Taylor

The One therefore will be thus circumstanced with respect to itself: viz. from neither possessing magnitude nor parvitude in itself, it will neither surpass nor be surpassed by itself; but being equally affected it will be equal to itself.

Entirely so.

The One therefore will be equal both to itself and others.

So it appears.

But if *The One* should be in itself, it would also be externally about itself; and so, through comprehending itself, it would be greater than itself;

Jowett

And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself; having neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality with and equal to itself.

Certainly.

Then the one will be equal to both itself and the others?

Clearly so.

And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without itself; and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself;

Oxford Greek

περιεχόμενον δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ οὕτω μείζον ἂν καὶ ἔλαττον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἔν.
 εἴη γὰρ ἂν.
 οὐκοῦν καὶ τότε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἑνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων;
 πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί που δεῖ τό γε ὃν αἰί.
 ναί.

Balboas

but on the other hand , by **Being Contained** , It would **Be smaller than It-Self** ; and in this way
 151A δε περιεχομενον ελαττον , και ουτω
The One Self would be **bigger** and **smaller** than **It-Self** .
 το εν αυτο αν ειη μειζον και ελαττον εαυτου .

Ari: It would be so . (αν ειη γαρ .)

Par: Must not the following also be the case ; that there **Is nothing at all Outside**
 αναγκη ουκουν τοδε και , ειναι μηδεν εκτος
 of **The One** and **The Others** ? (του ενος τε και των αλλων ;)

Ari: How could it not be in this way ? (πως ου γαρ ;)

Par: But it **Must Be** the case that , **That** which **Is** , **Must Always Be somewhere** .
 αλλα δει γε μην το ον αει ειναι που .

Ari: Yes . (ναι .)

150d μείζω, μείζον, μείζον

150e μείζον

151a μείζον, μείζονι

151b μείζω, μείζον, μείζον

151c μείζον, μείζον, μείζον

150d ἐλάττω, ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον

150e ἔλαττον

151a ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον

151b ἔλαττον, ἐλάττω, ἔλαττόν

151c ἔλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττόνων, ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον

150d αὐτό, αὐτό

150e αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῶ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῶ, ἑαυτῶ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῶ, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ

151a αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό

151b αὐτό, αὐτόν, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

151c αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτόν

Loeb

and since it is contained by itself it would be less than itself; thus the one would be both greater and less than itself.”

“Yes, it would.”

“And is it true, moreover, that nothing can exist outside of the one and the others?”

“Of course.”

“But that which exists must always exist somewhere.”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

but from being comprehended less than itself: and thus *The One* would be both greater and lesser than itself.

It would so.

Is not this also necessary, that nothing has any subsistence besides The One and others?

How should it be otherwise?

But ought not whatever has a being to be always somewhere?

Certainly.

Jowett

and, as contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and less than itself.

It will.

Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others?

Of course not.

But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?

Yes.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔν τῳ ὄν ἐν **μείζονι** ἔσται **ἔλαττον** ὄν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως **ἕτερον** ἐν **ἐτέρῳ** εἴη.
οὐ γάρ.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν **ἕτερον** ἔστι **χωρὶς** τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, δεῖ δὲ **αὐτὰ** ἔν τῳ εἶναι, οὐκ
ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τά τε ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι;
φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: Is it not indeed the case that , **That** which **Is in anything** , will **Subsist**
οὐκ οὐν γε το ον εν τω εσται
by **Being** the **smaller in** the **bigger** ? For otherwise , **One** cannot **Subsist in The Other** .
ον ελαττον εν μειζονι ; γαρ αλλως ετερον αν ου ειη εν ετερω .
Ari: It cannot . (γαρ ου .)

Par: But since there **Is no Other** , apart from **The One** and **The Others** , then **Selves**
δε επειδη εστι ουδεν ετερον χωρις του ενος και των αλλων , δε αυτα
Must Be in something . Then is it not also **Necessary** that since **Selves Are** already **in**
δει ειναι εν τω , ουκ αναγκη ειναι ηδη εν
Each-Other , then **The Others** also **Subsist in The One** and **The One** also **Subsists in**
αλληλοις , τα αλλα τε εν τω ενι και το εν εν
The Others , or else **Selves Exist in no way whatsoever** ?
151B τοις αλλοις , η ειναι μηδαμου ;

Ari: So it has come to **Light** . (φαινεται .)

150d μείζω, μείζον, μείζον

150e μείζον

151a μείζον, μείζονι

151b μείζω, μείζον, μείζον, μείζον

151c μείζον, μείζον

150d ἐλάττω, ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον

150e ἔλαττον

151a ἔλαττον, ἔλαττω, ἔλαττόν

151b ἔλαττον, ἐλάττω, ἔλαττόν

151c ἔλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττόνων, ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον

148c ἕτερον, ἕτερόν

148d ἕτερόν

151a ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον

153a ἕτερά, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερα

154a ἐτέρως

140a χωρὶς

149a χωρὶς

151a χωρὶς

159b χωρὶς, χωρὶς

159c χωρὶς, χωρὶς

150d αὐτό, αὐτό

150e αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

151a αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτά

151b αὐτό, αὐτόν, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

151c αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῶν

Loeb

“And that which exists in anything will be smaller and will exist in the greater? One thing cannot exist in another in any other way, can it?”

“No, it cannot.”

“But since there is nothing else apart from the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the others in the one and the one in the others, or else be nowhere at all?”

“Clearly.”

Thomas Taylor

And does not that which subsists in another, subsist as the lesser in the greater? For one thing cannot in any other way subsist in another.

It cannot.

But since there is nothing else except *The One* and others, and it is necessary that these should be in something, is it not necessary that they should be in one another, viz. others in *The One*, and *The One* in others; or that they should be no where?

It appears so.

Jowett

But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it is will be greater; in no other way can one thing be in another.

True.

And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the one in the others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere?

That is clear.

Oxford Greek

ὅτι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνεστι, **μείζω** ἢ εἴη τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, περιέχοντα **αὐτό**, τὸ δὲ ἐν **ἐλαττον** τῶν ἄλλων, περιεχόμενον: ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν **αὐτὸν λόγον μείζον** ἢ εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός **ἐλάττω**.

ἔοικεν.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα **ἴσον** τε καὶ **μείζον** καὶ **ἐλαττόν** ἐστὶν **αὐτό** τε **αὐτοῦ** καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , on the one hand , since **The One Is Inherent in The Others** , then
 ἀρα μὲν οτι το εν ενεστι εν τοις αλλοις ,
The Others will **Be bigger than The One** , by **Comprehending/Containing The Self** ;
 τα αλλα αν ειη μειζω του ενος , περιεχοντα αυτο ,
 whereas on the other hand , **The One** will **Be smaller** than **The Others** by **Being Contained** ;
 δε το εν ελαττον των αλλων , περιεχομενον :
 but since **The Others Are Inherent in The One** , then by **The Self/Same Logos** , **The One**
 δε οτι τα αλλα εν τω ενι , κατα τον αυτον λογον το εν
 will **Be bigger** than **The Others** ; and thus , **The Other Beings** will be **smaller** than **The One** .
 αν ειη μειζον των αλλων , δε τα αλλα ελαττω του ενος .

Ari: As it is **Reasonable** . (εοικεν .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One Self** , **Is Equal to** , and **bigger** and **smaller than** ,
 αρα το εν αυτο εστιν ισον τε και μειζον και ελαττον
 both **The Self** and **The Others** .
 τε αυτου και των αλλων .

Ari: So it has come to **Light** . (φαινεται .)

150e μείζον
 151a μείζον, μείζονι
151b μείζω, μείζον, μείζον
 151c μείζον, μείζόν, μείζον
 151d μείζον

150e αὐτό, ἐαυτό, ἐαυτῶ, ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτῶ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶ, ἐαυτό, ἐαυτοῦ
 151a αὐτό, ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτῶ
151b αὐτό, αὐτόν, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ
 151c αὐτῶ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶ, αὐτῶν
 151d ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

150e ἔλαττον
 151a ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον
151b ἔλαττον, ἐλάττω, ἔλαττόν
 151c ἔλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττόνων, ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον
 151d ἔλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττόνων, ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον

147b λόγος
 148c λόγον
151b λόγον
 154a λόγον
 155b λόγον

150d ἴσον
 150e ἴσον, ἴσον
151b ἴσον
 151c ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον
 151d ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

Loeb

“And because the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one less than the others, since it is contained; but because the others are in the one, the one will by the same reasoning be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.”

“So it appears.”

“Then the one is equal to and greater and less than itself and the others.”

“Evidently.”

Thomas Taylor

Because, therefore, *The One* is in others, others will be greater than *The One*, through comprehending it; but *The One* will be less than others, because comprehended: but if others are inherent in *The One*, *The One* on the same account will be greater than others; but others will be less than *The One*.

It appears so.

The One, therefore, is equal to, greater and lesser, both than itself and others.

It seems so.

Jowett

But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than the others, because it is contained in them; and inasmuch as the others are in the one, the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.

True.

The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others?

Clearly.

καὶ μὴν εἴπερ **μείζον** καὶ **ἐλαττον** καὶ **ἴσον**, ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ **ἐλαττόνων** **αὐτῷ** καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ **μερῶν**.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὄν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ **ἐλαττόνων**, καὶ ἀριθμῷ **ἐλαττον** ἂν καὶ πλεον εἴη **αὐτό** τε **αὐτοῦ** καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ **ἴσον αὐτῷ** τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ **ταῦτά**.

πῶς;

ὧνπερ **μείζον** ἐστὶ, πλειόνων που καὶ μέτρων ἂν εἴη **αὐτῶν**, ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ **μερῶν**: καὶ ὧν **ἐλαττον**, ὡσαύτως: καὶ οἷς **ἴσον**, κατὰ **ταῦτά**.

οὕτως.

Balboas

Par: And certainly , if indeed **It Is bigger** , **smaller** and **Equal** , then **It** will **Be** of **Equal** , **more** 151C καὶ μὴν εἴπερ μείζον καὶ ἐλαττον καὶ ἴσον , καὶ ἂν εἴη ἴσων πλειονων and **less Measures** than **The Self** and **The Others** ; but if of **Measures** , then also of **Parts** . καὶ ἐλαττονων μετρων αὐτω καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις , δε ἐπειδη μετρων , καὶ μερων .

Ari: How could it not be ? (πῶς δ' οὐ .)

Par: Accordingly then , on the one hand , by **Being** of **Equal** , **more** and **lesser Measures** , ἀρα μὲν ὄν ἴσων καὶ πλειονων καὶ ἐλαττονων μετρων , then **It** will also **Be less** and **more** in **Number** , both in relation to **The Self** and **The Others** , ἂν καὶ εἴη ἐλαττον καὶ πλεον ἀριθμῷ τε αὐτου καὶ τῶν ἀλλων and also , according to **The Same Logos** , **It** will **Be Equal** to **The Self** and to **The Others** . καὶ τε κατὰ ταυτα ἴσον αὐτω καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις .

Ari: How ? (πῶς ;)

Par: Whatever **Is big** , will also **Be in some way of more Measures** than **Selves** , whereas ὧνπερ ἐστὶ μείζον , ἂν καὶ εἴη που πλειονων μετρων αὐτων : δε it will also **Be of as many Measures as Parts** ; and **in the same way** for that which **Is small** , ὅσων μετρων , μερων : καὶ ὡσαυτως ὧν ἐλαττον , and according to **The Same Logos** for that which **Is equal** . κατὰ ταυτα οἷς ἴσον .

Ari: In the same way .(οὕτως .)

151a μείζον, μείζονι

151b μείζω, μείζον, μείζον

151c **μείζον, μείζον**

151d μείζον, μείζον

156b μείζον

151a ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον

151b ἔλαττον, ἐλάττω, ἔλαττον

151c **ἐλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττον, ἐλαττον**

151d ἔλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττόνων , ἐλαττον, ἐλαττον

151e ἔλαττον

150e ἴσον, ἴσον

151b ἴσον

151c **ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον**

151d ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

151e ἴσον

150a μέρει

150b μέρει, μέρει, μέρους, μέρει

151c **μερῶν, μερῶν**

151d μερῶν, μερῶν

153c μέρη, μέρη

151a αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτά

151b αὐτό, αὐτόν, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ

151c **αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῶν**

151d αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

151e αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ

148d ταῦτόν

150b ταῦτά

151c **ταῦτά, ταῦτά**

158e ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

159a ταῦτά

Loeb

“And if equal and greater and less, it will be of equal and more and less measures with itself and the others, and since of equal, more, and less measures, of equal, more, and less parts.”

“Of course.”

“And being of equal and more and less measures, it will be less and more in number than itself and the others and likewise equal in number to itself and the others.”

“How is that?”

“If it is greater than any things, it will be of more measures than they; and of as many parts as measures. Similarly if it is less or equal, the number of parts will be less or equal.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor

But if it is greater, equal, and lesser, it will be of equal, more, and fewer measures, both than itself and others; and if of measures, also of parts.

How should it not?

Being, therefore, of equal, more, and fewer measures, it will also be more and less in number, both with respect to itself and others; and also, for the same reason, equal to itself and others.

How?

That which is greater possesses more measures than that which is smaller, and contains as many parts as measures; and that which is lesser in the same manner, as also that which is equal.

It is so.

Jowett

And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and more and less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if of measures, also of parts?

Of course.

And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in number to itself and to the others?

How is that?

It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of as many parts as measures; and so with that to which it is equal, and that than which it is less.

True.

Loeb

“Then one, being greater and less than itself and equal to itself, will be of more and less measures than itself and of equal measures with itself, and if of measures, of parts also?”

“Of course.”

“And being of equal parts with itself, it will also be equal in number to itself, and if of more parts, more in number, and if of less parts, less in number than itself.”

“Clearly.”

“And will not the one possess the same relation towards other things? Because it is shown to be greater than they, must it not also be more in number than they and because it is smaller, less in number? And because it is equal in size, must it not be also, equal in number to the others?”

“Yes, it must.”

Thomas Taylor

Since *The One*, therefore, is both greater, lesser, and equal to itself, will it not also contain measures equal to, more and fewer than itself? And if of measures, will not this also be true of parts?

How should it not?

If, therefore, it contains equal parts with itself, it will be equal in multitude to itself: but if more, more in multitude, and if fewer, less in multitude, than itself.

It appears so.

But will *The One* be similarly affected towards others? For, since it appears to be greater than others, is it not necessary that it should be more in number than others? but, because it is lesser, must it not also be fewer in number? and because equal in magnitude, must it not also be equal in multitude to others?

It is necessary.

Jowett

And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself; and if of measures then also of parts?

It will.

And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself?

Certainly.

And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it is greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and inasmuch as it is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch as it is equal in size to other things, it will be equal to them in number.

Certainly.

οὕτω δὴ αὖ, ὥς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλεον καὶ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ἔσται.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἐν, καὶ ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχον;

πῶς;

εἶναι μὲν που αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἐν ἔστιν.

ναί.

Par: Surely then , in this way in turn , as it is Reasonable , **The One Self** will **Be Equal** , 151E

δη οὕτω αυ , ὡς εοικε , το εν αυτο εσται και ισον

and **more** and **less in Number** , **than** both **The Self** and **The Others** .

και πλεον και ελαττον τον αριθμον τε αυτου και των αλλων .

Ari: It will be so . (εσται .)

Parmenides: 19 Take notice then , will **The One** also **Participate** of **Time** ? And does

Αρ' ουν το εν και μετεχει χρονου , και εστι

The Self also become **younger** and **older** , both than **It-Self** and **The Others** , and also

αυτο τε και γιγνεται νεωτερον τε και πρεσβυτερον τε εαυτου και των αλλων , και

neither **younger** nor **older** than **It-Self** nor **The Others** , by **Participating** of **Time** ?

ουτε νεωτερον ουτε πρεσβυτερον ουτε εαυτου ουτε των αλλων , μετεχον χρονου ;

Aristotle: How ? (πῶς ;)

Par: On the one hand , **To Be** , **Is Present in some way** with **The Self** , if indeed **It Is One** .

μεν ειναι υπαρχει που αυτω ειπερ εστιν εν .

Ari: Yes . (ναί .)

(compare **This** to 160d4)

151c ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

151d ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

151e ἴσον

152e ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

154d ἴσον, ἴσον

151c ἔλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττόνων, ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον

151d ἔλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττόνων, ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον

151e ἔλαττον

153a ἐλάττω, ἐλάττω

154d ἐλάττον, ἐλάττονος, ἔλαττον

151e αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτῶν

151d ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

151e αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ

146d χρόνον

146e χρόνον, χρόνον

151e χρόνου, χρόνου

152a χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνον

152b χρόνον

147a μετέχει, μετέχε, μετέχεν

149c μετέχει

151e μετέχει, μετέχον

152a μετέχει

153a μετέχει

144c γένοιτο

149a γένοιτο

151e γίγνεται

152a γίγνεται, γιγνομένου, γίγνεται

152b γίγνεται, γιγνομένου, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γιγνομένου

141c νεωτέρου, νεώτερον

141d νεώτερον

151e νεώτερόν, νεώτερον

152a νεωτέρου

152b νεωτέρου, νεώτερόν

141c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

141d πρεσβύτερόν

151e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152b πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

Loeb

“And so once more, as it appears, the one will be equal to, greater than, and less than itself and other things in number.”

“Yes, it will.”

“And does the one partake of time and if it partakes of time, is it and does it become younger and older than itself and other things, and neither younger nor older than itself and the others?”

“What do you mean?”

“If one is, it is thereby shown to be.”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

And thus again, as it appears, *The One* will be equal, more, and less in number, both than itself and others.

It will so.

Will *The One*, therefore, participate of time? And is it, and does it subsist in becoming to be younger and older, both than itself and others? And again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, though participating of time?

How?

To be in a certain respect is present with it, since it *is The One*.
certainly.

Jowett

Once more then, as would appear, the one will be in number both equal to and more and less than both itself and all other things.

It will.

Does the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become older and younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, by virtue of participation in time?

How do you mean?

If one is, being must be predicated of it?

Yes.

Oxford Greek

τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ μέθεξις **οὐσίας** μετὰ **χρόνου** τοῦ παρόντος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος **οὐσίας** ἐστὶ κοινωνία;

ἔστι γάρ.

μετέχει μὲν ἄρα **χρόνου**, εἵπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι.

πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: But on the other hand , what else **Is The To Be** , than **The Participation** of **Ousia** with
 δε τι ἄλλο ἐστὶν το εἶναι ἡ μεθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ
The Present of **Time** ? Just as , **The Was Is The Participation** of **Ousia** with
 152A του παροντος χρονου , ὡσπερ το ἦν μετὰ
The Past , and in turn , **The Will be Is The Communion** of **Ousia** with **The Future** ?
 του παρεληλυθοτος και αυ το εσται ἐστὶ κοινωνία οὐσίας μετὰ του μελλοντος ;

Ari: It is so . (ἐστὶ γὰρ .)

Par: Accordingly then , **It Participates** of **Time** , if indeed **It** also **Participates** of **The To Be** .
 ἀρα μὲν μετεχει χρονου , εἵπερ και του εἶναι .

Ari: Entirely so . (πάνυ γε .)

146e χρόνον, χρόνον

151e χρόνου, χρόνου

152a χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνου

152b χρόνον

152e χρόνον, χρόνον, χρόνον

144e οὐσίας

149e οὐσίας

152a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

155e οὐσίας, οὐσίας

156a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

149c μετέχει

151c μετέχει, μετέχον

152a μετέχει

153a μετέχει

155d μετέχει, μετέχον, μετέχει

Loeb

“But is 'to be' anything else than participation in existence together with present time, just as 'was' denotes participation in existence together with past time, and 'will be' similar participation together with future time?”

“True.”

“Then the one partakes of time if it partakes of being.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But what else is *to be* than a participation of essence with the present time? In the same manner as it was in a communication of essence with the past, and it will be with the future?

It is no other.

It must participate, therefore, of time, if it participates of being.

Entirely so.

Jowett

But to be (*einai*) is only participation of being in present time, and to have been is the participation of being at a past time, and to be about to be is the participation of being at a future time?

Very true.

Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν πορευομένου τοῦ **χρόνου**;

ναί.

ἀεὶ ἄρα **πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται** ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ **χρόνον**.

ἀνάγκη.

ἂρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα ὅτι **νεωτέρου γιγνομένου** τὸ **πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται**;
μεμνήμεθα.

Balboas

Par: Will not then , **The Time** of which **It Participates** , **Be in** a state of **Procession** ?
οὐκ οὖν τοῦ χρόνου πορευομένου ;

Ari: Yes . (ναί .)

Par: Accordingly then , **It Is Always becoming older than It-Self** ,
ἀρα αἰ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ,
if indeed **It Proceeds** according to **Time** . (As opposed to **Abiding** in **The Eternal**)
εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον .

Ari: Necessarily . (ἀνάγκη .)

Par: Take notice then , do we remember (141a) that whatever **becomes younger** does so ,
ἀρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα γιγνομένου νεώτερου
because the **older becomes older** (than **it**) ?
ὅτι τὸ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ;

Ari: We do remember . (μεμνήμεθα .)

146c χρόνον, χρόνον

151e χρόνου, χρόνου

152a χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνον

152b χρόνον

152c χρόνον, χρόνον, χρόνον

141d πρεσβύτερόν

151e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152b πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

149a γένοιτο

151e γίγνεται

152a γίγνεται, γιγνομένου, γίγνεται

152b γίγνεται, γιγνομένου, γίγνοιτο, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον

152c γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, γιγνόμενον

141d νεώτερον

151e νεώτερόν, νεώτερον

152a νεωτέρου

152b νεωτέρου, νεώτερόν

152d νεωτέρος, νεώτερον

Loeb

“And the time in which it partakes is always moving forward?”

“Yes.”

“Then it is always growing older than itself, if it moves forward with the time.”

“Certainly.”

“Now, do we not remember that there is something becoming younger when the older becomes older than it?”

“Yes, we do.”

Thomas Taylor

Must is not, therefore, participate of time in progression?

Certainly.

It will always, therefore, subsist *in becoming to be* older than itself, if it proceeds according to time.

It is necessary.

Do we, therefore, call to mind that the older is always becoming older, because it is always becoming younger?

We do call it to mind.

Jowett

And is not time always moving forward?

Yes.

Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward in time?

Certainly.

And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger?

I remember.

οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ **πρεσβύτερον** ἑαυτοῦ **γίνεται** τὸ ἔν, **νεωτέρου** ἂν **γιγνομένου** ἑαυτοῦ **πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτο**;

ἀνάγκη.

γίνεται μὲν δὴ **νεώτερόν** τε καὶ **πρεσβύτερον αὐτοῦ** οὕτω.

ναί.

ἔστι δὲ **πρεσβύτερον** ἂρ' οὐχ ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν **χρόνον** ἢ **γιγνόμενον** τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πορευόμενόν γε ἐκ τοῦ **ποτε** εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν.

οὐ γάρ.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that while **The One** , **becomes older than It-Self** ,
 οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ το ἐν γίνεται πρεσβύτερον εαυτοῦ ,
 that **It is becoming older** than **It-Self** ,while **It is becoming younger** than **It-Self** ?
 152B **γιγνομένου πρεσβύτερον εαυτοῦ ἂν γίγνοιτο νεωτέρου** ;

Ari: Necessarily . (ἀνάγκη .)

Par: Surely then in this way , on the one hand , **It will become younger** and **older** than **The Self** .
 δη οὕτως μὲν γίνεται νεωτερον τε και πρεσβυτερον αυτου .

Ari: Yes .(ναί .)

Par: But accordingly , on the other hand , **It Is** not in any way **older** , when **Coming-to-Be**
 ἀρ' δε εστι ουχ η πρεσβυτερον οταν γιγνομενον
 according to **The Present Time** ; **That** which **Is between The Was** and **The Will Be** ? For
 κατα τον νυν χρονον τον μεταξυ του ην τε και εσται ; γαρ
 by **Proceeding** from **The Past** to **The Future** , **It** will not somehow go-beyond **The Present** ?
 πορευομενον εκ του ποτε εις το επειτα γε ου που υπερβησεται το νυν .

Ari: How could it . (γαρ ου .)

151e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152b πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152d πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

151e γίνεται

152a γίνεται, γιγνομένου, γίγνεται

152b γίγνεται, γιγνομένου, γίγνοιτο, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον

152c γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, γιγνόμενον

152d γιγνόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, ἐγίγνετο, ἐγίγνετο, γιγνόμενον

151e νεώτερόν, νεώτερον

152a νεωτέρου

152b νεωτέρου, νεώτερόν

152d νεωτέρου, νεώτερον

152e νεώτερον, νεώτερόν, νεώτερον

151d ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

151e αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ

152b αὐτοῦ

152d αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ

152e ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ

151e χρόνου, χρόνου

152a χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνον

152b χρόνον

152e χρόνον, χρόνον, χρόνον

154b χρόνω

146d ποτε

150b ποτε

152b ποτε

152c ποτε

154c ποτε, ποτε

Loeb

"Then the one, since it becomes older than itself, would become older than a self which becomes younger?"

"There is no doubt of it."

"Thus the one becomes older and younger than itself."

"Yes."

"And it is older (is it not) when in becoming older it is in the present time, between the past and the future; for in going from the past to the future it cannot avoid the present."

"No, it cannot."

Thomas Taylor

Does not *The One*, therefore, while it is becoming older than itself, subsist in becoming older than itself, while it is becoming younger than itself?

Necessarily so.

It will, therefore, become both younger and older than itself.

Certainly.

But is it not then older when it subsists in *becoming to be* according to the present time, which is between *it was* and *it will be*: for, through proceeding from the past to the future, it will not pass beyond the present *now*?

It will not.

Jowett

Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the same time?

Certainly.

Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself?

Yes.

And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming, it gets to the point of time. between "was" and "will be," which is "now": for surely in going from the past to the future, it cannot skip the present?

No.

ἀρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει **τότε** τοῦ **γίγνεσθαι** **πρεσβύτερον**, ἐπειδὴν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχη, καὶ οὐ **γίνεται**, ἀλλ' ἔστι **τότ'** ἤδη **πρεσβύτερον**; προῖον γὰρ οὐκ ἂν **ποτε** **ληφθεῖν** ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προῖον οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμενον, τοῦ δ' ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον, μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων **γινόμενον**, τοῦ τε ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν.

ἀληθῆ.

εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ **γινόμενον**, ἐπειδὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἦ, ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ **γίγνεσθαι** καὶ ἔστι **τότε** τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν **τύχη** **γινόμενον**.

φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: Take notice then , will **It** not *at that time cease* to *become older* , since **It arrives** at **The** 152C ἀρ' οὖν οὐκ **ποτε** ἐπισχει τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον , ἐπειδὴν ἐντύχη τῷ **Now** and is *no longer becoming* , but *at that time It Is already older* ? For when **It Proceeds** νῦν καὶ οὐ γίνεται , ἀλλ' **τοτ'** ἐστὶ ἤδη πρεσβύτερον ; γὰρ **ποτε** προῖον **It** will not **Be Grasped** by **The Now** . For **That** which **Proceeds Has To Be in such a way** as ἀν οὐκ ληφθεῖν ὑπο τοῦ νῦν . γὰρ τὸ προῖον ἐχει οὕτως ὡς to *Grasp both The Now* and *The Future* ; on the one hand , *by Departing from The Now* , while ἐφάπτεσθαι ἀμφοτέρων , τοῦ νῦν τε καὶ τοῦ ἐπειτα , μὲν ἀφιέμενον τοῦ νῦν , δ' also *Apprehending The Future* , by *Coming-to-Be Between* both *The Future* and *The Now* . ἐπιλαμβανομένου τοῦ ἐπειτα , γινόμενον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων , τοῦ ἐπειτα τε καὶ τοῦ νῦν .

Ari: **True** . (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: But if it is indeed **Necessary** that **All** that **Is becoming** should not by-pass δε εἰ γε ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον μὴ παρελθεῖν **The Now** ; since , *as soon as it arrives at This Now* , **That/Ousia** will *Always cease becoming* , τοῦ νῦν , ἐπειδὴν ἡ κατὰ τοῦτο , τοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπίσχει γίγνεσθαι and **Is** , *at that time* , **That** which **It** was **Aiming to become** . 152D καὶ ἐστὶ **τότε** τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν **τύχη** **γινόμενον** .

Ari: So it has come to **Light** . (φαίνεται .)

127b τότε

127c τότε, τότε

152c τότε, τότ', τότε

152d τότε, τότε

155e τότε

152a γίνεσθαι, γινόμενοι, γίνεσθαι

152b γίνεσθαι, γινόμενοι, γίνεσθαι, γινόμενοι

152c γίγνεσθαι, γίνεσθαι, γινόμενοι, γινόμενοι, γίγνεσθαι, γινόμενοι

152d γινόμενοι, γίγνεσθαι, ἐγίνετο, ἐγίνετο, γινόμενοι

152e γίνεσθαι, γίνεσθαι, γινόμενοι, γινόμενοι, γίνεσθαι

152a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152b πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152d πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

150b ποτε

152b ποτέ

152c ποτε

154c ποτε, ποτε

155d ποτέ

135e λάβοι

143a λάβωμεν

152c ληφθεῖν

154d λαμβάνον

156a λαμβάνει

145c τυγχάνει

145c τυγχάνει

152c τύχη

155d τυγχάνει

Loeb

“Then is it not the case that it ceases to become older when it arrives at the present, and no longer becomes, but actually is older? For while it moves forward it can never be arrested by the present, since that which moves forward touches both the present and the future, letting the present go and seizing upon the future, proceeding or becoming between the two, the present and the future.”

“True.”

“But if everything that is becoming is unable to avoid and pass by the present, then when it reaches the present it always ceases to become and straightway is that which it happens to be becoming.”

“Clearly.”

Thomas Taylor

Will it not, therefore, cease becoming to be older, when it arrives at *the now*, and is no longer *becoming to be*, but *is* now older? For while it proceeds it will never be comprehended by *the now*. For that which proceeds subsists in such a manner as to touch upon both *the now* and the future time; departing, indeed, from *the now*, but apprehending the future, because it subsists in the middle of the future and *the now*.

True.

But if it be necessary that whatever is becoming to be should not pass by *the now* or the present time, hence, as soon as it arrives at *the now*, it will always cease becoming to be, and *is* then that which it was in pursuit of becoming.

It appears so.

Jowett

And when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older, and no longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on it would never be reached by the present, for it is the nature of that which goes on, to touch both the present and the future, letting go the present and seizing the future, while in process of becoming between them.

True.

But that which is becoming cannot skip the present; when it reaches the present it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may happen to be becoming.

Clearly.

καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὅταν **πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον** ἐντύχη τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχευ τοῦ **γίγνεσθαι** καὶ ἔστι **τότε πρεσβύτερον**.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν οὐδὲρ **ἐγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον**, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν: **ἐγίγνετο** δὲ **αὐτοῦ**;

ναί.

ἔστι δὲ τὸ **πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον**;

ἔστιν.

καὶ **νεώτερον** ἄρα **τότε αὐτοῦ** ἔστι τὸ ἔν, ὅταν **πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον** ἐντύχη τῷ νῦν.
ἀνάγκη.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** , also , *in Aiming* at **becoming older** , when **It Hits-upon**
 ἄρα το ἐν και γιγνομενον πρεσβυτερον σταν εντυχη
The Now , **It** will also *cease becoming at that time* that **It Is older**.
 τω νυν , και επεσχευ του γιγνεσθαι τοτε εστι πρεσβυτερον .

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ γε .)

Par: Is it not the case then , that **It** is also **older** than **that** , in relation to which
 ουκουν εστιν και πρεσβυτερον τουτου ουπερ
It has become older , when it was thus **becoming older** than **The Self** ?
 εγίγνετο δε εγίγνετο αυτου ;

Ari: Yes . (ναι .)

Par: But the **older** is **older** than the **younger** ?
 δε το πρεσβυτερον εστι πρεσβυτερον νεωτερου ;

Ari: It is . (εστιν .)

Par: Accordingly then , at that time , **The One** is **younger** than **The Self** ,
 ἄρα τοτε το ἐν εστι νεωτερον αυτου ,
 when by **becoming older It Hits upon The Now** .
 σταν γιγνομενον πρεσβυτερον εντυχη τω νυν .

Ari: Necessarily . (αναγκη .)

152b πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152d **πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον**

152e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

153b πρεσβύτερον

152b γίγνεται, γιγνόμενοι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενοι

152c γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, γιγνόμενον

152d **γιγνόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, ἐγίγνετο, ἐγίγνετο, γιγνόμενον**

152e γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται

153a γίγνεσθαι, γιγνόμενοι

151e αὐτό, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῷ

152b αὐτοῦ

152d **αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ**

152e ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ

153b αὐτοῦ

127c τότε, τότε

152c τότε, τότε, τότε

152d **τότε, τότε**

155e τότε

156a τότε, τότε

152a νεωτέρου

152b νεωτέρου, νεωτέρων

152d **νεωτέρου, νεωτέρων**

152e νεώτερον, νεωτέρων, νεώτερον

153b νεώτερα, νεώτερα

Loeb

“The one, then, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become and straightway is older.”

“Certainly.”

“It therefore is older than that than which it was becoming older; and it was becoming older than itself.”

“Yes.”

“And that which is older is older than that which is younger, is it not?”

“It is.”

“Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present.”

“Undoubtedly.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*, will cease *becoming to be*, and then *is* older.

Entirely so.

Is it not, therefore, older than that in respect of which it becomes older? And does it not become older than itself?

Certainly.

And is not the older older than the younger?

It is.

The One, therefore, is younger than itself, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*.

It is necessary.

Jowett

And so the one, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become, and is then older.

Certainly.

And it is older than that than which it was becoming older, and it was becoming older than itself.

Yes.

And that which is older is older than that which is younger?

True.

Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present?

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

τό γε μὴν νῦν ἀεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἐνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι: ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ νῦν ὅτανπερ ᾗ.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ἀεὶ ἄρα ἐστὶ τε καὶ **γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ** καὶ **νεώτερον** τὸ ἔν.

ἔοικεν.

πλείω δὲ **χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ** ἔστιν ἢ **γίγνεται**, ἢ τὸν **ἴσον**;

τὸν **ἴσον**.

Balboas

Par: Most certainly then , **The Now** is **Always Present** with **The One** (Like @ 142c 6) ,
 152E γε μὴν το νυν αει παρεστι τω ενι
 through-out **The Whole** of **Its Being** : For **It Is Always Now** , as long as and insofar as , **It Is** .
 δια παντος του ειναθι : γαρ αει νυν οτανπερ η εστι .

Ari: How could it not be ? (πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One Always Is** and also **becomes older** and **younger** than **It-Self** .
 αρα το εν αει εστι τε και γιννεται πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον εαυτου .

Ari: It is **Reasonable** . (εοικεν .)

Par: But **Is** or does **Self become** in a more-extended or in an **Equal Period of Time** to **It-Self** ?
 δε εστιν η αυτο γιννεται , πλειω η ισον τον χρονον εαυτου ;

Ari: In an equal period of time .

τον ισον .

152c γίνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, γιγνόμενον
 152d γιγνόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, ἐγίγνετο, ἐγίγνετο, γιγνόμενον
152e γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται
 153a γίγνεσθαί, γεγονέναι
 153b γέγονε, γεγονός, γέγονε, γεγονότα, γεγονότος, γεγονός
 152b νεώτερον, νεώτερον
 152d νεωτέρου, νεώτερον
152e νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον
 153b νεώτερα, νεώτερα
 153d νεώτερον
 152b αὐτοῦ
 152d αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ
152e ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτήν, αὐτήν, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ
 153b αὐτοῦ
 153c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

152c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον
 152d πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον
152e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον
 153b πρεσβύτερον
 153d πρεσβύτερα
 152a χρόνοι, χρόνοι, χρόνοι, χρόνον
 152b χρόνον
152e χρόνον, χρόνον, χρόνον
 154b χρόνω
 154d χρόνον, χρόνω, χρόνον, χρόνον
 151d ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον
 151e ἴσον
152e ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον
 154d ἴσον, ἴσον
 156b ἴσον

Loeb

“But the present is inseparable from the one throughout its whole existence; for it always is now whenever it is.”

“Of course.”

“Always, then, the one is and is becoming younger than itself.”

“So it appears.”

“And is it or does it become for a longer time than itself, or for an equal time?”

“For an equal time.”

Thomas Taylor

But the now is always present with The One, through the whole of its being; for it is always now as long as it is.

How should it not?

The One, therefore, always is, and is becoming to be younger and older than itself.

So it appears.

But is The One, or does it subsist in becoming to be, in a time more extended than or equal to itself?

In an equal time.

Jowett

But the present is always present with the one during all its being; for whenever it is it is always now.

Certainly.

Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself?

Truly.

And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself?

An equal time.

Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ ὃν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει.
 πῶς δ' οὐ;
 τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν.
 οὐ γάρ.
 τὸ ἔν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὃν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε
 πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν οὐδὲ γίγνεται.
 οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

Balboas

Par: But most certainly , **That** which either **Is** or **becomes** in an **Equal Period** of **Time** ,
 ἀλλὰ γε μὴν τὸν ἢ οὐ γιγνόμενον ἴσον χρόνον
 has to be of **The Same Age** .
 εχει την αυτην ηλικιαν .

Ari: How could it not ? (πως δ' ου ;)

Par: But **That** which is of **The Same Age** , is neither *older* nor *younger* .
 δε το εχον την αυτην ηλικιαν εστιν ουτε πρεσβυτερον ουτε νεωτερον .

Ari: It is not . (γαρ ου .)

Par: Accordingly then , since **The One Self** both **becomes** and **Is** in a **Period** of **Time** that
 ἀρα το εν αυτο και γιγνομενον και ον τον χρονον
Is Equal to **It-Self** , then **It** neither **Is** nor **becomes** neither *younger* nor *older* than **It-Self** .
 ισον εαυτω ουτε εστιν ουδε γινεται ουτε νεωτερον ουτε πρεσβυτερον εαυτου .

Ari: It does not appear to me , that it can . (ου δοκει μοι .)

151d ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

151e ἴσον

152e ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

154d ἴσον, ἴσον

156b ἴσον

152a χρόνοι, χρόνοι, χρόνοι, χρόνοι

152b χρόνον

152e χρόνοι, χρόνον, χρόνον

154b χρόνω

154d χρόνον, χρόνω, χρόνον, χρόνον

152c γίνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γιγνόμενον, γίνεσθαι, γιγνόμενον

152d γιγνόμενον, γίνεσθαι, ἐγίνετο, ἐγίνετο, γιγνόμενον

152e γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται

153a γίγνεσθαι, γερονέαι

153b γέρονε, γερονός, γέρονε, γερονότα, γερονότος, γερονός

152b αὐτοῦ

152d αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ

152e ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτήν, αὐτήν, αὐτό, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτοῦ

153b αὐτοῦ

153c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

141a ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν

141d ἡλικίαν

152e ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν

153c ἡλικίαν

154b ἡλικία

152c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152d πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

153b πρεσβύτερον

153d πρεσβύτερα

152b νεώτερον, νεώτερόν

152d νεωτέρου, νεώτερον

152e νεώτερον, νεώτερόν, νεώτερον

153b νεώτερα, νεώτερα

153d νεώτερον

Loeb

“But that which is or becomes for an equal time is of the same age.”

“Of course.”

“But that which is of the same age is neither older nor younger.”

“No.”

“Then the one, since it is and becomes for an equal time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself.”

“I agree.”

Thomas Taylor

But that which either *is*, or subsists in *becoming to be*, in an equal time possesses the same age.

How should it not?

But that which has the same age is neither older nor younger.

By no means.

The One, therefore, since it both subsists in *becoming to be* and *is*, in a time equal to itself, neither *is* nor is *becoming to be* younger nor older than itself.

It does not appear to me that it can.

Jowett

But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same age with itself?

Of course.

And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger?

No.

The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself?

I should say not.

τί δέ; τῶν ἄλλων;

οὐκ ἔχω **λέγειν**.

τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις **λέγειν**, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ **ἕτερά** ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μὴ **ἕτερον**, πλείω ἐστὶν ἑνός: **ἕτερον** μὲν γὰρ ὃν ἐν ἅν ἦν, **ἕτερα** δὲ ὄντα πλείω ἑνός ἐστί καὶ πλῆθος ἅν ἔχοι.

ἔχοι γὰρ ἅν.

Balboas

Par: What follows then , in relation to **The Others** ?

τι δε ; τῶν ἀλλων ;

Ari: I know not what to say . (οὐκ εχω λεγειν .)

Par: You may certainly say the following ; that **Those Other** than **The One** ,

153A εχεις μὴν λεγειν τοδε , οτι τα αλλα του ενος ,

if indeed **They Are** indeed **Other** (plural) , but not **Another** (singular) , **Are more** than **One** .

ειπερ εστιν γε ετερα , αλλα μη ετερον , εστιν πλειω ενος :

For on the one hand , by **Being Other** , **They** will also **Be One** ; but on the other hand , by **Being**

γαρ μεν ον ετερον αν ην εν : δε οντα

Others , **They Are more** than **One** , and **They** will **Possess Multitude** .

ετερα εστι πλειω ενος και αν εχοι πληθος .

Ari: They will possess it . (γαρ αν εχοι .)

147e λέγομεν, λέγομεν

148c λέγεις

153a λέγειν, λέγειν

154a λέγειν

155d λέγεις, λέγεται

148d ἕτερόν

151a ἕτερον, ἐτέρῳ, ἕτερον

153a ἕτερά, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερα

154a ἐτέρως

154b ἕτερον, ἐτέρου

Loeb

“Well, then, is it or does it become older or younger than other things?”

“I cannot tell.”

“But you can at any rate tell that the others, if they are others, not an other—plural, not singular—are more than one; for if they were an other, they would be one; but since they are others, they are more than one and have multitude.”

“Yes, they have.”

Thomas Taylor

But how is it affected with respect to others?

I know not what to say.

But this you may say, that things different from The One because they are others, and not another, are more than The One. For that which is another is one; but being others they are more than one, and possess multitude.

They do.

Jowett

And what are its relations to other things? Is it or does it become older or younger than they?

I cannot tell you.

You can at least tell me that others than the one are more than the one—other would have been one, but the others have multitude, and are more than one?

They will have multitude.

Oxford Greek

πλήθος δὲ ὃν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν **μετέχου** ἢ τοῦ ενός.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω **γίγνεσθαι** τε καὶ **γεγονέναι** πρότερον, ἢ τὰ **ἐλάττω**; τὰ **ἐλάττω**.

τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον: τοῦτο

δ' ἔστι τὸ ἕν. ἢ γάρ;

ναί.

Balboas

Par: But by **Being Many They** will **Participate** of a **greater Number** than **The One** .
δε ον πληθος αν μετεχου πλειονος αριθμου η του ενος .

Ari: How could they not ? (πῶς δ' οὐ ;)

Par: What then ? Do we say that **Those** that are **more** in **Number** are **generated** , and
τι ουν ; φησομεν τα πλειω αριθμου γιγνεσθαι τε
have also **been generated before** or do we say that **The Few** were **generated before/Prior** ?
και γεγονεναι προτερον η τα ελαττω ;

Ari: The few . (τα ελαττω .)

Par: Accordingly then , **That** which **Is Least Is First** . But **This Is The One** . Can it be so ?
αρα το ολιγιστον πρωτον : δ' τουτο εστι το εν . η γαρ ;

Ari: Yes . (ναί .)

151e μετέχει, μετέχον

152a μετέχει

153a μετέχου

155d μετέχει, μετέχουν, μετέχει

155e μετέχον, μετέχουν, μετέχουν, μετέχει, μετέχουν, μετέχει, μετέχουν

152d γιγνόμενον, γίγνεσθαι, ἐγίγνετο, ἐγίγνετο, γιγνόμενον

152e γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται

153a γίγνεσθαι, γεγονέναι

153b γέγονε, γεγονός, γέγονε, γεγονότα, γεγονότος, γεγονός

153c γίγνεται, γεγονέναι

151d ἔλαττον, ἐλαττόνων, ἐλαττόνων, ἔλαττον, ἔλαττον

151e ἔλαττον

153a ἐλάττω, ἐλάττω

154d ἐλάττονι, ἐλάττονος, ἔλαττον

154e ἔλαττον

Loeb

“And being a multitude, they would partake of a number greater than one.”

“Of course.”

“Well, which shall we say come and have come into being first, the greater or the smaller numbers?”

“The smaller.”

“Then the smallest comes into being first and that is the one, is it not?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

But multitude participates of a greater number than *The One*?

How should it not?

What then? Do we say that things more in number are generated, or have been generated, before the few?

We assert this of the few before the many.

That which is the fewest, therefore, is first: but is not this *The One*?

Certainly.

Jowett

And a multitude implies a number larger than one?

Of course.

And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to have come into existence?

The lesser.

Then the least is the first? And that is the one?

Yes.

Oxford Greek

πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἐν πρῶτον **γέγονε** τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐχόντων: ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἀριθμὸν, εἴπερ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστίν.

ἔχει γάρ.

πρῶτον δέ γε οἶμαι **γεγονὸς** πρότερον **γέγονε**, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὕστερον,

τὰ δ' ὕστερον **γεγονότα νεώτερα** τοῦ πρότερον **γεγονότος**; καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη τὰλλα **νεώτερα** τοῦ ἐνός, τὸ δὲ ἐν **πρεσβύτερον** τῶν ἄλλων.

εἴη γὰρ ἂν.

τί δὲ τόδε; ἂρ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν **αὐτοῦ γεγονός**, ἢ ἀδύνατον;

ἀδύνατον.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **The One has become The First** of **All Those Possessing Number** :

153B ἀρα το ἐν γεγονε πρωτον παντων των εχοντων αριθμον .

But **All The Others** also **Possess Number** , if indeed **They** are **Others** and not **Another** .

δε παντα ταλλα και εχει αριθμον , ειπερ εστιν αλλα και μη αλλο .

Ari: They have to be . (γαρ εχει .)

Par: But indeed , by **having-come-to-be First** , I think , **It came-to-be Before** ,

δε γε γεγονος πρωτον , οιμαι , γεγονε προτερον ,

but **The Others came-to-be Later** . But **Those** that **have-come-to-be Later** are **younger**

δε τα αλλα υστερον . δ' τα γεγονοτα υστερον νεωτερα

than **That** which **has come-to-be Before** : and thus , **The Others** will **Be younger**

του γεγονοτος προτερον : και ουτως ταλλα αν ειη νεωτερα

than **The One** , but **The One** will be **Older** than **The Others** .

του ενος , δε το εν πρεσβυτερον των αλλων .

Ari: It will be indeed . (αν ειη γαρ .)

Parmenides: 20 But what about the following ? Could it **Be** the case , that **The One**

δε Τι τοδε ; αρ' αν ειη το εν

has come-to-Be , contrary to **The Nature of The Self** , or is this **Impossible** ?

γεγονος παρὰ την φυσιν αυτου , η αδυνατον ;

Aristotle: Impossible . (αδυνατον .)

152e γίγνεται, γίνεταί, γιγνόμενον, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται

153a γίγνεσθαι, γεγονέναι

153b γέγονε, γεγονός, γέγονε, γεγονότα, γεγονότος, γεγονός

153c γίγνεται, γεγονέναι

153d γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γεγονός, γίγνεσθαι

152d νεώτεροι, νεώτερον

152e νεώτερον, νεώτερόν, νεώτερον

153b νεώτερα, νεώτερα

153d νεώτερον

154a νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

152d πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

152e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

153b πρεσβύτερον

153d πρεσβύτερα

154a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερόν, πρεσβύτερόν, πρεσβύτερον

152d αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ

152e ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτήν, αὐτήν, αὐτό, ἐαυτῶ, ἐαυτοῦ

153b αὐτοῦ

153c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

153d αὐτό

Loeb

“The one, therefore, has come into being first of all things that have number; but all others also have number, if they are others and not an other.”

“They have.”

“And since it came into being first, it came into being, I suppose, before the others, and the others later; but things which have come into being later are younger than that which came into being before them and thus the other things would be younger than the one, and the one older than the other things.”

“Yes, they would.”

“Here is another question: Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?”

“It is impossible.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, becomes the first of all things possessing number: but all other things have number, if they are *others* and not *another*.

They have indeed.

But that which is first generated has I think a priority of subsistence: but others are posterior to this. But such as have an after generation are younger than that which had a prior generation; and thus others will be younger than *The One*, but *The One* will be older than others.

It will indeed.

But what shall we say to this? Can *The One* be generated contrary to its nature, or is this impossible?

Impossible.

Jowett

Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into being; but all other things have also number, being plural and not singular.

They have.

And since it came into being first it must be supposed to have come into being prior to the others, and the others later; and the things which came into being later, are younger than that which preceded them? And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things?

True.

What would you say of another question? Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?

Impossible.

Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μὴν **μέρη** γε ἔχον ἐφάνη τὸ ἓν, εἰ δὲ **μέρη**, καὶ **ἀρχὴν** καὶ **τελευτήν** καὶ **μέσον**.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον **ἀρχὴ γίγνεται**, καὶ **αὐτοῦ** τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν **ἀρχὴν** καὶ τὰλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους;

τί μήν;

καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ' εἶναι πάντα τὰλλα τοῦ **ὅλου** τε καὶ ἑνός, **αὐτὸ** δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἅμα τῇ **τελευτῇ γεγονέναι** ἓν τε καὶ **ὅλον**.

φήσομεν γάρ.

Balboas

Par: But surely , **The One** has indeed come to **Light** to consist of **Parts** (*Older* , *Same* , *Younger*) ;

153C ἀλλὰ μὴν το ἐν γε ἐφανη ἔχον μερη ,

but if of **Parts** , then also of a **Beginning** , **End** and **Middle** .

δε εἰ μερη , καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μεσον .

Ari: Yes . (ναί .)

Par: Is it not the case then , that **The Beginning** (HYPARXIS) **Is Generated First** of **All** ,
οὐκοῦν ἀρχὴ γίγνεται πρῶτον παντων ,

both of **The Self** of **The One** and of **Each** of **The Others** ; and after that , **The Beginning**

καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων , καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν

of **All the others** as far as to **the end** ?

παντα τὰλλα μεχρι τοῦ τέλους ;

Ari: What follows then ? (τι μὴν ;)

Par: And we shall most certainly say that **All** these **Others** , **Are Parts** of **The Whole** and

καὶ γε μὴν φησομεν παντα ταυτ' ὅλα εἶναι μορία τοῦ ὅλου τε

of **The One** ; but **That Self has come-to-Be At-Once** with **The End** , **One-and-Whole** .

καὶ ἐνός , δε ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ γέγονεναι ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ ἐν τε καὶ ὅλον .

Ari: We shall say so . (γὰρ φησομεν .)

151c μερών, μερών
151d μερών, μερών
153c μέρη, μέρη
153d μέρος, μέρος, μέρη, μέρος
166a μέρος

145a ἀρχὴν
145b ἀρχὴν
153c ἀρχὴν, ἀρχὴν
153d ἀρχὴν

145a τελευτήν
145b τελευτήν
153c τελευτήν, τελευτήν
153d τελευτή, τελευτή
165b τελευτήν, τελευτή

145b μέσον, μέσον, μέσον
149a μέσω
153c μέσον
153c μέσου
165a μέσον

137d ἀρχή
142b ἀρχῆς, ἀρχῆς
153c ἀρχή
159b ἀρχῆς
160d ἀρχῆς

152e ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτό, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτήν, αὐτό, ἑαυτῶ, ἑαυτοῦ
153b αὐτοῦ
153c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό
153d αὐτό
153e αὐτήν, αὐτό

150a ὅλω, ὅλω, ὅλου
150b ὅλω, ὅλον, ὅλω
153c ὅλου, ὅλον
153c ὅλον
157c ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλου

153a γίνεσθαι, γεγονέναι
153b γέγονε, γεγονός, γέγονε, γεγονότα, γεγονότος, γεγονός
153c γίγνεται, γεγονέναι
153d γίγνεται, γίνεσθαι, γίνεσθαι, γέγονός, γίνεσθαι
153c γιγνόμεν, γίγναι, γιγνόμενων, γένεται, γεγονός

Loeb

“But surely the one was shown to have parts, a beginning, a middle, and an end.”

“Yes.”

“And the beginning of everything—of one and everything else alike—comes into being first, and after the beginning come all the other parts until the end arrives, do they not?”

“Certainly.”

“And we shall say also that all these others are parts of the whole and the one, and that it has become one and whole at the moment when the end arrives.”

“Yes, we shall say that.”

Thomas Taylor

But *The One* appears to consist of parts; and if of parts, it possesses a beginning, end and middle.

Certainly.

Is not, therefore, the beginning generated first of all, both of *The One* and of every other thing; and after the beginning all the other parts, as far as to the end?

What then?

And, indeed, we should say that all these are parts of a whole and of one; but that *The One*, together with the end, is generated *one* and a *whole*.

We should say so.

Jowett

And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end?

Yes.

And a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things, comes into being first of all; and after the beginning, the others follow, until you reach the end?

Certainly.

And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?

Yes; that is what we shall say.

τελευτή δέ γε οἶμαι ὕστατον γίγνεται, τούτω δ' ἅμα τὸ ἐν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι: ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τελευτῇ ἂν γεγονὸς ὕστατον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἴη γίγνεσθαι.

φαίνεται.

νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν ἐστί, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα.

οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται.

τί δὲ δῆ; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν, ἐάνπερ μέρος ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ μέρη, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν;

ἀνάγκη.

Balboas

Par: But **The End** I suspect , **comes-to-Be** the very **last** of all . Thus **The One Naturally** δε τελευτη , οἶμαι , γίγνεται γε ὑστατον : δ' το ἐν πεφυκε **comes-to-Be** At-Once with **This** ; so that , if indeed it **Is Necessary** that **The One Self** 153D γίγνεσθαι αμα ουτω : ωστ' ειπερ αναγκη το ἐν αυτο **come-to-Be** contrary to **Nature** , in that **The One** would **have-come-to-Be** , **At-Once** μη γίγνεσθαι παρὰ φύσιν , αν γεγονος αμα with **The End** ; which will **Be Naturally Generated Last** of **The Others** . τελευτη αν ειη πεφυκος γίγνεσθαι υστατον των αλλων .

Ari: So it has come to **Light** . (φαινεται .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One Is younger** than **The Others** , αρα το ἐν ἐστί νεωτερον των αλλων , while **The Others** are **older** than **The One** . δ' τα αλλα πρεσβυτερα του ἐνος .

Ari: To me , it has come to **Light** in turn in this way in turn . (μοι φαινεται αυ ουτως .)

Par: But what then ? Must not **The Beginning** or any other **Part** whatsoever δε τι δη ; ουκ αρχην η αλλο μερος σιουν of **The One** , or of anything else , if indeed and inasmuch as it **Is** a **Part** (singular) , του ἐνος η σιουν αλλου , εανπερ η μερος but not **Parts** (plural) , **Necessarily** be **One** , if it **Is** indeed a **Part** ? αλλα μη μερη , αναγκαιον ειναι ἐν , ον γε μερος ;

Ari: Necessarily . (αναγκη .)

153b αὐτοῦ
153c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό
153d αὐτό
153e αὐτὴν, αὐτό
154a αὐτό

152e νεώτερον, νεώτερόν, νεώτερον
153b νεώτερα, νεώτερα
153d νεώτερον
154a νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον
154b νεώτερον, νεώτερον

145b ἀρχὴν
153c ἀρχὴν, ἀρχὴν
153d ἀρχὴν
163b ἀρχὴν
165a ἀρχὴν

153b γέγονε, γεγονός, γέγονε, γεγονότα, γεγονότος, γεγονός
153c γίγνεται, γιγνόμεναι
153d γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γεγονός, γίγνεσθαι
153e γιγνομένην, γίγνεται, γιγνομένων, γένηται, γεγονός
154a γεγονός, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι

145b τελευτήν
153c τελευτήν, τελευτή
153d τελευτή, τελευτή
165b τελευτήν, τελευτή

152e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον
153b πρεσβύτερον
153d πρεσβύτερα
154a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερόν, πρεσβύτερόν, πρεσβύτερον
154b πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

151d μερόν, μερόν
153c μέρη, μέρη
153d μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος
154a μέρος, μέρος

Loeb

“The end, I imagine, comes into being last; and at that moment the one naturally comes into being; so that if the absolute one cannot come into being contrary to its own nature, since it has come into being simultaneously with the end, its nature must be such that it comes into being after all the others.”

“That is clear.”

“Then the one is younger than the others and the others are older than the one.”

“I think that is clear, too.”

“Well, must not a beginning or any other part whatsoever of one or of anything else whatsoever, if it be a part, not parts, be one, since it is a part?”

“It must.”

Thomas Taylor

But the end I think must be generated last of all, and *The One* must be naturally generated together with this; so that *The One*, since it is necessary that it should not be generated contrary to nature, being produced together with the end, will be naturally generated the last of others.

-

The One, therefore, is younger than others, but others are older than *The One*.

So again it appears to me.

But what, must not the beginning, or any other part whatever, of *The One*, or of any thing else, if it is a part, and not parts - must it not necessarily be one, since it is a part?

Necessarily.

Jowett

But the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come into being with the last; and, since the one cannot come into being except in accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come into being after the others, simultaneously with the end.

Clearly.

Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one.

That also is clear in my judgment.

Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ἅμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ **γίγνομένῳ γίγνεται** ἂν καὶ ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων **γίγνομένων**, ὅτιπερ ἂν προσγίγνηται ὁτῶοῦν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὼν **ὅλον** ἐν **γένηται**, οὔτε **μέσου** οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

ἀληθῆ.

πάσιν ἅρα τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν **αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν** ἴσχει τὸ ἐν: ὥστ' εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν **αὐτὸ** τὸ ἐν, οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων **γεγονὸς** ἂν εἶη, ἀλλ' ἅμα.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that **The One** *Has-come-to-Be At-Once* with both **The First Part** , 153E οὐκοῦν το ἐν γίγνομενῳ ἀμα τε τῷ πρωτῷ and also **Will come-to-Be At-Once** with **The Second Part** ; and **It** does not abandon a single one καὶ ἀν γίγνεται ἀμα τῷ δευτέρῳ , καὶ ἀπολείπεται οὐδενος of **The Others** that are *coming-to-Be* , nor any **Part** to which **It Can Be Attached** ; until τῶν ἄλλων γίγνομένων , ὅτιπερ ὁτῶοῦν ἀν προσγίγνηται , ἕως **Arriving at The Extreme Part** , **It Becomes One Whole** ; by neither **Being** excluded διελθὼν πρὸς τὸ ἐσχατὸν γένηται ἐν ὅλον , οὔτε ἀπολειφθὲν of **The Middle** nor of **The First** nor of **The Last** , nor of any other **Part** in *Its coming-to-Be* . μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε οὐδενος ἄλλου ἐν τῇ γενέσει .

Ari: **True** . (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** , will **Possess The Self/Same Age** with **All The Others** . ἀρα το ἐν ἴσχει τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν πασὶν τοῖς ἄλλοις . So that if **The One** was not **Produced** contrary to **Its Self Nature** , then **It has come-to-Be** ὥστ' εἰ το ἐν εἰη μὴ πέφυκεν παρὰ αὐτοφύσιν , ἀν γεγονὸς neither **Before** nor **Later** than **The Others** , but *at-the-same-time* with **Them** . 154A οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων , ἀλλ' ἀμα .

153c γίγνεται, γεγενῆσθαι

153d γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γεγονὸς, γίγνεσθαι

153e γίγνομένῳ, γίγνεται, γίγνομένων, γένηται, γεγονὸς

154a γεγονὸς, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι

154b γίγνεσθαι, γένόμενον, γίγνεσθαι

150b ὅλω, ὅλον, ὅλω

153c ὅλου, ὅλον

153e ὅλον

157c ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλου

157e ὅλον, ὅλω, ὅλον

149a μέσῳ

153c μέσον

153e μέσου

165a μέσον

165b μέσῳ, μεσσίτερα, μέσου

153c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

153d αὐτό

153e αὐτὴν, αὐτό

154a αὐτό

154b αὐτό

141d ἡλικίαν

152c ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν

153e ἡλικίαν

154b ἡλικία

154c ἡλικίαν

Loeb

“Then the one would come into being simultaneously with the first part and with the second, and it is not wanting in any part which comes into being in addition to any part whatsoever which may precede it, until it reaches the end and becomes complete one; it will not be wanting in the middle, nor in the first, nor in the last, nor in any other part in the process of coming into being.”

“True.”

“Then one has the same age as all the others so that the absolute one, unless it is naturally contrary to nature, could not have come into being either before or after the others, but only simultaneously with them.

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, while becoming to be, together with the first part, will be generated, and together with the second; and it will never desert any one of the other generated parts, till arriving at the extremity it becomes one whole; neither excluded from the middle, nor from the last, nor the first, nor from any other whatever in its generation.

True.

The One, therefore, will possess the same age with others, as (if it be not *The One* contrary to its own nature) it will be generated neither prior nor posterior to others, but together with them;

Jowett

And will not the one come into being together with each part-together with the first part when that comes into being, and together with the second part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part, which is added to any other part until it has reached the last and become one whole; it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on?

True.

Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior nor posterior to the others, but simultaneous;

καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν **λόγον** τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε **πρεσβύτερον** οὔτε **νεώτερον** ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός: κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν **πρεσβύτερόν** τε καὶ **νεώτερον**, καὶ τὰλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ **γεγονός**. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ **γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν** τε καὶ **νεώτερον** τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ μήτε **νεώτερον** μήτε **πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι**; ἄρα ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ **γίγνεσθαι** ἔχει, ἢ **ἐτέρως**; οὐκ ἔχω **λέγειν**.

Balboas

And by *This*

καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον

Relationship, **The One** will neither be *older* nor *younger* than **The Others**, nor **The Others** **τον λόγον**, **το ἐν** **αν** **ουτε** **ειη** **πρεσβυτερον** **ουτε** **νεωτερον** **των** **αλλων** **ουδε** **ταλλα** **than The One**. Whereas, according to the former **Relationship**, **The One** was both *older* **του ἐνος**: **δε** **κατα** **τον** **προσθεν** **τε** **πρεσβυτερον** and *younger* than **The Others**, and **The Others**, *in a similar way*, than **That**. **και** **νεωτερον**, **και** **ταλλα** **ωσαυτως** **εκεινου**.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

Par: Surely then, on the one hand, **The One Is** and **Has-to-Be** and **Has-come-to-Be in this way** **δη** **μεν** **εστι** **τε** **εχον** **και** **γεγονος** **ουτως** also. But then in turn, what shall we say about **The Self coming-to-Be older** and also *younger* **και**. **αλλα** **αυ** **τι** **περι** **αυτο** **γινεσθαι** **πρεσβυτερον** **τε** **και** **νεωτερον** **than The Others**, and **The Others** **than The One**; and again, that **It** neither **comes-to-Be** **των** **αλλων** **και** **ταλλα** **του ἐνος**, **και** **μητε** **γινεσθαι** *younger* nor *older*? Therefore does **It Have-to-Be in the same way** with **That** which **Is** **νεωτερον** **μητε** **πρεσβυτερον**; **αρα** **εχει** **ουτω** **περι** **του** **ειναι** just as **It** also does with **That** which **Is coming-to-Be**, or otherwise? **ωσπερ** **και** **περι** **του** **γινεσθαι**, **η** **ετερω**;

Ari: I am not able to say.

εχω ουκ λεγειν.

148c λόγον
151b λόγον
154a λόγον
155b λόγον
155d λόγος

153b πρεσβύτερον
153d πρεσβύτερα
154a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερόν, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον
154b πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον
154c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερόν, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον

153b νεώτερα, νεώτερα
153d νεώτερον
154a νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον
154b νεώτερον, νεώτερον
154c νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερα

153d γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γεγονός, γίγνεσθαι
153e γιγνομένων, γίγνεται, γιγνομένων, γένηται, γεγονός
154a γεγονός, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι
154b γίγνεσθαι, γινόμενον, γίγνεσθαι
154c γίγνεται, γέγονε, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

153d αὐτό
153e αὐτὴν, αὐτό
154a αὐτό
154b αὐτό
154d αὐτῶν

151a ἕτερον, ἐτέρω, ἕτερον
153a ἑτερά, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερα
154a ἐτέρως
154b ἕτερον, ἐτέρου
155b ἕτερον, ἐτέρου

148c λέγεις
153a λέγειν, λέγειν
154a λέγειν
155d λέγεις, λέγεται
155e λέγομεν

Loeb

And by this reasoning the one would be neither older nor younger than the others nor the others than the one, but of the same age; but by the previous reasoning the one would be both older and younger than the others, and likewise the others than the one."

"Certainly."

"In this state, then, it is and in this way it has come into being. But what about the one becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and becoming neither older nor younger? Is it the same with becoming as with being, or otherwise?"

"I cannot say."

Thomas Taylor

and on this account *The One* will neither be older nor younger than others, nor others than *The One*: but, according to the former reasoning, *The One* was both older and younger than others, and others in a similar manner than it.

Entirely so.

After this manner, therefore, *The One* subsists and is generated. But what shall we say respecting its becoming older and younger than others, and others than *The One*; and again, that it neither becomes older nor younger? Shall we say that it subsists in the same manner with respect to the term *becoming to be* as with respect to the term *to be*? or otherwise?

I am not able to say.

Jowett

and according to this argument the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older and younger than the others and the others than the one.

Certainly.

After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older. nor younger, what shall we say? Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise?

I cannot answer.

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοσόνδε γε: εἰ καὶ ἔστιν **πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, γίγνεσθαι** γε αὐτὸ **πρεσβύτερον** ἔτι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον **εὐθύς γενόμενον** διήνεγκε τῇ **ἡλικίᾳ** οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δύναιτο, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ **νεώτερον** ὃν ἔτι **νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι: ἀνίσοις** γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα, **χρόνῳ** τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὅτῳδον, ἴσῳ ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἀεὶ ὅσῳπερ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ.
πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Balboas

Par: But I am indeed able to affirm the following , that if **One Member Is** also *older*
154B ἀλλ' ἐγὼ γε τοσόνδε , οτι εἰ ἕτερον ἐστὶν καὶ πρεσβύτερον
than **Another Member** , **Self** cannot still *become* even *older* , other than by the age difference
ἑτερου , αὐτο ἀν οὐκ δύναιτο ἐτι γίγνεσθαι ἐτι πρεσβύτερον , ἡ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διήνεγκε
which **Self First** possessed as soon as **Self came-to-Be** ; nor in turn that by **Being younger** can **It**
ὡς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθύς γενομενον , οὐδ' αὖ τὸ ὃν νεώτερον
become still younger ; for if **Equals** are added to *un-equals* -whether **Time** is added or *anything*
γίγνεσθαι ἐτι : γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα ἀνίσοις , χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ
whatsoever- It will always make *them* differ **Equally** by just as much as *they* differed at **First** .
ὅτῳδον , ἀν ἀεὶ ποιεὶ διαφέρειν ἴσῳ ὅσῳπερ διενέγκῃ τὸ πρῶτον .
Ari: How could it be otherwise ? (πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;)

153d πρεσβύτερα

154a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερόν, πρεσβύτερόν, πρεσβύτερον

154b πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

154c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερόν, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον

154d πρεσβύτερον

153a ἑτέρα, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἑτερα

154a ἑτέρως

154b ἕτερον, ἑτέρου

155b ἕτερον, ἑτέρου

158b ἑτερα, ἑτερα

153e γιγνομένων, γίγναι, γιγνομένων, γένεται, γεγονός

154a γεγονός, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι

154b γίγνεσθαι, γενόμενον, γίγνεσθαι

154c γίγναι, γέγονε, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

154d γέγονεν

153e αὐτὴν, αὐτό

154a αὐτό

154b αὐτό

154d αὐτῶν

155a αὐτοῖν

145b εὐθέως

148e εὐθύς

154b εὐθύς

162a εὐθὺς

152e ἡλικίαν, ἡλικίαν

153e ἡλικίαν

154b ἡλικία

154c ἡλικίαν

154d ἡλικία, ἡλικία

153d νεώτερον

154a νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

154b νεώτερον, νεώτερον

154c νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερα

154e νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

140b ἄνισον

149d ἄνισον

154b ἀνίσοις

161c ἄνισα, ἄνισα, ἀνίσω ἄνισα, ἄνισα

152b χρόνον

152c χρόνον, χρόνον, χρόνον

154b χρόνῳ

154d χρόνον, χρόνῳ, χρόνον, χρόνον

155d χρόνου, χρόνου

Loeb

“But I can say as much as this, that even if one thing be older than another, it cannot become older by any greater difference in age than that which existed at first, nor if younger can it become younger by any greater difference; for the addition of equals to unequals, whether in time or anything else whatsoever, makes the difference always equal to that which existed at first.”

“Yes, of course.”

Thomas Taylor

But I am able to affirm this, that however one thing may be older than another, yet it cannot otherwise subsist in *becoming to be* older, than by that difference of age which it possessed as soon as it was born: nor, on the contrary, can that which is younger subsist in *becoming to be* younger, otherwise than by the same difference. For, equal things being added to unequals, whether they are times or any thing else, always cause them to differ by the same interval by which they were distant at first.

How should it be otherwise?

Jowett

But I can venture to say, that even if one thing were older or younger than another, it could not become older or younger in a greater degree than it was at first; for equals added to unequals, whether to periods of time or to anything else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.

Of course.

οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὄν τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος γίγνται ἄν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἴσῳ διαφέρει αἰ τὴν ἡλικίαν: ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον, γίγνεται δ' οὐ.

ἀληθῆ.

καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα ὄν τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβυτέρων ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον γίγνεται.

οὐ γὰρ οὐν.

ὅρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται.

πῇ δὴ;

ἦι τό τε ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός.

τί οὐν;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **The Being Cannot** indeed **come-to-Be older** nor **younger** **154C** ἀρα το ον αν ουκ γε γιγναιτ' πρεσβυτερον ουδε νεωτερον than **The One** , at any time , if indeed **It Is Always Equally** different in age ; whereas (του ενος **BT**) ποτε , ειπερ αι ισω διαφερει την ηλικιαν : αλλ' **It Is** and **Has Come-to-Be older** , but then **That** which **Is younger** , does not **come-to-Be** . εστι και γεγονε πρεσβυτερον , δε δ' το νεωτερον , ου γιγνεται .

Ari: **True** . (αληθῆ .)

Par: And so , **The One Being** , will not at any time **become older** nor **younger** , και αρα το εν ον ουτε ποτε γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον ουτε νεωτερον than **The Others Beings**. (των αλλων οντων .)

Ari: It will not . (γαρ ουν ου .)

Par: Then **See** if **The One Being becomes older** and **younger in this way** . δε ορα ει γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον τηδε .

Ari: In what way then ? (πῇ δὴ ;)

Par: Insofar as **The One** has come to **Light older** than **The Other Beings** , η το εν εφανη πρεσβυτερον των αλλων and **The Others** than **The One** . τε και ταλλα του ενος .

Ari: What follows then ? (τι ουν ;)

154a γεγονός, γίνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γίνεσθαι

154b γίνεσθαί, γενόμενον, γίνεσθαι

154c γίγναιτ, γέγονε, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

154d γέγονεν

154e γίγναιτ, γεγονός, γίγνεται, γεγονός, γίγνεται

152b ποτέ

152c ποτε

154c ποτε, ποτε

155d ποτέ

155e ποτέ, ποτε

154a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβυτέρων, πρεσβυτέρων, πρεσβυτέρων

154b πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβυτέρων

154c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβυτέρων, πρεσβυτέρων, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβυτέρων

154d πρεσβύτερον

154e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβυτέρων, πρεσβυτέρων, πρεσβυτέρων, πρεσβυτέρων

154a νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

154b νεώτερον, νεώτερον

154c νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερα

154e νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

155a νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερα, νεώτερον

153e ηλικία

154b ηλικία

154c ηλικία

154d ηλικία, ηλικία

154e ηλικία

Loeb

“Then that which exists can never become older or younger than that which exists, if the difference in age is always the same; but it is and has become older, and the other is and has become younger, but it does not become so.”

“True.”

“And the one, since it exists, never becomes either older or younger than the other things.”

“No, it does not.”

“But see whether they become older and younger in this way.”

“In what way?”

“Because the one was found to be older than the others, and the others than the one.”

“What then?”

Thomas Taylor

That which is, therefore, cannot subsist in *becoming to be* older or younger than *one being*, since it *is* always equally different from it in age: but this *is* and *was* older, but that younger; but by no means subsists in *becoming* so.

True.

That which *is* one, therefore, will never subsist in *becoming to be* either older or younger than other beings.

Never.

But see whether by this means other things will *become* younger and older.

After what manner?

The same as that through which *The One* appeared to be older than others, and others than *The One*.

What then?

Jowett

Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which is, since the difference of age is always the same; the one is and has become older and the other younger; but they are no longer becoming so.

True.

And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger than the others which are
No.

But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another way.

In what way?

Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than the one.

And what of that?

ὅταν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων **πρεσβύτερον** ἢ, πλείω που **χρόνον γέγονεν** ἢ τὰ ἄλλα.

ναί.

πάλιν δὴ σκόπει: ἐὰν πλέονι καὶ **ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ** προστιθώμεν τὸν **ἴσον χρόνον**, ἄρα τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ διοίσει τὸ πλεόν τοῦ **ἐλάττονος** ἢ μικροτέρῳ;

σμικροτέρῳ.

οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται, ὅτιπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς τὰλλα **ἡλικία** διαφέρων τὸ ἐν, τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ **ἴσον λαμβάνον χρόνον** τοῖς ἄλλοις **ἔλαττον** αἰετὴ **ἡλικία** διοίσει **αὐτῶν** ἢ πρότερον: ἢ οὐ;

ναί.

Balboas

Par: At the **Time** when **The One** has come to **Light older** than **The Others** , **It has-come-to-be**

154D οταν το εν η **πρεσβυτερον των αλλων** , **γεγονεν**
in some way for a **longer Period of Time** than **The Others** .
που πλειω χρονον η τα αλλα .

Ari: Yes . (ναί.)

Par: Surely then consider again . If we add an **Equal Time** to a **longer** and **shorter Period**
δη σκοπει παλιν : εαν προστιθωμεν τον ισον χρονον πλεονι και ελαττονι
of **Time** , then will the **longer differ from** the **shorter by** an **Equal** or **by a smaller Part** ?
χρονω , αρα το πλεον διοισει ου ελαττονος τω ισω η σμικροτερω μοριω;

Ari: By a smaller part . (σμικροτερω .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** will not be different in age from **The Others** by **as much as**
αρα το εν ουκ εσται διαφερον ηλικια προς ταλλα οτιπερ
This Time and in **The Future** , as **It Was** at **First (longer)** ; but by receiving an **Equal Time**
τουτο και εις το επειτα , ην το πρωτον , αλλα λαμβανον ισον χρονον
along with **The Others** , **It** will **Always** differ by a **less** age than **Theirs** than **before** . Or not ?
τοις αλλοις , αει διοισει ελαττον τη ηλικια αυτων η προτερον : η ου;

Ari: Yes , this is the case . (ναί .)

154b πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

154c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον

154d πρεσβύτερον

154e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

155a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερου, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον

152e χρόνον, χρόνον, χρόνον

154b χρόνῳ

154d χρόνον, χρόνῳ, χρόνον, χρόνον

155d χρόνου, χρόνου

155e χρόνου

154b γίνεσθαι, γενόμενον, γίνεσθαι

154c γίγνεται, γέγονε, γίνεσθαι, γίνεσθαι, γίνεσθαι

154d γέγονεν

154e γίγνεται, γέγονος, γίνεσθαι, γέγονος, γίνεσθαι

155a γίγνεται, γίνεσθαι, γενέσθαι, γένοντο, γίνοντο, γίνονται, γίνονται, γέγονος

142c πάλιν

142c πάλιν

154d πάλιν

159b πάλιν

163b πάλιν

151e Ελαττον

153a ἐλάττω, ἐλάττω

154d ἐλάττονι, ἐλάττονος, ἔλαττον

154e ἔλαττον

156b ἔλαττον

151e ἴσον

152c ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

154d ἴσον, ἴσον

156b ἴσον

157b ἴσον

154b ἡλικία

154c ἡλικίαν

154d ἡλικία, ἡλικία

154e ἡλικία

143a λάβωμεν

152c ληφθεῖη

154d λαμβάνον

156a λαμβάνη,

156b λαμβάνον

154a αὐτό

154b αὐτό

154d αὐτῶν

155a αὐτοῖν

155b αὐτόν, αὐτό

Loeb

“When the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others.”

“Yes.”

“Then consider again. If we add an equal to a greater and to a less time, will the greater differ from the less by the same or by a smaller fraction?”

“By a smaller fraction.”

“Then the proportional difference in age which existed originally between the one and the others will not continue afterwards, but if an equal time be added to the one and the others, the difference in their ages will constantly diminish, will it not?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

Since *The One* is older than others, it was for a longer period of time than others.

Certainly.

But again consider, if we add an equal time to a longer and shorter time, does the longer differ from the shorter by an equal or by a small part?

By a smaller.

The One, therefore, will not differ from others by so great an age afterwards as before; but, receiving an equal time with others, it will always differ by a less age than before. Will it not be so?

Certainly.

Jowett

If the one is older than the others, has come into being a longer time than the others.

Yes.

But consider again; if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion than before?

By a smaller portion.

Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal time be added to both of them they will differ less and less in age?

Yes.

οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔλαττον διαφέρον ἡλικία πρὸς τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἃ ἦν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον;

νεώτερον.

εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὖ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἐν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρότερον;

πάνυ γε.

τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονὸς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονὸς τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὃν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται αἰ ἐκείνου πρεσβύτερον:

Par: Is it not the case indeed , that **Whatever** differs *less* in age , in relation to anything ,
154E ουκουν γε το διαφερον ελαττον ηλικια προς τι
than **It** did *before* , **It** will *become younger* than in *the past* , in relation to **Those** to which
η προτερον αν γιγνοιτ' νεωτερον η εν τω προσθεν προς εκεινα προς α

It was older before ?

ην πρεσβυτερον προτερον ;

Ari: Younger . (νεωτερον .)

Par: But if in turn , **That Is younger** , will not **The Others Be older** than *before* ,
δε ει αυ εκεινο νεωτερον , ουκ εκεινα τα αλλα πρεσβυτερα η προτερον
in relation to **The One** ? (προς το εν ;)

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ γε .)

Par: Accordingly then , on the one hand , **That which has-come-to-be younger** ,
αρα μεν το γεγονος νεωτερον
will *become older* , in relation to **That** which *has-come-to-be before* and by *Being older* ; but on
γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον προς το γεγονος προτερον τε και ον πρεσβυτερον ,
the other hand , **It** never (really) **Is older** , for **It Is Always becoming older** than **That** ;
δε ουδεποτε εστι πρεσβυτερον , αλλα αι γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον εκεινου :

153a ἐλάττω, ἐλάττω
154d ἐλάττονι, ἐλάττονος, ἔλαττον
154e ἔλαττον
156b ἔλαττον
160a ἐλάττω

154c ἡλικίαν
154d ἡλικία, ἡλικία
154e ἡλικία

154b νεώτερον, νεώτερον
154c νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερα
154e νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον
155a νεώτερον, νεωτέροι, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεωτέρου, νεώτερα, νεώτερον
155b νεώτερον, νεώτερον

154c γίγνοιτ, γέγονε, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

154d γέγονεν

154e γίγνοιτ, γεγονὸς, γίγνεται, γεγονός, γίγνεται

155a γίγνεται, γίγνεσθον, γενέσθαι, γένοντο, γίγνοιτο, γίγνοντο, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται
155b γέγονε, γεγονότα, γίγνεται, γίγνοιτ, γένόμενα

154c πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερόν, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον

154d πρεσβύτερον

154e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

Loeb

“And that which differs less in age from something than before becomes younger than before in relation to those things than which it formerly was older?”

“Yes, it becomes younger.”

“But if the one becomes younger, must not those other things in turn become older than formerly in relation to the one?”

“Certainly.”

“Then that which came into being later, becomes older in relation to the older, which came into being earlier; yet it never is older, but is always becoming older;

Thomas Taylor

But does not that which differs less in age, with respect to any thing, than it did before, become younger than before, with respect to those than which it was before older?

Younger.

But if it is younger, will not, on the contrary, others with respect to *The One* be older than before?

Entirely so.

That, therefore, which was generated younger, will subsist in *becoming to be* older, with respect to that which was before generated and is older; but it never *is* older, but always is *becoming* older than it;

Jowett

And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from being older will become younger in relation to that other than which it was older?

Yes, younger.

And if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become older than they were before, in relation to the one.

Certainly.

Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to that which previously had become and was older; it never really is older, but is always becoming,

ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσιν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. τὸ δ' αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως. ἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου: γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἶω τε εἴτην. εἰ γὰρ γένοιντο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γίγνοιτο, ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄν. νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα: τὸ μὲν ἐν τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὃν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός,

Balboas

for on the

γὰρ μὲν

one hand, **That** advances to a **younger** state, but on the other hand, **The Other** to an **older** state .

155A ἐκεῖνο ἐπιδίδωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον , δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου .

But in turn , in the same way , **That** which **Is older** is **becoming younger** than **The younger** .

δ' αὖ ὡσαύτως τὸ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου .

For by **both** of Them tending to that which is opposite , They **become** opposite to Each other ;

γὰρ αὐτοῖν ἰόντε εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον γίγνεσθον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοιν ,

on the one hand , **The younger become older** than **The older** , but on the other hand , **The older**

μὲν τὸ νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου , δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον

become younger than **The younger** ; but they will not **Be** able to **Be** such . For if They

νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου : δὲ ἂν οὐκ εἴτην γενέσθαι οἶω τε . γὰρ εἰ

would-have-become , then They **would** no longer **be-coming-to-be** , but **would Be** . But now ,

γίγνοιτο , ἂν οὐκ ἐτι γένοιτο , ἀλλ' ἂν εἶεν . δὲ νῦν

They are **becoming** both **older** and **younger** than Each other . On the one hand , **The One**

γίγνεται μὲν πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων : μὲν τὸ ἐν

becomes younger than **The Others** , because **It** came to **Light Being older** , and **would-have-**

γίγνεται νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων , ὅτι ἐφάνη ὃν πρεσβύτερον καὶ

come-to-Be before ;

155B γεγονός προτερον ,

154c νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερα

154e νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

155a νεώτερον, νεωτέρου, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεωτέρου, νεώτερα, νεώτερον

155b νεώτερον, νεώτερον

155c νεώτερα, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

154d πρεσβύτερον

154e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

155a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβυτέρου, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον

155b πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

155c πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

154d γέγονε

154e γίγνοιτ, γεγονός, γίγνεται, γεγονός, γίγνεται

155a γίγνεται, γίγνεσθον, γενέσθαι, γένονται, γίγνοιτο, γίγνονται, γίγνεται, γεγονός

155b γέγονε, γεγονότα, γίγνεται, γίγνοιτ, γεγόμενα

155c γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

154b αὐτό

154d αὐτῶν

155a αὐτοῖν

155b αὐτόν, αὐτοῦ

155c αὐτό αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ

Loeb

for the latter always tends towards being younger, and the former towards being older. And conversely the older becomes in the same way younger than the younger. For as they are moving in opposite directions, they are becoming the opposites of one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger; but they cannot finish the process of becoming; for if they finished the process of becoming, they would no longer be becoming, they would be. But as the case is, they become older and younger than one another—the one becomes younger than the others, because, as we saw, it is older and came into being earlier,

Thomas Taylor

the one indeed advancing to a more juvenile state, but the other to one more aged: but that which is older is *becoming to be* younger than the younger, after the same manner. For both tending to that which is contrary they subsist in becoming contrary to each other; the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger: but they are not able to *become* so. For if they should *become* they would no longer subsist in *becoming*, but would now *be*. But now they are becoming younger and older than each other; and *The One* indeed becomes younger than others, because it appears to be older, and to have a prior generation:

Jowett

for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always in process of becoming younger than the younger; for as they are always going in opposite directions they become in ways the opposite to one another, the younger older than the older and the older younger than the younger. They cannot, however have become; for if they had already become they would be and not merely become. But that is impossible; for they are always becoming both older and younger than one another: the one becomes younger than the others because it was seen to be older and prior,

τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς **πρεσβύτερα**, ὅτι ὕστερα **γέγονε**. κατὰ δὲ τὸν **αὐτὸν λόγον** καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἴσχει, ἐπειδήπερ **αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα** ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα **γεγονότα**.

φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν οὐδὲν **ἕτερον ἐτέρου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται** οὐδὲ **νεώτερον**, κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων αἰε διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων **πρεσβύτερον γίγναι** ἂν οὐδὲ **νεώτερον**, οὔτε τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός: ἢ δὲ ἄλλῳ αἰε μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων **γενόμενα** καὶ τὰ ὕστερα τῶν προτέρων,

Balboas

whereas on the other hand , **The Others have-come-to-be older** than

^{δε} ^{τα αλλα} ^{πρεσβυτερα}
The One since **They have-come-to-be later** . According to **The Self Logos** , **The Others**
^{του ενος} ^{οτι} ^{γεγονε} ^{υστερα} . ^{κατα τον αυτον λογον} ^{ταλλα}
will also be **related** in the same way **in relation to The One** , inasmuch as **They** also **came-to-**
^{και} ^{ισχει} ^{ουτω} ^{προς} ^{το εν} , ^{επειδηπερ} ^{και} ^{ε-}
Light older than **The Self** , and **to-have-come-to-be before** .
-φανη πρεσβυτερα αυτου και γεγονοτα προτερα .

Ari: It has come to **Light** in this way . (γὰρ φαίνεται οὖν οὕτως .)

Par: Is it not always the case that , on the one hand , insofar as **One Member** does not

^{αιε ουκουν} ^{μεν} ^η ^{ετερον} ^{ουδεν}
become older nor **younger** than **Another** , **by differing from** Each Other by an **Equal Number** ,
γίγνεται πρεσβυτερον ουδε νεωτερον ετερου το διαφερειν αλληλων κατα ισω αριθμω ,
then neither **will The One become older** nor **younger** than **The Others** , nor **The Others** than
^{ουτε} ^{αν} ^{το εν γιγναι} ^{πρεσβυτερον ουδε νεωτερον των αλλων} , ^{ουτε} ^{ταλλα}
The One ; but on the other hand , insofar as **Those** that are **Prior** must **Necessarily Always**
^{του ενος} : ^{δε} ^η ^{τα προτερα} ^{αναγκη} ^{αιε}
differ by a different part **from Those** that **come-to-be later** , and **The Later from The Prior** .
155C διαφερειν αλλω μοριω των γενομενα υστερον , και τα υστερα των προτερων ,

154e πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

155a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερου, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον

155b πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

155c πρεσβύτερά, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

155d πρεσβύτερόν

154e γίγναι, γεγονός, γίγνεται, γεγονός, γίγνεται

155a γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γένεσθαι, γένοιντο, γίγναι, γίγνεται, γεγονός

155b γέγονε, γεγονότα, γίγνεται, γίγναι, γενόμενα

155c γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

155d γίγνεσθαι, γίγναι, γίγνεται, γένεσθαι

154e νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

155a νεώτερον, νεωτέρος, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεωτέρος, νεώτερα, νεώτερον

155b νεώτερον, νεώτερον

155c νεώτερα, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

155d νεώτερον

151b λόγον

154a λόγον

155b λόγον

155d λόγος

157a λόγον

154a ἐτέρως

154b ἕτερον, ἐτέρου

155b ἕτερον, ἐτέρου

158b ἕτερα, ἕτερα

158c ἐτέραν

Loeb

and the others are becoming older than the one, because they came into being later. By the same reasoning the others stand in the same relation to the one, since they were seen to be older than the one and to have come into being earlier.”

“Yes, that is clear.”

“Then from the point of view that no one thing becomes older or younger than another, inasmuch as they always differ by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but in so far as that which comes into being earlier must always differ by a different proportional part from that which comes into being later, and vice versa—

Thomas Taylor

but others are older than *The One*, because they have a posterior generation; and, from the same reason, other things will be similarly related with respect to *The One*, since they appear to be more ancient and to have a prior generation.

So indeed it appears.

Does it not follow, that so far as the one does not become younger or older than the other, because they differ by an equal number from each other, that, so far as this, *The One* will not become older or younger than others, nor others than *The One*? But that, so far as it is necessary that the prior should always differ from such as are becoming to be posterior, and the posterior from the prior;

Jowett

and the others become older than the one because they came into being later; and in the same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because they were seen to be older, and prior to the one.

That is clear.

Inasmuch then, one thing does not become older or younger than another, in that they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the other than the one; but inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which came into being later must continually differ from each other by a different portion

Oxford Greek

ταύτη δὴ ἀνάγκη **πρεσβύτερά** τε καὶ **νεώτερα** ἀλλήλων **γίγνεσθαι** τά τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν **αὐτό** τε **αὐτοῦ** καὶ τῶν ἄλλων **πρεσβύτερον** καὶ **νεώτερον** ἔστι τε καὶ **γίγνεται**, καὶ οὔτε **πρεσβύτερον** οὔτε **νεώτερον** οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε **γίγνεται** οὔτε **αὐτοῦ** οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων.

παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

Then , in this way , it is **Necessary** that They must **become older** and **younger** than Each Other ;
 δη ταυτη αναγκη γιγνεσθαι πρεσβυτερα τε και νεωτερα αλληλων
 both **The Others** than **The One** and **The One** than **The Others** ?
 τε τα αλλα του ενος και το εν των αλλων ;

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ μεν ουν .)

Par: Surely then , according to all these accounts , **The One Self** , both **Is** , and
 δη κατα παντα ταυτα το εν αυτο τε εστι και
becomes older and **younger** than **The Self** and **The Others** ; and in turn , neither **Is** , nor
 γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον αυτου και των αλλων , και ουτ' εστιν ουτε
becomes neither **older** nor **younger** than **The Self** nor than **The Others** .
 γιγνεται ουτε πρεσβυτερον ουτε νεωτερον αυτου ουτε των αλλων .

Ari: That is perfectly so . (μεν παντελως ουν .)

155a πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον

155b πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

155c πρεσβύτερά, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

155d πρεσβύτερόν

155a νεώτερον, νεωτέρου, νεώτερον, νεώτερον, νεωτέρου, νεώτερα, νεώτερον

155b νεώτερον, νεώτερον

155c νεώτερα, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

155d νεώτερον

155a γίγνεται, γίγνεσθαι, γενέσθαι, γίνονται, γίνονται, γίνονται, γίνονται, γεγονός

155b γέγονε, γεγονότα, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γενόμενα

155c γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

155d γίγνεσθαι, ἐγίγνετο, γίγνεται, γενήσεται

156a γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται

155a αὐτοῖν

155b αὐτόν, αὐτοῦ

155c αὐτό αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ

155d αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶ

155e αὐτό

Loeb

from this point of view the one and the others must necessarily become both older and younger than one another, must they not?"

"Certainly."

"For all these reasons, then, the one both is and becomes both older and younger than both itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes either older or younger than either itself or the others."

"Perfectly true."

Thomas Taylor

so far it is necessary that they should become older and younger than each other, both others than *The One* and *The One* than others?

Entirely so.

On all these accounts, therefore, *The One is*, and is *becoming to be*, older and younger both than itself and others; and again, neither *is* nor is *becoming to be* older nor younger than itself and others.

It is perfectly so.

Jowett

in this point of view the others must become older and younger than the one, and the one than the others.

Certainly.

For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself or the others.

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἐν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον γίνεσθαι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει;

ἀνάγκη.

ἦν ἄρα τὸ ἐν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται.

τί μήν;

Balboas

Par: But since **The One Participates** of **Time** , and of **becoming older** and **younger** ,
 155D δε επειδη το εν μετεχει χρονου και του γινεσθαι πρεσβυτερον τε και νεωτερον ,
 is it not **Necessary** that **It** should also **Participate** of **The Past** , **The Future** and **The Present** ,
 αρ' ουκ αναγκη και μετεχειν του ποτε και του επειτα και του νυν ,
 if indeed **It Participates** of **Time** ?
 ειπερ μετεχει χρονου ;

Ari: It is necessary . (αναγκη .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One Was** , and **Is** , and **Will be** ; and **was-coming-into-Being**
 αρα το εν ην και εστι και εσται και εγινετο
 and **Is-coming-into-Being** , and **will-come-into-Being** .
 και γινεται και γενησεται .

Ari: What follows then ? (τι μην ;)

154b χρόνῳ

154d χρόνον, χρόνῳ, χρόνον, χρόνον

155d χρόνου, χρόνου

155e χρόνου

156a χρόνῳ, χρόνος

152a μετέχει

153a μετέχῃ

155d μετέχει, μετέχειν, μετέχει

155e μετέχον, μετέχειν, μετέχειν, μετέχει, μετέχειν, μετέχει, μετέχειν

156a μετέχει, μετέχει, μετέχῃ, μετέχῃ

155b πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερα, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

155c πρεσβύτερά, πρεσβύτερον, πρεσβύτερον

155d πρεσβύτερόν

155b νεώτερον, νεώτερον

155c νεώτερα, νεώτερον, νεώτερον

155d νεώτερον

155b γέγονε, γεγονότα, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γινόμενα

155c γίνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

155d γίνεσθαι, ἐγίγνετο, γίγνεται, γενήσεται

156a γίνεσθαι

156b γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται

152c ποτε

154c ποτε, ποτε

155d ποτέ

155e ποτέ, ποτε

156a ποτε

Loeb

“But since the one partakes of time and can become older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the future, and the present?”

“It must.”

“Then the one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But since The One participates of time, and of becoming to be older and younger, is it not necessary that it should participate of the past, present, and future, since it participates of time?

It is necessary.

The One, therefore, was, and is, and will be; and was generated, and is generated, and will be generated.

What then?

Jowett

But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?

Of course it must.

Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become?

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

καὶ εἶη ἂν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται.

πάνυ γε.

καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἶη ἂν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν.

ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται· καὶ ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἐν ἔστιν.

παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως.

Balboas

Par: And there **Should/Can/Must/Will Be Something (Ousia , 152a)** in *relation* to **That** ,
 καὶ ἀν εἰη τι ἐκείνῳ
 that also **Belongs** to **That** ; which **Was** , and **Is** , and **Will be** .

καὶ καὶ ἐκείνου ἦν καὶ ἐστιν καὶ ἔσται .

Ari: Entirely so .(πανυ γε .)

Par: Surely then , there **Can/Must/Will Be Knowledge** , and **opinion** , and **perception**
 δη ἀν εἰη ἐπιστήμη καὶ δοξα καὶ αἰσθησις
 of **The Self** , since we have now dealt with all these aspects concerning **The Self** .
 αὐτοῦ , εἰπερ ἡμεῖς νυν πράττομεν πάντα ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ .

Ari: You speak rightly . (λέγεις ὀρθῶς .)

Par: Surely then , there **Is** a **Name** and a **Logos** in *relation* to **The Self** , and so **It** is **Named**
 δη καὶ ἐστιν ὄνομα καὶ λόγος αὐτῷ καὶ ὀνομάζεται
 and accounted for ; and whatsoever happens to such aspects concerning **The Other Beings** ,
 155E καὶ λεγεται : καὶ ὅσαπερ τυγχάνει τῶν τοιούτων περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὄντα ,
 is also the case concerning **The One** .
 ἐστιν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἐν .

Ari: Therefore , it has to be entirely in this way .
 οὖν μὲν ἔχει παντελῶς οὕτως .

134e ἐπιστήμη

142a ἐπιστήμη

155d ἐπιστήμη

160d ἐπιστήμη

160e ἐπιστήμη

155b αὐτόν, αὐτό

155c αὐτό αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ

155d αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ

132a δόξη

142a δόξα, δοξάζεται

155d δόξα

164b δόξα

164d δόξαντος

142a αἴσθησις

155d αἴσθησις

164b αἴσθησις

150a πράττειν

155d πράττομεν

153a λέγειν, λέγειν

154a λέγειν

155d λέγεις, λέγεται

155e λέγωμεν

157b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν

147e ὀνομάζεις, ὄνομα, τοῦ ὄνομα

149d ὄνομα

155d ὄνομα, ὀνομάζεται

164b ὄνομα

154a λόγον

155b λόγον

155d λόγος

157a λόγον

157c λόγος

148c τοιοῦτον

149e τοιαῦτα

155d τοιούτων

158c τοιούτων

160a τοιούτων

143e τυγχάνει

152c τέχνη

155d τυγχάνει

Loeb

“And there would be and was and is and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?”

“Certainly.”

“And there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it; there must be, if we are now carrying on all this discussion about it.”

“You are right.”

“And it has a name and definition, is named and defined, and all the similar attributes which pertain to other things pertain also to the one.”

“That is perfectly true.”

Thomas Taylor

And there will also be something belonging to it, and which may be asserted of it, and which was, and is, and will be.

Entirely so.

There will, therefore, be science, opinion, and sense of *The One*, since we have now treated of all these things about it.

You speak rightly.

A name, therefore, and discourse may subsist about *The One*, and it may be denominated and spoken of: and whatever particulars of the same kind take place in other things, will also take place about *The One*.

The case is perfectly so.

Jowett

And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?

True.

And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?

Quite right.

Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed, and everything of this kind which appertains to other: things appertains to the one.

Certainly, that is true.

Oxford Greek
3rd

ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. τὸ ἐν εἰ ἔστιν οἶον διεληλύθαμεν, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἐν τε ὄν και
πολλὰ και μήτε ἐν μήτε πολλὰ και μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ,
ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὐ ποτε οὐσίας;

ἀνάγκη.

ἄρ' οὖν, ὅτε μετέχει, οἶόν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν;
οὐχ οἶόν τε.

Balboas
3rd

Parmenides: 21 Surely then in the third place , let us still relate , that if **The One Is** such as
δη το τρίτον ετι λεγωμεν . ει το εν εστιν οιον
we have described , is it not **Necessary** that **The Self** , **Is One** and **Being** and **Many** (143b)
διεληλυθαμεν , αρ' ουκ αναγκη αυτο , εν τε ον και πολλα
and **Neither One Nor Many** and **Participates** of **Time** , because on the one hand , **It Is One** ,
και μητε εν μητε πολλα και μετεχον χρονου , οτι μεν εστιν εν ,
then at that **Time** , **It Participates** of **Ousia** ; but on the other hand , because **It Is Not** ,
ποτε μετεχειν ουσιας δ' οτι εστι ουκ ,
then in turn , **It does not** , at that **Time Participate** of **Ousia** ?
αυ μη ποτε μετεχειν ουσιας ;

Aristotle: It is necessary . (αναγκη .)

Par: Take notice then , is it possible , that **It will Participate** at the **Time** that **It does not**
αρ' ουν , οιον τε εσται μετεχει τότε οτε μη
Participate ; or that **It will not Participate** at the **Time** when **It does Participate** ?
μετεχειν , η μη μετεχει οτε μετεχειν ;

Ari: It is not possible . (ουχ οιον τε .)

154a λέγειν
155d λέγεις, λέγεται
155e λέγωμεν
157b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν
159a λέγεις

155c αὐτό αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ
155d αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶ
155e αὐτό
156a αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτό
156c αὐτό

147d πολλή
150d πολλή
155e πολλά, πολλά
156b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλή
157a πολλά, πολλῶν, πολλά

153a μετέχοι
155d μετέχει, μετέχειν, μετέχει
155e μετέχον, μετέχειν, μετέχειν, μετέχει, μετέχειν, μετέχει,
μετέχειν

154d χρόνον, χρόνῃ, χρόνον, χρόνον
155d χρόνον, χρόνον
155e χρόνου
156a χρόνῃ, χρόνος
156c χρόνῃ, χρόνος, χρόνῃ

149e οὐσίας
152a οὐσίας, οὐσίας
155e οὐσίας, οὐσίας
156a οὐσίας, οὐσίας
156b οὐσίαν

154c ποτε, ποτε
155d ποτέ
155e ποτέ, ποτε
156a ποτε
156c ποτ

Loeb
3rd

“Let us discuss the matter once more and for the third time. If the one is such as we have described it, being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partakes of time, must it not, because one is, sometimes partake of being, and again because one is not, sometimes not partake of being?”

“Yes, it must.”

“And can one, when it partakes of being, not partake of it, or partake of it when it does not partake of it?”

“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor
3rd

In the third place, let us consider, if *The One* subsists in the manner we have already asserted, is it not necessary, since it is both one and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating of time, that because *it is* one it should participate of essence; but that because *it is not*, it should not at any time participate of essence?

It is necessary.

Is it, therefore, possible, that when it participates and becomes such as it is, that then it should not participate; or that it should participate when it does not participate?

It cannot be possible.

Jowett
3rd

Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is both one and many, as we have described, and is, neither one nor many, and participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake of being?

Certainly.

But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being?

Impossible.

ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα **χρόνῳ μετέχει** καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ **μετέχει**: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν **μόνως** τοῦ **αὐτοῦ μετέχοι** τε καὶ οὐ **μετέχοι**.

ὁρθῶς.

οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος **χρόνος**, ὅτε **μεταλαμβάνει** τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται **αὐτοῦ**; ἢ πῶς οἶόν τε ἔσται **τοτέ** μὲν ἔχειν τὸ **αὐτό**, **τοτέ** δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μὴ **ποτε** καὶ **λαμβάνῃ** αὐτὸ καὶ **ἀφίῃ**;

οὐδαμῶς.

τὸ δὴ **οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν** ἄρα γε οὐ **γίγνεσθαι** καλεῖς;

ἔγωγε.

τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι **οὐσίας** ἄρα οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι;

καὶ πάνυ γε.

Par: Accordingly then , **It Participates** at one **Time** , and **does not Participate** at another **Time** .
 ἀρὰ μετεχει εν αλλω χρονω και ου μετεχει εν αλλω ;

For only thus , will it be possible for **It** to **Participate** and **not Participate** of **The Self** .

156A γαρ μονως ουτω αν μετεχοι τε και ου μετεχοι του αυτου .

Ari: Rightly so . (ορθως .)

Par: Is there not also such a **Time** , when **It Shares** of **That** which **Is** and when **It takes-leave**
 εστι ουκουν και ουτος χρονος , οτε μεταλαμβανει του ειναι και οτε απαλλαττεται
 of **The Self** ? Or how can it be possible , that **It Will** on the one hand , **Possess The Self** at one
 αυτου ; η πως οιον τε εσται μεν εχειν το αυτο
Time , but at another **Time** **Not Possess It** , unless if **It** both **Receives-and-loses The Self** ?
 τοτε δε τοτε μη εχειν εαν μη και λαμβανη και αφιη αυτο ;

Ari: No other way . (ουδαμως .)

Par: Surely then , do you not call **The Receiving/Sharing** of **Ousia coming-to-Be** ?
 γε δη αρα ου καλεις το μεταλαμβανειν ουσιας γιγνεσθαι ;

Ari: I do at least . (εγωγε .)

Par: But accordingly then , is not **the loss** of **Ousia** , to **perish/to dissolve** ?
 δε αρα ουκ το απαλλαττεσθαι ουσιας απολλυσθαι ;

Ari: Entirely so . (και πανυ γε .)

155d χρόνου, χρόνου
 155e χρόνου, χρόνῳ
156a χρόνῳ, χρόνος
 156c χρόνῳ, χρόνος, χρόνῳ
 156e χρόνῳ, χρόνῳ

155d μετέχει, μετέχειν, μετέχει
 155e μετέχον, μετέχειν, μετέχειν, μετέχει, μετέχειν, μετέχει
156a μετέχει, μετέχει, μετέχοι, μετέχοι
 157c μετέχει
 157e μετέχοι, μετέχειν

149c μόνον
 149d μόνον
156a μόνως
 156c μόνως
 159b μόνον

155d αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ
 155e αὐτό
156a αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτό

131e μεταλήφεται, μεταλαμβάνειν
 133a μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνει
156a μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνειν
 158b μεταλαμβάνοντα, μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνει
 163d μεταλαμβάνειν

152d τότε, τότε
 155e τότε
156a τοτέ, τοτέ
 156d τότε
 156e τότε

155d ποτέ
 155e ποτέ, ποτε
156a ποτε
 156c πότε
 163e ποτέ

156a ἀφίῃ

146b οὐδαμῶς
 150c οὐδαμῶς
156a οὐδαμῶς
 159d οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῇ
 162d οὐδαμῶς

152a οὐσίας, οὐσίας
 155e οὐσίας, οὐσίας
156a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

155c γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται
 155d γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται
156a γίγνεσθαι
 156b γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται
 157a γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

Loeb

“Then it partakes at one time and does not partake at another; for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same thing.”

“True.”

“And is there not also a time when it assumes being and when it gives it up? How can it sometimes have and sometimes not have the same thing, unless it receives it at some time and again loses it?”

“There is no other way at all.”

“But would you not say that receiving existence is generation or becoming?”

“Yes.”

“And losing existence is destruction?”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

It participates, therefore, at one time, and does not participate at another: for thus alone can it participate and not participate of the same.

Right.

Is not that also time, when it receives *being* and again loses it? Or how can it be possible that, being such as it is, it should at one time possess the same thing, and at another time not, unless it both receives and loses it?

No otherwise.

Do you not denominate the receiving of essence *to become*?

I do.

And is not to lose essence the same as to perish?

Entirely so.

Jowett

Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same.

True.

And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes being—for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives and also gives it up at; some time?

Impossible.

And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?

I should.

And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?

I should.

τὸ ἐν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, **λαμβάνον** τε καὶ ἀφιέν **οὐσίαν γίγνεται** τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται.

ἀνάγκη.

ἐν δὲ καὶ **πολλὰ** ὃν καὶ **γινόμενον** καὶ ἀπολλόμενον ἄρ' οὐχ, ὅταν μὲν **γίγνηται** ἔν, τὸ **πολλὰ** εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ **πολλά**, τὸ ἐν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται;

πάνυ γε.

ἐν δὲ **γινόμενον** καὶ **πολλὰ** ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι;

πολλή γε.

καὶ μὴν **ἀνόμοιον** γε καὶ **ὅμοιον** ὅταν **γίγνηται**, ὁμοιοῦσθαι τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι;
ναί.

Balboas

Par: Surely then , **The One** , as it is **Reasonable** , **comes-to-Be** and **dissolves** ,
δη το ἐν , ὡς εοικε , γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπολυτται ,
by **receiving/grasping/taking/seizing** and by **letting-go/discharging/losing Ousia** ,
156B λαμβανον τε καὶ αφιεν ουσιαν .

Ari: It is necessary . (ἀναγκη .)

Par: Then by **Being One** and **Many** and by **coming-to-Be** and by **going-out-of-Being** ,
δε ον ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ γιγνομενον καὶ ἀπολλυμενον
accordingly on the one hand , when **It comes-to-Be One** , does **It** not **cease to Be Many** ,
αρ' μὲν ὅταν γίγνηται ἐν , το ουχ ἀπολλυται εἶναι πολλὰ ,
but on the other hand , when **It comes-to-Be Many** , does **It** not **cease to Be The One** ?
δε ὅταν πολλὰ , ἀπολλυται εἶναι το ἐν ;

Ari: Entirely so .

πανυ γε .

Par: But accordingly then , by **coming-to-Be One** and **Many** ,
δε αρ' γιγνομενον ἐν καὶ πολλὰ
must **It** not **Necessarily Be** both **Dispersed-apart** and **Collected-together** ?
ουκ ἀναγκη τε διακρινεσθαι καὶ συγκρινεσθαι ;

Ari: Very much so indeed .(πολλη γε .)

Par: And most certainly , when **It comes-to-Be Unlike** and **Like** ,
καὶ γε μὴν ὅταν γίγνηται ἀνομοιον καὶ ὁμοιον ,
It then also **comes-to-Be Assimilated** and **Dissimilated** ?
τε ὁμοιουσθαι καὶ ἀνομοιουσθαι ;

Ari: Yes . (ναί .)

154d λαμβάνον

156a λαμβάνη

156b λαμβάνον

163d λαμβάνοι

164d λάβη

155e οὐσίας, οὐσίας

156a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

156b οὐσίαν

161e οὐσίας

162a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

155d γίγνεσθαι, ἐγγίγντο, γίγνεται, γενήσεται

156a γίγνεσθαι

156b γίγνεται, γινόμενον, γίγνηται, γινόμενον, γίγνηται

157a γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

157c γεγονός

150d πολλή

155e πολλά, πολλά

156b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλή

157a πολλά, πολλών, πολλά

157c πολλών, πολλών

148e ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἀνόμοιον

148d ἀνόμοιον

156b ἀνόμοιον

157a ἀνόμοιον, ἀνομοίου, ἀνόμοιον

158e ἀνόμοια

148e ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον

148d ὅμοιον

156b ὅμοιον

157a ὅμοιου, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον

158e ὅμοια

Loeb

“The one, then, as it appears, since it receives and loses existence, is generated and destroyed.”

“Inevitably.”

“And being one and many and being generated and destroyed, when it becomes one its existence as many is destroyed, and when it becomes many its existence as one is destroyed, is it not?”

“Certainly.”

“And in becoming one and many, must it not be separated and combined?”

“Inevitably.”

“And when it becomes like and unlike, it must be assimilated and dissimilated?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, as it seems, by receiving the losing essence, is generated and perishes.

Necessarily so.

But since it is both one and many, and subsists in becoming to be and perishing, when it becomes one does it cease to be many, and when it becomes many does it cease to be one?

Entirely so.

But, in consequence of becoming one and many, must it not be separated and collected?

It must.

And when it becomes dissimilar and similar, must it not be assimilated and dissimilated?

Certainly.

Jowett

The one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking and giving up being.

Certainly.

And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one?

Certainly.

And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience separation and aggregation?

Inevitably.

And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated?

Yes.

Oxford Greek

και ὅταν **μειζον** και **ἔλαττον** και **ἴσον**, αὐξάνεσθαι τε και φθίνειν και ἰσοῦσθαι;

οὕτως.

ὅταν δὲ **κινούμενον** τε **ἴσθηται** και ὅταν **ἑστὸς** ἐπὶ τὸ **κινεῖσθαι** μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δήπου **αὐτό** γε μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ **χρόνῳ** εἶναι.

πῶς δὴ;

ἑστὸς τε πρότερον ὕστερον **κινεῖσθαι** και πρότερον **κινούμενον** ὕστερον **ἑστάναι**, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα **πάσχειν**.

πῶς γάρ;

Balboas

Par: And when **It comes-to-Be more , less , and Equal ,**

και οταν μειζον και ελαττον και ισον ,

then **It** also **Becomes-increased** and **Becomes-decreased** and also **Becomes-Equalized ?**

156C τε αυξανεσθαι και φθινειν και ισουσθαι ;

Ari: It becomes in this way . (οὕτως .)

Par: But when **It Is Standing-Still , from-Being-in-the-state-of-motion ,**

δε οταν ισθηται κινουμενον

and in turn when **It Is At-Rest , It Is** then **changed into That** which **Is In-Motion** , then surely

οταν εστος μεταβαλλῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι δη

it is necessary that **The Self** must indeed not **Be** in **Any/Some Singular Period in Time** .

δει αυτο γε μηδ' ειναι που ενι εν χρονω .

Ari: How could it indeed ? (πῶς δὴ ;)

Par: But that which **was formerly At-Rest , and later-on Moves , and that which**

προτερον εστος τε υστερον κινεῖσθαι και

was-Moving before and **later-on Stands-still** ; on the one hand , will not **Be Able** to **experience**

κινουμενον προτερον υστερον εσταναι , μεν εσται ουχ οιον τε πασχειν

these experiences without **Mutation/Alteration** .

ταυτα ανευ του μεταβαλλειν .

Ari: How could it ? (πῶς γὰρ ;)

151c μειζον, μειζον

151d μειζον, μειζον

156c μειζον

157b μέγα, μέγα

160a μειζω

154d ἐλάττον, ἐλάττονος, ἐλάττον

154e ἔλαττον

156c ἔλαττον

160a ἐλάττω

165a Ἐλαττον

152e ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

154d ἴσον, ἴσον

156c ἴσον

157b ἴσον

161c ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

145e κινεῖσθαι

146a κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι

156c κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι

156d κινουμένης

156e κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖται, κινεῖται

145d ἐστάναι

146a ἔστηκε, ἐστὸς, ἐστάναι, ἐστὸς, ἐστάναι

156c ἴσθηται, ἐστὸς, ἐστὸς, ἐστάναι, ἐστάναι, ἐστάναι, ἐστὸς

156d ἐστάναι, ἐστῶτος

156e ἐστάναι, ἐστὸς, ἐστηκέ, ἐστη

155e αὐτό,

156a αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτό

156c αὐτό

157a αὐτὸν

157d αὐτό

148a πεπονθέναι, πεπονθός, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν

148c πέπονθε, πεπονθέναι, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν

156c πάσχειν

157b πάσχοι, πάσχειν, πεπονθέναι

158e πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα, πέπονθεν, πέπονθεν

155e χρόνου, χρόνῳ

156a χρόνος

156c χρόνῳ, χρόνος, χρόνῳ

156e χρόνῳ, χρόνῳ

Loeb

“And when it becomes greater and smaller and equal, it must be increased and diminished and equalized?”

“Yes.”

“And when being in motion it comes to rest, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it must itself be in no time at all.”

“How is that?”

“It is impossible for it to be previously at rest and afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without changing.”

“Of course.”

Thomas Taylor

And when it becomes greater, lesser, and equal, must it not be increased, corrupted, and equalized?

It must so.

But when from being moved it stands still, and when from standing still it is changed into being moved, it is requisite that it should not subsist in one time.

How should it?

But that which before stood still and is afterwards moved, and was before moved and afterwards stands still, cannot suffer these affections without mutation.

For how can it?

Jowett

And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalized?

True.

And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all?

How can it?

But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without experiencing change, is impossible.

Impossible.

Oxford Greek

χρόνος δέ γε οὐδείς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι οἶόν τε ἅμα μήτε **κινεῖσθαι** μήτε **ἑστάναι**.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.

οὐκ εἰκός.

πότ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ **ἑστὸς** ὄν οὔτε **κινούμενον** μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν **χρόνῳ** ὄν.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Balboas

Par: But on the other hand , there **Is** indeed **No-Time** , in which **Anything** can **change**

δε εστιν γε ουδεις χρονος , εν ω τι οιον
At-That-Same-Time ; that is , neither **when Moving** nor **when Standing-still** .
τε αμα μητε κινεισθαι μητε εσταναι .

Aristotle: There is not . (γαρ ουν ου .)

Parmenides: Certainly then , **Nothing Can Be changed** without **Mutation** .

μην αλλ' ουδε μεταβαλλει ανευ του μεταβαλλειν .

Ari: It is not likely that it can . (ουκ εικος .)

Par: Then **at what Time** will **Anything Change/Mutate/Alter** ? For **Nothing**

ουν ποτ' μεταβαλλει ; γαρ ουτε
Is Altered while Being At-Rest , nor **while Being In-Motion** , nor **while Being** in **Time** .
156D μεταβαλλει ον εστος ουτε κινουμενον , ουτε ον εν χρονω .

Ari: It will not . (ου γαρ ουν .)

155e χρόνος

156a χρόνῳ, χρόνος

156c χρόνῳ, χρόνος, χρόνῳ

156e χρόνῳ, χρόνῳ

145e κινεῖσθαι

146a κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι

156c κινούμενός, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινούμενον

156d κινουμένης

156e κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖται, κινεῖται

145e ἑστάναι

146a ἑστηκε, ἑστὸς, ἑστάναι, ἑστὸς, ἑστάναι

156c ἵσται, ἑστὸς, ἑστὸς, ἑστάναι, ἑστάναι, ἑστὸς

156d ἑστάναι, ἑστὸς

156e ἑστάναι, ἑστὸς, ἑστηκε, σταίη

155e ποτέ, ποτε

156a ποτε

156c πότ

163e ποτέ

164b ποτέ

Loeb

“And there is no time in which anything can be at once neither in motion nor at rest.”

“No, there is none.”

“And certainly it cannot change without changing.”

“I should say not.”

“Then when does it change? For it does not change when it is at rest or when it is in motion or when it is in time.”

“No, it does not.”

Thomas Taylor

But there is no time in which any thing can neither be moved nor stand still.

There is not.

But it cannot be changed without mutation.

It is not probable that it can.

When, therefore, will it be changed? For neither while it stands still, nor while it is moved, will it be changed: nor while it is in time.

It will not.

Jowett

And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest?

There cannot.

But neither can it change without changing.

True.

When then does it change; for it cannot change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time?

It cannot.

Oxford Greek

ἀρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ **τότ'** ἂν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει;

τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

τὸ ἐξαίφνης, τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιονδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ **ἑστάναι ἑστῶτος** ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως **κινουμένης** ἔτι μεταβάλλει: ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθεται

Balboas

Par: Take notice then , **Is This** , **That which Is Outside** of the ordinary ,

αρ' ουν εστι τουτο το ατοπον

In Which , **It** will **Be** , at the (**No**)-**Time** when **It Changes** ?

εν ω αν ειη τοτ' οτε μεταβαλλει ;

Ari: What kind of state is that then ? (το ποιον δη ;)

Par: **The Sudden** . For **The Sudden Is Likely** to signify something **Like This** , such as

το εξαιφνης . γαρ το εξαιφνης εοικε σημαινειν τι τοιονδε , ως

That from which It changes into each of these conditions . For **while It Stands-still** , **It** will

εκεινου εξ μεταβαλλον εις εκατερον . γαρ ετι του εσταναι γε

not **Be changed from standing-still** , nor **while in motion** will **It Be** changed **out of the motion** :

ου μεταβαλλει εκ εστωτος , ουδ' ετι κινουμενης μεταβαλλει εκ της κινήσεως :

but **That Nature which Is Outside** of the ordinary , **The Sudden Her-Self** , is **Something** situated

αλλα φυσις ατοπος η εξαιφνης αυτη τις εγκαθεται

155e τότε

156a τοτέ, τοτέ

156d τότ'

156e τότε

157a τότε, τότε

146a ἔστηκε, ἐστός, ἐστάναι, ἐστός, ἐστάναι

156c ἴσθαι, ἐστός, ἐστός, ἐστάναι, ἐστάναι, ἐστός

156d ἐστάναι, ἐστῶτος

156e ἐστάναι, ἐστός, ἔστηκε, σταίη

157a στάσεων

146a κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι

156c κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινούμενον

156d κινουμένης

156e κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖται, κινεῖται

157a κινήσεων

Loeb

“Does this strange thing, then, exist, in which it would be at the moment when it changes?”

“What sort of thing is that?”

“The instant. For the instant seems to indicate a something from which there is a change in one direction or the other. For it does not change from rest while it is still at rest, nor from motion while it is still moving; but there is this strange instantaneous nature, something interposed between

Thomas Taylor

Is that any wonderful thing in which it will be when it changes?

What thing?

The sudden, or that which unapparently starts forth to the view. For *the sudden* seems to signify some such thing, as that from which it passes into each of these conditions. For while it stands still it will not be changed from standing, nor while in motion will it be changed from motion: but that wonderful nature *the sudden* is situated between

Jowett

And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really exist?

What thing?

The moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of which change takes place into either of two states; for the change is not from the state of rest as such, nor, from the state of motion as such; but there is this curious nature, which we call the moment lying between

Oxford Greek

μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν **χρόνῳ** οὐδενὶ **οὔσα**, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε **κινούμενον** μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ **ἐστάναι** καὶ τὸ **ἐστός** ἐπὶ τὸ **κινεῖσθαι**.

κινδυνεύει.

καὶ τὸ ἐν δὴ, εἴπερ **ἔστηκέ** τε καὶ **κινεῖται**, μεταβάλλοι ἂν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα—**μόνως** γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφοτέρα ποιοῖ—μεταβάλλον δ' ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ **χρόνῳ** ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ **κινεῖτ'** ἂν **τότε**, οὐδ' ἂν **σταίῃ**.

οὐ γάρ.

ἂρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει,

Balboas

Between (The Gap) Motion and The Stationary, by *Being in No-Time*, and certainly *into This* 156E μεταξυ κινήσεως τε και της στασεως, ουσα εν ουδενι χρονω, και δη εις ταυτην και and also *from This*, *That* which *moves*, *changes to That* which *Stands-Still*, τε και εκ ταυτης το κινουμενον μεταβαλλει επι το εσταναι and in turn *That* which is *At-Rest*, *changes to That* which is *Moved*. και το εστος επι το κινεισθαι.

Ari: I dare say .

κινδυνευει .

Par: And surely, if indeed *The One Stands-still* and *Is Moved*, *It* will *Be Changed* και δη ειπερ το εν εστηκε τε και κινειται, αν μεταβαλλοι into *Each*. For only in this way will *It* create both of these conditions. But *when It Is Changing* εφ' εκατερα : γαρ μονως ουτως αν ποιοι αμφοτερα : δ' μεταβαλλον *It* will *Be Changed* by *The Sudden Turn-About*; and *when It Changes*, *It Will Be* in μεταβαλλει εξαιφνης, και οτε μεταβαλλει, αν ειη εν *No-Time*, for *At That Time*, *It* will *neither* be *Moved*, *nor Stand-still*. ουδενι χρονω, τοτε αν ουδε κινειτ, ουδ' αν σταιη.

Ari: It will not .

γαρ ου .

Par: Take notice then, does *The One* also have to *Be* in this way, *in relation to the other mutations*? μεταβολας,

156a χρόνῳ, χρόνος
156c χρόνῳ, χρόνος, χρόνῳ
156e χρόνῳ, χρόνῳ

142b οὔσα
150a οὔσα
156e οὔσα
161d οὔσα

156c κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινούμενον
156d κινούμενης
156e κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖται, κινεῖτ'
157a κινήσεων
159a κινούμενα

156c ἵσταιται, ἐστός, ἐστός, ἐστάναι, ἐστάναι, ἐστός
156d ἐστάναι, ἐστός
156e ἐστάναι, ἐστός, ἔστηκέ, σταίῃ
157a στάσεων
159a ἐστός

149d μόνον
155e μόνως
156e μόνως
159b μόνον
160c μόνον

156a τότε, τότε
156d τότε
156e τότε
157a τότε, τότε
158b τότε

Loeb

motion and rest, not existing in any time, and into this and out from this that which is in motion changes into rest and that which is at rest changes into motion.”

“Yes, that must be so.”

“Then the one, if it is at rest and in motion, must change in each direction; for that is the only way in which it can do both. But in changing, it changes instantaneously, and when it changes it can be in no time, and at that instant it will be neither in motion nor at rest.”

“No.”

“And will the case not be the same in relation to other changes?”

Thomas Taylor

motion and abiding, is in no time, and into this and from this that which is moved passes into standing still, and that which stands still into motion.

It appears so.

The One, therefore, if it stands still and is moved, must be changed into each: for thus alone will it produce both these affections. But, becoming changed, it will be changed suddenly; and when it changes will be in no time: for it will then neither stand still nor be moved.

It will not.

Will *The One* also be thus affected with respect to other mutations?

Jowett

rest and motion, not being in any time; and into this and out of this what is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest into motion.

So it appears.

And the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will change to either, for only in this way can it be in both. And in changing it changes in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in no time, and will not then be either in motion or at rest.

It will not.

And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes,

ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ
τινων τότε γίνεταί κινήσεών τε καὶ **στάσεων**, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι **τότε** οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε
γίνεταί οὔτε ἀπόλλυται;

ἔοικε γοῦν.

κατὰ δὴ τὸν **αὐτὸν λόγον** καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ **πολλὰ** ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ **πολλῶν** ἐφ' ἑν οὔτε ἓν ἔστιν οὔτε
πολλὰ, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ **ὁμοίου** ἐπὶ **ἀνόμοιον** καὶ ἐξ **ἀνομοίου** ἐπὶ
ὁμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε **ὁμοιον** οὔτε **ἀνόμοιον**,

Balboas

And when **It Is changed** from **That** which **Is** , into **that** which **dissolves** , or from
 οταν μεταβαλλῃ εκ του ειναι εις το απολλυσθαι η εκ
that which **Is not** , to **that** which **comes-to-Be** ; does **It Become at that Time** , **Between (The Gap)**
 157A του ειναι μη εις το γινεσθαι , γινεταί τότε μεταξυ
 certain states of **moving** and of **standing-still** ? And **At That Time** , **It neither**
 τινων κινήσεων τε και στάσεων , και τότε ουτε
Exists , nor **does not Exist** , **nor Becomes nor dissolves** ?
 εστι ουτε ουκ εστι , ουτε γινεταί ουτε απολυται ;

Ari: It certainly does appear to be likely .
 γουν εοικε .

Par: And surely according to **The Self/Same Logos (Rep 511B-C)** , **when It Passes from One**
 και δη κατα τον αυτον λογον ιον εξ ενος
into Many and **from Many into One** , **It is neither One nor Many** , **neither** is **It dispersed** επι
 πολλά και εκ πολλων εφ' εν εστιν ουτε εν ουτε πολλά , ουτε διακρινεται
nor gathered-together . And in **Passing from Like to Unlike** , and **from Unlike to Like** ,
 ουτε συγκρινεται . και ιον εξ ομοιου επι ανομοιον και εξ ανομοιου επι ομοιον

156a γίνεσθαι
 156b γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται
157a γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται
 157c γεγονός
 158d γένηται, γίγνεσθαι

148e τινος
 150a τινός
157a τινων
 157c τινός, τινος
 159e τινόν

156d τότε
 156e τότε
157a τότε, τότε
 158b τότε

156d κινούμενης
 156e κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινείται, κινεῖτ'
157a κινήσεών
 159a κινούμενα
 160a κινούμενα

156d ἐστάναι, ἐστότος
 156e ἐστάναι, ἐστός, ἐστηκέ, σταίη
157a στάσεων
 159a ἐστότα
 160a ἐστότα

156a αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτό, αὐτό
 156c αὐτό
157a αὐτὸν
 157d αὐτό
 158a αὐτῶν, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῶ

155b λόγον
 155d λόγος
157a λόγον
 157e λόγος
 161a λόγος

155c πολλά, πολλά
 156b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλή
157a πολλά, πολλῶν, πολλά
 157c πολλῶν, πολλῶν
 157d πολλῶν, πολλῶν

148d ὁμοῖον
 156b ὁμοιον
157a ὁμοίου, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον
 158e ὁμοιά
 159a ὁμοιά, ὁμοιά

148d ἀνόμοιον
 156b ἀνόμοιον
157a ἀνόμοιον, ἀνομοίου, ἀνόμοιον
 158e ἀνόμοια
 159a ἀνομοιότατα, ἀνομοιότατα, ἀνόμοια

Loeb

When it changes from being to destruction or from not being to becoming, does it not pass into an intermediate stage between certain forms of motion and rest, so that it neither is nor is not, neither comes into being nor is destroyed?"

"Yes, so it appears."

"And on the same principle, when it passes from one to many or from many to one, it is neither one nor many, is neither in a process of separation nor in one of combination. And in passing from like to unlike or from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a process of assimilation nor in one of dissimulation;

Thomas Taylor

And when it is changed from *being* into the *loss of being*, or from *non-being* into *becoming to be*, does it not then become a medium between certain motions and abidings? and then neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor perishes?

It appears so.

And in the same manner, when it passes from one into many and from many into one, it is neither one nor many, nor is it separated nor collected. And in passing from similar to dissimilar, and from dissimilar to similar, it is neither similar nor dissimilar, nor is assimilated nor dissimilated.

Jowett

when it passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being into becoming-then it passes between certain states of motion and rest, and, neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed.

Very true.

And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many to one, the one is neither one nor many, neither separated nor aggregated; and in the passage from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor of dissimulation;

Oxford Greek

οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον· καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ **μέγα** καὶ ἐπὶ **ἴσον** καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἰὸν
οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε **μέγα** οὔτε **ἴσον**, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἄν.

οὐκ ἔοικε.

ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ' ἂν **πάσχοι** τὸ ἔν, εἰ ἔστιν.

πῶς δ' οὔ;

Balboas

It is neither Like nor Unlike , nor is Assimilated nor Dissimilated . And while It Passes from
157B οὔτε ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνομοιον , οὔτε ὁμοιουμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιουμενον : καὶ ἰον ἐκ
Small into Big , and into Equal and into Its contraries , It will neither be Small nor Big ,
σμικρου ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἂν οὔτε εἰη σμικρον οὔτε μέγα
nor Equal , nor increasing , nor decreasing , nor Equalized .
οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον .

Ari: It does not appear that it can .

οὐκ εἰοικε .

Par: Certainly then , if **The One Is** , **It** will **undergo** all **these experiences** .

δὴ εἰ το ἐν ἐστὶν ἂν πασχοι παντ' ταυτα τα παθηματα .

Ari: How could it not ? (πῶς δ' οὐ ;)

151d μείζον, μείζον

156b μείζον

157b μέγα, μέγα

160a μείζω

163a μεγάλη

154d ἴσον, ἴσον

156b ἴσον

157b ἴσον, ἴσον

161c ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

165a ἴσος

148c πέπονθε, πεπονθέναι, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν

156c πάσχειν

157b πάσχοι, πάσχειν, πεπονθέναι

158c πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα, πέπονθεν, πέπονθεν

159a πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα

Loeb

and in passing from small to great and to equal and vice versa, it is neither small nor great nor equal, neither in a process of increase, nor of diminution, nor of equality.”

“Apparently not.”

“All this, then, would happen to the one, if the one exists.”

“Yes, certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

And while it passes from small into great, and into equal or its contrary, it will neither be small nor great, nor unequal, nor increasing, nor perishing, nor equalized.

It does not appear that it can.

But all these passions *The One* will suffer, if it is.

How should it not?

Jowett

and in the passage from small to great and equal and back again, it will be neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a state of increase, or diminution, or equalization.

True.

All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one has being.

Of course.

Oxford Greek
4th

τί δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις **προσῆκοι** ἂν **πάσχειν**, ἔν ἐῖ ἔστιν, ἄρα οὐ σκεπτέον;
σκεπτέον.

λέγωμεν δὴ, ἔν ἐῖ ἔστι, τᾶλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς τί χρὴ **πεπονθέναι**;
λέγωμεν.

οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἔν ἐστι τᾶλλα: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἦν.
ὀρθῶς.

Balboas
4th

Parmenides: 22 Then must we not consider what will likely *happen* to **The Others** if **One Is** ?
δε ἀρα οὐ σκεπτεον Τι ἀν προσηκοι πασχειν τοις ἀλλοις εἰ ἐν ἐστιν ;

Aristotle: We must so consider . (σκεπτεον .)

Par: Then let us say, if **One Is** , what **Those Other** than **The One Must experience** ?
δὴ λεγωμεν , εἰ ἐν ἐστι , τι τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς χρὴ πεπονθεναι ;

Ari: Let us do so . (λεγωμεν.)

Par: Is it not the case then , if indeed **The Others Are Other** than **The One** ,
οὐκοῦν ἐπειπερ τᾶλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ,
then **They Are not The One** ; for otherwise they would *not Be Other* than **The One** ?
ἐστὶ οὔτε τὸ ἐν : γὰρ ἀν οὐ ἦν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς .

Ari: Rightly so .(ορθῶς .)

138d προσήκει
139c προσήκει
157b προσήκοι

148c πέπονθε, πεπονθέναι, πεπονθός, πέπονθεν
156c πάσχειν
157b πάσχοι, πάσχειν, πεπονθέναι
158c πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα, πέπονθεν, πέπονθεν
159a πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα

155d λέγεις, λέγεται
155c λέγωμεν
157b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν
159a λέγεις
159b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν

Loeb
4th

“Must we not consider what is likely to happen to the other things, if the one exists?”

“We must.”

“Shall we tell, then, what must happen to the things other than one, if one exists?”

“Let us do so.”

“Well, since they are other than the one, the other things are not the one for if they were, they would not be other than the one.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor
4th

But should we not consider what other things ought to suffer if *The One* is?

We should.

Let us relate, therefore, if *The One* is, what other things ought to suffer from *The One*.

By all means.

Does it not follow that because other things are different from *The One* they are not *The One*: for otherwise they would not be different from *The One*?

Right.

Jowett
4th

But if one is, what will happen to the others -is not that also to be considered?

Yes.

Let us show then, if one is, what will be the affections of the others than the one.

Let us do so.

Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the one; for if they were they could not be other than the one. Very true.

Very true.

οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεται γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τάλλα, ἀλλὰ **μετέχει** πη.

πῇ δὴ;

ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν: εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη.
ὀρθῶς.

μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν **ὅλον** ᾗ.

φαμέν γάρ.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε **ὅλον** ἐν ἐκ **πολλῶν** ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὗ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια: ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν
μορίων οὐ **πολλῶν** μόριον χρῆ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ **ὅλου**.

πῶς τοῦτο;

Balboas

Par: Yet certainly , **The Others Are not entirely deprived** of **The One** ,
157C μὴν γε τάλλα ουδε πανταπασι στερεται του ενος ,
but **Participate** of **It** , in a **Certain (Definite) Way** .
ἀλλὰ μετεχει πη .

Ari: In a certain way then ? (πῇ δη ;)

Par: Since **The Others Are Other** than **The One in some (indefinite) way**
οτι τα αλλα εστιν αλλα του ενος που
by **having Parts** , for if **They had no Parts** , **They** would **Be Entirely One** .
εχοντα μορια : γαρ ει εχοι μη μορια , αν ειη παντελως εν .

Ari: Rightly so . (ορθως .)

Par: But we said that since **They have Parts** , **They** will **Belong** to **That** which **Is Whole**.
δε φαμεν γε , η μορια αν εστιν τουτου ο ολον .

Ari: We have so affirmed . (γαρ φαμεν.)

Par: But certainly , it is indeed **Necessary** that **The Whole** will **Be One** composed of
αλλα μὴν ειναι γε αναγκη το ολον εσται εν εκ
Many , and of which **Whole** , **The Many Parts Are Parts** . For **Each One** of **Those Parts**
πολλων , ου τα μορια μορια . γαρ εκαστον των μοριων
must **not be** a **piece/fragment** of **many** , but a **Part** of a **Whole** .
χρη ου ειναι πολλων , αλλα μοριον ολου .

Ari: How is this so ? (πως τουτο ;)

155e μετέχον, μετέχιν, μετέχιν, μετέχει, μετέχιν, μετέχει, μετέχιν

156a μετέχει, μετέχει, μετέχοι, μετέχοι

157c μετέχει

157e μετέχοι, μετέχιν

158a μετέχοι, μετέχιν, μετέχιν

153e ὅλου, ὅλον

153e ὅλον

157c ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλου

157e ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον

158a ὅλου, ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλου

156b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλά, πολλή

157a πολλά, πολλῶν, πολλά

157c πολλῶν, πολλῶν

157d πολλῶν, πολλῶν

157e πολλῶν

Loeb

“And yet surely the others are not altogether deprived of the one, but they partake of it in a certain way.”

“In what way?”

“Because the others are other than the one by reason of having parts; for if they had no parts, they would be altogether one.”

“True.”

“But parts, we affirm, belong to that which is a whole.”

“Yes, we affirm that they do.”

“But the whole must be one composed of many and of this the parts are parts. For each of the parts must be a part, not of many, but of a whole.”

“How is that?”

Thomas Taylor

Nor yet are others entirely deprived of *The One*, but participate it in a certain respect.

In what respect?

Because things different from *The One* are different, from their having parts: for if they had not parts they would be entirely one.

Right.

But parts we have asserted belong to that which is a whole.

We have so.

But it is necessary that a whole should be one composed from many, of which one the many are parts: for each of the parts ought not to be a part of many, but of a whole.

How so?

Jowett

Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they participate in the one.

In what way?

Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have parts; for if they had no parts they would be simply one.

Right.

And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?

So we say.

And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; and the parts will be parts of the one, for each of the parts is not a part of many, but of a whole.

How do you mean?

Oxford Greek

εἴ τι **πολλῶν** μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς **αὐτό** εἴη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δήπου μόριον ἔσται, ὃ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ἑνὸς ἐκάστου, εἴπερ καὶ πάντων. ἑνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὄν μόριον, πλὴν τούτου τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἑνὸς ἐκάστου οὐκ ἔσται μόριον, μὴ ὄν δὲ μόριον ἐκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν **πολλῶν** ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὄν πάντων τούτων τι εἶναι, ὧν οὐδενὸς οὐδέν ἐστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

φαίνεται γε δὴ.

Balboas

Par: If **anything** would **be** a **piece of many**, among which **it** would **exist**, surely then **somehow**
 157D εἰ τι εἴη μοριον πολλων, ἐν οἷς εἴη, δη που
The Self would also **be** a **piece of it-self** and of **each one of the others**, which is surely **impossible**,
 αυτο τε εσται μοριον εαυτου, και εκαστου ενος των αλλων, ο εστιν δη αδυνατον,
 if indeed **It is** also a **piece of all**. For by **not being** a **piece of one of these**, **It** will **be** a **piece of**
 ειπερ και παντων. γαρ μη ον μοριον ενος τουτου, εσται μοριον
the others, except of **this**, and thus it will not **be** a **piece of each one**. Then by **not being** a **piece**
 των αλλων, πλην τουτου και ουτως ουκ εσται μοριον εκαστου ενος, δε μη ον μοριον
 of **each**, **It** will not in any way **be piece of the many**. But **anything** that does **not-exist-in-one**,
 εκαστου εσται ουδενος των πολλων. δε τι ον μηδενος αδυνατον
 cannot exist in **all** of those of **which it belongs to none**, **neither as a piece** or **anything else at all**.
 ειναι παντων τουτων, ων εστι ουδενος, ουδεν και μοριον και αλλο οτιουν.

Ari: Surely then it has indeed come to Light. (δη γε φαινεται.)

157a πολλά, πολλῶν, πολλά

157c πολλῶν, πολλῶν

157d πολλῶν, πολλῶν

157e πολλῶν

158b πολλά

156c αὐτό

157a αὐτόν

157d αὐτό

158a αὐτῶν, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῷ

158b αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς

Loeb

“If anything is a part of many, and is itself one of the many, it will be a part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of some particular one, it will be a part of the rest, with the exception of that one, and thus it will not be a part of each one, and not being a part of each one, it will not be a part of any one of the many. But that which belongs to none cannot belong, whether as a part or as anything else, to all those things to none of which it belongs.”

“That is clear.”

Thomas Taylor

If any thing should be a part of many, among which it subsists itself, it would doubtless be a part of itself (which is impossible), and of each one of the others; since it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of these it will be a part of the others, this being excepted; and so it will not be a part of each one: and not being a part of each, it will be a part of no one of the many: and being a part of no one of the many, it is impossible that it should be any thing belonging to all those, of no one of which it is either a part or any thing else.

So it appears.

Jowett

If anything were a part of many, being itself one of them, it will surely be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part of each one of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some one, it will be a part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a part of each one; and if not a part of each, one it will not be a part of anyone of the many; and not being a part of any one, it cannot be a part or anything else of all those things of none of which it is anything.

Clearly not.

Oxford Greek

οὐκ ἄρα τῶν **πολλῶν** οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς **τινὸς ἰδέας** καὶ ἑνὸς **τινος** ὃ καλοῦμεν **ὅλον**, ἐξ ἀπάντων ἓν τέλειον **γεγονός**, τοῦτου μόριον ἂν τὸ μόριον εἴη.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

εἰ ἄρα τὰλλα μόρια ἔχει, κἂν τοῦ **ὅλου** τε καὶ ἑνὸς **μετέχῃ**.

πάνυ γε.

ἔν ἄρα **ὅλον** τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰλλα τοῦ ἑνός.

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μορίου γε ἐκάστου ὁ αὐτὸς **λόγος**; καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη **μετέχειν** τοῦ ἑνός.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **The Part Is not a piece of many** nor of **all** ;

157E αρα το μοριον ουκ μοριον των πολλων ουδε παντων ,
but of **One Undefined Idea** , and of **Some Unity** , which **we call Whole** , which **has-come-to-Be**
ἀλλὰ μιᾶς τινος ἰδέας καὶ τινος ἐνός , ὁ καλούμεν ὅλον , γεγονός
One Perfect Idea composed from **All** ; **of That which The Part will Be a Part** .
ἐν τέλειον ἐξ απαντων , τουτου το μοριον αν ειη μοριον .

Ari: Entirely so . (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)

Par: Accordingly then , if **The Others have Parts** , then they will also **Participate**

αρα ει ταλλα εχει μορια , καν μετεχει
of **The Whole** and also of **The One/Unity/Oneness** .
του ολου τε και ενος .

Ari: Very much so . (πανυ γε .)

Par: Accordingly then , **Those** that **Are Other** than **The One** , **Must Be One Perfect**

αρα ταλλα του ενος αναγκη ειναι εν τελειον
Whole which **has Parts** .
ολον εχον μορια .

Ari: They must be . (αναγκη .)

Par: And most certainly , **The Self/Same Logos** , also applies to each **Part** . For

και γε μιν ο αυτος λογος και περι του εκαστου μοριου . γαρ
The Part Must Participate of **The One** . For if each of **These Parts Is a Part** , then “**each**”
τουτου αναγκη μετεχειν του ενος .

157c πολλῶν, πολλῶν
157d πολλῶν, πολλῶν
157e πολλῶν
158b πολλά
159d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
150a τινός
157a τινῶν
157e τινός, τινος
159e τινοῖν
160e τινός, τινός
135a ἰδέαι
135c ἰδέαν
157e ἰδέας

153e ὅλον
157c ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλου
157e ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον
158a ὅληρ, ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλου
158b ὅλοο
156b γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον, γίγνεται
157a γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται
157e γεγονός
158d γέννεται, γίγνεσθαι
160a γιγνόμενα
156a μετέχει, μετέχει, μετέχει, μετέχει
157c μετέχει
157e μετέχει, μετέχειν
158a μετέχει, μετέχεν, μετέχειν
158b μετέχει, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα

155d λόγος
157a λόγον
157e λόγος
161a λόγος
161b λόγος

Loeb

“Then the part is a part, not of the many nor of all, but of a single form and a single concept which we call a whole, a perfect unity created out of all this it is of which the part is a part.”

“Certainly.”

“If, then, the others have parts, they will partake of the whole and of the one.”

“True.”

“Then the things which are other than one must be a perfect whole which has parts.”

“Yes, they must.”

“And the same reasoning applies to each part for the part must partake of the one.”

Thomas Taylor

A part, therefore, is neither a part of many nor of all; but of one certain idea and of one certain thing which we call a whole, and which becomes one perfect thing from all: for a part indeed is a part of this.

Entirely so.

If, therefore, other things have parts, they will also participate of a whole and one.

Certainly.

One perfect whole, therefore, possessing parts, must necessarily be different from *The One*.

It is necessary.

But the same reasoning is true concerning each of the parts; for it is necessary that each of these should participate of *The One*.

Jowett

Then the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a certain single form, which we call a whole, being one perfect unity framed out of all-of this the part will be a part.

Certainly.

If, then, the others have parts, they will participate in the whole and in the one.

True.

Then the others than the one must be one perfect whole, having parts.

Certainly.

And the same argument holds of each part, for the part must participate in the one;

Oxford Greek

εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον **αὐτῶν** μόνιον ἐστι, τό γε ἕκαστον εἶναι ἐν δήπου σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καθ' **αὐτὸ** δὲ ὄν, εἴπερ ἕκαστον ἔσται.

ὀρθῶς.

μετέχου δέ γε ἂν τοῦ ἐνός δηλον ὅτι ἄλλο ὄν ἢ ἓν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν **μετεῖχεν**, ἀλλ' ἦν ἂν **αὐτὸ** ἓν.

νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν εἶναι πλὴν **αὐτῷ** τῷ ἐνὶ ἀδύνατόν που.

ἀδύνατον.

μετέχειν δέ γε τοῦ ἐνός ἀνάγκη τῷ τε **ὅλῳ** καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν **ὅλον** ἔσται, οὐ μέρη τὰ μέρη: τὸ δ' αὖ ἕκαστον ἐν μόνιον τοῦ **ὅλου**, ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνιον **ὅλου**.

οὕτως.

Balboas

For if each of **These Parts Is a Part** , then “each”

γὰρ εἰ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ μόνιον ,το ἕκαστον

without a doubt , indeed signifies to **Be “One”** ; by first **Being Distinct** from **the others** ,

158A δηπου γε σημαίνει εἶναι ἐν , μὲν ἀφωρισμένον τῶν ἄλλων

then by **Being “According to Self”** , if indeed **It** will **Be** that which **Is** called , “**Each Part**” .

δε ὄν καθ'αὐτο , εἴπερ ἔσται ἕκαστον .

Ari: Rightly so . (ορθῶς .)

Par: But **It** will indeed **Participate** of **The One** , since this **Is** clear by **Being another**

δε ἂν γε μετέχου τοῦ ἐνός ὅτι δηλον ὄν ἄλλο

than **One** ; for otherwise **It** would **not Participate** , but **It would Be One Self** ; but now

ἡ ἐν : γὰρ οὐ μετεῖχεν , ἀλλ' ἂν ἦν ἐν αὐτο : δε νυν

on the one hand , it **Is Impossible** that **some Part** to **Be One** , except by **The One Self** .

μὲν ἀδύνατον που εἶναι ἐνὶ πλὴν τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτῷ .

Ari: Impossible . (ἀδύνατον .)

Par: But on the other hand , it is quite **Necessary** that both **The Whole** and **The Part Participate**

δε γε ἀνάγκη τε τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ μετέχειν

of **The One** ; for on the one hand , **The Whole** of which **The Parts Are Parts** , will **Be One** , but

τοῦ ἐνός : γὰρ μὲν τὸ ὅλον οὐ τὰ μέρη μέρη ἐστὶ ἐν : δ'

then in turn , **Each Singular Part** of **The Whole** , **Is That** which will **Be** a **Part** of **The Whole** .

αὐ ἕκαστον ἐν μόνιον τοῦ ὅλου , ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνιον τὸ ὅλου .

Ari: It is so . (οὕτως .)

157a αὐτῶν

157d αὐτὸ

158a αὐτῶν, αὐτὸ, αὐτὸ, αὐτῷ

158b αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτοῦ

158c αὐτήν, αὐτήν, αὐτῆς

157c μετέχει

157c μετέχου, μετέχειν

158a μετέχου, μετεῖχεν, μετέχειν

158b μεθέξει, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα

158c μετέχου

157c ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλου

157c ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον

158a ὅλῳ, ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλου

158b ὅλου

158d ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλα

Loeb

For if each of the parts is a part, the word 'each' implies that it is one, separated from the rest, and existing by itself; otherwise it will not be 'each.'"

"True."

"But its participation in the one clearly implies that it is other than the one, for if not, it would not partake of the one, but would actually be one; but really it is impossible for anything except one itself to be one."

"Yes, it is impossible."

"And both the whole and the part must necessarily participate in the one; for the one will be a whole of which the parts are parts, and again each individual one which is a part of a whole will be a part of the whole."

"Yes."

Thomas Taylor

For, if each of these is a part, the very being each, in a certain respect, signifies one; since it is distinguished from others, and has a subsistence by itself, if it is that which is called each.

Right.

But it participates of *The One* as it is evidently something different from *The One*; for otherwise it would not participate, but would be *The One Itself*. But now it is impossible that any thing can be *The One* except *The One Itself*.

Impossible.

But it is necessary both to a whole and to a part to participate of *The One*: for a whole is one certain thing and has parts. But each part whatever, which is a part of the whole, is one part.

It is so.

Jowett

for if each of the parts is a part, this means, I suppose, that it is one separate from the rest and self-related; otherwise it is not each.

True.

But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearly be other than one; for if not, it would merely have participated, but would have been one; whereas only the itself can be one.

Very true.

Both the whole and the part must participate in the one; for the whole will be one whole, of which the parts will be parts; and each part will be one part of the whole which is the whole of the part.

True.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἑνὸς μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

τὰ δ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνὸς πολλά που ἂν εἴη: εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἓν μήτε ἑνὸς πλείω εἴη τᾶλλα τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that **The Beings** which **Participate** of **The One** ,

158B ουκουν τα οντα μεθεξει του ενος

Participate of **The Self** , by **Being Other** (as in 148b) ?

μετεχοντα αυτου ετερα ;

Ari: How could they not ? (πως δ' ου ;)

Par: But **Those** that **Are Other** than **The One** will **Be Many in some indefinite way** . δ'

τα ετερα του ενος αν ειη πολλα που .

For if **Those** that **Are Other** than **The One Were neither One nor More** than **One** , then **They**

γαρ ει ταλλα του ενος ειη μητε εν μητε πλειω ενος ,

would be nothing. (αν ειη ουδεν .)

Ari: They would be nothing then . (ου γαρ ουν.)

154b ἕτερον, ἑτέρου

155b ἕτερον, ἑτέρου

158b ἕτερα, ἕτερα

158c ἑτέραν

158d ἑτερόν

157e μετέχου, μετέχεν

158a μετέχου, μετεῖχεν, μετέχειν

158b μεθέξει, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα

157d αὐτό

158a αὐτῶν, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῷ

158b αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτοῦ

158c αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ

158d ἑαυτῶν, ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτῶν, ἑαυτῶν

157d πολλόν, πολλόν

157e πολλῶν

158b πολλά

159d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

161a πολλόν, πολλόν

Loeb

“And will not the things which participate in the one be other than the one while participating in it?”

“Of course.”

“But the things which are other than the one will be many; for if they were neither one nor more than one, they would not be anything.”

“No.”

Thomas Taylor

Must not, therefore, those which participate of The One participate it, as being different from The One?

How should they not?

But things different from The One will in a certain respect be many; for if things different from The One were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.

They would.

Jowett

And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it?

Of course.

And the things which are other than the one will be many; for if the things which are other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.

True.

Oxford Greek

ἐπεὶ δὲ γε πλείω ἑνὸς ἐστὶ τὰ τε τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς **ὅλου μετέχοντα**, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη πληθεῖ **ἄπειρα** εἶναι **αὐτά** γε ἐκεῖνα τὰ **μεταλαμβάνοντα** τοῦ ἑνός;

πῶς;

ὥδε ἴδωμεν. ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἓν ὄντα οὐδὲ **μετέχοντα** τοῦ ἑνός **τότε**, ὅτε **μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει;**

δηλα δῆ.

Balboas

Par: Since **The Beings** that **Participate** both of a **Part** of **One** , and
 Ἐπει τα μετεχοντα τε του μοριου ενος και
The Beings that **Participate** of **The One Whole** , **Are** indeed **More** than **One** , then **Must** not
 τα του ενος ολου εστι γε πλειω ενος , δε αναγκη ουκ
These Beings which **Participate** of **The One** already **Be Unlimited Multitude** ?
 εκεινα τα μεταλαμβανοντα του ενος ηδη ειναι απειρα πληθει ;

Ari: How ? (πως ;)

Par: Let us **See** in the following way . At the **Time** when **They Partake** of **Something other**
 ιδωμεν ωδε . τοτε οτε οντα μεταλαμβανει τι αλλο
 than **The One** , do **They Participate** of **Not-One** , and do not **Participate** of **The Self** ?
 του ενος μετεχοντα ουχ εν , ουδε μεταλαμβανει αυτου ;

Ari: Clearly so . (δηλα δη .)

157e ὅλον, ὅλοι, ὅλον

158a ὅλω, ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλου

158b ὅλου

158d ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλα

159c ὅλον

157e μετέχοι, μετέχειν

158a μετέχοι, μετεῖχεν, μετέχειν

158b μετέχει, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα

158c μετέχοι

158d μετέχει

144e ἄπειρα

145a ἄπειρον

158b ἄπειρα

158c ἄπειρον

158d ἄπειρά

157d αὐτό

158a αὐτῶν, αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτῶ

158b αὐτῶ, αὐτά, αὐτοῦ

158c αὐτῇν, αὐτῇν, αὐτῆς

158d ἑαυτῶν, ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτῶν, ἑαυτά

133a μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνει

156a μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνειν

158b μεταλαμβάνοντα, μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνει

163d μεταλαμβάνειν

156e τότε

157a τότε, τότε

158b τότε

Loeb

“But since the things which participate in the one as a part and the one as a whole are more than one, must not those participants in the one be infinite in number?”

“How so?”

“Let us look at the question in this way. Is it not true that at the moment when they begin to participate in the one they are not one and do not participate in one?”

“Clearly.”

Thomas Taylor

But since the things which participate of one part and one whole are more than one, is it not necessary that these very things which participate of *The One* should be infinite in multitude?

How?

Thus: they are different from *The One*, nor are they participants of *The One*, then when they have already participated of it.

Certainly.

Jowett

But, seeing that the things which participate in the one as a part, and in the one as a whole, are more than one, must not those very things which participate in the one be infinite in number?

How so?

Let us look at the matter thus:-Is it not a fact that in partaking of the one they are not one, and do not partake of the one at the very time. when they are partaking of it?

Clearly.

Loeb

“Then they are multitudes, in which the one is not, are they not?”

“Yes, they are multitudes.”

“Well, then, if we should subtract from them in thought the smallest possible quantity, must not that which is subtracted, if it has no participation in one, be also a multitude, and not one?”

“It must.”

“And always when we consider the nature of the class, which makes it other than one, whatever we see of it at any time will be unlimited in number, will it not?”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Are not those multitudes in which *The One* is not? Multitudes, certainly.

What then?

If we should be willing by cogitation to take away the least quantity from these, would it not be necessary that this quantity which is taken away should be multitude, and not one, since it does not participate of *The One*?

It is necessary.

By always surveying, therefore, another nature of form, itself subsisting by itself, will not any quantity of it which we may behold be infinite in multitude?

Entirely so.

Jowett

They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present?

Very true.

And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction, must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of the one, be a multitude and not one?

It must.

And if we continue to look at the other side of their nature, regarded simply, and in itself, will not they, as far as we see them, be unlimited in number?

Certainly.

καὶ μὴν ἐπειδὴν γε ἕν ἕκαστον μόνιον μόνιον **γένηται**, **πέρας** ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ **ὅλον**, καὶ τὸ **ὅλον** πρὸς τὰ μέρη.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς **συμβαίνει** ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐξ **ἐαυτῶν** κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἔοικεν, **ἕτερόν** τι **γίγνεσθαι** ἐν **ἐαυτοῖς**, ὃ δὲ **πέρας** παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα:

ἢ δ' **ἐαυτῶν** φύσις καθ' **ἐαυτὰ** ἀπειρίαν.

φαίνεται.

οὕτω δὲ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ **ὅλα** καὶ κατὰ μέρη **ἄπειρά** τέ ἐστι καὶ πέρατος **μετέχει**.

πάνυ γε.

Par: And most certainly , whenever **Each Part becomes One** , **Each Part Will Already**

158D καὶ γε μὴν ἐπειδὴν ἕκαστον μόνιον γένηται ἐν , μόνιον ἡδὲ **Possess Limit** , **in relation to Each Other** , and **in relation to The Whole** , and ἔχει πέρασ πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον , καὶ **The Whole in relation to The Parts** .
τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μέρη .

Ari: Exactly so then . (κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν .)

Par: Surely then , on the one hand , it then results for **Those Other** than **The One** , as it **Is** **Reasonable** , both **from Their Sharing-a-Commonness with Each Other** and **from The One** , **εοικεν** , **ἐξ** **κοινωνησάντων** **ἐαυτῶν** καὶ **ἐκ** **τοῦ** **ενος** , that **Something Other Will Come-to-Be** within **Them-Selves** ; which certainly **Provides Them** **τι** **ετερον** **γίγνεσθαι** **ἐν** **ἐαυτοῖς** , **ο** **δη** **παρεσχε** **The Limit in relation to Each Other** ; but on the other hand , by **The Nature** of **Them-Selves** , **περας** **πρὸς** **ἄλληλα** : **δ'** **ἡ** **φύσις** **ἐαυτῶν** .
according to **Them-Selves (Other/Many)** , **The Unlimited Comes-to-Be** .
καθ' **ἐαυτὰ** **ἀπειρίαν** .

Ari: So it has come to **Light** . (φαίνεται .)

Par: Surely then in this way , **Those Other** than **The One** , according to both

Wholes and **Parts** , are **Unlimited** and also **Participate** of **Limit** .
ὅλα **καὶ** **μοῖρα** **ἐστὶ** **ἀπειρά** **τε** **καὶ** **μετέχει** **πέρατος** .

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ γε .)

157a γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

157e γεγονός

158d γένηται, γίγνεσθαι

160a γινόμενα

163b γίγνεσθαι γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

137d πέρας

143a πέρας

158d πέρας, πέρας

165a πέρας, πέρας

165c πέρας

158a ὅλη, ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλου

158b ὅλου

158d ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλα

159c ὅλον

159d ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλου

143d συμβαίνει

149b συμβαίνει

158d συμβαίνει

160b συμβαίνει

163c συμβαίνει

158b αὐτοῦ, αὐτά, αὐτοῦ

158c αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ, αὐτῇ

158d ἐαυτῶν, ἐαυτοῖς, ἐαυτῶν, ἐαυτὰ

158e ἐαυτοῖς; ἐαυτῶν

159a αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς

158b ἄπειρα

158c ἄπειρον

158d ἄπειρά

158e ἄπειρά, ἄπειρα

164d ἄπειρός

158b μετέχει, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα

158c μετέχει

158d μετέχει

158e μετέχει

159d μετέχει, μετέχοντα, μετέχει

158b ἕτερα, ἕτερα

158c ἕτερον

158d ἕτερόν

159a ἕτερα

159c ἕτερον, ἕτερον

Loeb

“And, further, when each part becomes a part, straightway the parts are limited in relation to each other and to the whole, and the whole in relation to the parts.”

“Undoubtedly.”

“The result, then, to the things which are other than one, that from the one and the union of themselves with it there arises, as it appears, something different within themselves which gives them a limitation in relation to one another; but their own nature, when they are left to themselves, gives them no limits.”

“So it appears.”

“Then the things which are other than one, both as wholes and as parts, are both unlimited and partake of limitation.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

And since every part becomes one, the parts will have bounds with respect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with respect to the parts.

Perfectly so.

It will happen, therefore, to things different from *The One*, as it appears both from *The One* and from their communicating with each other, that a certain something different will take place in them; which indeed affords to them a bound towards each other, while in the mean time the nature of these causes them to become essentially connected with infinity.

It appears so.

And thus things different from *The One*, both as wholes and according to parts, are infinite and participate of bound.

Entirely so.

Jowett

And yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the parts have a limit in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to the parts.

Just so.

The result to the others than the one is that of themselves and the one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them limitation in relation to one another; whereas in their own nature they have no limit.

That is clear.

Then the others than the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite, and also partake of limit.

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς;

πῇ δὴ;

ἦι μὲν που ἄπειρά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταῦτὸν πεπονθότα ἂν εἴη ταύτη.

πάνυ γε.

καὶ μὴν ἦ γε ἅπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτη πάντ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτὸν πεπονθότα.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ἦι δέ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρα πέπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθῃ ἀλλήλοις ὄντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθῃ πέπονθεν.

ναί.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that **They** are **Like** and **Unlike** , to **Each Other** and to **Themselves** ?
158E Ουκουν και ομοια τε και ανομοια τε αλληλοις και εαυτοις ;

Ari: in what way then ? (πη δη ;)

Par: Since on the one hand , according to **Their Own Nature** , **All** of **Them** will be ,
η μεν κατα εαυτων την φυσιν παντα αν ειη
in some way Unlimited ; and in **This Way** , **They are (passively) affected** by **The Same** .
που απειρα ταυτη εστι πεπονθοτα ταυτον .

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ γε .)

Par: And certainly , insofar as **They All** indeed **Participate** of **Limit** ,
και μην η απαντα γε μετεχει περατος ,
and by **Experiencing in This Way** , **They** will **All** be **The Same** .
και πεπονθοτα ταυτη αν ειη ταυτον .

Ari: How could they not ; (πως δ' ου .)

Par: But on the other hand , inasmuch as **They have been so affected** so as to be
δε η πεπονθεν γε ειναι
both **Limited** and **Unlimited** , they are **affected** by **experiences** that are **opposite** to one another .
τε πεπερασμενα και απειρα , πεπονθεν παθη εναντια αλληλοις .

Ari: Yes . (ναι.)

156b ὅμοιον
157a ὁμοίου, ὁμοιον, ὁμοιον
158e ὅμοιά
159a ὁμοια, ὁμοιά
159e ὁμοια, ὁμοια

156b ἀνόμοιον
157a ἀνόμοιον, ἀνομοίου, ἀνόμοιον
158e ἀνόμοια
159a ἀνομοιότατα, ἀνομοιότατα, ἀνόμοια
159e ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

158e αὐτήν, αὐτήν, αὐτῆς
158d ἑαυτῶν, ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτῶν, ἑαυτὰ
158e ἑαυτοῖς; ἑαυτῶν
159a αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς
159c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

158c ἄπειρον
158d ἄπειρά
158e ἄπειρά, ἄπειρα
164d ἄπειρός
165c ἄπειρον, ἄπειρά

150b ταῦτα
151c ταῦτά, ταῦτά
158e ταῦτὸν, ταῦτὸν
159a ταῦτά
159c ταῦτῶν

156c πάσχειν
157b πάσχοι, πάσχειν, πεπονθέναι
158e πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα, πέπονθεν, πέπονθεν
159a πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα
159b πεπονθέναι

158c μετέχει
158d μετέχει
158e μετέχει
159d μετέχοι, μετέχοντα, μετέχει
159e μετέχειν, μετέχοι

Loeb

“And are they also both like and unlike one another and themselves?”

“How is that?”

“Inasmuch as they are all by their own nature unlimited, they are all in that respect affected in the same way.”

“Certainly.”

“And surely inasmuch as they all partake of limitation, they are all affected in the same way in that respect also.”

“Obviously.”

“And inasmuch as they are so affected as to be both limited and limitless, they are affected by affections which are the opposites of one another.”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

Are they not, therefore, similar and dissimilar, both to each other and to themselves?

Why?

Because, so far as all of them are in a certain respect infinite, according to their own nature, they all of them, in consequence of this, suffer that which is *the same*.

-
-

How should they not?

But so far as they suffer to be bounded and infinite, which are passions contrary to each other, they suffer these passions.

Certainly.

Jowett

Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves.

How is that?

Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature, they are all affected in the same way.

True.

And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected in the same way.

Of course.

But inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited, they are affected in opposite ways.

Yes.

Oxford Greek

τὰ δ' ἐναντία γε ὡς οἶόν τε **ἀνομοιότατα**.

τί μὴν;

κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἑκάτερον τὸ πάθος **ὅμοια** ἂν εἴη **αὐτά** τε **αὐτοῖς** καὶ ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ' ἀμφοτέρα ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά τε καὶ **ἀνομοιότατα**.

κινδυνεύει.

Balboas

Par: But **opposites** are indeed as most **Unlike** as it is possible .

159A δ' τα εναντια γε ως ανομοιοτατα οιον τε .

Ari: Of course , what then ? (τι μην ;)

Par: Thus on the one hand , **each** of **these experiences** , will be both **Like them-selves**

αρα μεν εκατερον το παθος αν ειη τε ομοια αυτοις

and **Like each other** ; but on the other hand , according to both **affections** ,

και αλληλοις , δ' κατα αμφοτερα

they are in both ways , **most opposite** and **most Unlike** .

αυτα αμφοτερως εναντιωτατα τε και ανομοιοτατα .

Ari: I dare say so . (κινδυνευει .)

157a ἄνόμοιον, ἀνομοίῳ, ἀνόμοιον

158e ἀνόμοια

159a ἀνομοιότατα, ἀνομοιότατα, ἀνόμοια

159e ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια . ἀνόμοιά

160a ἀνόμοια

157a ὁμοίῳ, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον

158e ὁμοιά

159a ὅμοια, ὅμοιά

159e ὁμοια, ὁμοια

160a ὁμοια, ὁμοια

158d ἑαυτῶν, ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτῶν, ἑαυτά

158e ἑαυτοῖς; ἑαυτῶν

159a αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς

159c αὐτῶ, αὐτοῦ

159d αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

Loeb

“But opposites are as unlike as possible.”

“To be sure.”

“Then with regard to either one of their two affections they are like themselves and each other, but with regard to both of them together they are utterly opposed and unlike.”

“Yes, that must be true.”

Thomas Taylor

But things contrary, as such, are most dissimilar.

What then?

According to each of these passions, therefore, they are similar to themselves and to each other; but, according to both, they are on both sides most contrary and dissimilar.

It appears so.

Jowett

And opposites are the most unlike of things.

Certainly.

Considered, then, in regard to either one of their affections, they will be like themselves and one another; considered in reference to both of them together, most opposed and most unlike.

That appears to be true.

Oxford Greek

οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα **αὐτά** τε **αὐτοῖς** καὶ ἀλλήλοις **ὅμοιά** τε καὶ **ἀνόμοια** ἂν εἶη.

οὕτως.

καὶ **ταῦτά** δὴ καὶ **ἕτερα** ἀλλήλων, καὶ **κινούμενα** καὶ **ἐστῶτα**, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθῃ οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὐρήσομεν **πεπονθότα** τὰλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφάνη **πεπονθότα**. ὀρθῶς **λέγεις**.

Balboas

Par: Surely then , in this way , **The Other Beings** will **Themselves** be both
 δη ουτω τα αλλα αν αυτα ειη τε
Like and **Unlike** with **Themselves** and with **Each Other** .
 ομοια τε και ανομοια αυτοις και αλληλοις .

Ari: It is so . (οὕτως .)

Par: Surely then , **They** will be both **The Same** and **Other** from **Each Other** , and
 δη και ταυτα και ετερα αλληλων , και
 will be **In-Motion** and **Standing-still** , and it will not in any way be difficult for us to discover
 κινουμενα και εστωτα , και ουκετι χαλεπως ευρησομεν
 that all kinds of contrary **experiences** are **undergone** by **Those** that are **Other** than **The One** ,
 159B παντα εναντια τα παθη πεπονθοτα ταλλα του ενος ,
 seeing that **They** appear **to have been so affected** .
 επειπερ ταυτα εφανη πεπονθοτα .

Ari: You speak rightly . (λέγεις ὀρθῶς .)

158d ἑαυτῶν, ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτῶν, ἑαυτά

158e ἑαυτοῖς; ἑαυτῶν

159a αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς

159c αὐτῶ, αὐτοῦ

159d αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτοῖς, αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

157a ὅμοιοι, ὅμοιον, ὅμοιον

158e ὅμοιά

159a ὅμοια, ὅμοιά

159c ὅμοια, ὅμοια, ὅμοια

160a ὅμοια

157a ἀνόμοιον, ἀνομοίου, ἀνόμοιον

158e ἀνόμοια

159a ἀνομοιότατα, ἀνομοιότατα, ἀνόμοια

159c ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

160a ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

151c ταῦτά, ταῦτά

158e ταὐτὸν, ταὐτὸν

159a ταῦτά

159c ταὐτῶ

162d ταὐτοῦ, ταὐτόν

158c ἑτέραν

158d ἑτερόν

159a ἕτερα

159c ἕτερον, ἕτερον

160a ἑτέρου, ἕτερα

156e κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖται, κινεῖτ'

157a κινήσεών

159a κινούμενα

160a κινούμενα

162c κινούμενον, κινεῖτ'

156e ἐστάναι, ἐστός, ἐστηκέ, σταιῖ

157a στάσεων

159a ἐστῶτα

160a ἐστῶτα

162e ἐστηκέ

157b πάσχει, πάσχειν, πεπονθέναι

158e πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα, πέπονθεν, πέπονθεν

159a πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα

159b πεπονθέναι

160a πέπονθε

155e λέγωμεν

157b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν

159a λέγεις

159b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν

160c λέγοι, λέγοι, λέγει, λέγει, λέγει

Loeb

“Therefore the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another.”

“So they are.”

“And they are the same as one another and also other than one another, they are both in motion and at rest, and since we have proved these cases, we can easily show that the things which are other than one experience all the opposite affections.”

“You are right.”

Thomas Taylor

And thus others will be the same with themselves and with each other, and similar and dissimilar.

They will so.

And again, they will be the same and different from each other, will both be moved and stand still; and it will not be difficult to find all kinds of contrary passions suffered by things different from *The One*, while they appear to be passive, in the manner we have related.

You speak rightly.

Jowett

Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?

True.

And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection, as may be proved without difficulty of them, since they have been shown to have experienced the affections aforesaid?

True.

Oxford Greek
5th

οὐκοῦν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη ἐώμεν ὥς φανερά, ἐπισκοποῖμεν δὲ **πάλιν** ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ οὕτω **μόνον**;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

λέγωμεν διὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν εἰ ἔστι, τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς **πεπονθέναι**.

λέγωμεν γάρ.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐ **χωρίς** μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, **χωρίς** δὲ τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς εἶναι;

τί δὴ;

Balboas
5th

Parmenides: 23 Is it not so then , that if on the one hand , we presently let these matters **Be**
Ουκουν εἰ μὲν ἤδη εωμεν ταυτα
as **Openly Clear** , so then in turn , we can consider , if **One Is** , whether **Those Other** than
ως φανερα , δε αρα παλιν επισκοποιμεν , εἰ ἐν ἐστιν , τα αλλα
The One , *do not Have* to **Be** in **This Way** , or if *they Have* to *be solely in the following way* ?
του ενος ουχ εχει ουτως η μονον ουτω ;

Aristotle: Entirely so . (πανυ μὲν ουν .)

Par: Surely then , let us state from the beginning , if **One Is** ,
δη λεγωμεν εξ αρχης , εἰ ἐν ἐστι ,
what **those other** than **The One** must *undergo/experience/suffer* .
τι τα αλλα του ενος χρη πεπονθεναι .

Ari: Let us do so . (λεγωμεν γαρ .)

Par: Take notice then , on the one hand , is not **The One Separate/Apart/Distinct**
αρ' ουν μὲν ειναι ου το εν χωρις
from **the others** , and on the other hand , **the others Separate/Distinct/Parallel** to **The One** ?
των αλλων δε ταλλα χωρις του ενος ;

Ari: Why do you ask ? (τι δη ;)

142e πάλιν
154d πάλιν
159b πάλιν
163b πάλιν
165e πάλιν

155e μόνως
156e μόνως
159b μόνον
160c μόνον

157b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν
159a λέγεις
159b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν
160c λέγοι, λέγοι, λέγει, λέγει, λέγει
160d λεγόμενον, λέγεται, λέγεσθαι

142b ἀρχῆς, ἀρχῆς
153c ἀρχῇ
159b ἀρχῆς
160d ἀρχῆς
165a ἀρχῆς, ἀρχῇ

158e πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα, πέπονθεν, πέπονθεν
159a πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα
159b πεπονθέναι
160a πέπονθε
160b πεπονθέναι

149a χωρίς
151a χωρίς
159b χωρίς, χωρίς
159c χωρίς, χωρίς
165d χωρίς

Loeb
5th

“Then what if we now drop these matters as evident and again consider whether, if one is, the things other than one are as we have said, and there is no alternative.”

“Certainly.”

“Let us then begin at the beginning and ask, if one is, what must happen to the things which are other than one.”

“By all means.”

“Must not the one be separate from the others, and the others from the one?”

“Why is that?”

Thomas Taylor
5th

Shall we not, therefore, pass by these things as evident, and again consider if *The One* is, whether things different from *The One* will subsist not in this manner, or whether in this manner alone?

Entirely so.

Let us, therefore, assert again from the beginning, if *The One* is, what things different from *The One* ought to suffer.

Let us.

Is, therefore, *The One* separate from others, and are others separate from *The One*?

Why?

Jowett
5th

Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these matters as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the one is, whether opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the others.

By all means.

Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others?

Let us ask that question.

Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one?

Why so?

Oxford Greek

ὅτι που οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα **ἕτερον**, ὃ ἄλλο μὲν ἔστι τοῦ ενός, ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἄλλων: πάντα γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅταν ῥηθῇ τό τε ἐν καὶ τάλλα.

πάντα γάρ.

οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ' ἔστιν **ἕτερον** τούτων, ἐν ᾧ τό τε ἐν ἂν εἴη τῷ **αὐτῷ** καὶ τάλλα.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν **ταύτῳ** ἔστι τὸ ἐν καὶ τάλλα.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Balboas

Par: Because nothing **exists** in **some** other way besides **these** ways . One which exists

οτι ουκ εστι που ετερον παρα ταυτα , μεν ο εστι
by **being other** than **The One** , then the other ; which exists by **being other** than **the others** .

159C αλλο του ενος , δε αλλο των αλλων .

For that is all that can be specified , when we say , **The One** and **the others** .

γαρ παντα ειρηται οταν ρηθη το εν τε και ταλλα .

Ari: All indeed . (παντα γαρ .)

Par: Accordingly then , there is **no other way** besides these , in which both **The One**

αρα εστιν ουκ ετερον ετ' τουτων , εν ω τε το εν
and **the others** can subsist in **The Self (Parallel) Existence** . (**Odyssey 602** on **Heracles**)

και ταλλα αν ειη τω αυτω .

Ari: For there is none .(γαρ ου .) (Since **They** are **Parallel**)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** and **the others** , never **subsist** in **The Same/Self** .

αρα το εν και ταλλα ουδεποτε εν ταυτω .

Ari: It does not appear that they do . (ουκ εοικεν .)

158d ἕτερόν

159a ἕτερα

159c ἕτερον, ἕτερον

160a ἕτερου, ἕτερα

160c ἕτερόν, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

158e ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτῶν

159a αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς

159c αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ

159d αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

159e αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτοῖς

158e ταῦτόν, ταῦτόν

159a ταὐτά

159c ταύτῳ

162d ταὐτοῦ, ταὐτόν

162e ταῦτῳ

Loeb

“Because there is nothing else besides these, which is other than one and other than the others. For when we have said 'one and the others' we have included all things.”

“Yes, all things.”

“Then there is nothing other than these, in which both the one and the others may be.”

“No.”

“Then the one and the others can never be in the same.”

“Apparently not.”

Thomas Taylor

Because there is no other different besides these, viz. that which is different from The One, and that which is different from others; for all that can be spoken is asserted, when we say The One and others.

All, indeed.

There is nothing else, therefore, besides these in which The One and others can subsist after the same manner.

Nothing.

The One and others, therefore, are never in the same.

It does not appear that they are.

Jowett

Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both of them; for the expression "one and the others" includes all things.

Yes, all things.

Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in which both the one and the others might exist?

There is nothing.

Then the one and the others are never in the same?

True.

χωρίς ἄρα;

ναί.

οὐδὲ μὴν μόρια γε ἔχειν φαμέν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔν.

πῶς γάρ;

οὐτ' ἄρα **ὅλον** εἶη ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια **αὐτοῦ**, εἰ **χωρίς** τέ ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει.

πῶς γάρ;

Balboas

Par: Are They **Separate** then ? (αρα χωρις ;)

Ari: Yes , they are separate . (ναι .)

Par: We most certainly affirmed that **That** which Is **Truly One** , has no **Parts** (137c) .
γε μην φαμεν ως το αληθως εν εχειν ουδε μορια .

Ari: How could it ? (πως γαρ ;)

Par: Accordingly then , neither will **The Whole One** be in **the others** ,
αρα ουτ' αν το ολον εν ειη εν τοις αλλοις ,
nor **The Parts** of **The Self** , if **It** is both **Separate** from **the others** , and also , if **It** has no **Parts** .
ουτε μορια αυτου , ει εστι τε χωρις των αλλων και εχει μη μορια .

Ari: How could it not be so ? (πως γαρ ;)

158b ὅλοε

158d ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλα

159c ὅλον

159d ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον

158e ἑαυτοῖς; ἑαυτῶν

159a αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς

159c αὐτῶ, αὐτοῦ

159d αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

159e αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτοῖς

151a χωρίς

159b χωρίς, χωρίς

159c χωρίς, χωρίς

165d χωρίς

166b χωρίς

Loeb

“Then they are separate?”

“Yes.”

“And surely we say that what is truly one has no parts.”

“How can it have parts?”

“Then the one cannot be in the others as a whole, nor can parts of it, if it is separate from the others and has no parts.”

“Of course not.”

Thomas Taylor

Are they separate, therefore?

They are.

We have likewise asserted that *the truly one* has not any parts.

For how can it?

Neither, therefore, will the whole of *The One* be in *others*, nor the parts of it, if it is separate from *others*, and has no parts.

How should it not be so?

Jowett

Then they are separated from each other?

Yes.

And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?

Impossible.

Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts?

Impossible.

οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ **μετέχῃ** ἂν τᾶλλα τοῦ ἑνός, μήτε κατὰ μέρειον τι **αὐτοῦ** μήτε κατὰ **ὅλον** **μετέχοντα**.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἐν τᾶλλα ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἔχει ἐν **ἑαυτοῖς** ἐν οὐδέν.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐδ' ἄρα **πολλά** ἐστὶ τᾶλλα: ἐν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕκαστον **αὐτῶν** μέρος τοῦ **ὅλου**, εἰ **πολλά** ἦν: νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἐν οὔτε **πολλά** οὔτε **ὅλον** οὔτε μέρος ἐστὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπεὶ δὲ **αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει**.

ὀρθῶς.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, *in no way* will **the others** **Participate** of **The One**, since **they** 159D ἄρα οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ ἂν τᾶλλα μετέχῃ τοῦ ἑνός, neither **Participate** according to a certain **Part** of **The Self**, nor according to **The Whole**. μήτε μετέχοντα κατὰ τι μέρος αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον.

Ari: It does not appear to be likely. (οὐκ εοικεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, *in no way* are **the others** **One**, nor **have/maintain** any **One** in **themselves**. ἄρα οὐδαμῇ ἐστὶν τᾶλλα ἐν, οὐδ' ἔχει οὐδέν ἐν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς.

Ari: They have not then. (γὰρ οὐ οὖν.)

Par: Accordingly then, neither are **the others** **Many**. For if **they** were **Many**, then **Each Self** ἄρα οὐδ' ἐστὶ τᾶλλα πολλά. γὰρ εἰ ἦν πολλά ἕκαστον αὐτῶν would be **One** by being a **Part** of **The Whole**; but now, **those other** than **The One** are neither ἂν ἦν ἐν μέρος τοῦ ὅλου: δὲ νῦν τᾶλλα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστὶ οὔτε **One** nor **Many**, nor a **Whole**, nor **Parts**, since **they in no way Participate** of **The Self**. ἐν οὔτε πολλά οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μέρη, ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει αὐτοῦ.

Ari: Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς.)

158d μετέχει

158e μετέχει

159d μετέχῃ, μετέχοντα, μετέχει

159e μετέχειν, μετέχῃ

160a μετέχῃ

159a αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς

159c αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

159d αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

159e αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτοῖς

160a αὐτά

158d ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλα

159c ὅλον

159d ὅλον, ὅλου, ὅλον

150c οὐδαμοῦ

156a οὐδαμῶς

159d οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῇ

162d οὐδαμοῦ

163a οὐδαμῇ

157e πολλῶν

158b πολλά

159d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

161a πολλῶν, πολλῶν

164d πολλά, πολλοί

Loeb

“Then the others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of any part of it nor of the whole.”

“No, apparently not.”

“The others are, then, not one in any sense, nor have they in themselves any unity.”

“No.”

“But neither are the others many; for if they were many, each of them would be one part of the whole; but actually the things that are other than one are not many nor a whole nor parts, since they do not participate in the one in any way.”

“Right.”

Thomas Taylor

In no way, therefore, will others participate of The One, since they neither participate according to a certain part of it, nor according to the whole.

It does not appear that they can.

By no means, therefore, are others The One, nor have they any one in themselves.

They have not.

Neither, the, are other things many; for, if they were many, each of them, as being a part of a whole, would be one: but now things different from *The One* are neither one nor many, nor a whole, nor parts, since they in no respect participate of *The One*.

Right.

Jowett

Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part?

It would seem not.

Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity?

There is not.

Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them would be a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.

True.

οὐδ' ἄρα **δύο** οὐδὲ **τρία** οὔτε **αὐτά** ἐστί τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν **αὐτοῖς**, εἴπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς πανταχῇ στέρεται.

οὕτως.

οὐδὲ **ὅμοια** ἄρα καὶ **ἀνόμοια** οὔτε **αὐτά** ἐστί τῶ ἐνὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν **αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης** καὶ **ἀνομοιότης**: εἰ γὰρ **ὅμοια** καὶ **ἀνόμοια αὐτά** εἴη ἢ ἔχοι ἐν **ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα** καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, **δύο** που **εἶδη** ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἂν ἐν **ἑαυτοῖς** τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός.

φαίνεται.

ἦν δέ γε ἀδύνατον **δυοῖν τινοῖν μετέχειν** ἢ μηδ' ἑνὸς **μετέχει**.

ἀδύνατον.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **the others** are neither **Two** nor **Three** , nor are **These Numbers**

159E αρα τα αλλα ουδ' δυο ουδε τρια ουτε εστι αυτα

contained in **them** , since **they** are entirely deprived of **The One** .

ενεστιν εν αυτοις , ειπερ πανταχη στερεται του ενος .

Ari: So it is . (οὕτως .)

Par: Accordingly then , **the others** are neither **Like** nor **Unlike** ,

αρα τα αλλα εστι ουδε ομοια και ανομοια

nor **The Same/Selves** with **The One** , nor are **Likeness** and **Unlikeness** inherent in **them** selves .

ουτε αυτα τω ενι , ουτε ομοιοτης και ανομοιοτης ενεστιν εν αυτοις .

For if selves **were Like** and **Unlike** , or **Contained Likeness** and **Unlikeness** in **themselves** , then

γαρ ει αυτα ειη ομοια και ανομοια η εχοι ομοιοτητα και ανομοιοτητα εν εαυτοις ,

those other than **The One** would **somehow** **Contain in themselves** , **Two Opposite Ideas** .

τα αλλα του ενος αν που εχοι εν εαυτοις δυο εναντια ειδη .

Ari: So it appears . (φαινεται .)

Par: But it is indeed impossible for anything to **Participate** of **Two Opposite Ideas** ,

δε ην γε αδυνατον τινοιν μετεχειν δυοιν

which do **not in any way Participate** of **The One** .

ω μηδ' μετεχοι ενος .

Ari: Impossible . (αδυνατον .)

149b δυοῖν, δύο, δύο
149d δύο, δυοῖν
159e δύο, δύο, δυοῖν
160a δυοῖν
160b δυοῖν

145a τριῶν
149b τρία
159e τρία
160b τριῶν

158e ὁμοιά
159a ὅμοια, ὁμοιά
159e ὅμοια, ὁμοια
160a ὁμοια, ὁμοια
161c ὁμοῖον

158e ἀνόμοια
159a ἀνομοιότατα, ἀνομοιότατα, ἀνόμοια
159e ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια
160a ἀνόμοιά, ἀνόμοια
161a ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

159c αὐτῶ, αὐτοῦ
159d αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ
159e αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτοῖς
160a αὐτά
160b αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοῦ

136b ὁμοιότης
140e ὁμοιότητος, ὁμοιότητος
159e ὁμοιότης, ὁμοιότητα
161b ὁμοιότητα
161c ὁμοιότητα

129e ἀνομοιότητα
140e ἀνομοιότητος
159e ἀνομοιότης, ἀνομοιότητα
161a ἀνομοιότης
161b ἀνομοιότης, ἀνομοιότης, ἀνομοιότης

149d δύο, δυοῖν
159d δύο
159e δύο, δυοῖν
160a δυοῖν
160b δυοῖν

149e εἶδει, εἶδη
158c εἶδους
159e εἶδη
160a εἶδους

157a τινων
157e τινός, τινος
159e τινοῖν
160e τινός, τινός
162d τινός

158e μετέχει
159d μετέχοι, μετέχοντα, μετέχει
159e μετέχειν, μετέχοι
160a μετέχοι
160b μετέξει, μετέχειν

Loeb

“Neither are the others two or three, nor are two or three in them, if they are entirely deprived of unity.”

“True.”

“Nor are the others either themselves like and unlike the one, nor are likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike or had likeness and unlikeness in them, the things which are other than the one would have in them two elements opposite to one another.”

“That is clear.”

“But it is impossible for that to partake of two things which does not even partake of one.”

“Impossible.”

Thomas Taylor

Others, therefore, are neither two nor three, nor is *one* contained in them, because they are entirely deprived of *The One*.

So it is.

Others, therefore, are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor the same with *The One*, nor are similitude and dissimilitude inherent in them. For, if they were similar and dissimilar, so far as they contained in themselves similitude and dissimilitude, so far things different from *The One* would comprehend in themselves two contrary species.

So it appears.

But it is impossible for those to participate of two certain things which do not participate of one.

Impossible.

Jowett

Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one?

True.

Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to one another.

That is clear.

But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible?

Impossible.

οὐτ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὐτ' ἀνόμοιά ἐστιν οὐτ' ἀμφότερα τάλλα. ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ἂν ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἐνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἶδους μετέχῃ, ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοις: ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐδ' ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἐστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα: οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων:

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **the others** are neither **Like** nor **Unlike** , nor **Both** .

160A ἄρα τάλλα ἐστὶν οὐτ' ὁμοία οὐτ' ἀνομοία οὐτ' ἀμφοτέρα .

For on the one hand , if **they were Like** or **Unlike** , then **They would Participate**

γὰρ μὲν ἂν ὄντα ὁμοία ἢ ἀνομοία ἂν μετέχῃ

of **One Different Idea** ; but on the other hand , if **they were Both Like** and **Unlike** , then

ἐνὸς ἑτέρου εἶδους , δὲ ὄντα ἀμφοτέρα

They would Participate of **Two Opposite Ideas** ; but this has been shown to be impossible .

τοιὺν δυοῖν ἐναντιοῖν : δὲ ταῦτα ἐφάνη ἀδύνατον .

Ari: This is true . (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: Accordingly then , **they** are neither **themselves** nor **others** ,

ἀρα τὰ οὐδ' αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἕτερα ,

nor **In-motion** nor **Standing-still** , nor **generated** nor **dissolved** , nor are **greater** nor **less** ,

οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἐστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω

nor **Equal** ; nor do **they undergo** anything else of this kind .

οὐδὲ ἴσα : οὐδὲ πεπονθε οὐδὲν ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων .

159a ὅμοια, ὁμοιά

159c ὁμοία, ὁμοία

160a ὅμοια, ὁμοία

161c ὁμοιον

162a ὁμοίως

159a ἀνομοιοτάτα, ἀνομοιοτάτα, ἀνόμοια

159c ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

160a ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

161a ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

161b ἀνόμοιά, ἀνομοίᾳ, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

159a ἕτερα

159c ἕτερον, ἕτερον

160a ἕτερου, ἕτερα

160c ἕτερόν, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

160d ἕτερα, ἕτερον

158c εἶδος

159e εἶδη

160a εἶδους

159d μετέχῃ, μετέχοντα, μετέχει

159c μετέχειν, μετέχῃ

160a μετέχῃ

160b μεθέξει, μετέχειν

160c μετέχει

149d δύο, δυοῖν

159e δύο, δύο, δυοῖν

160a δυοῖν

160b δυοῖν

159d αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

159e αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς

160a αὐτά

160b αὐτοῖς αὐτοῦ

160c αὐτῶ

157a κινήσεων

159a κινούμενα

160a κινούμενα

162c κινούμενον

162d κινούτ'

157a στάσεων

159a ἐστῶτα

160a ἐστῶτα

162c ἐστηκέ

163e ἐστάναι, ἐστός, ἐστάναι

157e γενοῦς

158d γένηται, γίγνεσθαι

160a γιγνόμενα

163b γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

163d γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται

156b μείζον

157b μέγα, μέγα

160a μείζω

163a μεγάλη

164e μεγάλη

154e ἐλαττον

156b ἐλαττον

160a ἐλάττω

165a ἐλαττον

159a πεπονθότα, πεπονθότα

159b πεπονθέναι

160a πέπονθε

160b πεπονθέναι

163e πάσῃ

155d τοιούτων

158c τοιούτων

160a τοιούτων

160b τοιοῦτον

160c τοιούτων

Loeb

“The others are, then, not like nor unlike nor both. For if they were like or unlike, they would partake of one of the two elements, and if they were both, of the two opposites and that was shown to be impossible.”

“True.”

“They are, then, neither the same nor other, nor in motion nor at rest, nor becoming nor being destroyed, nor greater nor less nor equal, and they experience no similar affections;

Thomas Taylor

Others, therefore, are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor both. For, if they were things similar or dissimilar, they would participate of one other form; and if they were both, they would participate of two contrary forms: but these things appear to be impossible.

True.

Others, therefore, are neither *same* nor *different*, nor are moved nor stand still, nor are generated nor destroyed, nor are greater, or lesser, or equal, nor do they suffer any thing else of this kind.

Jowett

Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake of opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to be impossible.

True.

Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort;

Oxford Greek

εἰ γάρ τι **τοιούτον πεπονθέναι** ὑπομένει τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ **δυοῖν** καὶ **τριῶν** καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ **ἄρτιου μεθέξει**, ὧν **αὐτοῖς** ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη **μετέχειν** τοῦ ἑνός γε πάντη πάντως στερομένοις.

ἀληθέστατα.

οὕτω δὴ ἓν εἴ ἔστιν, πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐδὲ ἓν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς **ἑαυτὸ** καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως.

παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

For if **they** could **sustain undergoing**
 γαρ ει τα αλλα υπομενει πεπονθεναι
 any such **experience** , then **They** would also **Participate** of **One** and **Two** and **Three** ,
 τι τοιουτον , και μεθεξει ενος και δυοιν και τριων
 and of **Even** and of **Odd** ; all of which , have indeed been shown to be impossible for **themselves**
 160B και περιττου και αρτιου , παντη ω γε εφανη αδυνατον αυτοις
 to **Participate** , by being entirely **deprived** of **The One** .
 μετεχειν παντως στερομενοις του ενος .

Ari: All this is most true . (αληθεστατα .)

Par: Surely then in this way , if **One Is** , then **The One** is **All** , and also , **nothing at all** ;
 δη ουτω ει εν εστιν , το εν εστι παντα τε και εστι ουδε εν
 and so also in **Relation** to **It-Self** and in the (non) **relation** to **the other** selves .
 και ωσαυτως προς εαυτο και προς τα αλλα .

Ari: This is entirely so . (παντελως μεν ουν .)

158c τοιούτων
 160a τοιούτων
160b τοιούτον
 160c τοιούτων
 160e τοιούτων
 159b πεπονθέναι
 160a πέπονθε
160b πεπονθέναι
 163c πάσχον
 164b πεπονθέναι
 159e δύο, δύο, δύοιν
 160a δυοῖν
160b δυοῖν

149b τρία
 159d τρία
160b τριῶν
 143d ἄρτια
 144a ἄρτιά, ἄρτια
160b ἄρτιου
 164e ἄρτια
 159e μετέχεν, μετέχοι
 160a μετέχοι
160b μεθέξει, μετέχειν
 160e μετέχει
 161a μετέχεν

159e αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά, αὐτοῖς, αὐτά ἑαυτοῖς, ἑαυτοῖς
 160a αὐτά
160b αὐτοῖς ἑαυτὸ
 160c αὐτῷ
 160d αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ

Loeb

for if the others are subject to such affections, they will participate in one and two and three and odd and even, in which we saw that they cannot participate, if they are in every way utterly deprived of unity.”

“Very true.”

“Therefore if one exists, the one is all things and nothing at all in relation both to itself and to all others.”

“Perfectly true.”

Thomas Taylor

For, if *others* could sustain to suffer any such affection, they would participate of one and two, and of even and odd; all which it appears impossible for them to participate, since they are entirely deprived of *The One*.

All this is most true.

Hence, then, if *The One is*, *The One* is all things and nothing; and is similarly affected towards itself and towards others.

Entirely so.

Jowett

for, if they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one.

Very true.

Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other things.

Certainly.

Loeb
6th

“Well, and ought we not next to consider what must happen if one does not exist?”

“Yes, we ought.”

“What, then, is the sense of this hypothesis—if one does not exist? Is it different in any way from this—if not one does not exist?”

“Certainly it is different.”

Thomas Taylor
6th

Let this then be admitted. But should we not after this consider what ought to happen if *The One* is not?

We should.

What then will be the hypothesis if *The One is not*? Will it differ from the hypothesis if *that which is not one is not*?

It will indeed differ.

Jowett
6th

Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not?

Yes; we ought.

What is the meaning of the hypothesis-If the one is not; is there any difference between this and the hypothesis-If the not one is not?

There is a difference, certainly.

Oxford Greek

διαφέρει **μόνον**, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἔν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ εἰ ἔν μὴ ἔστιν;
πᾶν τοῦναντίον.

τί δ' εἴ τις **λέγοι** εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν **τοιούτων**, ἄρα ἐφ'
ἐκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ ὅτι **ἕτερόν** τι **λέγοι** τὸ μὴ ὄν;

πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: Will it *merely differ*, or is the expression, if **Not-One** is *not*,

160C **μόνον** διαφέρει, ἢ ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἐν ἐστὶ μὴ

Entirely Opposite to the hypothesis, if **One Is not**?

πᾶν τοῦναντίον τοῦ εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν μὴ;

Ari: Entirely opposite. (πᾶν τοῦναντίον.)

Par: But what if anyone were to say, 'if **Greatness Is not**' or '**Smallness Is not**',

δ' τι εἰ τις **λέγοι**, εἰ μέγεθος ἐστὶν μὴ ἢ σμικρότης ἐστὶν μὴ

or *anything else of this kind*, then they should make it clear in each of these cases,

ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἀρα ἂν δηλοῖ ἐφ' ἐκάστου

that they speak of **The Non-Being**, as *something Other*? (The Principle

ὅτι **λέγοι** τὸ μὴ ὄν τι ἕτερον; of The 6th.PG)

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)

156e μόνως
159b μόνον
160c μόνον

159a λέγεις
159b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν
160c λέγοι, λέγοι, λέγει, λέγει, λέγει
160d λεγόμενον, λέγεται, λέγεσθαι
160e λέγει, λέγει, ἐλέγετο, ἐλέγετο

160a τοιούτων
160b τοιοῦτον
160c τοιούτων
160e τοιούτων
161b τοιούτου

159c ἕτερον, ἕτερον
160a ἐτέρου, ἕτερα
160c ἕτερόν, ἕτερον, ἕτερον
160d ἕτερα, ἕτερον
160e ἕτερον, ἕτερα

Loeb

“Is it merely different, or are the two expressions—if not one does not exist and if one does not exist—complete opposites?”

“They are complete opposites.”

“Now if a person should say 'if greatness does not exist', 'if smallness does not exist,' or anything of that sort, would he not make it clear that in each case the thing he speaks of as not existing is different?”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Will it only differ, or is the hypothesis if that which is not one is not, entirely contrary to the hypothesis if The One is not?

Entirely contrary.

But what, if any one should say, if magnitude is not, or parvitude is not, or any thing else of this kind, would he not evince in each of these that he speaks of that which is not as something different?

Entirely so.

Jowett

Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions—if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?

They are entirely opposed.

And suppose a person to say:—If greatness is not, if smallness is not, or anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such an expression, that "what is not" is other than other things?

To be sure.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅτι **ἕτερον λέγει** τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἔν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ **λέγει**;

ἴσμεν.

πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι **λέγει**, ἔπειτα **ἕτερον** τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἔν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι **αὐτῷ** προσθεῖς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι:

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that now they also make it clear what they mean when they

say , if **One Is not** , that **The Non-Being Is Other** from **The Others** ,
 ουκουν νυν και δηλοι λεγει οταν
 ειπη ει εν εστι μη , οτι το μη ον ετερον των αλλων
 and so we will **know** , **That which** they mean ?
 και ισμεν ο λεγει ;

Ari: We will know . (ισμεν [ειδομαι].)

Par: On the one hand , when they say **One** , first of all , do they speak of **something**

μεν οταν ειπη εν , πρωτον αρα λεγει τι
 that **Is Knowable** , and secondly , of **something Other** from **The Others** , whether they add
 γνωστον , επειτα ετερον των αλλων , ειτε προσθεις
existence to **The Self** or **non-existence** ;
 το ειναι αυτω ειτε το μη ειναι :

159c ἕτερον, ἕτερον

160a ἑτέρου, ἕτερα

160c ἑτερόν, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

160d ἕτερα, ἕτερον

160e ἕτερον, ἕτερα

159a λέγεις

159b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν

160c λέροι, λέροι, λέγει, λέγει, λέγει

160d λεγόμενον, λέγεται, λέγεσθαι

160e λέγει, λέγει, ἐλέγετο, ἐλέγετο

160a αὐτά

160b αὐτοῖς ἐαυτὸ

160c αὐτῷ

160d αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ

160e αὐτῷ

Loeb

“And in our case does he not make it clear that he means, when he says 'if one is not,' that the thing which is not is different from other things, and do we not know what he means?”

“Yes, we do know.”

“In the first place, then, he speaks of something which is known, and secondly of something different from other things, when he says 'one,' whether he adds to it that it is or that it is not;

Thomas Taylor

Would he not, therefore, now evince that he calls *that which is not* different from others, when he says *if The One is not*; and should we understand that which he says?

We should understand.

In the first place, therefore, he speaks of something which may be known; and afterwards of something different from others when he says *The One*, whether he adds to it *to be* or *not to be*:

Jowett

And so when he says "If one is not" he clearly means, that what "is not" is other than all others; we know what he means—do we not?

Yes, we do.

When he says "one," he says something which is known; and secondly something which is other than all other things; it makes no difference whether he predicate of one being or not being,

Oxford Greek

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον **γινώσκεται**, τί τὸ **λεγόμενον** μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὐ;
ἀνάγκη.

ὥδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ **ἀρχῆς**, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί χρὴ εἶναι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν **αὐτῷ** τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ,
ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι **αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην**, ἢ μὴδὲ ὅτι **λέγεται γινώσκεσθαι**, ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ
ἔστιν.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν **αὐτῷ** τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι **αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην**, ἢ μὴδὲ ὅτι
λέγεται γινώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα **ἕτερα αὐτοῦ** εἶναι, ἢ μὴδὲ ἐκεῖνο **ἕτερον** τῶν ἄλλων **λέγεσθαι**;

πάνυ γε.

Balboas

for what they call **non-existence**, will **be** no less
γὰρ τι τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι , οὐδὲν ἦττον
recognized/known , and that **non-existence** is **Different** from **The Others** ; or is it not so ?
160D γινώσκεται , καὶ ὅτι διαφορὸν τῶν ἄλλων . ἢ οὐ ;

Ari: It is necessarily so . (ἀναγκή .)

Par: Accordingly then , we must affirm from the beginning , what **Must Be** , if **One Is not** ,
ἀρὰ λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς τι χρὴ εἶναι , εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ μὴ ,
in the following way . Thus on the one hand , as it is **Reasonable** , **This Must Belong** to
ὥδε . οὖν μὲν , ὡς ἔοικεν , τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν
The Self ; first of all , there **Must Be Knowledge** of **The Self** , or else , nothing which is said
αὐτῷ , πρῶτον εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ , ἢ μὴδὲ τι ὃ λέγεται
Will Be Recognized/Known , when anyone says , if **One Is not** .
γινώσκεσθαι , ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἐν ἐστὶν μὴ .

Ari: True . (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: Is this not also the case then , that **The Others Must Be Other** from **The Self** ,
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἶναι ἕτερα αὐτοῦ ,
or else **The Others** would not then **Be** said to **Be Other** from **That** ?
ἢ τῶν ἄλλων μὴδὲ λέγεσθαι ἕτερον ἐκεῖνο ;

Ari: Entirely so . (πάνυ γε .)

134e γινώσκωμεν, γινώσκουσι

142a γινώσκεται

160d γινώσκεται, γινώσκεσθαι

159b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν

160c λέγοι, λέγοι, λέγει, λέγει, λέγει

160d λεγόμενον, λέγεται, λέγεσθαι

160e λέγει, λέγει, ἐλέγετο, ἐλέγετο

161e λέγομεν, λέγομεν, λέγοντες, λέγομεν

153c ἀρχή

159b ἀρχῆς

160d ἀρχῆς

165a ἀρχῆς, ἀρχή

160b αὐτοῖς αὐτῷ

160c αὐτῷ

160d αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ

160e αὐτῷ

161a αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

142a ἐπιστήμη

155d ἐπιστήμη

160d ἐπιστήμην

160e ἐπιστήμη

164b ἐπιστήμη

160a ἑτέρου, ἕτερα

160c ἑτερόν, ἕτερον, ἕτερον

160d ἕτερα, ἕτερον

160e ἕτερον, ἕτερα

161a ἕτερα

Loeb

for that which is said to be non-existent is known none the less, and is known to be different from other things, is it not?"

"Certainly."

"Then we should begin at the beginning by asking: if one is not, what must follow?"

In the first place this must be true of the one, that there is knowledge of it, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known."

"True."

"And is it not also true that the others differ from the one, or it cannot be said to differ from the others?"

"Certainly."

Thomas Taylor

for that which is said not to be will be not the less known, nor that it is something different from others: is it not so?

It is necessary it should.

Let us, therefore, relate from the beginning, if The One is not, what ought to be the consequence.

In the first place, therefore, this as it appears ought to happen it, that either there should be a science of it, or that nothing of what is pronounced can be known, when any one says if The One is not.

True.

Must not this also happen, that either other things must be different from it, or that it must be said to be different from others?

Entirely so.

Jowett

for that which is said "not to be" is known to be something all the same, and is distinguished from other things.

Certainly.

Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the consequences?

In the first place, as would appear, there is a knowledge of it, or the very meaning of the words, "if one is not," would not be known.

True.

Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as different from the others?

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

καὶ ἑτεροιοῦτης ἄρα ἐστὶν **αὐτῷ** πρὸς τῇ **ἐπιστήμῃ**. οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἑτεροιοῦτητα **λέγει**, ὅταν τὸ ἐν **ἑτερον** τῶν ἄλλων **λέγῃ**, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου.

φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ **τινός** καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν **τοιούτων** **μετέχει** τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐν **ἐλέγετο** οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἐνός **ἕτερα**, οὐδ' ἐκείνῳ ἂν τι ἦν οὐδ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν τι **ἐλέγετο**, εἰ μήτε τοῦ **τινός** **αὐτῷ** μετὴν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων.

ὀρθῶς.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **Difference-in-Kind** , besides **Knowledge** , **Is Present** in **The Self** .

αῖρα ετεροιοιτης προς τη επιστημη εστιν αυτω .
so that when it is said that **The One Is Other** than **The Others** , they will not speak of
γαρ οταν λεγη το εν ετερον των αλλων , ου λεγει
the **Difference-in-Kind** of **The Others** , but of **The Difference** of **That** .

160E τὴν ετεροιοιτητα τῶν ἄλλων , ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου .

Ari: So it has come to **Light** . (φαίνεται .)

Par: And certainly , **The Being** that **Is Not-One** , **Must Participate of That** and **of a Certain**

και γε μην το ον μη εν μετεχει του εκεινου και τινος
One and **of This** and **in relation to This** and **of These** and **All such as These** . For then ,
του και τουτου και τουτω και τουτων και παντων των τοιουτων . γαρ
neither could **The One Be** spoken of , nor of **Those Other** than **The One** , nor would
ου αν το εν ελεγετο ουδ' του ετερα του ενος , ουδ' αν
anything **of That Be Present with That** , nor could anything **Be** said about **The Self** ,
τι εκεινου ην εκεινω , ουδ' αν τι ελεγετο αυτω ,
if **It** neither **Participated of Some** nor **of Those Others** .
ει μητε μετην του τινος μητε των τουτων αλλων .

ει μήτε μετὴν τοῦ τινος μήτε τῶν τούτων ἄλλων .

Ari: Rightly said . (ὀρθῶς .)

160c λέγοι, λέγοι, λέγει, λέγει, λέγει

160d λεγόμενον, λέγεται, λέγεσθαι

160e λέγει, λέγῃ, ἐλέγετο, ἐλέγετο

161e λέγομεν, λέγοιμεν, λέγοντες, λέγομεν

162a λέγειν, λέγειν

160c ἑτερόν, ἑτερον, ἑτερον

160d ἕτερα, ἕτερον

160e ἕτερον, ἕτερα

161a ἕτερα

163a ἑτέρως, ἑτερον

157e τινός, τινος

159e τινοῖν

160e τινός, τινός

162d τινός

160b τοιοῦτον

160c τοιούτων

160e τοιούτων

161b τοιούτου

161d τοιοῦτω

160a μετέχει

160b μετέχει, μετέχειν

160e μετέχει

161a μετέχειν

161c μετέχει, μετέχει

160c αὐτῷ

160d αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ

160e αὐτῷ

161a αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

161b αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

155d ἐπιστήμη

160d ἐπιστήμην

160e ἐπιστήμη

164b ἐπιστήμη

Loeb

“Then a difference belongs to the one in addition to knowledge; for when we say that the one differs from the others, we speak of a difference in the one, not in the others.”

“That is clear.”

“And the non-existent one partakes of 'that' and 'some' and 'this' and 'relation to this' and 'these' and all notions of that sort; for the one could not be spoken of, nor could the things which are other than one, nor could anything in relation to the one or belonging to it be or be spoken of, if the one did not partake of the notion some or of those other notions.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor

Diversity, therefore, besides science, is present with it; for, when any one says that *The One* is different from others, he will not speak of the diversity of others, but of the diversity of *The One*.

It appears so.

And besides, that which is not, or non-being, will participate of *that*, and of *some certain thing*, and of *this*, and of *these*, and every thing of this kind. For neither could *The One* be spoken of, nor things different from *The One*, nor would any thing be present with it, nor could it be denominated any thing, if it neither participated of some certain thing or things of this kind.

Right.

Jowett

Difference, then, belongs to it as well as knowledge; for in speaking of the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a difference in the others, but in the one.

Clearly so.

Moreover, the one that is not is something and partakes of relation to "that," and "this," and "these," and the like, and is an attribute of "this"; for the one, or the others than the one, could not have been spoken of, nor could any attribute or relative of the one that is not have been or been spoken of, nor could it have been said to be anything, if it did not partake of "some," or of the other relations just now mentioned.

True.

Oxford Greek

εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἐνὶ οὐχ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, **μετέχειν** δὲ **πολλῶν** οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτ' ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ ὁ **λόγος**, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν: εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο **ὑπόκειται** μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων **πολλῶν** ἀνάγκη **αὐτῷ** μετεῖναι.

καὶ πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: Thus on the one hand , it **Is not Possible** for to **be** , to **be Present** with **The One** ,
 161A δὴ μὲν τε οὐχ οἶον εἶναι τῷ ἐνί ,
 if indeed **It does not exist** ; but on the other hand , nothing prevents **it** to **Participate** of **many** ,
 εἰπερ γε μὴ ἐστὶ , δε οὐδὲν κωλύει μετεχειν πολλων ,
 But **it Must** even do so , if indeed **The One Is not** , and **Is not something else** than **that** .
 ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη καὶ , εἰπερ γε τὸ ἐν ἐστὶν μὴ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐκείνο .
 Certainly then , if **neither The One nor that exists** , then **nothing** will **exist** . But if **The**
 μεντοι εἰ μήτε το ἐν μήτ' ἐκείνο μὴ ἐσται , ἀλλὰ ὁ
Discourse/Logos is about **something else** , then there is nothing that **can** be spoken of .
 λογος περὶ τοῦ ἀλλου , οὐδὲν οὐδε δεῖ φθεγγεσθαι :
 But if **non-existence underlies That One** and **Is not something else** , then it **Is** also **Necessary**
 εἰ μὴ εἶναι ὑποκειται ἐκείνο ἐν καὶ μὴ τὸ ἄλλο , καὶ ἀνάγκη
 for **The Self** to also have a **Share** of **that non-existence** and of **many others** .
 αὐτῷ μετεῖναι τοῦ ἐκείνο καὶ πολλων ἀλλων .

Ari: Entirely so . (πάνυ γε .)

160b μετέχει, μετέχειν
 160c μετέχει
161a μετέχειν
 161c μετέχει, μετέχει
 161e μετέχειν

158b πολλά
 159d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
161a πολλῶν, πολλῶν
 164d πολλά, πολλοί
 164e πολλῶν, πολλά, πολλῶν

157a λόγον
 157c λόγος
161a λόγος
 161b λόγος
 162d λόγος

161a ὑπόκειται

160d αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ
 160e αὐτῷ
161a αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ
 161b αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ
 161c αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτῷ

Loeb

“It is impossible for the one to be, if it does not exist, but nothing prevents its partaking of many things; indeed it must do so, if that one of which we are speaking, and not something else, is not. But if neither the one, nor 'that,' is not, but we are speaking of something else, there is no use in saying anything at all; but if non-existence is the property of that one, and not of something else, then the one must partake of 'that' and of many other attributes.”

“Yes, certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But to be cannot be present with The One if it is not; though nothing hinders but it may participate of the many: but, indeed, it is necessary that it should, if the one is that, and is not something different from that. If, therefore, it is neither The One nor that, neither will it be; but discourse must take place about something else, and it will be necessary to pronounce nothing concerning it. But if The One is established as that and not as another, it is necessary that it should participate of that and of many other things.

Entirely so.

Jowett

Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since it is not; but the one that is not may or rather must participate in many things, if it and nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor the one that is not is supposed not to be, and we are speaking of something of a different nature, we can predicate nothing of it. But supposing that the one that is not and nothing else is not, then it must participate in the predicate "that," and in many others.

Certainly.

καὶ **ἀνομοιότης** ἄρα ἐστὶν **αὐτῷ** πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς **ἕτερα** ὄντα ἑτεροῖα καὶ εἴη ἄν.

ναί.

τὰ δ' ἑτεροῖα οὐκ ἄλλοῖα;

πῶς δ' οὔ;

τὰ δ' ἄλλοῖα οὐκ **ἀνόμοια**;

ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν.

Par: Accordingly then , **Unlikeness Is** also **Present** with **The Self *in relation to* the others** .
 ἀρα ἀναμοιοτης εστιν Και αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα .

For **the others** , by **being other** than **The One** , will also **be** of a **different kind/genus** .
 γαρ τα ἄλλα ὄντα ετερα του ἐνος ἀν και εἰη ετεροια .

Ari: Yes . (ναί .)

Par: But are not **those of another kind** , **various** ?
 δ' ουκ τα ετεροια ἄλλοια ;

Ari: How could they not be ? (πῶς δ' οὐ ;)

Par: But are not **the various** , **Unlike** ?
 δ' ουκ τα ἄλλοια ἀνομοια ;

Ari: They are indeed unlike . (μὲν οὖν ἀνομοια .)

140e ἀνομοιότητος

159e ἀνομοιότης, ἀνομοιότητα

161a ἀνομοιότης

161b ἀνομοιότης, ἀνομοιότης, ἀνομοιότης

160d αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ

160e αὐτῷ

161a αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

161b αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

161c αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτῷ

160d ἕτερα, ἕτερον

160e ἕτερον, ἕτερα

161a ἕτερα

163a ἐτέρως

163b ἕτερον, ἕτερα

159e ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

160a ἀνόμοιά, ἀνόμοια

161a ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

161b ἀνόμοιά, ἀνομοίω, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

164a ἀνόμοια

Loeb

“And it will possess unlikeness in relation to other things for the things which are other than one, being different, will be of a different kind.”

“Yes.”

“And are not things which are of a different kind also of another kind?”

“Of course.”

“And things which are of another kind are unlike, are they not?”

“Yes, they are unlike.”

Thomas Taylor

Dissimilitude, therefore, is present with it as to other things: for other things being different from *The One* will also be foreign from it.

Certainly.

But are not things foreign various?

How should they not?

And are not things various dissimilars?

Dissimilars.

Jowett

And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the others being different from the one will be of a different kind.

Certainly.

And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?

Of course.

And are not things other in kind unlike?

They are unlike.

οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τῷ ἐνὶ **ἀνόμοιά** ἐστι, δηλον ὅτι **ἀνομοίῳ** τά γε **ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια** ἂν εἴη.

δηλον.

εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ **ἀνομοιότης**, πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα **ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ** ἐστιν.

ἔοικεν.

εἰ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἄλλων **ἀνομοιότης** ἔστιν **αὐτῷ**, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ **ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ** εἶναι;

πῶς;

εἰ ἐνὸς **ἀνομοιότης** ἔστι τῷ ἐνί, οὐκ ἂν που περὶ τοῦ **τοιούτου** ὁ **λόγος** εἴη οἴου τοῦ ἐνός, οὐδ' ἂν ἢ **ὑπόθεσις** εἴη περὶ ἐνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἐνός.

πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that if indeed **they** are **unlike The One** ,

161B οὐκ οὖν εἰπερ ἐστὶ ἀνομοία τῷ ἐνί ,

it is evident that **they** will indeed **be unlike That** which **Is Unlike** .

δηλον ὅτι τὰ ἀν γε εἴη ἀνομοία ἀνομοίῳ .

Ari: It is evident . (δηλον .)

Par: Certainly then , **Unlikeness** will also **Be** in **The One** ,

δη ἀνομοιοτήτης ἀν καὶ εἴη τῷ ἐνί ,

according to which , **The Others** will **Be Unlike in relation to The Self** .

ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἀνομοία πρὸς αὐτῷ .

Ari: So it is Reasonable .(εοικεν .)

Par: But certainly , if **It** is **Unlike The Others** ,

δε δη εἰ αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἀνομοιοτήτης τῶν ἄλλων ,

then must not **The Self Be The Likeness** of **It-Self** ?

ἀρ' ἀνάγκη οὐκ αὐτῷ εἶναι ὁμοιοτήτητα ἑαυτοῦ ;

Ari: How ? (πῶς ;)

Par: If **Unity** were **Unlike The One** , then **The Discourse** , would somehow

εἰ ἐνός ἐστὶ ἀνομοιοτήτης τῷ ἐνί , ὁ λόγος ἀν που

not Be Possible about **The One** , nor about **That** which is **Like It** ; nor would there **Be**

οὐκ οἴου περὶ τοῦ ἐνός τοῦ τοιούτου , οὐδ' ἀν εἴη

the hypothesis about **The One** , but about **something other** than **The One** .

ἡ ὑπόθεσις περὶ ἐνός , ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἐνός .

Ari: Entirely so . (παννυ γε .)

160a ἀνόμοιά, ἀνόμοια

161a ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

161b ἀνόμοιά, ἀνομοίῳ, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

164a ἀνόμοια

165c ἀνόμοια

159e ἀνομοιότης, ἀνομοιότητα

161a ἀνομοιότης

161b ἀνομοιότης, ἀνομοιότης, ἀνομοιότης

160e αὐτῷ

161a αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

161b αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

161c αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτῷ

161d αὐτοῖν, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῶ

140e ὁμοιότητος, ὁμοιότητος

159e ὁμοιότης, ὁμοιότητα

161b ὁμοιότητα

161c ὁμοιότητα

164a ὁμοιότης

160c τοιούτων

160e τοιούτων

161b τοιούτου

161d τοιούτω

162c τοιούτων

157e λόγος

161a λόγος

161b λόγος

162d λόγος

164b λόγος, λόγος

142c ἐπὶθεσις, ἐπὶθεσιν

160b ἐπὶθεσις

161b ὑπόθεσις

Loeb

“Then if they are unlike the one, the one is evidently unlike the things which are unlike it.”

“Evidently.”

“Then the one possesses unlikeness in relation to which the others are unlike.”

“So it appears.”

“But if it possesses unlikeness to the others, must it not possess likeness to itself?”

“How is that?”

“If the one possesses unlikeness to the one, our argument will not be concerned with that which is of the nature of the one, and our hypothesis will not relate to the one, but to something other than one.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

If, therefore, they are dissimilars to The One, it is evident they will be dissimilars to that which is dissimilar.

It is evident.

Dissimilitude, therefore, will be present with The One, according to which others will be dissimilars to it.

It appears so.

But if a dissimilitude with respect to other things belongs to it, must not similitude to itself be present with it?

How?

If there be a dissimilitude of *The One* with respect to *The One*, discourse would not take place about a thing of this kind as of *The One*; nor would the hypothesis be about *The One*, but about something different from *The One*.

Entirely so.

Jowett

And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be unlike them?

Clearly so.

Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike it?

That would seem to be true.

And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must have likeness to itself.

How so?

If the one have unlikeness to one, something else must be meant; nor will the hypothesis relate to one; but it will relate to something other than one?

Quite so.

οὐ δεῖ δέ γε.

οὐ δῆτα.

δεῖ ἄρα **ὁμοιότητα** τῷ ἐνὶ **αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ** εἶναι.

δεῖ.

καὶ μὴν οὐδ' αὖ **ἴσον** γ' ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· εἰ γὰρ εἴη **ἴσον**, εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ **ὅμοιον** ἂν εἴη **αὐτοῖς** κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα. ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοτέρω ἀδύνατα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἓν.

ἀδύνατα.

Par: But that must not indeed be the case .

161C δε δει ου γε .

Ari: Without a doubt . (ου δητα .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The Likeness** to **The One** to **It-Self Must Be** of **The Self** .

αρ' ομοιοτητα τω ενι εαυτω δει ειναι αυτου .

Ari: It must . (δει .)

Par: And most certainly in turn , **The One Is not Equal** to **Others** . For if **It Were Equal** ,

Και γε μὴν αὖ οὐδ' ἐστὶ ἴσον τοῖς ἄλλοις . γὰρ εἰ εἴη ἴσον ,

then **It** would already **Be** and **It** would also **Be Like Them-Selves** , according to **Equality** ;

αν ηδη ειη τε αν και ειη ομοιον αυτοις κατα την ισοτητα ;

but both of these conditions **Are Impossible** , if indeed **One Is not** .

δ' αμφοτερα ταυτα αδυνατα , ειπερ εν εστιν μη .

Ari: Impossible . (αδυνατα .)

159e ὁμοότης, ὁμοότητα

161b ὁμοότητα

161c ὁμοότητα

164a ὁμοότης

161a αὐτῷ, αὐτῶ

161b αὐτῷ, αὐτῶ, αὐτῷ

161c αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτῷ, αὐτοῖς αὐτῷ

161d αὐτοῖν, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῶ

161e αὐτῷ, αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ

156b ἴσον

157b ἴσον, ἴσον

161c ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

165a ἴσος

159e ὅμοια, ὅμοια

160a ὅμοια, ὅμοια

161c ὅμοιον

162a ὁμοίως

164a ὅμοια

Loeb

“But that is inadmissible.”

“It certainly is.”

“Then the one must possess likeness to itself.”

“It must.”

“And neither is the one equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would both be and be like them in respect to equality, both of which are impossible, if one does not exist.”

“Yes, they are impossible.”

Thomas Taylor

But it ought not.

Certainly not.

There ought, therefore, to be a similitude of *The One* with respect to itself.

There ought.

But neither is *The One* equal to others. For, if it were equal, it would according to equality be similar to them; but both these are impossible, since *The One* is not.

Impossible.

Jowett

But that cannot be.

No.

Then the one must have likeness to itself?

It must.

Again, it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would at once be and be like them in virtue of the equality; but if one has no being, then it can neither be nor be like?

It cannot.

Oxford Greek

ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι;
ἀνάγκη.

τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα;

ναί.

τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἓν, πρὸς ἣν τᾶλλα αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἄνισα;

μετέχει.

Balboas

Par: Then since , **The One Is not Equal** to **the others** , then must it not **Be Necessary**
ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ οὐκ ἴσον τοῖς ἄλλοις , δε ἀρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη

that **the others Must** also **not Be Equal** to **That One** ?

ταῖς ἄλλαις καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἴσα ἐκείνῳ ;

Ari: It is necessary . (ἀνάγκη .)

Par: But are not **those that Are not-Equal** , **unequal** ?

δε οὐκ τα μὴ ἴσα ἀνισα ;

Ari: Yes . (ναί .)

Par: But are not **those that are unequal** , **unequal** to **That** which **Is Unequal** ?

δε ου τα ἀνισα ἀνισα τῷ ἀνίσῳ ;

Ari: How could they not be ? (πῶς ου δ' ;)

Par: And surely then , **The One** will **Participate** of **Inequality** ,

καὶ διὸ το ἐν μετέχει ἀνισότητος ,

because of which , **the others are unequal** to **The Self** .

πρὸς ἣν τᾶλλα ἐστὶν ἀνισα αὐτῷ ;

Ari: It will so participate . (μετέχει .)

156b ἴσον

157b ἴσον, ἴσον

161c ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

165a ἴσος

149d ἄνισον

154b ἀνίστοις

161c ἄνισα, ἄνισα, ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα, ἄνισα

160e μετέχει

161a μετέχειν

161c μετέχει, μετέχει

161e μετέχειν

162a μετέχοντα

161a αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

161b αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

161c αὐτῷ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

161d αὐτοῖν, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῷ

161e αὐτὸ, αὐτὸ, αὐτὰ

Loeb

“And since it is not equal to the others, they cannot be equal to it, can they?”

“Certainly not.”

“And things which are not equal are unequal, are they not?”

“Yes.”

“And things which are unequal are unequal to something which is unequal to them?”

“Of course.”

“Then the one partakes of inequality, in respect to which the others are unequal to it?”

“Yes, it does.”

Thomas Taylor

But since it is not equal to others, is it not necessary that others also should not be equal to it?

It is necessary.

But are not things which are not equal unequal?

Certainly.

And are not unequals unequal to that which is unequal?

How should they not?

The One, therefore, will participate of inequality, according to which others will be unequal to it.

It will participate.

Jowett

But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to it?

Certainly not.

And things that are not equal are unequal?

True.

And they are unequal to an unequal?

Of course.

Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are unequal to it?

Very true.

Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητός γε ἔστι μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης.
 ἔστι γάρ.
 ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ **τοιούτῳ** ἐνί;
 κινδυνεύει.
 μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν.
 πάνυ γε.
 μεταξὺ ἄρα τι **αὐτοῖν** αἰεὶ ἔστιν.
 ἔστιν.
 ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ **αὐτοῖν** ἢ ἰσότητα;
 οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.
 ὅτῳ ἄρα ἔστι μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ ἰσότης **αὐτῷ** μεταξὺ τούτων **οὕσα**.
 φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: But certainly , **Bigness** and **Smallness** do indeed **belong** to **Inequality** .
 161D ἀλλὰ μεντοι μεγεθος τε και σμικροτης γ' εστι ανισοτητος .
Ari: They do indeed . (γαρ εστι .)
Par: Accordingly then , **Bigness** and **Smallness** and such as these , **belong** to **The One** ?
 αρα τε μεγεθος και σμικροτης και τω τοιουτω εστιν ενι ;
Ari: It appears likely . (κινδυνευει .)
Par: Certainly then , **Bigness** and **Smallness** always **stand-apart** from each other .
 μην μεγεθος και σμικροτης αιι αφεστατον αλληλοιν .
Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ γε .)
Par: Accordingly then , something always **exists** between **Them-Selves** .
 αρα τι αιι εστιν μεταξυ αυτοιιν .
Ari: It is so . (εστιν .)
Par: Therefore , can you assign anything else between **Them-Selves** , except **Equality** ?
 ουν εχεις ειπειν τι αλλο μεταξυ αυτοιιν η ισοτητα ;
Ari: Nothing else but this . (ουκ , αλλα τουτο .)
Par: Accordingly then , in whatsoever , there **Is Bigness** and **Smallness** ,
 αρα στω εστι μεγεθος και σμικροτης
Equality Is also **Present** , by **Being Between These** .
 ισοτης και εστι , ουσα μεταξυ τουτοιιν .
Ari: So it has come to **Light** . (φαινεται .)

160e τοιούτων
 161b τοιούτου
161d τοιούτω
 162c τοιοῦτον
 164d τοιοῦτων

161b αὐτῷ, αὐτῶ, αὐτῷ
 161c αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτῷ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτῶ
161d αὐτοῖν, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῷ
 161e αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτά
 162a αὐτό

150a οὕσα
 156c οὕσα
161d οὕσα

Loeb

“But greatness and smallness are constituents of inequality.”

“Yes.”

“Then the one, such as we are discussing, possesses greatness and smallness?”

“So it appears.”

“Now surely greatness and smallness always keep apart from one another.”

“Certainly.”

“Then there is always something between them.”

“There is.”

“Can you think of anything between them except equality?”

“No, only equality.”

“Then anything which has greatness and smallness has also equality, which is between the two.”

“That is clear.”

Thomas Taylor

But magnitude and parvitude belong to inequality.

They do.

Do magnitude and parvitude, therefore, belong to a one of this kind?

It appears they do.

But magnitude and parvitude are always separated from each other.

Entirely so.

Something, therefore, always subsists between them.

Certainly.

Can you assign any thing else between these, except equality?

Nothing else.

With whatever, therefore, there is magnitude and parvitude, with this equality also is present, subsisting as a medium between these.

It appears so.

Jowett

And inequality implies greatness and smallness?

Yes.

Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness?

That appears to be true.

And greatness and smallness always stand apart?

True.

Then there is always something between them?

There is.

And can you think of anything else which is between them other than equality?

No, it is equality which lies between them.

Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies between them?

That is clear.

τῷ δὴ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἰσότητος ἂν μετεῖη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος.
ἔοικεν.

καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πη.

πῶς δὴ;

ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς
λέγοντες τὸ ἐν μὴ εἶναι: εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;
οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

Par: Surely then , as it is Reasonable , **The One** that *does not Truly exist* ,
161E δὴ , ὡς εοικε , τῷ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄντι ,
will also have a *Share* of **Equality** , **Bigness** and **Smallness** .
ἀν καὶ μετεῖη ἰσότητος καὶ μεγεθους καὶ σμικροτητος .

Ari: So it is Reasonable . (εοικεν .)

Par: And certainly , **The Self Must** also **Participate** of **Ousia in a Definite way** .
Καὶ γε μὴν αὐτο δεῖ καὶ μετεχειν ουσιας πη .

Ari: How so ? (πῶς δὴ ;)

Par: **The Self Must Possess Ousia in This way** that we have described . For otherwise ,
αὐτο δεῖ εχειν οὕτως ὡς λεγομεν . γὰρ
we shall not speak **Truly** when we say , **The One Is not** ; but if we do speak **Truly** ,
ἡμεῖς ἀν οὐκ λεγοιμεν ἀληθῆ λεγοντες , το ἐν ειναι μὴ : δε εἰ ἀληθῆ ,
then it is clear that we have affirmed that **Selves Are Beings** : or is it not in this way ?
δῆλον λεγομεν οτι αὐτὰ ὄντα , ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ;

Ari: It is indeed thus . (μὲν οὖν οὕτω .)

156a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

156b οὐσίαν

161e οὐσίας

162a οὐσίας, οὐσίας

162b οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία

161c αὐτοῦ, ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτοῖς, αὐτῶ

161d αὐτοῖν, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῶ

161e αὐτὸ, αὐτὸ, αὐτὰ

162a αὐτὸ

162d αὐτῶ, αὐτὸ

161a μετέχεν

161c μετέχει, μετέχει

161e μετέχειν

162a μετέχοντα

163c μετέχει, μετέχειν

160d λεγόμενον, λέγεται, λέγεσθαι

160c λέγει, λέγει, ἐλέγετο, ἐλέγετο

161e λέγομεν, λέγοιμεν, λέγοντες, λέγομεν

162a λέγειν, λέγειν

163c λέγομεν, λεγόμενον

Loeb

“Then the non-existent one, it appears, partakes of equality and greatness and smallness.”

“So it appears.”

“And it must also, in a way, partake of existence.”

“How is that?”

“It must be in such conditions as we have been saying; for if it were not, we should not be speaking the truth in saying that the one is not. And if we speak the truth, it is clear that we say that which is. Am I not right?”

“You are.”

Thomas Taylor

But to *The One which is not*, equality, magnitude, and parvitude, as it appears, belong.

So it seems.

But it ought likewise, in a certain respect, to participate of essence.

How so?

Ought it to possess the properties which we have already described? for, unless this is the case, we shall not speak the truth when we say *The One is not*; but if this is true, it is evident that we have asserted things which have a subsistence: is it not so?

It is.

Jowett

Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and smallness and equality?

Clearly.

Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being?

How so?

It must be so, for if not, then we should not speak the truth in saying that the one is not. But if we speak the truth, clearly we must say what is. Am I not right?

Yes.

Oxford Greek

ἐπειδὴ δὲ φαμεν ἀληθὴ **λέγειν**, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι καὶ ὄντα **λέγειν**.

ἀνάγκη.

ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ πῃ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, **εὐθύς** ἔσται ὄν.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Then since , we affirm that we speak **The Truth** , then it **Is** also **Necessary**

162A ἐπειδὴ φαμεν λεγειν αληθη δε και αναγκη
to affirm that we speak of **Beings** .
φαναι ημιν λεγειν οντα .

Ari: It is necessary . (αναγκη .)

Par: Accordingly then , as it is **Reasonable** , **The One** which **Has no Being** , *exists* .

αρα , ως εοικε , το εν ουκ ον , εστιν .

For if it were not the case that there will **be non-Being** , then **That** which **Is** would

γαρ ει μη εσται μη ον , αλλα του ειναι

let something go to non-Being , and **it (non-Being)** would **immediately be Being** .

ανησει(ανιημι) τι προς το μη ειναι , ευθυς εσται ον .

Ari: Altogether so . (πανταπασι μεν ουν .)

160e λέγει, λέγη, ἐλέγετο, ἐλέγετο

161c λέγομεν, λέγοιμεν, λέγοντες, λέγομεν

162a λέγειν, λέγειν

163c λέγωμεν, λεγόμενον

163e λέγομεν

148e εὐθύς

154b εὐθύς

162a εὐθύς

Loeb

“Then inasmuch as we assert that we are speaking the truth, we necessarily assert that we say that which is.”

“Necessarily.”

“Then, as it appears, the non-existent one exists. For if it is not non-existent, but gives up something of being to not-being, then it will be existent.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But since we assert that we speak truly, it is likewise necessary to assert that we speak of things which exist.

It is necessary.

The One, therefore, *which is not*, as it appears, *is*; for *if it is not*, while *not being*, but remits something of *being* in order to *not being*, it will immediately become *being*.

Entirely so.

Jowett

And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say what is?

Certainly.

Then, as would appear, the one, when it is not, *is*; for if it were not to be when it is not, but were to relinquish something of being, so as to become not-being, it would at once be.

Quite true.

Oxford Greek

δεῖ ἄρα **αὐτό** δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, **ὁμοίως** ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὖ εἶναι ᾗ: οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὄν μάλιστα ᾗ εἶη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν εἶη, **μετέχοντα** τὸ μὲν ὄν **οὐσίας** τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ **οὐσίας** δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ

Par: Accordingly then , **The Self Must Possess The Bond** of **That** which **Is not** , in order **to be**
 αρα αυτο δει εχειν το δεσμον του ειναι μη , ειναι

non-Being , if **It** is **going** to **not Be** ; just as , in a similar way , **The Being Must Possess**
 μη ον , ει μελλει μη ειναι , ωσπερ ομοιως το ον εχειν

The Bond to **not Be non-Being** , in order that **It** may in turn **Perfectly Be** such as **It Is** .
 το μη ειναι μη ον , ινα αυ τελεως ειναι(BT) η .

For in this way , especially , both , **The Being** will **Be** , and **the non-Being will not Be** ; on the
 γαρ ουτως μαλιστ' τε το ον ανειη και το μη ον αν ουκ ειη:

one hand , **The Being Participates** of **Ousia** in order that **The Being Be** ; but on the other hand ,
 μεν το ον μετεχοντα ουσιας του ον ειναι , δε

The Being Participates of **non-Ousia** , in order that **It** may **be** , **non-Being** , (The
 162B μη ουσιας του ειναι μη ον , *Patho-logos*)

if **It** is **going** to **Perfectly Be** .

ει μελλει τελεως ειναι ,

161d αὐτοῖν, αὐτοῖν, αὐτῶ
 161e αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτά
162a αὐτό
 162d αὐτῶ, αὐτό
 163a αὐτῶ

160a ὁμοια, ὁμοια
 161c ὁμοιον
162a ὁμοίως
 164a ὁμοια
 165c ὁμοιά, ὁμοια

161c μετέχει, μετέχει
 161e μετέχειν
162a μετέχοντα
 163c μετέχει, μετέχειν
 163d μετέχει

156b οὐσίαν
 161c οὐσίας
162a οὐσίας, οὐσίας
 162b οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία
 163c οὐσίας, οὐσίας

Loeb

“Then if it does not exist and is to continue to be non-existent, it must have the existence of not-being as a bond, just as being has the non-existence of not-being, in order to attain its perfect existence. For in this way the existence of the existent and the non-existence of the non-existent would be best assured, when the existent partakes of the existence of being existent and of the non-existence of not being non-existent, thus assuring its own perfect existence,

Thomas Taylor

It ought, therefore, to have, as the bond of *not to be*, *to be that which is not*, if it is about *not to be*: just as *being* ought to have as a bond *not to be that which is not*, that it may be perfectly *that which is*. For thus, in a most eminent degree, *being* will *be* and *non-being* will *not be*: *being* participating of essence, in order that it may *be being*; but of *non-essence* in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is about perfectly *to be*:

Jowett

Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have the being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not being is when being partakes of the being of being, and not of the being of not-being—that is, the perfection of being;

Oxford Greek

ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν μὴ **οὐσίας** μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, **οὐσίας** δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ τελέως μὴ ἔσται.

ἀληθέστατα.

οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τῷ τε ὄντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ ἐνί, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι.

ἀνάγκη.

Balboas

Furthermore , on the one hand , **the non-Being Participates**

δε μεν το μη ον
non-Ousia , in order that *it* may **be non-Being** ; whereas on the other hand , **non-Being**
μη ουσιας του ειναι μη ον δε
Participates of **Ousia** , in order that *it* may **be** , **non-Being** , if in turn ,
ουσιας του ειναι μη ον , ει αυ
it will also **Perfectly not Be** , **the non-Being** .
και τελεως μη εσται το μη ον .

Ari: Most truly . (ἀληθεστατα .)

Par: Is it not the case then , seeing that both **non-Being is present with Real-Being** ,

ουκουν επειπερ τε του μη ειναι μετεστι τω οντι
and **That** which **Is** , **is present with non-Real-Being** , is it not also the case that **The One** ,
και του ειναι μη τω οντι , και τω ενι ,
since indeed **It Is not** , **Must Necessarily Share** of **existence** , in order that **It** may **not Be** .
επειδη εστι ουκ αναγκη μετειναι του ειναι εις το μη ειναι .

Ari: It is necessary . (ἀναγκη .)

161e οὐσία
162a οὐσίας, οὐσία
162b οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία
163c οὐσίας, οὐσίας
163d οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίαν, οὐσίας, οὐσίας

Loeb

and the non-existent partakes of the non-existence of not being existent and the existence of being non-existent, and thus the non-existent also secures its perfect non-existence.”

“Very true.”

“Then since the existent partakes of non-existence and the non-existent of existence, the one, since it does not exist, necessarily partakes of existence to attain non-existence.”

“Yes, necessarily.”

Thomas Taylor

but *non-being* participating of *non-essence*, in order that *it may not be that which is not being*; but participating of essence, in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is to be perfectly *that which is not*.

Most truly so.

Since, therefore, *non-being* is present with *being*, and *being* with *non-being*, is it not necessary that *The One* also, since it is not, should participate of *being*, in order that it may *not be*?

It is necessary.

Jowett

and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being but of the being of not-being—that is the perfection of not-being.

Most true.

Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῷ ἐνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.

φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

οἶόν τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πῶς μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως;

οὐχ οἶόν τε.

Balboas

Par: Certainly then , **Ousia** will also **Manifestly Be** with **The One** , if **It Is not** .
 δη ουσια και φαινεται τω ενι , ει εστιν μη .

Ari: It will so *appear* .(φαινεται .)

Par: Accordingly then , so also *the non-Ousia* , if indeed **She Is not** .
 αρα και μη ουσια , ειπερ εστιν μη .

Ari: How could it not ? (πῶς δ' ου ;)

Par: Therefore , is it also **Possible** that *that* which *is maintained/kept in some way* ,
 ουν τε Οιον το εχον πως
is not so maintained , when it *is not changed* from this condition (*passive*) by habit ?
 μη ουτω εχειν , μη μεταβαλλον εκ ταυτης της εξεως ;

Ari: It cannot . (τε οιον ουχ .)

161e οὐσίας
 162a οὐσίας, οὐσίας
162b οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία
 163c οὐσίας, οὐσίας
 163d οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίαν, οὐσίας, οὐσίας

Loeb

“Clearly, then, the one, if it does not exist, has existence.”

“Clearly.”

“And non-existence also, if it does not exist.”

“Of course.”

“Well, can anything which is in a certain condition be not in that condition without changing from it?”

“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

Essence, therefore, will appear with *The One*, if it is not.

So it seems.

And non-essence, since it is not.

How should it not?

Can any thing, therefore, which is affected in a certain manner, be not so affected when not changed from this habit?

It cannot.

Jowett

Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?

Clearly.

And has not-being also, if it is not?

Of course.

But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing?

Impossible.

Oxford Greek

πᾶν ἄρα τὸ **τοιοῦτον** μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχη.
 πῶς δ' οὐ;
 μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις: ἢ τί φήσομεν;
 κίνησις.
 οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὄν ἐφάνη;
 ναί.
 οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται.
 ἔοικεν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , everything which *can be kept in this way* , and in turn
 162C ἀρα παν ο αν εχη ουτω τε και
not kept in this (indefinite) way , signifies , *that* which *can be changed in such a way* .
 μη ουτως , σημεινει το μεταβολην τοιουτον .

Ari: How could it not ? (πῶς δ' οὐ ;)

Par: But *is Alteration a Motion* ; or what else should we call *It* ?
 δε μεταβολη κινησις : η τι φησομεν ;

Ari: It is a motion . (κίνησις .)

Par: Is it not the case , that *The One has been shown to be* both *Being* and *non-Being* ?
 ουκουν το εν εφανη τε ον και ουκ ον ;

Ari: Yes . (ναί .)

Par: Accordingly then , *It has been shown to be kept in this way* and *not kept in this way* .
 αρα φαινεται εχον ουτως και ουχ ουτως .

Ari: It has so appeared . (εοικεν .)

161b τοιούτου
 161d τοιούτω
162c τοιοῦτον
 164d τοιούτων
 165b τοιοῦτον

Loeb

“Then everything of that sort—if a thing is and is not in a given condition—signifies a change.”

“Of course.”

“But change is motion; we agree to that?”

“It is motion.”

“And did we not see that the one is and is not?”

“Yes.”

“Then we see that it both is and is not in a given condition.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

Every thing, therefore, signifies a certain mutation, which is affected and again not affected in some particular manner.

How should it not?

Is mutation a motion, or what else do we call it?

It is a motion.

But has not The One appeared to be both being and non-being?

Certainly.

It has appeared, therefore, to be thus and not thus affected.

It has.

Jowett

Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?

Certainly.

And change is motion—we may say that?

Yes, motion.

And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?

Yes.

And therefore is and is not in the same state?

Yes.

Oxford Greek

καὶ **κινούμενον** ἄρα τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν πέφανται, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον.

κινδυνεύει.

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν μεθίσταίτο ποθέν ποι.

πῶς γάρ;

οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν **κινοῖτ'** ἄν.

οὐ γάρ.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , *has* not **The One Being** also *been shown to be* in **Motion** ,
 ἀρα οὐκ τὸ ἐν ὄν καὶ πέφανται κινούμενον ,
 seeing that **It** also *has to be altered* from **Being** into **non-Being** .
 ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ἔχον μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι .

Ari: I dare say . (κινδυνεύει .)

Par: But certainly , if indeed **It in no way Is** among **The Real Beings** , since **It Is not** ,
 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ γε μηδαμοῦ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων , ὥς ἐστιν οὐκ ,
 then if indeed **It Is not** , **It** will *not alternate* from one place to another .
 εἴπερ ἐστιν μὴ , ἂν οὐδ' μεθίσταίτο(μεθίστημι) ποθεν ποι .

Ari: How is that the case ? (πῶς γὰρ ;)

Par: Accordingly then , **It** will indeed not *be moved* by **Alteration** .
 ἀρα ἂν γε οὐκ κινοῖτ' τῷ μεταβαίνειν .

Ari: It will not . (γὰρ οὐ .)

159a κινούμενα

160a κινούμενα

162c κινούμενον, κινοῖτ'

162c κινοῖτο, κινεῖται, κινεῖται

163a κινήθη, κινούμενον, κινούμενον, κινεῖται, κινεῖται

Loeb

“And we have seen that the non-existent one has motion, since it changes from being to not-being.”

“There is not much doubt of that.”

“But if it is nowhere among existing things—and it is nowhere, if it does not exist—it cannot move from any place to another.”

“Of course not.”

“Then its motion cannot be change of place.”

“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, which is *non-being* appears to be moved, since it possesses a mutation from *being* into *non-being*.

It appears so.

But if it be no where among beings, as *it is not* in consequence of *not being*, it cannot pass elsewhere.

For how can it?

It will not, therefore, be moved by transition.

It will not.

Jowett

Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it changes from being to not-being?

That appears to be true.

But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, it cannot change from one place to another?

Impossible.

Then it cannot move by changing place?

No.

Oxford Greek

οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ** ἂν στρέφοιτο: **ταῦτοῦ** γὰρ **οὐδαμοῦ ἄπτεται**. ὃν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ **ταυτόν**:
τὸ δὲ μὴ ὃν ἐν τῷ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

ἀδύνατον γάρ.

οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἐν γε μὴ ὃν στρέφεσθαι ἂν δύναιτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦταί που τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὃν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὃν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὁ **λόγος** ἔτι περὶ
τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ ἡλλοιοῦτο **αὐτὸ** ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου **τινός**.

ὀρθῶς.

Balboas

Par: Certainly then , neither will **It Turn-about** in **The Self** ;

162D μὴν ουδε αν στρεφοιτο εν τω αυτω

for **It** will **not Grasp The Self/Same in any way** . For **The Being Is The Self/Same** .

γαρ απτεται ταυτου ουδαμου . γαρ το ον εστι ταυτον :

Therefore it **Is Impossible** for **non-Being** to **Reside** in any of **The Real Beings** .

δε ειναι αδυνατον το μη ον εν τω των οντων .

Ari: For it is impossible .

γαρ αδυνατον .

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** which **Is not** , cannot **Turn-about** in **That** in which **It Is not** .

αρα το εν ον μη , αν δυναιτο ουκ στρεφεσθαι εν εκεινω εν ω εστιν μη .

Ari: It cannot . (γαρ ουν ου .)

Par: Certainly then , **The One** , whether **The One** that **Is** , or **The One** that **Is not** ,

μην το εν ουτε το ον ουτε το ον μη

cannot in any way **be altered** into something **other** than **It-Self** . For then **The Logos** would

ουδε που αλλοιουται εαυτου . γαρ ο λογος αν
no longer be about **The One** , but about something else , if indeed **It** was **altered** from **It-Self** . ου
ετι ην περι του ενος , αλλα περι τινος αλλου . ειπερ αυτο ηλλοιουτο εαυτου .

Ari: Rightly so . (ορθως .)

161e αὐτό, αὐτό, αὐτά

162a αὐτό

162d αὐτῷ, αὐτό

163a αὐτῷ

163c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

159a ταῦτα

159c ταῦτῳ

162d ταῦτοῦ, ταυτόν

162c ταῦτῳ

163b ταῦτα

156a οὐδαμῶς

159d οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῇ

162d οὐδαμοῦ

163a οὐδαμῇ

163c οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ

149c ἄφες

149d ἄπτεται, ἄπτεται, ἄπτεται

162d ἄπτεται

165d ἀπτομένους

166b ἀπτόμενα

161a λόγος

161b λόγος

162d λόγος

164b λόγος, λόγος

159e πινόν

160c τινός, τινός

162d τινός

Loeb

“Nor surely can it turn in the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same for the same is existent, and the non-existent cannot be in any existent thing.”

“No, it is impossible.”

“Then the one, being non-existent, cannot turn in that in which it is not.”

“No.”

“And the one, whether existent or non-existent, cannot change into something other than itself; for if it changed into something other than itself, our talk would no longer be about the one, but about something else.”

“Quite right.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither will it revolve in *same*: for it will never touch *same*, since *same* is *being*. But it is impossible that *non-being* can reside in *any being*.

Impossible.

The One, therefore, *which is not*, cannot revolve in that in which it is not.

It cannot.

Neither will *The One* be altered from itself, either into *being* or *non-being*: for our discourse would no longer be concerning *The One*, if it was altered from itself, but concerning something different from this one.

Right.

Jowett

Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the same is, and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things that are?

It cannot.

Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?

No.

Neither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into other than itself, for if it altered and became different from itself, then we could not be still speaking of the one, but of something else?

True.

Oxford Greek

εἰ δὲ μήτ' ἀλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν **ταύτῳ** στρέφεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἄρ' ἂν πῇ ἔτι **κινεῖτο**;
 πῶς γάρ;
 τὸ γε μὴν **ἀκίνητον** ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἐστάναι.
 ἀνάγκη.
 τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὄν **ἔστηκε** τε καὶ **κινεῖται**.
 ἔοικεν.

Balboas

Par: But if **It** does not **alter** , nor **turn-about** in **The Self/Same**, nor undergoes **transition** ,
 162E δε ει μητ' αλλοιουται μητε στρεφεται εν ταυτω μητε μεταβαινει
 is there any way in which **It** can still **be moved** ?
 αρ αν πη ετι κινειτο ;

Ari: How could there be ? (πως γαρ ;)

Par: Most certainly then , **That** which is **Immovable** must necessarily be **kept** at **Rest** ;
 γε μην το ακινητον αναγκη αγειν ησυχιαν ,
 but **That** which is at **Rest/Peace/Quiet** must **Abide/Stand-still** .
 δε το ησυχάζον εσταναι .

Ari: It is necessary . (αναγκη .)

Par: Accordingly then **The One** that **Is not** , *as it was shown* , both **stands-still** and **is moved** .
 αρα το εν ον ουκ , ως εοικεν , τε εστηκε και κινεται .

Ari: as it is Reasonable . (εοικεν .)

.

159c ταύτω
 162d ταύτοδ, ταυτόν
162e ταύτῳ
 163b ταυτά
 164a ταυτά

160a κινούμενα
 162c κινούμενον, κινεῖτ'
162d κινεῖτο
 162e κινεῖται, κινεῖται
 163a κινήθη, κινούμενον, κινούμενον, κινεῖται, κινεῖται

139a ἀκίνητον, ἀκίνητον
162e ἀκίνητον

159a ἐστῶτα
 160a ἐστῶτα
162e ἔστηκε
 163e ἐστάναι, ἐστός, ἐστάναι
 165d ἐστῶτας

162c κινούμενον, κινεῖτ'
 162d κινεῖτο
162e κινεῖται
 163a κινεῖται, κινήθη, κινούμενον, κινούμενον, κινεῖται, κινεῖται
 163e κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι

Loeb

“But if it neither changes into something else, nor turns in the same spot, nor changes its place, can it still move in any way?”

“No how can it?”

“But surely that which is without motion must keep still, and that which keeps still must be at rest.”

“Yes, it must.”

“Then the non-existent one is both at rest and in motion.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in *Same*, nor suffers transition, is there any way in which it can be moved?

How should there?

But that which is immovable must necessarily be at rest; and that which is at rest must abide or stand still.

It is necessary.

The One which is not, therefore, as it appears, both abides and is moved.

It appears so.

Jowett

But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?

Impossible.

Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest must stand still?

Certainly.

Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion?

That seems to be true.

καὶ μὴν εἴπερ γε **κινεῖται, μεγάλη** ἀνάγκη **αὐτῷ** ἀλλοιοῦσθαι: ὅπῃ γὰρ ἂν τι **κινηθῇ**, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκέθ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὡς εἶχεν, ἀλλ' **ἑτέρως**.

οὕτως.

κινούμενον δὴ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται.

ναί.

καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε **κινούμενον οὐδαμῇ** ἂν ἀλλοιοίτο.

οὐ γάρ.

ἦ μὲν ἄρα **κινεῖται** τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν, ἀλλοιοῦται: ἦ δὲ μὴ **κινεῖται**, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.

οὐ γάρ.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.

φαίνεται.

Par: And most certainly , if indeed **It were moved**, there **is** a **Great Necessity** that **The Self** must **be altered** . For in so far as **anything** may **be moved** , **it** is no longer **kept in the same way** ἀλλοιουσθαι . γὰρ ὅπῃ τι ἀν κινήθῃ , οὐκέθ' ἔχει ὡσαύτως τοσοῦτον such as it **was before** , but **in another way** .

κατὰ ὡς εἶχεν , ἀλλ' ἑτερώς .

Ari: In this way . (οὕτως .)

Par: Surely then , since **The One moves** , **It is** also **altered** .
 δὴ τὸ ἐν κινούμενον καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται .

Ari: Yes . (ναί .)

Par: And most certainly, by **Being** in no way **moved** , **It will Be** in no way **altered** .
 καὶ γε μὴν μηδαμῇ κινούμενον ἀν οὐδαμῇ ἀλλοιοίτο .

Ari: It will not . (γὰρ οὐ .)

Par: Accordingly then on the one hand , in so far as **The One** that **Is not moves** ,
 ἀρα μὲν ἡ τὸ ἐν ὄν οὐκ κινεῖται ,
It is altered , but on the other hand , in so far as **It Is not moved** , **It Is not altered** .
 ἀλλοιοῦται , δὲ ἡ μὴ κινεῖται , οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται .

Ari: It is not . (γὰρ οὐ .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** which **Is not** , **is** both **altered** and **not altered** .
 ἀρα τὸ ἐν ὄν μὴ τε ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται .

Ari: Apparently . (φαίνεται .)

162d κινεῖτο

162e κινεῖται

163a κινεῖται, κινήθῃ, κινούμενον, κινούμενον, κινεῖται, κινεῖται

157b μέγα, μέγα

160a μείζω

163a μεγάλη

164e μέγιστα

165a μείζονος

162a αὐτῷ

162d αὐτῷ, αὐτό

163a αὐτῷ

163c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

163d αὐτό

160e ἕτερον, ἕτερα

161a ἕτερα

163a ἑτέρως

163b ἕτερον, ἕτερα

164a ἕτερα

159d οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῇ

162d οὐδαμοῦ

163a οὐδαμῇ

163c οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ

163d οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ

Loeb

“And if it is in motion, it certainly must change in its nature; for if anything is moved in any way, in so far as it is moved it is no longer in its former condition, but in a different one.”

“True.”

“Then in moving, the one changes in nature.”

“Yes.”

“And yet when it does not move in any way, it will not change its nature in any way.”

“No.”

“Then in so far as the non-existent one moves, it changes, and in so far as it does not move, it does not change.”

“True.”

“Then the non-existent one both changes and does not change.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

But if it be moved, there is a great necessity that it should be altered; for, so far as any thing is moved, it is no longer affected in the same manner as before, but differently.

There is so.

The One, therefore, since it is moved, is also altered.

Certainly.

But as again it is in no respect moved, it will be in no respect altered.

It will not.

So far, therefore, as *The One* which is not is moved, it is altered; but so far as it is not moved it is not altered.

Certainly not.

The One, therefore, which is not, is both altered and not altered.

It appears so.

Jowett

But if it be in motion it must necessarily undergo alteration, for anything which is moved, in so far as it is moved, is no longer in the same state, but in another?

Yes.

Then the one, being moved, is altered?

Yes.

And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way?

No.

Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered?

Right.

Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered?

That is clear.

Oxford Greek

τὸ δ' ἀλλοιούμενον ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη **γίγνεσθαι** μὲν **ἕτερον** ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἕξεως: τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μήτε **γίγνεσθαι** μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι;

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν **γίγνεται** τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ οὔτε **γίγνεται** οὔτε ἀπόλλυται: καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν μὴ ὄν **γίγνεται** τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε **γίγνεται** οὔτ' ἀπόλλυται.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Thus on the one hand , is it not **Necessary** that **That** which is **altered** must **become** δ' μεν αρα ουκ αναγκη το αλλοιουμενον γινεσθαι **other** than **before** , and on the other hand , that **It Must** undergo a **dissolution** from **Its former** ετερον η προτερον , δε απολλυσθαι εκ της προτερας habit/condition ; but **That** which **Is not altered** , can neither **come-to-be generated** nor **dissolved** ? **163B** εξεως : δε το μη αλλοιουμενον μητε γινεσθαι μητε απολλυσθαι ;

Ari: It is necessary . (αναγκη .)

Par: Accordingly then , on the one hand , **The One** which **Is not** , by **being altered** , αρα και μεν το εν ον μη αλλοιουμενον **will be generated** and **dissolved** ; but on the other hand , **by not** undergoing **alteration** , γινεται τε και απολλυται , δε μη αλλοιουμενον **It will not be** subject to either **generation** nor **dissolution** . And thus , **The One** that **Is not** , ουτε γινεται ουτε απολλυται : και ουτω το εν ον μη **will be generated** and **dissolved** , and will **not be generated** nor **dissolved** . γινεται τε και απολλυται , και ουτε γινεται ουτ' απολλυται .

Ari: It will not . (γαρ ουν ου .)

158d γένηται, γίγνεσθαι

160a γιγνώμενα

163b γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται, γίγνεται

163d γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται

163e γίγοντό

161a ἕτερα

163a ἐτέρως

163b ἕτερον, ἕτερα

164a ἕτερά

164b ἕτερά, ἕτερον

Loeb

“And must not that which changes come into a state of being other than its previous one, and perish, so far as its previous state is concerned; whereas that which does not change neither comes into being nor perishes?”

“That is inevitable.”

“Then the non-existent one, when it is changed, comes into being and perishes, and when it is not changed, neither comes into being nor perishes and thus the non-existent one both comes into being and perishes and neither comes into being nor perishes.”

“Quite true.”

Thomas Taylor

But is it not necessary that when any thing is altered it should become different from what it was before, and should suffer a dissolution of its former habit; but that a nature which is not altered should neither be generated nor dissolved?

It is necessary.

The One, therefore, *which is not*, through being altered, will be generated and dissolved; but at the same time, from its not suffering alteration, will not be subject to either generation or corruption. And thus *The One which is not* will be generated and dissolved, and will neither be generated nor dissolved.

It will not.

Jowett

And must not that which is altered become other than it previously was, and lose its former state and be destroyed; but that which is not altered can neither come into being nor be destroyed?

Very true.

And the one that is not, being altered, becomes and is destroyed; and not being altered, neither becomes nor is destroyed; and so the one that is not becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is destroyed?

True.

Loeb
7th

“Let us now go back again to the beginning and see whether the conclusions we reach will be the same as at present, or different.”

“Yes, we should do that.”

Thomas Taylor
7th

But let us again return to the beginning, and see whether these things will appear to us in our subsequent discussion as they do now, or otherwise.

It is necessary, indeed, so to do.

Jowett
7th

And now, let us go back once more to the beginning, and see whether these or some other consequences will follow.

Let us do as you say.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, φαμέν, τί χρὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν;

ναί.

τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν, ἄρα μή τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ᾧ ἂν φώμεν μὴ εἶναι;

οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

πότερον οὖν, ὅταν φώμεν μὴ εἶναι τι, πῶς οὐκ εἶναι φαμεν αὐτό, πῶς δὲ εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἀπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὐδέ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ ὄν; ἀπλούστατα μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that we have already said ,

163C οὐκ οὐν , φαμεν ,
what must result in relation to **The Self** , if **One Is not** ?
τι χρὴ συμβαίνειν περὶ αὐτοῦ , εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ μὴ ;

Ari: Yes . (ναί)

Par: But when we say **That** which **Is not** , do we not then signify anything else ,
δε οταν λεγωμεν το ἐστὶν μὴ , ἀν μὴ ἀρα σημαίνει τι ἄλλο
than **the absence** of **Ousia** from **That** which we say , **Is not** ? (The Principle of The 7th)
ἡ ἀπουσίαν οὐσίας τούτῳ ᾧ φώμεν εἶναι μὴ ;

Ari: Nothing else . (οὐδὲν ἄλλο .)

Par: Therefore , when we say that **anything is not** , do we say that **The Self is not**
οὐν οταν φώμεν τι εἶναι μὴ , πότερον φαμεν αὐτο εἶναι οὐκ
in some way , but that **in some way It is** ? Or does the term '**is not**' , simply signify this ;
πῶς , δε πῶς εἶναι ; ἢ τοῦ λεγομένου ἐστὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς σημαίνει τούτο
that **It is in no way , anywhere** , since **It does not Participate in a certain definite way**
ὅτι ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ , οὐδε μετέχει πῃ
of **Ousia** since indeed **It is , the non Being** ?
οὐσίας γε το μὴ ον ;

Ari: It signifies this , most simply .(μὲν οὐν ἀπλούστατα .)

162d αὐτῷ, αὐτό
163a αὐτῷ
163c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό
163d αὐτό
163e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

158d συμβαίνει
160b συμβαίνειν
163c συμβαίνειν

161e λέγομεν, λέγομεν, λέγοντες, λέγομεν
162a λέγειν, λέγειν
163c λέγωμεν, λεγόμενον
163e λέγωμεν
164b λέγομεν, λέγομεν

162d οὐδαμοῦ
163a οὐδαμῇ
163c οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ
163d οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ
163e οὐδαμῇ

161e μετέχειν
162a μετέχοντα
163c μετέχει, μετέχειν
163d μετέχει
163e μετέχον, μετέχου

162a οὐσίας, οὐσίας
162b οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία
163c οὐσίας, οὐσίας
163d οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίαν, οὐσίας, οὐσίας
164a οὐσίας

Loeb

“We ask, then, if the one is not, what will be the consequences in regard to it?”

“Yes.”

“Does the expression 'is not' denote anything else than the absence of existence in that of which we say that it is not?”

“No, nothing else.”

“And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is in a way and is not in a way? Or does the expression 'is not' mean without any qualifications that the non-existent is not in any way, shape, or manner, and does not participate in being in any way?”

“Without any qualifications whatsoever.”

Thomas Taylor

Have we not already related, if *The One is not*, what ought to happen concerning it?

Certainly.

But when we say *it is not*, do we signify any thing else than the absence of essence from that which we say is not?

Nothing else.

Whether, therefore, when we say that any thing is not, do we say that in a certain respect it is not, and that in a certain respect it is? Or does the term is not simply signify that it is in no respect any where, and that it does not any how participate of essence, since it is not?

It signifies, indeed, most simply.

Jowett

If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one? That is the question.

Yes.

Do not the words "is not" signify absence of being in that to which we apply them?

Just so.

And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way but is in another? or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no sort or way or kind participation of being?

Quite absolutely.

Oxford Greek

οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύναιτο ἂν τὸ μὴ ὄν οὔτε ἄλλως **οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν**.

οὐ γάρ.

τὸ δὲ **γίγνεσθαι** καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μὴ τι ἄλλο ἦν ἢ τὸ μὲν **οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν**, τὸ δ' ἀπολλύναι **οὐσίαν**;

οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ὣι δέ γε μηδὲν τούτου μέτεστιν, οὔτ' ἂν **λαμβάνοι** οὔτ' ἀπολλύοι **αὐτό**.

πῶς γάρ;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , neither will *the non Being* , **Be Able** to **Be** ,

163D ἄρα οὔτε ἀν τὸ μὴ ὄν δύναιτο εἶναι
nor ever **Participate** in any other way of **Ousia** .

οὔτε μετεχειν οὐδαμῶς ἀλλῶς οὐσίας .

Ari: For it cannot .(γὰρ οὐ .)

Par: But *that which becomes* and *that which dissolves* , **are not** anything else than

δε τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἣν μὴ τι ἄλλο ἢ
the one to **have a Share** of **Ousia** , but *the other* to **lose Ousia** ?

τὸ μὲν μεταλαμβάνειν οὐσίας , τὸ δ' ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν ;

Ari: Nothing else . (οὐδὲν ἄλλο .)

Par: Then *that which has* indeed **no Share** of **This** , **can neither receive nor lose The Self** .

δε ὦ γε μηδὲν μέτεστιν τούτου , ἀν οὐτ' λαμβάνοι οὐτ' ἀπολλύοι αὐτό .

Ari: How could it ? (πῶς γὰρ ;)

163a οὐδαμῇ

163c οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ

163d οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ

164b οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῇ

166a οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς

160a γιγνόμενα

163b γίγνεσθαι γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεταί, γίγνεται, γίγνεταί, γίγνεται

163d γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται

163e γίγνοιτό

165d γιγνομένους

162b οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία

163c οὐσίας, οὐσίας

163d οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίαν, οὐσίας, οὐσίας

163e οὐσίας

156a μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνειν

158b μεταλαμβάνοντα, μεταλαμβάνει, μεταλαμβάνει

163d μεταλαμβάνειν

156a λαμβάνει

156b λαμβάνον

163d λαμβάνοι

164d λάβη

165b λάβη, λαμβάνεσθαι, λάβη, λαμβάνοι

163a αὐτῷ

163c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

163d αὐτό

163e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

164a αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

Loeb

“Then the non-existent cannot be and cannot in any other way partake of existence.”

“No.”

“But were coming into being and perishing anything else than receiving and losing existence.”

“No, nothing else.”

“But that which has no participation in it can neither receive it nor lose it.”

“Of course not.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither therefore can that which is not be, nor in any other respect participate of essence.

It cannot.

But is to be generated and corrupted any thing else than for this to receive essence and for that to lose essence?

It is nothing else.

That therefore with which nothing of essence is present, can neither receive nor lose it.

How can it?

Jowett

Then, that which is not cannot be, or in any way participate in being?

It cannot.

And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of being and the loss of being?

Nothing else.

And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose being?

Impossible.

Oxford Greek

τῷ ἐνὶ ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ **οὐδαμῇ** ἔστιν, οὔτε ἑκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον **οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς**.

εἰκός.

οὔτε ἄρα ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν οὔτε **γίνεται**, ἐπεὶ περ **οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας**.

οὐ φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , seeing that **The One in no way Is** ,
 ἀρα ἐπειδὴ τῷ ἐνὶ οὐδαμῇ ἐστίν ,
It can neither possess , nor lose , nor Partake of **Ousia** , **in any way whatsoever** .
 οὔτε ἐκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς .

Ari: That is reasonable . (εἰκός .)

Par: Accordingly then , **The One** which **Is not** , **can neither** be **dissolved nor generated** ,
 ἀρα τὸ ἐν ὄν μὴ οὔτε ἀπολλύται οὔτε γίνεται ,
 if indeed **It in no way Participates** of **Ousia** .
 ἐπεὶ περ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας .

Ari: It does not appear that it will . (οὐ φαίνεται .)

163a οὐδαμῇ
 163c οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ
163d οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ
 163e οὐδαμῇ
 164b οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῇ

162b οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία
 163c οὐσίας, οὐσίας
163d οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίαν, οὐσίας, οὐσίας
 163e οὐσίας

160a γηγόνενα
 163b γίνεσθαι γίνεσθαι, γίνεταί, γίνεταί, γίνεταί, γίνεταί
163d γίνεσθαι, γίνεταί
 163e γίγνοιτό
 165d γιγνομένους

162a μετέχοντα
 163c μετέχει, μετέχειν
163d μετέχει
 163e μετέχον, μετέχοι

Loeb

“Then the one, since it does not exist in any way, cannot possess or lose or share in existence at all.”

“That is reasonable.”

“Then the non-existent one neither perishes nor comes into being, since it participates in no way in existence.”

“No; that is clear.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, since it is no respect *is*, can neither possess, nor lose, nor receive essence, in any manner whatever.

It is proper it should be so.

The One which is not, will neither therefore be corrupted nor generated, since it in no respect participates of essence.

It does not appear that it will.

Jowett

The one then, since it in no way is, cannot have or lose or assume being in any way?

True.

Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither nor becomes?

No.

Oxford Greek

οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀλλοιοῦται **οὐδαμῇ**: ἤδη γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο τοῦτο **πάσῃ**.

ἀληθῆ.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ **κινεῖσθαι**;

ἀνάγκη.

οὐδὲ μὴν **ἑστάναι** φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ ὄν: τὸ γὰρ **ἑστὸς** ἐν τῷ **αὐτῷ** τινι δεῖ αἰεῖ εἶναι.

τῷ **αὐτῷ**: πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , **It can not** be **altered in any way** ; for if **It were**

163E αἰρ' οὐδ' ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῇ : γὰρ ἂν
to **experience This Participation** , then **It** would already **Be generated** and **dissolved** .
πασχόν τουτο ἤδη γίγνοιτο τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο .

Ari: This is true . (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: But if **It is not altered** , then **Is** it not **Necessary** that **It can not be moved** ?

δε εἰ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται , μηδε ἀνάγκη οὐκ κινεῖσθαι ;

Ari: It is necessary . (ἀνάγκη .)

Par: Certainly then , **The Being** which **exists in no way at all** , we shall say , **can not**

μὴν το ον μηδαμοῦ φησομεν οὐδε
Stand-still . For **That** which **Is-At-Rest** , **must Always Be** , **in a Certain way** in **The Self** .
εστάναι . γὰρ το εστος δεῖ αἰε εἶναι ἐν τινι τῷ αὐτῷ .

Ari: In the self/same ; how could it not ?

τῷ αὐτῷ : πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

163c οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ

163d οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ

163e οὐδαμῇ

164b οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῇ

166a οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς

163b γίνεσθαι γίνεσθαι, γίνεταί, γίνεταί, γίνεταί, γίνεταί

163d γίνεσθαι, γίνεταί

163e γίγνοιτό

165d γιγνομένων

160a πέπονθε

160b πεπονθέναι

163e πάσῃ

164b πεπονθέναι

165c πεπονθέναι

162e κινεῖται

163a κινεῖται, κινηθῇ, κινούμενον, κινούμενον, κινεῖται, κινεῖται

163e κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι

165d κινουμένων, κινήσεις

160a ἐστῶτα

162c ἐστηκέ

163e ἐστάναι, ἐστὸς, ἐστάναι

165d ἐστῶτας

163c αὐτῷ, αὐτό

163d αὐτό

163e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

164a αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

164b αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

Loeb

“Then it is not changed in nature at all; for such change involves coming into being and perishing.”

“True.”

“And if it is not changed, it cannot move, either, can it?”

“Certainly not.”

“And we cannot say that that which is nowhere is at rest; for that which is at rest must always be in some place which is the same.”

“Yes, of course, the same place.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither, therefore, will it be in any respect altered; for if it suffered this passion it would be generated and corrupted.

True.

But if it is not altered, is it not also necessary that it should not be moved?

It is necessary.

But that which is no respect is, we have likewise asserted, cannot stand still; for that which stands ought always to be in a certain same?

How should it not?

Jowett

Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be destroyed?

True.

But if it be not altered it cannot be moved?

Certainly not.

Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which stands must always be in one and the same spot?

Of course.

Oxford Greek

οὕτω δὴ αὖ τὸ μὴ ὄν μήτε **ποτέ ἐστάναι** μήτε **κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν**.

μὴ γὰρ οὖν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔστι γε **αὐτῷ** τι τῶν ὄντων· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν τοῦτου **μετέχον** ὄντος **οὐσίας μετέχου**.

δηλον.

Balboas

Par: Surely then , we must say in turn , that **in this way , the non Being** ,
 δη λέγωμεν αυ ουτω το μη ον

Can Never , stand-still nor be moved .

μητε ποτε εσταναι μητε κινεισθαι .

Ari: For it cannot do so . (γαρ μη ουν .)

Par: But clearly , **nothing** of **The Real Beings Is** indeed **Present** with **The Self** ;
 αλλα μην ουδ' τι των οντων εστι γε αυτω .

for **this** , by **Participating** of **Being** , would **Already Participate** of **Ousia** .

γαρ του μετεχον οντος αν ηδη μετεχου ουσιας .

Ari: Clearly . (δηλον .)

156a ποτε

156c πότ

163e ποτέ

164b ποτέ

160a ἐστῶτα

162c ἐστικέ

163e ἐστάναι, ἐστός, ἐστάναι

165d ἐστῶτας

162e κινεῖται

163a κινεῖται, κινήθη, κινούμενον, κινούμενον, κινεῖται, κινεῖται

163e κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι

165d κινουμένους, κινήσεις

162a λέγειν, λέγειν

163c λέγωμεν, λεγόμενον

163e λέγωμεν

164b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν

163c αὐτοῦ, αὐτό

163d αὐτό

163e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

164a αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

164b αὐτά, αὐτῷ

163e μετέχει, μετέχεν

163d μετέχει

163e μετέχον, μετέχου

163c οὐσίας, οὐσίας

163d οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίαν, οὐσίας, οὐσίας

163e οὐσίας

Loeb

“Thus we shall say again that the non-existent one is neither at rest nor in motion.”

“No, neither.”

“Nor can anything which exists pertain to it for the moment it partook of anything which exists it would partake of existence.”

“That is plain.”

Thomas Taylor

And thus we must assert that *non-being* neither at any time stands nor is moved.

For indeed it does not.

But likewise nothing of beings if present with it; for this, through participating of being, would participate of essence.

It is evident.

Jowett

Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never moves?

Neither.

Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for if there had been, it would partake of being?

That is clear.

Oxford Greek

οὔτε ἄρα μέγεθος οὔτε σμικρότης οὔτε ἰσότης **αὐτῷ** ἔστιν.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐδὲ μὴν **ὁμοιότης** γε οὐδὲ ἑτεροιοτήης οὔτε πρὸς **αὐτὸ** οὔτε πρὸς τᾶλλα εἴη ἂν **αὐτῷ**.

οὐ φαίνεται.

τί δέ; τᾶλλα ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν εἴη **αὐτῷ**, εἰ μηδὲν **αὐτῷ** δεῖ εἶναι;

οὐκ ἔστιν.

οὔτε ἄρα **ὁμοια** οὔτε **ἀνόμοια** οὔτε **ταῦτά** οὔθ' **ἕτερα** ἐστὶν **αὐτῷ** τὰ ἄλλα.

οὐ γάρ.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , neither **Bigness** nor **Smallness** , nor **Equality** , **Belongs** to **The Self** .

164A αρα ουτε μεγεθος ουτε σμικροτης ουτε ισοτης εστιν αυτω .

Ari: It does not . (γαρ ου .)

Par: Most certainly then , neither **Likeness** nor **Unlikeness** ,

γε μην ουδε ομοιοτης ουδε ετεροιοτης

neither in relation to The Self nor in relation to the others , will **Be** with **The Self** .

ουτε προς αυτο ουτε προς ταλλα αν ειη αυτω .

Ari: It does not appear that it will . (ου φαινεται .)

Par: What follows then ? **Can The Other Beings Be in any way Present** with **The Self** ,

τι δε ; αν ταλλα ειη οπως εσθ' αυτω ,

if **None Can Be Present** with **The Self** ?

ει μηδεν δει ειναι αυτω ;

Ari: They cannot . (εστιν ουκ .)

Par: Accordingly then , **the others** are neither **Like** nor **Unlike** ,

αρα τα αλλα ουτε ομοια ουτε ανομοια

nor **The Same/Selves** nor **Other** , from **The Self** .

ουτε ταυτα ουθ' ετερα αυτω .

Ari: They are not . (γαρ ου .)

163d αὐτό

163e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

164a αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

164b αὐτά, αὐτῷ

164c αὐτοῖς

161b ὁμοιότητα

161c ὁμοιοτήτητα

164a ὁμοιότηης

163d αὐτό

163e αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

164a αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

164b αὐτά, αὐτῷ

164c αὐτοῖς

161c ὁμοιον

162a ὁμοίως

164a ὁμοια

165c ὁμοιά, ὁμοια

165d ὁμοιοις

161a ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

161b ἀνόμοιά, ἀνομοίω, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

164a ἀνόμοια

165c ἀνόμοια

165d ἀνόμοια, ἀνομοιοις

162e ταῦτῷ

163b ταῦτά

164a ταῦτά

165c ταῦτόν

163a ἐτέρως

163b ἕτερον, ἕτερα

164a ἕτερά

164b ἕτερά, ἕτερον

164c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρου

Loeb

“Then neither greatness nor smallness nor equality pertains to it.”

“No.”

“Nor likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to other things.”

“Clearly not.”

“And can other things pertain to it, if nothing pertains to it?”

“Impossible.”

“Then the other things are neither like it nor unlike it, nor the same nor different.”

“No.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither magnitude, therefore, nor parvitude, nor equality, belongs to it.

Certainly not.

Neither will similitude or diversity, either with respect to itself or others, be present with it.

It does not appear that they will.

But what, can other things be in any respect present with it, if nothing ought to be present with it?

They cannot.

Neither, therefore, are similars nor dissimilars, nor *same* nor *different*, different from it.

They are not.

Jowett

And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be attributed to it?

No.

Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others?

Clearly not.

Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be attributed to it?

Certainly not.

And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or different in relation to it?

They cannot.

Oxford Greek

τί δέ; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνω ἢ τὸ τί ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τούτου ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλω ἢ **ποτέ** ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν ἢ **ἐπιστήμη** ἢ **δόξα** ἢ **αἴσθησις** ἢ **λόγος** ἢ **ὄνομα** ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται;

οὐκ ἔσται.

οὕτω δὲ ἔν οὐκ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει πως **οὐδαμῇ**.

οὐκουν δὲ ἔοικέν γε **οὐδαμῇ** ἔχειν.

Balboas

Par: What then ? **Can anything be** of *That* , or with *That* , or with *anything* , or *of another* ,
τι δε ; το εσται εκεινου η το εκεινω η το τι η αλλου

or *with another* , or *at some time Past* , or *at some time* in the **Future** , or **Now** .

164B η αλλω η ποτε η επειτα η νυν

Or **Can** there **be** knowledge , or opinion , or perception , or discourse , or name ,
η επιστημη η δοξα η αισθησις η λογος η ομνομα

or *anything else whatsoever* of **The Real Beings** , where *the non Being* is concerned ?

η αλλο οτιουν των οντων το μη ον περι ;

Ari: There can not . (εσται ουκ .)

Par: Surely then , in this way , **One Being Is not** , **not can exist in any way at all** .
δη ουτω εν ον ουκ ουκ εχει πως ουδαμη .

Ari: Surely then , it is indeed **not** likely to be the case , that it can exist anywhere .
δη γε ουκουν εοικεν εχειν ουδαμη .

156c πότε

163c ποτέ

164b ποτέ

160d ἐπιστήμην

160e ἐπιστήμη

164b ἐπιστήμη

142a δόξα, δοξάζεται

155d δόξα

164b δόξα

164d δόξαντος

165a δoξασθήσεται

142a αἴσθησις

155d αἴσθησις

164b αἴσθησις

161b λόγος

162d λόγος

164b λόγος, λόγος

149d ὄνομα

155d ὄνομα, ὀνομάζεται

164b ὄνομα

163d οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ

163e οὐδαμῇ

164b οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῇ

166a οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς

Loeb

“Well, then, will the notions 'of that' or 'to that' or 'some,' or 'this' or 'of this' or 'of another' or 'to another' or past or future or present or knowledge or opinion or perception or definition or name or anything else which exists pertain to the non-existent?”

“No.”

“Then the non-existent one has no state or condition whatsoever.”

“It appears to have none whatsoever.”

Thomas Taylor

But what, can any thing be asserted of it, or be with it, or can it be any certain thing, or this, or belong to this, or that, or be with some other thing, or be formerly, or hereafter, or now - or can science, or opinion, or sense, or discourse, or a name, or any thing else belonging to beings, subsist about that which is not?

There cannot.

The One therefore *which is not*, will not in any respect subsist any where.

So indeed it appears.

Jowett

Nor can what is not, be anything, or be this thing, or be related to or the attribute of this or that or other, or be past, present, or future. Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with it?

No.

Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind?

Such appears to be the conclusion.

Oxford Greek
8th

ἔτι δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τάλλα τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι.

λέγωμεν γάρ.

ἄλλα μὲν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι: εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο.

οὕτω.

εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, τὰ γε ἄλλα ἕτερά ἐστιν. ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἕτερον;

ἔγωγε.

Balboas
8th

Parmenides: 26 Now then , let us yet declare , what must happen to **the others** , if **one Is not** .
 δη Ετι λεγωμεν τι χρη πεπονθεναι ταλλα ει εν εστι μη ,

Aristotle: For we say so . (γαρ λεγωμεν .)

Par: Then , on the one hand , **selves** must **exist in some (indefinite) way** ; (The Principle
 αλλα μεν αυτα δε ειναι που : of The 8th)

for if **others do not at all exist** , we could not discourse about **the others** .
 γαρ ει αλλα μηδε εστιν , αν ουκ λεγοιτο περι των αλλων .

Ari: So it is . (ουτω .) .

Par: But if **The Logos/Discourse is** about **the others** , then **the others are** indeed **other** .
 δε ει ο λογος περι των αλλων , τα αλλα εστιν γε ετερα .

Or do you not require that both **another** and **the other be** applied to **the self** ?
 η ουκ καλεις τε το αλλο και το ετερον επι τω αυτω ;

Ari: I do at least . (εγωγε .)

163c λέγωμεν, λεγόμενον
 163c λέγωμεν

164b λέγωμεν, λέγωμεν

160b πεπονθέναι
 163c πάσχον

164b πεπονθέναι

165c πεπονθέναι

163c αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

164a αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ

164b αὐτὰ, αὐτῷ

164c αὐτοῖς

164d αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

161b λόγος

162d λόγος

164b λόγος, λόγος

163b ἕτερον, ἕτερα

164a ἕτερά

164b ἕτερά, ἕτερον

164c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἑτέρου

165b ἑτέρα

Loeb
8th

“Let us then discuss further what happens to the other things, if the one does not exist.”

“Let us do so.”

“Well, they must exist; for if others do not even exist, there could be no talking about the others.”

“True.”

“But if we talk about the others, the others are different. Or do you not regard the words other and different as synonymous?”

“Yes, I do.”

Thomas Taylor
8th

But let us again declare *if The One is not*, what other things ought to suffer.

Let us.

But in a certain respect *others* ought to subsist; for, unless *others* have a being, we cannot discourse concerning them.

True.

But if discourse is about *others*, *others* will be different: or do you not call *others* and *different* the same?

I do.

Jowett
8th

Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others? Let us determine that.

Yes; let us determine that.

The others must surely be; for if they, like the one, were not, we could not be now speaking of them.

True.

But to speak of the others implies difference—the terms “other” and “different” are synonymous?

True.

ἕτερον δέ γε πού φαμεν τὸ **ἕτερον** εἶναι **ἑτέρου**, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου;

ναί.

καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι τι οὗ ἄλλα ἔσται.

ἀνάγκη.

τί δὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε.

οὐ γάρ.

ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἐστί: τοῦτο γὰρ **αὐτοῖς** ἔτι λείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις.

ὀρθῶς.

κατὰ πλήθη ἄρα ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἐστί: κατὰ ἓν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν οἶά τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἑνός.

Balboas

Par: But do we indeed say that **the other is in some (indefinite) way other** from **the other** ,

164C δε γε φαμεν το ετερον ειναι που ετερον ετερου ,

and certainly that which **is other is other** than **another** ?

και δη το αλλο ειναι αλλο αλλου ;

Ari: Yes . (ναι .)

Par: Accordingly then , if **they are** also **about to be other** , to **the others** ,

αρα , ει και μελλει ειναι αλλα , τοις αλλοις

then there **is something from which they will be other** .

εστι τι ου εσται αλλα .

Ari: It is necessary . (αναγκη .)

Par: Certainly then , what will **this be** ? For **they** will indeed not **be other**

δη ουν τι αν ειη ; μεν γε ουκ εσται αλλα

than **The One** , by **non Being** .

του ενος , μη οντος .

Ari: They will not . (γαρ ου .)

Par: Accordingly then , they **are other from each other** ; for this still remains for **selves** ;

αρα εστι αλληλων : γαρ τουτο ετι λειπεται αυτοις ,

or else to **be other** from nothing .

η ειναι αλλοις μηδενος .

Ari: Rightly so . (ορθως .)

Par: Accordingly then , **each is other from the others** , according to **multitude** .

αρα εκαστα εστι αλλα αλληλων κατα πληθη .

For **they** cannot **be so** according to **One**, and by the **non Being** of **One** .

γαρ αν ουκ ειη οια κατα εν , τε ενος μη οντος :

164a ἑτερά

164b ἑτερά, ἕτερον

164c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἑτέρου

165b ἑτέρα

165d ἑτερα, ἑτέρου, ἑτέρους

164a αὐτῶν, αὐτό, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

164b αὐτά, αὐτῶν

164c αὐτοῖς

164d αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

164e αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς

Loeb

“And we say that the different is different from the different, and the other is other than the other?”

“Yes.”

“Then if the others are to be others, there must be something of which they will be others.”

“Yes, there must be.”

“Now what can that be? For they cannot be others of the one, if it does not exist.”

“No.”

“Then they are others of each other; for they have no alternative, except to be others of nothing.”

“True.”

“They are each, then, others of each other, in groups; for they cannot be so one at a time, if one does not exist.

Thomas Taylor

But do we not say that different is different from different, and other is other than another?

Certainly.

With respect to others, therefore, if they are about to be others, there is something than which they will be others.

It is necessary.

But what will this be? For they will not be different from *The One*, since it is not.

They will not.

They are different therefore from each other; for this alone remains to them, or to be different from nothing.

Right.

According to multitudes, therefore, each is different from each; for they cannot be different according to *The One*, since *The One is not*.

Jowett

Other means other than other, and different, different from the different?

Yes.

Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be other?

Certainly.

And what can that be?-for if the one is not, they will not be other than the one.

They will not.

Then they will be other than each other; for the only remaining alternative is that they are other than nothing.

True.

And they are each other than one another, as being plural and not singular;

Oxford Greek

ἀλλ' ἕκαστος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὄγκος **αὐτῶν ἄπειρός** ἐστι πλήθει, κἂν τὸ σμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἶναι **λάβη** τις, ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀντι ἐνὸς **δόξαντος** εἶναι **πολλὰ** καὶ ἀντι σμικροτάτου παμμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ **αὐτοῦ**.

ὀρθότατα.

τοιούτων δὲ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἴη τᾶλλα, εἰ ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν **πολλοὶ** ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἰς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὧν δὲ οὐ, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται;

οὕτω.

Balboas

But **each mass** of **selves** ,

ἀλλ' ἕκαστος ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ὡς
as it appears , **is infinite multitude** ; and even if anyone should take *that which appears to be*
164D εοικεν εστι απειρος πληθει , καν τις λαβη δοκουν
the smallest piece , just as a dream in sleep , it then suddenly appears to be opposite to that
το σμικροτατον ωσπερ οναρ εν υπνω εξαιφνης φαινεται αντι
which appeared to be one , and instead of that which appeared to be the smallest , it would now
δοξαντος ενος , και αντι σμικροτατου ειναι
be many ; that is , an immensely great mass , in relation to the minute fragments of self .
ειναι πολλα , παμμεγεθες προς τα κερματιζομενα εξ αυτου .

Ari: Most rightly . (ορθοτατα .)

Par: Surely then , among such **masses** , **the others** will **be other** from one **another** ,
δη τοιουτων ογκων ταλλα αν ειη αλλα αλληλων ,
if **One has no Being** and **others exist** . (ει ενος μη οντος αλλα εστιν .)

Ari: Perfectly so . (μεν κομιδη ουν .)

Par: Is it not the case then , that there will **be many masses/heaps** ,
ουκουν εσονται πολλοι ογκοι
each of which , *will appear to be one* , but which **is not** so , if indeed **One will not be at all ?**
εκαστος φαινομενος εις , δε ων ου , ειπερ εν εσται μη ;

Ari: It will be so . (ουτω .)

164b αὐτᾶ, αὐτῶ
164c αὐτοῖς
164d αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ
164e αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῦς
165a αὐτοῖς, αὐτόν

158d ἄπειρά
158e ἄπειρά, ἄπειρα
164d ἄπειρός
165c ἄπειρον, ἄπειρά

156b λαμβάνον
163d λαμβάνοι
164d λάβη
165b λάβη, λαμβάνεσθαι, λάβη, λαμβάνοιτ

155d δόξα
164b δόξα
164d δόξαντος
165a δοξασθήσεται
166a δόξα, δοξάζεται

159d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
161a πολλῶν, πολλῶν
164d πολλὰ, πολλοὶ
164e πολλῶν, πολλὰ, πολλῶν
165a πολλοῖς

161d τοιοῦτο
162c τοιοῦτον
164d τοιούτων
165b τοιοῦτον
165d τοιαῦτα

Loeb

But each mass of them is unlimited in number, and even if you take what seems to be the smallest bit, it suddenly changes, like something in a dream that which seemed to be one is seen to be many, and instead of very small it is seen to be very great in comparison with the minute fractions of it."

"Very true."

"Such masses of others would be others of each other, if others exist and one does not exist."

"Certainly."

"There will, then, be many masses, each of which appears to be one, but is not one, if one does not exist?"

"Yes."

Thomas Taylor

But each mass of these, as it appears, is infinite in multitude. And though any one should assume that which appears to be the least, like a dream in sleep, on a sudden, instead of that which seemed to be *one*, *many* would rise to the view; and instead of that which is smallest, a quantity perfectly great with respect to the multitude distributed from it.

Most right.

But among these masses or heaps, *others* will be mutually different from one another, if they are *others* and *The One* is not.

Eminently so.

Will there not then be many heaps, each of which will appear to be one, but is not so since *The One* is not?

There will so.

Jowett

for if one is not, they cannot be singular but every particle of them is infinite in number; and even if a person takes that which appears to be the smallest fraction, this, which seemed one, in a moment evanesces into many, as in a dream, and from being the smallest becomes very great, in comparison with the fractions into which it is split up?

Very true.

And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others are, and the one is not?

Exactly.

And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not being one, if one is not?

True.

Oxford Greek

καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι **αὐτῶν** δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑκαστον, **πολλῶν** ὄντων.

πάνυ γε.

καὶ τὰ μὲν διὰ **ἄρτια**, τὰ δὲ **περιττὰ** ἐν **αὐτοῖς** ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν **αὐτοῖς** ἐνεῖναι: φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο **πολλὰ** καὶ **μεγάλα** πρὸς ἑκαστον τῶν **πολλῶν** ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

Balboas

Par: Thus , there will also *appear to be a number* of *selves* ,
 164E δε και δοξει ειναι αριθμος αυτων ,
 if indeed *each* of these *heaps* , *being many* , *also appear to be one* .
 ειπερ εκαστο ν , οντων πολλων , και εν

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ γε .)

Par: And certainly , *some* which are among *the selves* *will appear to be even*
 και δη μεν οντα εν αυτοις φαινεται τα αρτια
 and *others odd* , although *not truly* , if indeed *One will not exist at all* .
 δε τα περιττα ουκ αληθως , ειπερ εν εσται μη .

Ari: They will not be so . (γαρ ου ουν .)

Par: And most certainly , that which is smallest , as we have said ,
 και γε μην σμικροτατον , φαμεν ,
 will also *appear to be* in *selves* , but this will *appear to be many* and *big* ,
 και δοξει ειναι εν αυτοις , δε τουτο φαινεται πολλα και μεγαλα
 in relation to *each* of the *many* , since *they are small* .
 165A πρὸς ἑκαστον τῶν πολλων ὡς ὄντων σμικρων .

Ari: How could it not ? (πῶς δ' οὐ ;)

164c αὐτοῖς
 164d αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ
164e αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς
 165a αὐτός, αὐτόν
 165b αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

161a πολλῶν, πολλῶν
 164d πολλά, πολλοί
164e πολλῶν, πολλὰ, πολλῶν
 165a πολλοῖς
 165c πολλά
 144a ἄρτια, ἄρτια
 160b ἀρτίου
164e ἄρτια

143d περιττὰ
 144a περιττὰ, περιττὰ
164e περιττὰ
 160a μείζω
 163a μεγάλη
164e μεγάλα
 165a μείζονος

Loeb

“And they will seem to possess, number, if each seems to be one and they are many.”

“Certainly.”

“And some will seem to be even and others odd, but all that will be unreal, if the one does not exist.”

“True.”

“And there will, we assert, seem to be a smallest among them but this proves to be many and great in comparison with each of the many minute fractions.”

“Of course.”

Thomas Taylor

There will likewise appear to be a number of these, if each of these which are many is one.

Entirely so.

But the even and odd which are among them will not have a true appearance, since *The One* will not have a being.

They will not.

But likewise that which is smallest, as we have said, will appear to be with them; but this minimum will seem to be many things and great, with respect to each of the things which are many and small.

How should it not?

Jowett

And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them appears to be one, though it is really many?

It can.

And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no reality, if one is not?

Yes.

And there will appear to be a least among them; and even this will seem large and manifold in comparison with the many small fractions which are contained in it?

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

καὶ ἴσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἕκαστος ὅγκος **δοξασθήσεται** εἶναι: οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαινεν ἐκ **μείζονος** εἰς **ἐλαττον** φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειεν ἐλθεῖν, τοῦτο δ' εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος.

εἰκός.

οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὅγκον **πέρας** ἔχων, **αὐτός** γε πρὸς **αὐτὸν** οὔτε **ἀρχὴν** οὔτε **πέρας** οὔτε **μέσον** ἔχων;

πῇ δὴ;

Balboas

Par: And certainly **each mass will seem to the eye of opinion to be equal to the many** καὶ μὴν ἕκαστος οἶκος δόξασθησεται εἶναι ἴσος τοῖς πολλοῖς and **small masses** . For it will not *appear* to **change** from a **more** into a **lesser quantity** , καὶ σμικροῖς . γὰρ ἂν οὐ φαινόμενος μετεβαινέιν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἐλαττον , before it *appears* to arrive at **something between** ; but **this will be a phantasm of equality** . πρὶν δοξειεν ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ ; δ' τοῦτο ἂν εἴη φάντασμα ἰσότητος .

Ari: It is likely . (εἰκος .)

Par: Is it not the case , that although **it appears to have a limit** , in relation to οὐκοῦν καὶ ἔχων περας πρὸς **another mass** , and **self** in relation to **self** , **it neither has a** ἄλλον οἶκον , τε αὐτος πρὸς αὐτὸν οὔτε ἔχων

Beginning nor **Limit** nor **Middle** ?

ἀρχὴν οὔτε περας οὔτε μέσον ;

Ari: In what way then ? (πῇ δη .)

164d αὐτῶν, αὐτοῦ

164e αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς

165a αὐτός, αὐτὸν

165b αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

165c αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

165a ἴσος

164d πολλά, πολλοί

164e πολλῶν, πολλὰ, πολλῶν

165a πολλοῖς

165c πολλὰ

165d πολλὰ, πολλὰ

164b δόξα

164d δόξαντος

165a δοξασθήσεται

166a δόξα, δοξάζεται

166b δοξάζεται, δοξάσαι, δοξάζεται

162e μεγάλη

164e μεγάλα

165a μείζονος

156b ἐλαττον

160a ἐλάττω

165a ἐλαττον

145a πέρας

158d πέρας, πέρας

165a πέρας, πέρας

165c πέρας

153d ἀρχήν

163b ἀρχήν

165a ἀρχήν

165e ἀρχήν

153c μέσον

153e μέσου

165a μέσον

165b μέσω, μεσαίτερα, μέσου

Loeb

“And each mass will be considered equal to the many minute fractions for it could not appear to pass from greater to smaller, without seeming to enter that which is between them; hence the appearance of equality.”

“That is reasonable.”

“And although it has a limit in relation to another mass, it has neither beginning nor limit nor middle in relation to itself?”

“Why is that?”

Thomas Taylor

And every small heap will seem in the eye of opinion to be equal to many small heaps: for it will not appear to pass from a greater into a lesser quantity, before it seems to arrive at something between; and this will be a phantasm of equality.

It is likely to be so.

Will it not also appear to be bounded with respect to another heap, itself with respect to itself, at the same time neither having a beginning, nor middle, nor end?

How so?

Jowett

And each particle will be imagined to be equal to the many and little; for it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the less without having appeared to arrive at the middle; and thus would arise the appearance of equality.

Yes.

And having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate particle yet appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other.

How so?

ὅτι αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὥς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη αἰεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετά τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἐν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἐκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἐνός.

ἀληθέστατα.

θρύπτεσθαι δὴ οἶμαι κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἂν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ: ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἐνός αἰεὶ λαμβάνοιτ' ἄν.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Par: For when anyone grasps *something* of **These** through *the empirical mind* , as if
 ὅτι οταν τις λαβῇ τι τούτων τῇ διανοίᾳ ὡς
it were existing , then **another** “beginning” will also always *appear to be* prior to ‘the beginning’,
 165B ον , ἀλλῃ ἀρχῇ τε αἰεὶ φαίνεται προ τῆς ἀρχῆς ,
 and after the end , **another** “end” *will always still remain* ; and in “the middle” *there will*
 τε μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τε ἑτέρα τελευτὴ ὑπολειπομένη , τε ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τε
always be , **others** *more inward than “the middle”* ; *but smaller* , because *each* of *the selves*
 ἀλλὰ μεσαιτερα τοῦ μέσου , δε σμικρότερα , διὰ ἐκάστου αὐτῶν
is not Capable of receiving The One , and inasmuch as by *The One not Being* .
 μὴ δύνασθαι λαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ ἐνός , ἅτε τοῦ ἐνός οὐκ ὄντος .

Ari: This is most true .
 ἀληθεστατα .

Par: Surely then , all **The Being** , which anyone may grasp through *the empirical mind* ,
 δη πᾶν τὸ ὄν , ὃ τις ἀν λαβῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ,
 I think , must necessarily be broken-up into **minute pieces** . For the **masses** will , *in some way*
 οἶμαι , ἀνάγκη θρύπτεσθαι κερματιζόμενον . γὰρ ὄγκος ἀν που
always be apprehended without One/Unity .
 αἰεὶ λαμβάνοιτο ἀνευ ἐνός .

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ μὲν οὖν .)

164e αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς

165a αὐτός, αὐτόν

165b αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν

165d ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς, ἑαυτῶν

165e αὐτῶν

163d λαμβάνοι

164d λάβῃ

165b λάβῃ λαμβάνεσθαι, λάβῃ, λαμβάνοιτ

143a διανοίᾳ

158c διανοίᾳ

165b διανοίᾳ, διανοίᾳ

159b ἀρχῆς

160d ἀρχῆς

165a ἀρχῆς, ἀρχῇ

153c τελευτῇ, τελευτῇ

153d τελευτῇ, τελευτῇ

165b τελευτῇ, τελευτῇ

164b ἑτέρᾳ, ἑτερον

164c ἑτερον, ἑτερον, ἑτέρου

165b ἑτέρᾳ

165d ἑτέρα, ἑτέρου, ἑτέρους

166b ἑτέρα

153e μέσῳ

165a μέσον

165b μέσῳ, μεσαίτερα, μέσου

Loeb

“Because whenever the mind conceives of any of these as belonging to the masses, another beginning appears before the beginning, another end remains after the end, and in the middle are other more central middles than the middle, but smaller, because it is impossible to conceive of each one of them, since the one does not exist.”

“Very true.”

“So all being which is conceived by any mind must, it seems to me, be broken up into minute fractions; for it would always be conceived as a mass devoid of one.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Because, when any one apprehends by the dianoëtic power some one of these prior to the beginning, another beginning will always appear, and after the end another end will always be left behind: but in the middle there will always be other things more inward than the middle; and smaller, because each of them cannot receive *one one*, since *The One is not*.

This is most true.

But every thing which any one may apprehend by the dianoëtic power, must I think be broken to pieces and distributed; for the bulk will in a certain respect be apprehended without *The One*.

Entirely so.

Jowett

Because, when a person conceives of any one of these as such, prior to the beginning another beginning appears, and there is another end, remaining after the end, and in the middle truer middles within but smaller, because no unity can be conceived of any of them, since the one is not.

Very true.

And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity?

Certainly.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν τό γε **τοιούτων** πόρρωθεν μὲν ὄρωντι καὶ ἀμβλὺ ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὅζῳ νοοῦντι πληθὲι **ἄπειρον** ἐν ἑκαστον φανῆναι, εἴπερ στέρεται τοῦ ἐνός μὴ ὄντος;

ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν.

οὕτω δὴ **ἄπειρά** τε καὶ **πέρας** ἔχοντα καὶ ἐν καὶ **πολλὰ** ἕκαστα τὰλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τὰλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός.

δεῖ γάρ.

Balboas

Par: Is it not indeed the case then , that such a **mass** , on the one hand , *to those who*

γε ουκουν τοιουτον μεν το
behold it from afar and with a dull eye , **it** will necessarily *appear to be one* ; whereas on the
165C ορωντι πορρωθεν και αμβλυ , αναγκη φαινεσθαι εν ,
other hand , to **those** who *See it with an Intellectual Eye* , **closely** and **acutely** , then in that case
δε νοουντι εγγυθεν και οξυ
will not each “one” *be revealed to be* infinite in **multitude** , if indeed each “one” **is** deprived of
εκαστον εν φανηναι απειρον πληθει , ειπερ στερεται
The One , by **not Being** ?
του ενος μη οντος ;

Ari: Most necessarily so . (μεν αναγκαιοτατον ουν .)

Par: Surely then , in this way **each** of **the others** *must appear to be* **Unlimited** and
δη ουτω εκαστα ταλλα δει φαινεσθαι απειρα τε και
Limited , and **One** and **many** , if **One** is not at all , but **those other** than **The One** *exist* .
περας και εν και πολλα , ει εν μη , δε ταλλα του ενος εστιν .

Ari: It must be so . (γαρ δει .)

162c τοιοῦτον

164d τοιούτων

165c τοιοῦτον

165d τοιαῦτα

158e ἄπειρά, ἄπειρα

164d ἄπειρός

165c ἄπειρον, ἄπειρά

158d πέρας, πέρας

165a πέρας, πέρας

165c πέρας

164e πολλῶν, πολλά, πολλῶν

165a πολλοῖς

165c πολλὰ

165d πολλὰ, πολλὰ

165e πολλὰ, πολλὰ, πολλοῖς, πολλὰ

Loeb

“Now anything of that sort, if seen from a distance and dimly, must appear to be one, but if seen from close at hand and with keen vision, each apparent one must prove to be unlimited in number, if it is really devoid of one, and one does not exist. Am I right?”

“That is perfectly conclusive.”

“Therefore the other things must each and all appear to be unlimited and limited and one and many, if the things other than one exist and one does not.”

“Yes, they must.”

Thomas Taylor

But will not such a heap, to him who beholds it afar off and with a dull eye, necessarily appear to be one; but to him who with an intellectual eye surveys it near and acutely, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, since it is deprived of The One, because it has no subsistence?

It is necessary it should be so in the highest degree.

Each, therefore, of other things ought to appear infinite and bounded, and one and many, if The One is not, and other things besides The One have a subsistence.

It ought to be so.

Jowett

And such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears to be one; but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single thing appears to be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which is not?

Nothing more certain.

Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and one and many, if others than the one exist and not the one.

They must.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν καὶ **ὅμοιά** τε καὶ **ἀνόμοια** δόξει εἶναι;

πῇ δὴ;

οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα **ταῦτόν** φαίνεσθαι **πεπονθέναι** καὶ **ὅμοια** εἶναι.

πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that they will *appear to be* both **like** and **unlike** ?
 ουκουν δοξει ειναι και ομοια τε και ανομοια ;

Ari: In what way , then ? (πη δη ;)

Par: On the one hand , in such a way as , *to those who behold others from afar* ,
 μεν οιον αποσταντι

everything appears to be one , *as in a shadow painting* , *by appearing to have experienced*
 παντα φαινεσθαι εν εσκιαγραφημενα φαινομενα πεπονθεναι

The Same and *by appearing to be like* .

ταυτον και ειναι ομοια .

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ γε .)

162a ὁμοίως

164a ὅμοια

165c ὅμοιά, ὅμοια

165d ὁμοίους

166b ὅμοια

161b ἀνόμοιά, ἀνομοίως, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια, ἀνόμοια

164a ἀνόμοια

165c ἀνόμοια

165d ἀνόμοια, ἀνομοίους

166b ἀνόμοια

163b ταῦτά

164a ταῦτά

165c ταῦτόν

163e πάσχον

164b πεπονθέναι

165c πεπονθέναι

Loeb

“And will they not also appear to be like and unlike?”

“Why?”

“Just as things in a picture, when viewed from a distance, appear to be all in one and the same condition and alike.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Will they, therefore, appear to be similars and dissimilars?

But how?

Since to him who beholds *others* at a distance, involved as it were in shadow, they all appear to be one, they will seem to suffer *same* and to be similar.

Entirely so.

Jowett

Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?

In what way?

Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike?

True.

προσελθόντι δέ γε **πολλά** καὶ **ἕτερα** καὶ τῷ τοῦ **ἐτέρου** φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ **ἀνόμοια** **ἑαυτοῖς**.

οὕτω.

καὶ **ὁμοίους** διὴ καὶ **ἀνομοίους** τοὺς ὄγκους **αὐτούς** τε **αὐτοῖς** ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλοις.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς **αὐτούς** καὶ **ἐτέρους** ἀλλήλων, καὶ **ἀπτομένους** καὶ **χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν**, καὶ **κινουμένους** πάσας **κινήσεις** καὶ **ἐστῶτας** πάντη, καὶ **γιγνομένους** καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα που τὰ **τοιαῦτα**, ἃ διελθεῖν εὐπετές ἤδη ἡμῖν, εἰ ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος **πολλά** ἔστιν.

ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

Par: But on the other hand , as they approach closely , *they will appear to be* many and 165D δε προσελθοντι γε **πολλά** καὶ **other** , and **diverse from** and **unlike themselves** , through *the phantom appearance of the other* .
ετερα και ετεροια και ανομοια εαυτοις τω φαντασματι του ετερου .

Ari: It is so . (οὕτω .)

Par: Certainly then , *the massive selves* will necessarily *appear to be* δη τους ογκους αυτους αναγκη φαινεσθαι both **like** and **unlike themselves** , and to **each other** .
και ομοιους και ανομοιους εαυτοις τε και αλληλοις .

Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ μεν ουν .)

Par: Is it not so then , that **these are** both **selves** and **others** from **each other** ,
ουκουν τους και αυτους και ετερους αλληλων ,
and **have contact** and **are separate** from **themselves** , and **are moved** with every possible motion ,
και απτομενους και χωρις εαυτων , και κινουμενους πασας κινήσεις
and **are stationary** in every way , and **are generated** and **dissolved** , and **are** neither of these ,
και εστωτας παντη , και γιγνομενους και απολλυμενους και μηδετερα ,
and all such things possible , which we can at this time easily go through in detail , that is
και παντα τα τοιαυτα που , α ημιν ηδη ευπετες διελθειν ,
of course , if **One has no Being** and **many exist** ?

165E ει ενος μη οντος πολλά εστιν .

Ari: Most true then . (αληθεστατα μεν ουν .)

165a πολλοῖς
165c πολλά
165d πολλά, πολλά
165e πολλά, πολλοῖς, πολλά, πολλά
166a πολλά

164c ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἐτέρου
165b ἕτερα
165d ἕτερα, ἐτέρου, ἐτέρους
166b ἕτερα

164a ἀνόμοια
165c ἀνόμοια
165d ἀνόμοια, ἀνομοίους
166b ἀνόμοια

164a ὁμοια
165c ὁμοιά, ὁμοια
165d ὁμοίους
166b ὁμοια

165a αὐτός, αὐτόν
165b αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν
165d ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτούς, αὐτοῖς, αὐτούς, ἑαυτῶν
165e αὐτῶν
166b αὐτά, αὐτά

149d ἄπτεται, ἄπτεταί, ἄπτεται
162d ἄπτεται
165d ἀπτομένους
166b ἀπτόμενα

159b χωρίς, χωρίς
159c χωρίς, χωρίς
165d χωρίς
166b χωρίς

163a κινῆθῃ, κινούμενον, κινούμενον, κινεῖται, κινεῖται
163c κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι
165d κινουμένους, κινήσεις

162e ἐστηκέ
163c ἐστάναι, ἐστὸς, ἐστάναι
165d ἐστῶτας

163d γίνεσθαι, γίγνεται
163e γίγνιτό
165d γιγνομένους

164d τοιοῦτον
165b τοιοῦτον
165d τοιαῦτα

Loeb

“But when you come close to them they appear to be many and different, and, because of their difference in appearance, different in kind and unlike each other.”

“Yes.”

“And so the groups of the other things must appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other.”

“Certainly.”

“And also the same and different, and in contact with one another and separated, and in all kinds of motion and in every sort of rest, and coming into being and perishing, and neither of the two, and all that sort of thing, which we can easily mention in detail, if the many exist and the one does not.”

“Very true.”

Thomas Taylor

But to him who approaches nearer they will appear to be many and different, and different from and dissimilar to themselves, through the phantasm of *diversity*.

It is so.

The heaps, therefore, will necessarily appear to be similar and dissimilar to themselves, and to each other.

Entirely so.

Will they not also be the same and different from each other, and in contact with, and separate from, themselves, and moved with all possible motions, and every way abiding: likewise generated and corrupted, and neither of these, and all of this kind, which may be easily enumerated, if, though *The One is not, the many* have a subsistence?

All this is most true.

Jowett

But when you approach them, they appear to be many and different; and because of the appearance of the difference, different in kind from, and unlike, themselves?

True.

And so must the particles appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other.

Certainly.

And must they not be the same and yet different from one another, and in contact with themselves, although they are separated, and having every sort of motion, and every sort of rest, and becoming and being destroyed, and in neither state, and the like, all which things may be easily enumerated, if the one is not and the many are?

Most true.

Oxford Greek
9th

ἔτι δὴ ἅπαζ ἐλθόντες **πάλιν** ἐπὶ τὴν **ἀρχὴν** εἵπωμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τὰλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός, τί χρὴ εἶναι.

εἵπωμεν γάρ οὖν.

οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται τὰλλα.

πῶς γάρ;

οὐδὲ μὴν **πολλά** γε: ἓν γάρ **πολλοῖς** οὖσιν ἐνείη ἂν καὶ ἓν. εἰ γάρ μηδὲν **αὐτῶν** ἐστὶν ἓν, ἅπαντα οὐδὲν ἐστίν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν **πολλά** εἶη.

ἀληθῆ.

μὴ ἐνόητος δὲ ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὔτε **πολλά** οὔτε ἓν ἐστι τὰλλα.

οὐ γάρ.

Ballboas
9th

Parmenides: 27 Surely then , let us return again to **The Beginning** one more time ,
δη Ετι παλιν ελθοντες επι την αρχην απαξ ,
and relate what must then **be** , to **those other** than **The One** , if **One Is not** .
ειπωμεν , τι χρη δε ειναι , ταλλα του ενος , ει εν εστι μη .

Aristotle: Let us so relate . (γὰρ εἰπωμεν οὖν .)

Par: Is it **not** the case then , that on the one hand , **the others** will **not be one** .
ουκουν μεν ταλλα ουκ εσται εν .

Ari: How could they ? (πῶς γὰρ ;)

Par: **Nor** indeed will **they be many** ; for **one** would also **be present in many** .
ουδε μην γε πολλα : γαρ εν αν και ουσιν ενειη εν πολλοις .

For if **none** of **them are one** , then **all** of **them are nothing** ; so that **neither can many exist** .
γαρ ει μηδεν αυτων εστιν εν , απαντα εστιν ουδεν , ωστε ουδ' αν πολλα ειη .

Ari: True . (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: Then , by **One not being present in the others** , **neither are others many nor one** .
δε ενος μη ενοντος εν τοις αλλοις , ουτε εστι ταλλα πολλα ουτε εν .

Ari: They are not . (γὰρ οὐ .)

159b πάλιν
163b πάλιν
165e πάλιν

163b ἀρχὴν
165a ἀρχὴν
165e ἀρχὴν

165c πολλά
165d πολλά, πολλά
165e πολλά, πολλοῖς, πολλά, πολλά
166a πολλά
166b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

165b αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν
165d ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτοῦς, αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῦς, ἑαυτῶν
165e αὐτῶν
166b αὐτά, αὐτά
166c αὐτό, αὐτά

Loeb
9th

“Let us, then, go back once more to the beginning and tell the consequences, if the others exist and the one does not.”

“Let us do so.”

“Well, the others will not be one?”

“Of course not.”

“Nor will they be many for if they were many, one would be contained in them. And if none of them is one, they are all nothing, so that they cannot be many.”

“True.”

“If one is not contained in the others, the others are neither many nor one.”

“No.”

Thomas Taylor
9th

Once more, therefore, returning again to the beginning, let us relate what ought to happen to things different from *The One*, if *The One* is not.

Let us relate.

Does it not, therefore, follow that *others* are not *The One*?

How should it not be so?

Nor yet are they many; for, in *the many*, *The One* also would be inherent. For, if none of these is one, all are nothing; so that neither can there be many.

True.

The One, therefore, not being inherent in *others*, *others* are neither many nor one.

They are not.

Jowett
9th

Once more, let us go back to the beginning, and ask if the one is not, and the others of the one are, what will follow.

Let us ask that question.

In the first place, the others will not be one?

Impossible.

Nor will they be many; for if they were many one would be contained in them. But if no one of them is one, all of them are nought, and therefore they will not be many.

True.

If there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor one.

They are not.

οὐδέ γε φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ **πολλά**.

τί δή;

ὅτι τὰλλα τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ **οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς** οὐδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει,

οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ **μέρος** ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐδ' ἄρα **δόξα** τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστὶν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ **δοξάζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς** τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Balboas

Par: *Nor* will **they** indeed *appear to be one nor many* .

166A ουδε γε φαίνεται εν ουδε πολλά .

Ari: Why then ? (τι δη ;)

Par: Since **the others cannot in any way ever have any Communion** with **The Real Beings** ,

οτι ταλλα μη ουδαμη ουδαμως εχει ουδενι κοινωνιαν των οντων

nor can any Part of The Beings be Present with the **others** ; for **no Part exists** with **non-Beings** .

ουδε μη τι τω των οντων εστιν παρα των αλλων γαρ ουδεν μερος εστι μη τοις ουσιν .

Ari: True . (αληθη .)

Par: So then , **neither is there** any opinion about **that** which **is not present** in **others** , nor

αρα ουδ' εστιν δοξα του οντος μη παρα τοις αλλοις ουδε

any *phantasm* ; **nor can that** which **is not in any way whatsoever be** opined about **the others** .

τι φαντασμα , ουδε το ον μη ουδαμως ουδαμη δοξάζεται επι των αλλων .

Ari: It cannot . (γαρ ουν ου .)

165d πολλά, πολλά

165e πολλά, πολλοίς, πολλά, πολλά

166a πολλά

166b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

163e οὐδαμῇ

164b οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῇ

166a οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμῇ, οὐδαμῶς

153c μέρος, μέρος

153d μέρος, μέρος, μέρος, μέρος

166a μέρος

164d δόξαντος

165a δοξασθήσεται

166a δόξα, δοξάζεται

166b δοξάζεται, δοξάσαι, δοξάζεται

Loeb

“And they do not even appear to be one or many.”

“Why is that?”

“Because the others have no communion in any way whatsoever with anything which is non-existent, and nothing that is non-existent pertains to any of the others, for things that are non-existent have no parts.”

“True.”

“Nor is there any opinion or appearance of the non-existent in connection with the others, nor is the non-existent conceived of in any way whatsoever as related to the others.”

“No.”

Thomas Taylor

Nor will they appear either to be one or many.

Why not?

Because *others* cannot in any respect have any communication with things which are not, nor can any thing of non-beings be present with *others*; for no part subsists with non-beings.

True.

Neither, therefore, is there any opinion of that which is not, inherent in others, nor any phantasm; nor can that which is not become in any respect the subject of opinion to others.

It cannot.

Jowett

Nor do they appear either as one or many.

Why not?

Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort of not-being, nor can anything which is not, be connected with any of the others; for that which is not has no parts.

True.

Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connection with the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the others.

No.

ἐν ἅρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ **δοξάζεται** τι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εἶναι οὐδὲ **πολλά**: ἄνευ γὰρ ἐνὸς **πολλὰ** **δοξάσαι** ἀδύνατον.

ἀδύνατον γάρ.

ἐν ἅρα εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τὰλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε **δοξάζεται** ἐν οὐδὲ **πολλά**.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

οὐδ' ἅρα **ὅμοια** οὐδὲ **ἀνόμοια**.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ **αὐτά** γε οὐδ' **ἕτερα**, οὐδὲ **ἀπτόμενα** οὐδὲ **χωρίς**, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα **αὐτά**, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τὰλλα, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.

ἀληθῆ.

Par: Accordingly then , if **One Is not** , then **It cannot be** opined to **be any one**

166B ἀρα εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν μὴ , οὐδὲ δοξάζεται εἶναι τι ἐν
particular aspect of the others , nor yet of many ; for it is Impossible to form an opinion of many
τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ πολλά : γὰρ ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι πολλά
without Unity/One .
ἀνευ ἐνός .

Ari: It is impossible . (γὰρ ἀδύνατον .)

Par: Accordingly then , If **One Is not** , then **neither** will **the others exist** ;

ἀρα εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ μὴ , οὔτε τὰλλα ἐστὶν
nor can one , nor many , be opined .
οὔτε ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά δοξάζεται .

Ari: It is not likely . (οὐκ ἔοικεν .)

Par: Accordingly then , **neither** do **like nor unlike exist** .

ἀρα οὐδ' ὅμοια οὐδὲ ἀνόμοια .

Ari: They do not . (γὰρ οὐ .)

Par: Most certainly then , nor **the same** nor **the other** , nor those who grasp , nor those

γε μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἕτερα , οὐδὲ ἀπτομένα οὐδὲ
that are separate , nor others such as those we have before described in detail as having an
χωρὶς , οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα τοῖς αὐτὰ πρόσθεν ἐν διήλθομεν ὡς
appearance of existing ; for no particular of these will exist , nor will the others appear to be
φαινόμενα , οὔτε τι τούτων ἐστὶν οὔτε τὰλλα φαίνεται
if One Is not .
εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν μὴ .

Ari: True . (ἀληθῆ .)

165a δοξασθήσεται
166a δόξα, δοξάζεται
166b δοξάζεται, δοξάσαι, δοξάζεται

165e πολλά, πολλοίς, πολλά, πολλά
166a πολλά
166b πολλά, πολλά, πολλά

165c ἀνόμοια
165d ἀνόμοια, ἀνομοίους
166b ἀνόμοια

165c ὁμοιά, ὁμοια
165d ὁμοίους
166b ὅμοια

165d ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς, ἑαυτῶν

165e αὐτῶν
166b αὐτά, αὐτά
166c αὐτό, αὐτά

165b ἕτερα
165d ἕτερα, ἐτέρου, ἐτέρους
166b ἕτερα

162d ἀπτεται
165d ἀπτομένους
166b ἀπτόμενα

159c χωρίς, χωρίς
165d χωρίς
166b χωρίς

Loeb

“Then if one does not exist, none of the others will be conceived of as being one or as being many, either; for it is impossible to conceive of many without one.”

“True, it is impossible.”

“Then if one does not exist, the others neither are nor are conceived to be either one or many.”

“No so it seems.”

“Nor like nor unlike.”

“No.”

“Nor the same nor different, nor in contact nor separate, nor any of the other things which we were saying they appeared to be. The others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if the one does not exist.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, if it is not, cannot by opinion be conceived to be any certain one of others, nor yet many; for it is impossible to form an opinion of many without The One.

It is impossible.

If The One, therefore, is not, neither have others any subsistence; nor can The One or the many be conceived by opinion.

It does not appear that they can.

Neither, therefore, do similars nor dissimilars subsist.

They do not.

Nor *same nor different*, nor things in contact, nor such as are separate from each other, nor other things, such as we have already discussed, as appearing to subsist; for no particular of these will have any existence, nor will others appear to be, *if The One is not*.

True.

Jowett

Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor any of the others either as one or many; for you cannot conceive the many without the one.

You cannot.

Then if one is not, there is no conception of can be conceived to be either one or many?

It would seem not.

Nor as like or unlike?

No.

Nor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in any of those states which we enumerated as appearing to be;-the others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not?

True.

Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν καὶ **συλλήβδην** εἰ εἵπομεν, ἔν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἵπομεν;
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, **αὐτό** τε καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ
πρὸς **αὐτά** καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστὶ τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.
ἀληθέστατα.

Balboas

Par: Is it *not* the case then , if we must summarily say , that

166C ουκουν ει συλληβδην ειπομεν

if **One Is not** , and **nothing exists** ; then will our assertion **be Correctly** stated ?

ει εν εστιν μη , και ουδεν εστιν , αν ειπομεν ορθως ;

Ari: Altogether so .

πανταπασι μεν ουν .

Par: Now then , let this then be affirmed by you and me ; and we may add this also :

τοιυνν ειρησθω τε τουτο και

That if **One Is** , or **Is not** , then as it **is** likely/reasonable , both in relation to **The Self**

ειτ' εν εστιν ειτε εστιν μη , ως εοικεν , τε αυτο

and in relation to **the others** , and also in relation to **them-selves** and to **each other** ,

και ταλλα και προς αυτα και προς αλληλα

that **All exist** in every way , and also , **All** do not **exist** in every way ,

παντα εστι παντως τε και ουκ εστι

and **appear to be** , and also , **do not appear to be** .

και φαινεται τε και ου φαινεται .

Ari: Most true . (ἀληθεστατα .)

1 Aug 2006

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Completed with The Boetheia of All Our Friends

at The Noetic Society and The Parmenides Group ; such as Nancy Grimes, Nobuya Teraoka, Julie Postel, Jeff Stearn, Eldar Iz, Bradley Baumkirshner, Yoni Gileadi, Julie Hoigaard, Brian Miller, Jeff Lowe, Josh Bean, Oralia Balboa, Robin Russell, Ingmar Northcutt, Kevin Gray, Alex Dei, Jeff Terrill, and Our Beloved Friend and Leader and Spiritual-Guide, Pierre Grimes

142c συλλήβδην

166c συλλήβδην

165e αὐτῶν

166b αὐτά, αὐτά

166c αὐτό, αὐτά

Loeb

“Then if we were to say in a word, 'if the one is not, nothing is,' should we be right?”

“Most assuredly.”

“Then let us say that, and we may add, as it appears, that whether the one is or is not, the one and the others in relation to themselves and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and do not appear.”

“Very true.”

Thomas Taylor

If we should, therefore, summarily say, that *if The One is not, nothing is*, will not our assertion be right?

Entirely so.

Let this then be asserted by us, and this also: that whether *The One is* or *is not*, both itself, as it appears, and others, both with respect to themselves and to each other, are entirely all things, and at the same time are not all, and appear to be, and at the same time do not appear.

It is most true.

Jowett

Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is?

Certainly.

Let thus much be said; and further let us affirm what seems to be the truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not to be.

Most true.

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
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